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ABSTRACT 
The island states of Oceania enjoyed re111arkable success in collective diplomacy in the 1980s 
and early 1990s. In this time, their co-operative efforts achieved wide-ranging success in 
111ultilateral negotiations with the global co111munity. This was especially the case in relation to 
the conservation and 111anagement of the region's fisheries resources. The island states 
collectively achieved significant multilateral instruments in this area. Beginning in the late 
1990s, collective diplomacy becaine less effective in the fisheries sector, as evidenced by 
develop111ents associated with the negotiations for the Convention for the Conservation and 
Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific (WCPF 
Convention). The rise in effectiveness of collective diplomacy appeared to occur at a ti111e when 
the power of small states was in question; and decline when it might be expected they could 
maintain mo111entum. 
This thesis seeks both to establish this rise and decline in the effectiveness of collective 
dipl0111acy and to offer an explanation for this unexpected change. 
To gain an understanding of the explanations associated with this rise and decline, the 
thesis looks at the interplay between global developments and regional developments. In 
particular, in the period characterised by rising effectiveness, explanations include strong 
indigenous leadership, the region's Cold War climate, the regional co-operation between the 
Oceanic states, the unity of the region at 111ultilateral negotiations, the preparedness of external 
powers to support regional initiatives and changing global environmental norms. Alternatively, 
during the period of declining effectiveness, explanations include the end of the Cold War and 
the pre-e111inence of the neo-liberal agenda, the region ' s leadership, the level of cohesion and 
unity within the Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA), the role of external forces , national interests 
and changes in the global tuna economy. 
The thesis argues that unity among seemingly disparate, isolated s111all 
states/microstates brings with it a capacity to defy those who dis111iss the region's power in its 
dealings with the global co111n1unity. While only one factor among several, nevertheless unity 
can play a pivotal role in achieving outcomes. Overcon1ing national interests and competing 
de111ands is not an easy task in an enviro1unent of increasingly stringent economic resources. If 
the region is to 111eet head-on the challenges associated with globalisation, then unity must be 
their objective. 
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GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS AND TERMS 
ACP 
ADB 
Fish Stocks Agreement 
AOSIS 
APEC 
Apia Convention 
Arabushi 
ASEAN 
ATA 
CARICOM 
CARIFTA 
CCAMLR 
CCSBT 
CMT 
COFI 
CRGA 
Driftnet Fishing 
Convention 
DWFNS 
BEZ 
ENSO 
EU 
FADS 
FAO 
FEMM 
FFA 
FFC 
FIC 
GRT 
IATTC 
ICCAT 
IMF 
IOTC 
IWC 
Asian, Caribbean, and Pacific 
Asian Develop1nent Bank 
Agreement for the Implementation of the Provision of the United 
Nationals Convention on the Law of the Sea Relating to the 
Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly 
Migratory Fish Stocks (also known as The United Nations 
In1plementing Agreement, or the UNIA) 
Alliance of Small Island States 
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (forun1) 
Convention on Conservation of Nature in the South Pacific (1986) 
Sen1i-processed form of katsuobushi. The tuna is loined and 
Trimmed, then laid on trays for smoking (Ashenden and Kitson 
1987: 238). 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
A1nerican Tunaboat Association. Now known as the United States 
Tuna Foundation 
Caribbean Co1nmunity and Co1n1non Market (formerly Caribbean 
Free Trade Association) 
Caribbean Free Trade Association 
Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living 
Resources 
Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna (also 
Convention for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna) 
Customary Marine Tenure 
Committee on Fisheries (FAO) 
Comn1ittee of Representatives of Governments and Administrators 
(Secretariat of the Pacific Com1nunity) 
Convention for the Prohibition of Fishing with Long Driftnets in the 
South Pacific Ocean (1989) 
Distant Water Fishing Nations (also known as fishing states) 
Exclusive Econo1nic Zone 
El Nifio-Southen1 Oscillation 
European Union (formerly European Community, or 'EC ' ) 
Fish Aggregation Devices 
United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation 
Forum Economic Ministers Meetings 
South Pacific Foru1n Fisheries Agency 
South Pacific Forum Fisheries C01mnittee 
Forum Island Countries 
Gross Registered Tonnes 
Inter-American Tropical Tuna Co1nmission 
International Co1nmission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas 
(also International Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic 
Tunas) 
International Monetary Fund 
Indian Ocean Tuna Commission 
International Whaling Conunission 
Vlll 
JACADS 
Katsuobushi 
Katsuwonus pelamis 
LAFTA 
Longline fishing 
Magnuson Act 
MCS 
MSY 
Melanesia 
MHLC 
Micronesia 
MSG 
MTC 
Multilateral Fisheries 
Treaty 
NATO 
OFP 
PAFCO 
PFL 
PIPA 
PNA 
Pole and line fishing 
Polynesia 
Purse seine fishing 
Republic of Korea 
sashimi 
SBT 
Johnston Atoll Chemical Agent Destruction System 
Flaked tuna which is used in soup. The skipjack are cleaned, gutted 
and beheaded, then boiled and boned. The fish is then dried in sheds 
and smoked for several weeks (Peattie 1988: 139). 
Skipjack 
Latin American Free Trade Association 
A mainline, measuring as much as 130 kilometres in length, to which 
branchlines with baited hooks are attached. By attaching buoys to 
the mainline, a series of catenaries ( also known as baskets) are 
formed. The longline can go as deep as 300 metres (Campbell and 
Nicholl 1994: 89). 
Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act (1976) 
Monitoring, Control and Surveillance 
Maximum Sustainable Yield 
Regional grouping of Oceanic states/territories which includes New 
Caledonia, Vanuatu, Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea. Fiji 
is aligned with Melanesia, as well as being historically and culturally 
linked to Polynesia. 
Multilateral-High Level Conference on the Conservation and 
Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and 
Central Pacific 
Regional grouping of Oceanic states/territories which includes 
Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, Palau, the Federated States of 
Micronesia, Marshall Islands, Nauru and Kiribati 
Melanesian Spearhead Group 
Minimum Terms and Conditions 
Treaty on Fisheries Betvveen the Governments of Certain Pacific 
Island States and the Government of the United States of America 
(1987). Also known as the U.S. Multilateral Treaty. 
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
Oceanic Fisheries Program, Pacific Community 
Pacific Fishing Company Ltd, Fiji 
Pacific Forum Line 
Pacific Island Producers Association 
Parties to the Nauru Agreement (Nauru Agreement Concerning Co-
operation in the Management of Fisheries of Common Interest) 
Bamboo poles, unbaited barbless hooks and live bait are used. When 
tuna are sighted, the live bait is released and water is sprayed on the 
surface (V eitayaki 1994: 3 8). 
Regional grouping of Oceanic states/territories which includes the 
Cook Islands, Tonga, Samoa, American Samoa, Tuvalu, French 
Polynesia, Wallis and Futuna, Tokelau and Niue. Fiji has historical 
and cultural Polynesian ties, but is also aligned with Melanesia. 
A seine is a "wall of webbing used to encircle fish" (Veitayaki 1994: 
41). 
also referred to as ' South Korea' or simply 'Korea ' 
Raw fish 
Southern Bluefin Tuna 
lX 
SCTB 
SIDS 
SOPAC 
SPAR 
SPARTECA 
SPC 
SPEC 
SPNFZ 
SPOCC 
SPREP 
SPREP Convention 
STL 
TAC 
Tarawa Declaration 
The Forum 
Thunnus alalunga 
Thunnus albacares 
Thunnus obesus 
UNCED 
UNCLOS 
UNIA (the Fish Stocks 
Agree1nent) 
USP 
U.S. Multilateral Treaty 
WCPO 
WCPF Convention 
Wellington Convention 
VMS 
Standing Com1nittee on Tuna and Billfish, Secretariat of the Pacific 
Community) 
Small island developing states 
South Pacific Applied Geoscience Co1nmission 
South Pacific Albacore Research Group 
South Pacific Regional Trade and Economic Cooperation 
Pacific Community (formerly South Pacific Commission) 
South Pacific Bureau for Economic Cooperation 
South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (1985) 
South Pacific Organizations Coordinating Committee 
South Pacific Regional Enviromnent Programme 
Convention for the Protection of the National Resources and 
Environment of the South Pacific Region (1986) 
Solomon Taiyo Ltd 
Total Allowable Catch 
Ban on driftnet fishing, and 111anagement regime for albacore tuna, 
adopted by the Forum in 1989 
Pacific Islands Forum (formerly South Pacific Foru1n) 
Albacore 
Yellowfin 
Bigeye 
United Nations Conference on the Environment and Development 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
Agreement for the Implementation of the Provision of the United 
Nationals Convention on the Law of the Sea Relating to the 
Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly 
Migratory Fish Stocks (also known as The United Nations 
Iinple1nenting Agreement) 
University of the South Pacific 
Treaty on Fisheries Between the Governments of Certain Pacific 
Island States and the Government of the United States of America 
(1987), also known as the Multilateral Fisheries Treaty 
Western and Central Pacific Ocean 
Convention for the Conservation and Management of Highly 
Migrat01y Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific 
Convention/or the Prohibition of Fishing with Long Driftnets in the 
South Pacific, (1991) · 
Vessel Monitoring Syste1n 
X 
Figure Intro.1 
The Statesff erritories of the SPC Region, including 
Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) 
Source: Secretariat of the Pacific Community, 2002. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This thesis exainines the effectiveness of some of world's sn1allest states in confronting s0111e of 
the world's most powerful in relation to their most prized shared resource, tuna. Since the late 
1970s the s111all post-colonial states of Oceania1 have engaged in collective diplo111acy2 ai111ed at 
controlling the activities of powerful states affecting their region. They have jointly opposed 
French nuclear testing, French colonialis1n, Japanese Goven1111ent plans to dun1p low-level 
nuclear waste in the Pacific Ocean, north of the Ogasawara Islands, and United States' plans to 
store waste chemical weapons in concrete igloos on Jolu1ston Island. They have also engaged in 
collective diplomacy to gain better tern1s for trade and aid with the European Con1111unity, 
Australia and other donors. Their most sustained efforts at collective diplomacy have been 
focused on controlling the practices of the powerful fishing states seeking to exploit their shared 
fishing resource. They have pursued this through the Forum Fisheries Agency (FF A) over 
several decades of n1ultilateral negotiations. 
The Oceanic 1ne111bership of the FF A attaches great importance and value to their tuna 
fisheries as a 111ajor natural resource of the region. For exainple, the tuna fishery represents 70 
per cent of Samoa's export earnings, 60 per cent of the Federated States of Micronesia's exp01i 
ean1ings, 40 per cent of Tuvalu's export earnings and 30 per cent of Solomon Islands' export 
earnings (Aqorau 1998: 12). Fishing states also attach great importance and value to Oceania's 
tuna resource. For exainple, Oceania provides 30 per cent percent of Japan's sashimi3 111arket 
(Australian Depart111ent of Foreign Affairs and Trade [DFAT] 2000). Purse seine4 tuna fleets 
harvest approximately 774,000 tonnes per annun1 in the Westen1 and Central Pacific Ocean 
(WCPO) region, with between 70-75 per cent of this catch caught in the Exclusive Econo111ic 
Zone (EEZ) of Oceanic states, 111aking the global caiu1ed tuna industry highly dependent upon 
the region's tuna resource (FFA 1998: 89). 
For more than two decades, Oceania's tuna industry has benefited from and been 
strengthened by the effectiveness of collective dipl0111acy. Over this time, the FFA men1bership 
in1plen1ented EEZ conservation and 111anage1nent 1neasures for the region ' s tuna fishery in spite 
2 
3 
4 
For the purposes of this thesis, Oceania does not include Australia or New Zealand. In line with the 
Secretariat of the Pacific Community's (SPC) geographical boundaries of the region, Oceania's twenty-two 
island states and territories extends from Papua New Guinea to the west, north to the Commonwealth of the 
Northern Mariana Islands and south-east to Pitcairn Island. While Oceania includes 7,500 islands spread 
over thirty million square kilometres, only 500 islands are inhabited, occupying 2 per cent of the total land 
and sea area. Online< http ://w,vw.spc.org.nc date accessed 20.3.2001. See Figure 1.1 on page 1 a of the 
Introduction. 
' Collective diplomacy ' is a term coined by Greg Fry in his (1994) article "International Cooperation in the 
South Pacific: From Regional Integration to Collective Diplomacy". 
Raw tuna is known as sashimi. Appendix B provides a more detailed look at sashim.i. 
Purse seine is a method of tuna extraction. It" involves placing a net around a school of fish and closing the 
net at the base" (Veitayaki 1995: 41 ). See Appendix B for more detail on purse seine and other tuna 
harvesting methods. 
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of opposition by big and powerful fishing states.5 This outcome is puzzling, given that it 1night 
be expected that s1nall states are powerless in their relations with strong states, particularly over 
control of a resource as i1nportant as fish. 6 After two decades of cu1nulative success, however, 
the ability of the FF A men1bership to achieve the objectives of collective diplomacy appears to 
be in decline. This again is puzzling, given that after two successful decades it lnight be 
expected that collective diplo1nacy would continue to be effective. 
These puzzles lead to the central question guiding this thesis: why has the effectiveness 
of collective diplon1acy risen when we would expect failure, and declined when we would 
expect success? There are 1nany secondary questions which this thesis will examine that flow 
fro1n this central question. For exainple, in considering the strong indigenous leaders who 
emerged during Oceania's decolonising period, the question arises as to the extent to which 
leadership can affect the outcome of collective diplomacy. Further questions are: How much 
influence do Australia and New Zealand enjoy? Are there other external factors, both positive 
and negative, that exert influence on the outcomes of collective endeavours? Does the level of 
regional cohesion affect the outco1nes? How important are national interests? 
By 'collective diplo1nacy' I simply mean the joint efforts of states to engage in 
diplo1nacy with others external to the group aimed at pro1noting their shared interests. In this 
case the states are all from one region; thus they represent a regional interest, and their 
collective diplo1nacy can be seen as a form of regional co-operation. Collective diplo1nacy may 
be focused on influencing one powerful actor such as when the South Pacific Foru1n seeks to 
influence the European Community on econo1nic assistance policy or France on nuclear testing, 
or it may be concen1ed with putting up a joint position in 1nultilateral forun1s, such as in the 
Multilateral High Level Conference on the Conservation and Managen1ent of Highly Migratory 
Fish Stocks in Westen1 and Central Pacific (MHLC) or at the negotiations to conclude the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).7 Collective diplomacy 111ay also 
be involved when the Oceanic states seek to set up their own multilateral arrange1nents 
goven1ing global actors, such as the finalisation of various regional and sub-regional regulatory 
regin1es on tuna fishing in the region. 8 
In evaluating the effectiveness of collective diplomacy in relation to the fisheries 
resource the thesis will judge these joint efforts against the objectives that Pacific leaders have 
clai1ned for this activity. There are four particular objectives: the tuna fishery's sustainability; 
5 
6 
7 
8 
Chapter Three provides a complete discussion of the FFA's regional and sub-regional conservation and 
management arrangements. 
The realist theoretical school believes that a hegemonic balance of power provides influence and leadership 
in the international system. Under this system, small, militarily weak states accept the security offered by 
powerful states or a hegemonic power (see, for example, Keohane 1986). 
Throughout this thesis, UNCLOS is used to denote that Convention, rather than CLOS, or LOS. 
I am grateful to Greg Fry, Director of Studies, Graduate Studies in International Affairs, Australian 
National University, for his analysis of collective diplomacy (personal communication 31.7.02). 
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fair return to the region fro1n fishing states; do1nestication of the tuna industry; and indigenous 
control of the tuna industry. 
One interpretation of the 1neaning of 'sustainability' links it to ecology, " ... ( esp. of 
develop1nent) which conserves an ecological balance by avoiding depletion of natural resources 
... that can be sustained" (The Australian Concise Oxford Dictionary 1997). Sustainability was 
a crucial aspect of the region's pre-colonial 1narine exploitation, given Oceania's predisposition 
to droughts, cyclones and tsunami (McDaniel and Gowdy 2000). In pre-colonial tin1es, 
judicious 111ethods goven1ed extraction of terrestrial and marine resources, giving the island 
comn1unities a conservation and managen1ent ethic that has underpinned, for the most part, their 
attitude towards resource exploitation. Family, village or chiefly syste1ns governed these 
111ethods and ensured long-tenn food security in a region made vulnerable by clitnatic 
conditions. Conservation and 111anagement ethics included: closed areas; closed seasons; setting 
free a portion of the catch; holding excess catch in enclosures; bam1ing the catch of small fish; 
restricting inland lagoon fishing, taking sea birds and/or their eggs; turtle egg bans; taking 
turtles on the beach, taking their eggs and frequenting favourite spots on turtle nesting beaches 
(Johannes 1978: 353). These ethics underpinned a custodial attitude towards marine resource 
sustainability (Ruddle 1989b: 71). Sustainability of marine resources was a central component 
in the establish111ent of the FFA.9 
The Oceanic states also de111and a fair retun1 to the region fro111 fishing states extracting 
the resource. Durit1g the pre-colonial era, marine resources were controlled at the co111munity 
level. By employing judicious 111easures, a fair return to the com111unity's 111embers was ensured. 
While this was not perceived in monetary ten11s, the community's needs were 111et through the 
sustainable exploitation of marine resources. In conte111porary times, negotiating a fair retun1 is 
a focal point of the region's bilateral and 111ultilateral fisheries access arrangements. For 
exmnple, during 1999, the Oceanic states received approxi111ately US$60.3 111illion in license 
fees (FF A 2000).10 This represents a 402 per cent increase in license fees fro111 the $15 million 
reported in 1983 (Clarke in FF A 2000). Through the establishtnent of sub-regional groupings, 
like the Parties to the Nauru Group (PNA), the region has worked collectively to strengthen 
conservation and manage111ent 1neasures and in doing so, increased the level of return. 
In pre-colonial ti111es the tuna resource was d0111esticated. Customary control by 
co111111unities, chiefs or fmnilies extended outwards to the reefs and seawards (Ruddle 1989b: 
71 ). In contemporary times, the region aims to increase the levels of domestication of the tuna 
industry, which has pri111arily been controlled by fishing states. The finalisation of regional 
instru111ents such as The Federated States of Micronesia Arrangement for Regional Fisheries 
Access (the FSM Arrangement) has helped to encourage the develop111ent of a local tuna 
9 See comments made by Sir Michael Somare, Prime Minister of Papua New Guinea, when presenting a 
paper in support of the establishment of a regional fisheries organisation at the Seventh South Pacific 
Forum, 26-28 July 1976. 
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industry (see Aqorau and Bergin 1997b). 
In contemporary tin1es, the region strives for indigenous control of the tuna industry. 
Again, in pre-colonial ti1nes, marine resources were controlled through fan1ilies , chiefs or 
c01nn1unities. Judicious indigenous control was essential to a group of island c01nn1unities 
which received up to 90% of their animal protein fr01n fish (Johannes 1978: 350). A rationale 
behind the e1nergence of the South Pacific Forum and collective diplo1nacy was the indigenous 
control of economic and political develop1nents (see Fry 1994). Through the finalisation of 
various 1nultilateral instru1nents, the FF A has atten1pted to achieve that goal. 
The judgement concerning the degree of effectiveness of collective diplo1nacy in 
achieving these objectives will primarily be 111ade on the basis of an analysis of multilateral 
treaty outco1nes. The collective diplo1nacy of the Oceanic states has 1nainly taken place in a 
1nultilateral context. It has generally involved the negotiation of treaty provisions in relation to a 
significant nu1nber of usually very powerful states such as the United States, Japan, China and 
France. The focus of the analysis thus bec01nes the negotiation and outcomes of the various 
fisheries treaties of the 1980s and 1990s culminating in the various rounds of the MHLC 
negotiations. Of course it is not sufficient si1nply to note the achieven1ent of a treaty 
con1mitinent consistent with the objectives of the ai1ns of Oceanic collective diplon1acy. Part of 
that analysis necessarily involves determining whether collective diplo1nacy on the part of the 
Oceanic states produced this successful outcome, or whether this was due to other factors, for 
exainple, the Chair's independent action, or whether a powerful state, such as the United States 
was supportive of the FF A ' s efforts. In other words, how do we know that collective diplomacy 
111ade a difference? The analysis is also necessarily concerned with an evaluation of whether the 
achieved treaty commit1nent translates to a policy change on the ground, particularly in relation 
to the activities of fishing states. 
In turning to the question of how we should understand the change in the level of 
effectiveness of Oceanic collective diplon1acy in the fisheries sector I propose to consider 
several contributing factors. The first concerns the level of cohesion and strength of leadership 
in the regional institution responsible for collective fisheries diplo1nacy in this region, the FF A. 
Second, there is the question of the global and Asia/Pacific strategic context within which the 
region ' s tuna econo1ny operates and the global/ Asia/Pacific political economy of the tuna 
industry. Third, there is the changing global regimes/inten1ational law context, for exainple, the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UN CLOS) or the MHLC process. Fourthly, 
there are the various factors in the conference roo1n on the day affecting how the politics of the 
negotiations are played out, such as agenda setting and the role of the Chair within a process 
such as the MHLC. Finally, there is the changing econ01nic dependence of the Oceanic states. 
10 This compares to the value of the landed fish, which was approximately US$ 1.9 billion (FFA 2000). 
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Despite the importance of this industry, the only 1naJor work on the politics of 
Oceania's tuna economy was written in 1980 (Kent). As this was only a year after the region 
established the FFA, Kent was not able to evaluate the organisation's ability to achieve its 
objectives. Another study, an edited two-volume work by Doulman (1987a, 1987b), provides 
individual contributions on 1nany aspects of the region's tuna industry, but these contributions 
are a co1npilation of separate issues which are not integrated and analysed from the perspective 
of the effectiveness of the collective efforts of Pacific states. 11 There have also been significant 
journal collections by individual observers or in collaboration. For exainple, Bergin (1988, 
1993, 1994a, 1994b, 1997), Aqorau (2000a, 2000b, 2002), Aqorau and Bergin (1997a, 1997b, 
1998), Aqorau and Lili ( 1993 ). Apart fro1n these sources, the lack of interest is puzzling, given 
the i1nportance of Oceania's tuna industry to the region and to the global tuna economy. This 
1nay be a reflection of the fact that there has not as yet been the den1ise of a co1n1nercially 
i1nportant fishery in the region as in the crisis of Canada's Grand Banks cod stocks in 1994.12 
As this thesis focuses on the politics of multilateral negotiations and treaty-making this 
i1nposes son1e obvious liinitations on the analysis, particularly in relation to the more recent 
ongoing negotiations that re1nain politically sensitive. These 1nultilateral negotiations take place 
in-cainera, and the politics of 1nultilateral negotiations and treaty-making 1nake it difficult to 
access restricted information after the event. Therefore, some of the 1naterial is anonymously 
sourced fron1 interviews with officials, and reports from people attending regional n1eetings 
needs to be treated confidentially. Access was granted to archive 1naterial fro1n regional 
organisations, such as the FFA and the Australian Departn1ent of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
(DF AT); as well as interviews with officials from national goven1ments, regional and 
inten1ational fisheries organisations and the tuna industry. 
An observer at the negotiations fr01n MHLC3 onwards, Dr Sandra Tarte of the 
University of the South Pacific, wrote reports on each of the negotiating rounds MHLC3-7. 
Tarte was also an observer at the Forum Fisheries C01nmittee (FFC) meetings held around the 
MHLC negotiations. As the MHLC and FFC 1neetings were closed to outsiders, Chapters Six 
and Seven benefit fron1 Tarte's observations. Further docu1nentary evidence in relation to the 
II 
12 
Apart from the works by Kent and Doulman, there has been other major work undertaken in relation to 
aspects of Oceania's tuna fishery. For example Aqorau's (1998) PhD thesis examines the legal implications 
for the region of various multilateral fisheries instruments, including the Fish Stocks Agreement; Campbell 
et al' s (1989) compilation of papers from a conference on the economics of fisheries management in 
Oceania; Campbell and Owen 's (1994) edited work on Papua New Guinea's tuna industry with general 
articles of relevance to the region; Doulman 's 1984 PhD thesis on Papua New Guinea's fisheries sector; 
Herr 's (1989) work on the FFA and its operations; Jack's (2001) Masters of International Law thesis on the 
WCPF Convention, (The Convention for the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish 
Stocks in the Central and Western Pacific) ; Lodge 's (1996) Master of Science thesis on the Review of the 
Palau Arrangement; Sutherland's (1985) Masters of International Law thesis on Oceanic regional fisheries 
co-operation; Sutherland and Tsamenyi 's (1992) legal perspective on fisheries co-operation in Oceania; and 
Tarte's (1998a) work on Japan's fisheries aid policies in Oceania. There are two books written on the 
national fishing industries of two Oceanic states. These are Teiwaki 's (1988) work on Kiribati and 
Veitayaki 's (1995) work on Fiji. 
For a history of cod fishing, see Kurlansky (1999). 
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negotiations is provided by the official reports of each of the negotiating rounds as well as FFC 
reports. Me1nbers of the Asian fishing state delegations were not prepared to be interviewed. As 
the negotiations to conclude fisheries conservation and management 1neasures for the WCPO 
were sensitive, these decisions were respected. However, any future research on this subject 
should strive to obtain the perspectives of the Asian fishing states. This will enable a 
co1nparative analysis of the concen1s and issues of all parties with an interest in the WCPO's 
tuna resource. 
The approach followed for fieldwork interviews differed, depending on who was being 
interviewed. Two types of approach were taken because in evaluating the effectiveness of 
collective diplo1nacy, the perceptions of the influence of various external factors and national 
interests, vary between states and individuals. A structured style was used to interview 
Australian or New Zealand govern1nent, non-govern1nent or industry officials, with a series of 
questions designed to elicit a focused account and analysis of a particular 111eeting or process. 
Many of these interviews were frank; though several officials and organisations requested 
anony1nity or edited their quotes when provided with relevant extracts from the thesis. 
Interviews with indigenous fisheries officials were more open-ended. This was a 
deliberate strategy and reflected cultural sensitivities in the interviews with Oceanic officials. 
The interviews commenced with the writer setting out an overview of the subject matter, linking 
it to the conte1nporary concen1s of the region. The official was then given time to consider the 
overview and evaluate those concerns to the region. During this time, I re1nained quiet, allowing 
the official to fonnulate a considered judge1nent. After having done so, the official responded 
with perceptions, ideas and analysis of the subject. On so1ne occasions, Oceanic officials were 
prepared to criticise specific national governments, but generally this occurred when others had 
aired those criticisms publicly. 
The thesis is organised fro1n Chapter Three as a chronological development of the 
collective diplo1nacy of Oceanic states in relation to a series of multilateral instruments, with 
Chapters One and Two providing necessary theoretical context and historical background. 
Chapter One locates the thesis within the literature on regional co-operation at the global and 
regional levels. Chapter Two provides a survey of Oceania' s pre-colonial and colonial 
experiences as well as examining the early history of tuna fishing by the major fleets in the 
region. 
Chapter Three explores the negotiations to conclude the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS, 1982) and the participation of the independent Oceanic states. 
The Chapter illustrates that through these negotiations the region proclaimed EEZs over 200-
nautical 1niles and committed itself to the establishment of the FF A. Furthermore, to protect the 
interests of the Oceanic states against the demands of the fishing states, when the FFA was 
established, it c01nprised (and still comprises) only the region's independent states, as well as 
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Australia and New Zealand. Hence, the FFA is not considered an Article 64 (UNCLOS) 
organisation, as that regime calls for co-operative fisheries manage111ent and conservation 
between interested coastal and fishing states. The Chapter argues that the range of regional and 
sub-regional arrangements imple111ented by the FF A demonstrates so111e effectiveness in 
collective diplo111acy. This is indicated by the acquiescence (albeit reluctantly) of fishing states 
to abide by those conservation and manage111ent measures. 
The expansion of the purse seine industry and with it, the e111ergence in 1980 of the 
United States as a regional fishing power, changed the dynan1ics of the industry. The United 
States fleet's defiance of the UN CLOS led to confrontation in the region, which lasted until the 
Treaty on Fisheries between the Governments of Certain Pacific Island States and the 
Government of the United States (Multilateral Fisheries Treaty) was concluded in 1987. That 
Treaty was finalised to govern the fishing activities of the United States' fleet. The Multilateral 
Fisheries Treaty has had a profound effect on the region's atte111pts to rehabilitate the poor 
operating standards of the 111ajor fishing states, thereby strengthening the resource's 
sustainability, demonstrating the effectiveness of collective diplo111acy. The Treaty has also 
facilitated a fairer retun1 to the region for its tuna, an objective of collective diplomacy. 
Chapter Four continues the chronological study of the activities of fishing states in the 
region, as well as exainining joint ventures and the do111estic tuna industry between the 1980s 
and the 111id-1990s. Fro111 the 1980s, the tuna industry concentrated on three main extraction 
111ethods: purse seine; longline and pole-and-line. Specific tunas were targetted using these 
111ethods. For exan1ple, the four con1111ercially important species of skipjack (Katsuwonus 
pelamis), albacore (Thunnus alalunga), yellowfin (Thunnus albacares) and bigeye (Thunnus 
obesus).13 The Chapter demonstrates the importance of the region's tuna industry to the global 
tuna econon1y, both for fresh or frozen tuna and the cam1ed tuna industry between 1980 and the 
111id-1990s. In so doing, the Chapter illustrates how foreign fleets have 111aintained their control 
of the region's tuna industry, thus undem1ining indigenous attempts at domestication or control 
during this period. While there were joint ventures, these favoured the foreign partners and were 
not as successful as would have been expected, given the rich tuna stocks in the region. 
The developn1ent of joint ventures and d0111estic tuna industries has been encouraged at 
the regional level, through the FF A, which receives support through a variety of sources, such as 
the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation (PAO), United Nations Development 
Programme and other donors. Therefore, donor funding, regional objectives and ·the 
developn1ent efforts of joint ventures and domestic tuna industries are linked and de111onstrate 
an important aspect of the role and effectiveness of collective fisheries diplo111acy. 
Chapter Five exainines the role played by the Oceanic states at the negotiations to 
conclude the Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations 
13 These various extraction methods and tuna species are discussed in Appendix B. 
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Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and 
Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks.14 After the UNCLOS 
was finalised, fishing states moved their operations to the high seas to circumvent conservation 
and management measures put in place by coastal states, as well as to avoid paying fishing 
access fees. This created pressure on straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks and 
resulted in armed conflict over Grand Banks ground-fish stocks between Canada and Spain in 
1995.15 Because of the shortcomings of the UNCLOS regarding straddling and highly migratory 
stocks, the Fish Stocks Agreement was concluded to govern high seas fishing activities. The 
Chapter analyses the i1nportance of that Agreement to the WCPO, but de1nonstrates how, in 
supporting the Agreement' s finalisation, that it becaine a double-edged sword. On the one hand, 
the Fish Stocks Agree1nent protected those high seas areas adjacent to EEZs in the WCPO. On 
the other hand, however, the region's support for that Agreement indicated a willingness to 
enter into s01ne f on11 of co-operative arrangement with fishing states for the conservation and 
1nanagement of highly 111igratory fish stocks, such as tuna. 
This willingness resulted in the FF A staging a meeting between fishing and F arum 
Fisheries Con1111ittee (FFC) states, 16 known as the Multilateral High-Level Conference on South 
Pacific Tuna Fisheries (MHLC).17 Chapter Five also exainines the first two negotiating rounds 
(MHLC 1 and MHLC2) and the willingness of both fishing and FFC states to adopt, with 
acclaim, the Majuro Declaration. The conservation and management prescriptions of the Fish 
Stocks Agreement were incorporated into the Majuro Declaration. This outcome demonstrated 
the effectiveness of collective diplomacy, because fishing states were willing to take on board 
the conservation and management measures of the Fish Stocks Agreement contained within that 
Declaration. That they did so appears mischievous, given their disruptive attitudes towards 
supporting these 1neasures at subsequent MHLC negotiating rounds. 
Chapter Six exainines the MHLC3 and the MHLC4 negotiations as well as fishing state 
operations, joint ventures and the do1nestic tuna industry since the mid- l 990s. It is demonstrated 
that at the MHLC3 and the MHLC4, the FFC bloc maintained the momentum it had gained 
during the Fish Stocks negotiations and in finalising the Majuro Declaration. This momentum 
resulted in a draft negotiating text for the Convention on the Conservation and Management of 
Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific (WCPF Convention) at the 
end of the MHLC4 negotiations. The draft WCPF Convention reflected the region 's 
14 
15 
16 
17 
Referred to in this thesis as the Fish Stocks Agreement (or Fish Stocks negotiations). Also known as the 
UNIA (the United Nations Implementing Arrangement). 
Day 1995, Munro 1995, O'Reilly Hinds 1995, Roughgarden and Smith 1996 among others, provide useful 
discussions on the Grand Banks controversy. 
The Forum Fisheries Committee (FFC) comprises all member states of the FF A. It meets yearly, or more 
frequently, as needs arise. It met regularly both immediately before and during the MHLC negotiating 
rounds. 
The six subsequent negotiating rounds were knovm as The Multilateral High-Level Conference on the 
Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific (also 
known as the MHLC). 
8 
Introduction 
conservation and 1nanagement concerns. This positive result was due to: the FFC Chair's 
leadership abilities; the willingness by the Oceanic states to support the regional good over 
national interests; the co-operative stance taken by the FFC bloc; the Conference Chair' s 
willingness to take on board the region's concen1s; as well as a lack of unified action by the 
fishing states. 
In the Chapter's analysis of fishing state operations, it is argued that new players to the 
region, such as Spain, will be no more of an advocate of don1esticating the tuna industry than 
those traditional fishing states operating in the region. As regards joint ventures and the 
do1nestic tuna industry, it see1ns that little progress has been made for several reasons; including 
the difficult economic climate of the global tuna economy. Once more, during a period 
highlighted by achieving some objectives of collective diplomacy, this analysis demonstrates 
that 1neeting smne of these objectives did not result in other objectives being reached, such as 
domestication. 
Chapter Seven examines the last three negotiating rounds, the MHLC5, the MHLC6 and 
the MHLC7. The Chapter also contains an evaluation of the new Convention, a discussion on 
the role of fishing states and an overview of the interim regi1ne. For a variety of reasons 
explored in this Chapter, it is argued that the FFC bloc's unity was undermined at the MHLC 5 
and the MHLC6. Some reasons include: poor FFC leadership; animosity between individuals 
from different FFC states and the FF A Secretariat; the determination of members of the Parties 
to the Nauru Agreement (PNA) to speak out individually on issues of specific relevance to 
the1n; the ability of fishing state delegations to nurture divisions within the FFC bloc; and a 
greater willingness by the Conference Chair to accede to the demands of the fishing states. By 
the MHLC7 negotiating round, the region could not afford to give way on any of the draft 
articles. The Chapter shows, however, that at the MHLC7 negotiations, the Oceanic states were 
persuaded by Australia' s FFC Conference Chair, as well as members of Australia' s delegation, 
New Zealand and the United States to accept a chambered voting system that may be to their 
detriment at the yet-to-be-established WCPF Commission' s negotiating table. 
The Chapter concludes that the resulting WCPF Convention suggests a lessening in the 
effectiveness of Oceanic collective diplomacy. Some provisions appear to go against the 
region ' s objectives, for example, transshipment, the observer program, and the precautionary 
approach. It is important to remember that funding for the WCPF Commission will come 
largely from fishing states and that the implementation of highly controversial measures such as 
the observer program will be predicated on the external funding provided by fi shing states. 
Moreover, the contentious allocation issue has been left for the WCPF Commission. It is argued 
that this decline in effectiveness is mainly due to the lack of cohesion in the FFC bloc at 
MHLC5 and the MHLC6. 
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In spite of these shortcomings, it should not be denied that, as far as multilateral 
negotiations go, the WCPF Convention is a real achievement for the island stateshnicrostates of 
Oceania. While MHLCl took place in December 1994, when preli111inary views were explored, 
the serious side of the negotiations to conclude this Convention occurred from the signing of the 
Majuro Declaration at MHLC2 in June 1997 to the MHLC7's conclusion in Septe111ber 2000. 
This profound achievement of n1ultilateral diplon1acy should be acknowledged, particularly 
given the resources demanded of island states/inicrostates to 111aintain their level of participation 
at the negotiations. 
Nevertheless, the thesis argues that since the late- l 990s, there has been a decline in the 
effectiveness of collective diplo111acy, after two decades of cu111ulative achieve111ent. Given the 
watered-down prescriptions of the \,VCPF Convention, the sustainability of the tuna resource is 
not assured. Negotiating fairer access deals fro111 fishing states is also unce1iain, for while a 
newco111er, such as Spain, is prepared to pay slightly more than Japan for access, its notorious 
record in the global tuna econon1y precludes Spain being dee111ed a 'good actor' 18 of fishing 
operations in the region. The domestication of the tuna industry has not been achieved, and 
indigenous control is questioned, given the yielding by the Oceanic states over a chainbered 
voting system. 
There are parallels to be drawn from the experiences of collective diplo111acy 111ore 
generally in the Pacific. Collective diplomacy was effective during the Cold War years, given 
the willingness of foreign powers to support the region financially in exchange for the region ' s 
pro-Western stance. Rather than continue to reward and foster those states loyal to westen1 
geopolitical ain1s, the neo-liberal reform agenda, which has been endorsed by the development-
orientated international banking sector and donor states, has introduced conditionality as a 
feature of aid or loan provisions. Furthennore, in the case of Oceania, these funds have been 
channeled through a multilateral institution, the Pacific Islands Formn, 111aking that organisation 
responsible for the i111ple111entation of region-wide neo-liberal refonns. 
Sutherland (2000) argues that external forces and in particular donors are iinposing 
these reforn1s. Furthern1ore, the reforms are not inclusive. If the general populace has not been 
included and a regional body has i111ple111ented these imposed refonns, then the effectiveness of 
collective diplomacy is rendered ineffective. This demonstrates a weakened leadership capacity 
within the region to stand up to the de111ands of the donor co111n1unity. This argu111ent has 
application to collective diplo111acy generally and to collective fisheries diplo111acy specifically. 
18 I first came across this term in an article written by David Balton (2000). 
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The thesis concludes that for all the above reasons, the region has undergone a rise in 
the effectiveness of collective diplo1nacy when we would expect a decline, and a decline in 
collective diplon1acy when we would expect a rise. These conclusions also apply to its subset, 
that of collective fisheries diplomacy. This variation in effectiveness reflects a range of global, 
regional and local factors or conditions that can impact on the success or otherwise of collective 
diplo1nacy by the Oceanic states. The region's ability to exercise that control has been 
particularly dependent upon cohesion and unity of the Oceanic group and this in tum has 
depended on the quality of leadership, and the global geopolitical and economic context. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Understanding collective diplomacy 
In developing a theoretical framework for understanding the changing level of effectiveness of 
Oceanic collective diplomacy I examine two literatures. The first is literature concerned with 
understanding regionalism. As explained in the previous chapter, the joint diplomatic efforts of 
Oceanic states are a form of regionalism. Here I show that the regionalism literature and in 
particular the so-called 'new regionalism' debate is very limited in explaining the effectiveness 
of collective diplomacy at the regional level in Oceania. There are however some theoretical 
studies that do provide openings for thinking about this issue. In particular, I focus on Andrew 
Axline's (1994) approach as providing a useful way into this area. Axline's work was initially 
exciting, as he had applied his theories of regionalism to developing regions of the world. 
However, Axline did not raise the concept of collective diplomacy between developing states 
and it transpired that Axline had 1nore in com1non with other regional theorists and the idea of 
'new regionalis1n', an idea not useful to the Oceanic experience. The Chapter concludes that 
Axline and other regional theorists advancing 'new regionalis1n' provide an appropriate rather 
than a sufficient framework to answer the central question of this thesis. 
The second area of literature I explore is that concerned with collective diplomacy in 
Oceania. These studies of areas of joint diplomacy such as in relation to nuclear testing, 
dumping, colonialism, and trade, provide some useful general propositions about where to look 
for explanations of the effectiveness of collective diplomacy in the Pacific context. They 
therefore provide a useful starting point in thinking about their relevance to the fishing resource 
sector. In particular they signal the range of global regional and local factors that impact on the 
success or otherwise of collective action among the s1nall states of the Pacific in relation to 
powerful global processes. 
Overall I am concerned with developing a many-layered explanation that takes account 
of changing global, regional and local conditions. The critical theory approaches to 
multilateralis1n, such as that of Robert Cox, 1 that see outco1nes as historically contingent, 
provide a better understanding than those approaches which develop a static view of the 
possibilities of joint action by small states in multilateral fora. 
Before turning to these two literatures, I need to comment on why an area that may at 
first see1n to be relevant, is not, because it addresses a different set of questions - that of regime 
See Cox with Sinclair (1996), Approaches to World Order for a range of useful critical theory essays and 
articles. 
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theory.2 Regi1ne theory is concerned with understanding the power of international regimes, 
such as the fishing regi1ne in Oceania. For exa1nple, whether power should be seen in realist 
terms as derived from a hegemon, or as having some independence as a social norn1 accepted by 
states. This thesis, on the other hand, is concen1ed with explaining the effectiveness of 
collective diplomacy in establishing such a regime in the first place. 
Section one: The Regionalism Debate 
Part one: Physical features 
Before exainining the theoretical explanations surrounding the regionalism phenomena, it is 
necessary to look at the debate concerned with how the physical features of the 'region' are 
constituted. This is needed because the physical shape of regionalism may be a determinant in 
effective regional initiatives. It has been argued that a region comprises peoples who are bound 
by "homogeneity, or homogeneity plus interdependence plus geographical separateness" 
(Russett 1973: 184). 
Because of argu1nents over geographic and selective n1embership, Nye ( 1973: 81) 
considers that a regional organisation is based on "geographical contiguity". Further, he ( 1973: 
81-82) defines as "quasi regional", an organisation which co1nprises both regional and non-
regional me1nbers as being one concerned with "geographical contiguity or a geographical area 
of concen1". As well, a macroregionaI3 area incorporates a "vast region" and a microregional 
area comprises a more diminutive region (Nye 1973: 82). 
Following Nye's approach, so1ne of the Oceanic regional organisations could be 
considered 'quasi regional', as membership also includes non-regional states, for example, the 
Pacific C01nmunity (SPC).4 Others, however, could be considered geographically contiguous 
regional organisations, with no outside membership, for example, the Foru1n fa1nily of 
organisations. As well, in the case of Oceania, its vast geographical boundaries define its 
organisations as '1nacroregional' .5 This raises the question of whether these distinctions made a 
difference in achieving the objectives of collective diplomacy? Chapter Three argues that by 
confining the n1e1nbership of the Foru1n Fisheries Agency (FFA) to the independent Oceanic 
2 
3 
4 
5 
Regime theory is not useful to this thesis as it concentrates on an anarchic international system where 
hegemons/balance of power issues and social norms determine the formation of regimes. I am not looking 
at why states adhere to regimes, but rather how we understand power over time, instead of the more static 
approach, such as that taken by regime theorists, for example, realists such as Krasner (1983 , 1985), or 
liberal institutionalists, such as Keohane (1984) and Keohane and Nye (1989). 
To compartmentalise the term macroregional, it is a vast organisation "where the maximum distance 
between members ' capitals is one-fourth to one-half that of the "global" United Nations (i.e. 3100 to 6200 
miles)" (Nye 1973: 82). Micro regional comprises an organisation "where the maximum distance between 
members ' capitals is less than one-eighth that of the United Nations (i.e. , less than 1500)" (Nye 1973: 82). 
While Nye (1973: 82) concedes that these divisions are "arbitrary", he argues for their necessity in the 
construction of typologies. 
From 1947 to 1998, the SPC stood for the South Pacific Commission. From February 1998, the 
organisation 's name became the Pacific Community, but retained the same acronym. 
The Oceanic region extends over an area of more than thirty million square kilometres. The ocean 
comprises ninety-eight per cent of this area (SPC 2001). 
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states, plus Australia and New Zealand, the objectives of collective diplo1nacy could be 
achieved. 
Payne and Gamble (1996: 2) provide another interpretation of regionalis1n's physical 
attributes. They believe it to be a "state-led or states-led project designed to reorganise a 
particular regional space along defined economic and political lines." In this way, regionalis1n is 
linked to the pressures of global production, which results in all states, both strong and weak, 
choosing either an offensive or defensive strategy as a means of countering these global forces. 
Grugel and Hout (1999: 10) also argue in favour of a states-led strategy, specifically 
economic, in response to global change. Moreover, they suggest that these strategies are 
changeable, affected by actors or global conditions. While advancing state-centric leadership in 
the advancement of regionalism, Payne and Gamble (1993: 6-13) nonetheless espouse the social 
forces construct inherent in Robert Cox's reflectivist analysis of historical structures (see Cox 
1981). 
Hunell (1995) also takes up the idea of social forces playing a role in the geographical 
features of regionalis1n. According to Hunell, a regionalist strategy can also e1nerge for reasons 
such as co1mnon culture or religious traditions. Further, while son1e states may seek to formalise 
regionalist initiatives, others 1nay be happy to create a "looser structure" of meetings and rules 
(1995: 41). This is an interesting concept and raises the question of whether, because of a lack 
of legal identity, (because of its non-fonnal structure), the initiative can have authority, either 
regionally or internationally. This point has relevance to the discussion in Section two below on 
the South Pacific Foru1n, an organisation founded without a formal treaty, thus having no legal 
personality (see Fry 1994, Hen 1994). 
The above explanations provide a preparatory framework to conceptualise the physical 
attributes of regionalism. It can be described as a group of like-minded ( or hon1ogeneous) states 
concerned with a geographically separate set of common interests to advance a specific goal or 
goals. Fron1 these explanations, the physical features of regionalisn1 and its structures can be 
understood not only as a state-led ideology, but also as social forces with a united approach to a 
co1n1non culture or religion. 
Part two: Why and how do states co-operate? 
The question of why or how states co-operate is relevant only in so far as it affects the outcome 
of regional initiatives. For exa1nple, can regionalist ventures give greater strength and power to 
its members, than they would otherwise enjoy and is strength and/or power an integral 
component of success in their endeavours? Observers argue that states will co-operate if the 
benefits outweigh the costs (see among others Axline 1994a, Gamble and Payne 1996). 
Therefore, states appear to weigh-up the advantages versus the disadvantages of regional co-
operation before making a decision. 
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It is argued that moves to fonn integrative bonds between states are often pro1npted by 
"a triggering political event" (Hettne 2000: xxvi). This suggests that, on occasion, the decision 
to establish a regional organisation can be politically 1notivated, rather than econo1nically 
driven. This raises the question of whether the distinction between the political and econo1nic 
imperatives behind the establish1nent of regional organisations can affect their shape and 
direction and with it, the chances of meeting their objectives and whether other imperatives can 
be at work here. For exainple, can regional organisations be established because of an 
environmental trigger, or as Axline (1994a) and others believe, because of a social trigger? Fry 
(1979, 1981, 1991 and 1994) suggests it can, and argues that an overarching objective of 
Oceania's collective diplomacy was the indigenous control of its organisations. It follows that 
states 1nay use collective diplomacy to strengthen their development policies. There are, clearly, 
a variety of reasons why states decide to co-operate. 
Gamble and Payne (1996: 250) believe that costs and benefits calculations lead to a 
"wider context" of how co-operation as a state-led project is achieved and includes "the 
historical residues of past social interaction and the emergent patterns of current social 
interaction". These two features can both constrain and provide opportunity. Can either support 
or restrict the objectives of collective diplomacy? In this way, can the history of cultural, 
ideological, political, economic or social inter-state relations have a bearing on the effectiveness 
of collective diplo1nacy? Chapter Two examines Oceania's pre-colonial history of inter-island 
contact and argues that there was a sense of belonging to a wider community through tributary 
syste1ns, inter-island 1narriages and maritiine warfare. 
The brief examination of why and how states co-operate provides useful ideas to 
consider when charting the rise and decline of the effectiveness of collective fisheries 
diplomacy in Oceania. These ideas include: costs and benefits; a triggering political event; the 
pro1notion of econo1nic, political, social or environmental issues; bringing about indigenous 
control; strengthening developn1ent policies; and the i1nportance of historical relations, for 
exainple, ideological, political, econo1nic and social interaction. Whilst these ideas may explain 
why states co-operate, they do not explain the influence of other factors, such as geo-politics, 
leadership and the 1narket situation on the effectiveness of the co-operation between states. 
Furthermore, these ideas look at how and why states co-operate. 6 This thesis is concerned with 
the effectiveness of that co-operation. To look at the propositions about effectiveness, we need 
to look at collective dipl01nacy. 
Part three: Axline and his theory of regional co-operation 
A promising line of enquiry is to exainine the propositions regarding collective dipl01nacy. One 
promising theorist has established a theoretical framework goven1ing the political economy of 
6 See, among others: Corkran (1976); Falk (1995); Falk and Mendlovitz (1973); Payne and Gamble (1996); 
Grugel and Hout (1999); Herr (1976, 1990, 1994); Hettne (1999, 2000); and Oman (1994). 
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regionalis1n in the developing world. Axline ( 1994a: 5), as an observer of regional co-operation 
in developing states, provides: 
... an approach to regional cooperation that focuses on the issues and actors involved in a 
process of regional negotiations over the creation of benefits, the distribution of those 
benefits, and attempts to redefine relations between the region and the outside. 
Axline contends that there have been four generations of regional co-operation until the 
1990s. The first generation emerged with the European Economic Com1nunity (EEC) and 
included the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA) and the Caribbean Free Trade 
Association (CARIFTA). The second generation moved towards industrialisation for econon1ic 
develop1nent and integration and import substitution. The latter initiative was significant in 
Latin America in relation to the LAFT A, CARIFT A and the Central American Common Market 
(CACM). These two generations of regional economic initiatives by the Latin American 
countries involved larger economies, with a greater degree of industrialisation than the states of 
Oceania. Nevertheless, import substitution was an integral component of the manufacturing 
sector of Fiji's economy (see Chandra 1994). As was the case with the South Pacific Forun1 
(SPF), Caribbean co-operation, the CARIFTA was also econo1nically driven.7 
According to Axline ( 1994a: 4 ), the third generation of regional co-operation and 
regional institutions proliferated in a climate of "collective self-reliance" until the 1980s. During 
this third generation of change, there was a greater realisation of how regional co-operation 
worked within the global structure. The awakening of indigenous assertion occurred from the 
1nid- l 960s in Oceania. This indigenous move1nent was aware of the region's position within the 
global political economy through its experiences at the SPC. The "double oil price shock, 
increasing debt burden, and contraction of world-wide trade" marked the beginning of the fourth 
generation of regional co-operation fro1n the mid-1980s (Axline 1994a: 4 ). This fourth 
generation of change was buffeted by the end of the Cold War and would be challenged by the 
new political order from the 1990s. Axline (1994a: 5) believes that during the early 1990s, in 
answering the challenge posed by this new order, regional organisations "regrouped" and 
"relaunched" regional co-operation on a different basis. As this thesis demonstrates, however, 
this period 1nerely marked a change in relations between Oceania and the global political 
econo1ny. There was no regrouping or relaunching of its regional organisations. 
According to Axline, the emergence of a 'New World Order' in the 1990s has changed 
the face of that fourth generation of regional co-operation. Along with changing ideals of the 
post-Cold War international political economy, there has been a shift in thinking regarding 
7 That said, the Anglo-American Caribbean Commission was founded in 1942 and it subsequently became 
known as the Caribbean Commission in 1946 (Corkran 1976: 19). While the early aims of the South Pacific 
Forum included economic integration, the lack of a regional industrial base quashed these ideas (see Fry 
1994). 
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develop1nent policy. 8 Axline believes that regional co-operation has been priinarily concerned 
with economic and political issues. This argument is complementary to the view that security 
issues can relate to political, economic and environmental considerations.9 States will generally 
agree to co-operate if it means that their national goals will be better served and that the 
"perceived opportunity cost" relating to "relative costs and benefits of different options" is 
favourable (Axline 1994b: 23). A common regional position can then be taken on such diverse 
issues as "exploitation of resources, protection of the environment, regional demilitarization, 
coordination of foreign aid, etc" (Axline 1994b: 23). 
Detennining such benefits and costs might be subjective, not just because of national 
positions, but also because of the motives of individual actors. The reasons behind an 
individual's motives can include practical consideration of the policy concerned, rancour over 
the objectives of the organisation or specific issues under negotiation, or leverage being applied 
by, for exainple, exten1al forces. Therefore, Axline's argument in relation to a state's view of 
relevant econo1nic, social or political factors needs to be extended to include the sometimes 
contrary roles played by individual actors. 
Because regional organisations in the developing world are drawn from "small, 
econo1nically underdeveloped and militarily weak" states, Axline (1994b: 26) contends that they 
are exposed and vulnerable to global forces. This worked in their favour during the Cold War 
years, as the two rivals competed for friends within the developing world. A further external 
factor is that of "multinational corporations, intergovernmental and nongovernmental 
organizations" (Axline 1994b: 26). Axline believes that the influence exerted by this group can 
be understood in terms of their specific interest in the region. For example, economic interests 
can include their access to markets or resources and maintenance of investment possibilities. 
Because of these factors, an iinportant test is whether the regional organisation has "survived 
institutionally, and as a functioning organization" (Axline 1994b: 29). Hence, this influences the 
organisation's ability to attain goals and meet the interests of its 1nembers. 
Before reading Axline (1994), it had occurred to me that the Oceanic region had 
undergone a rise and decline in its collective diplo1nacy achieve1nents. That made Axline ' s 
theory of the four generations of regional co-operation and other theorists' views of 'new 
regionalism' and the supposed decline and then rise in regional co-operation at odds with what 
had occurred in Oceania. Even though this thesis argues that Axline's (1994) four generations of 
regional co-operation is not relevant to Oceania's experiences, it is referred to it throughout the 
thesis to demonstrate how Oceania's history of regionalism is so markedly different from that of 
8 
9 
The term "developmental regionalism" has been coined to analyse why regionalism may assist developing 
states (Hettne 2000: xxix-:xx,-:.). These include "sufficient size argument . .. viable economy argument .. . 
credibility argument ... effective articulation argument .. . social stability argument ... resource 
management argument ... peace dividend argument" (Hettne 2000: xxix-xxx). 
See Buzan (2000) for a discussion on traditional security theory and his argument regarding the new 
security agenda of the international economy and the environment. 
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other developing regions, such as South America. Furthermore, Axline's (1994) 'four 
generations' theory provides a framework of regional co-operation among developing states, 
which makes it interesting to work out why and how Oceania's experiences have been 
dissimilar. It is made 1nore interesting by the fact that a rise and decline in Oceania's effective 
collective diplomacy had been at odds with prevailing theories of regionalism. 
Section two: Collective Diplomacy in Oceania 
As we have seen, the general regionalism literature does not directly assist us in understanding 
the effectiveness of collective diplomacy. A 1nore promising line of enquiry or set of ideas can 
be derived from the li1nited literature on the general collective diplomacy experiences of 
Oceanic states. 10 This section examines the global, the regional and the local conditions which 
help explain effectiveness. For exainple, the role of Australia and New Zealand in their relations 
with the Oceanic states; the history of leadership in Oceania and how important it has been to 
effectiveness; the relations between the Oceanic states and the broad, geo-political community; 
ideas of equity in the region; and how national interests can affect the success or otherwise of 
effectiveness of collective diplomacy. Perhaps the 1nost important feature of this thesis, as 
de1nonstrated in this Section, is change over time and how that change is reflected in shifts in 
relations between states. 
The Oceanic region, which comprises s1nall states/microstates, represents a collection of 
recently decolonised states. 11 The fact that most of a regional grouping of territories achieved 
independence within twenty-five years of each other helped to create a decolonising bond of 
shared experiences (Fry 1979: 18). These states fall within three generalised groups: Polynesia 
to the East and South, Melanesia to the West, and Micronesia, to the N orth. 12 Historically, there 
have been differences of opinion between Melanesia and Polynesia over their hierarchical 
position in the region. 13 These differences are explored in part two of this section. Competition 
over the location of the headquarters for regional organisations, the varying econo1nic needs of 
10 
11 
12 
13 
The work of Greg Fry is used extensively in this thesis, as he is the foremost theorist on collective 
diplomacy in Oceania. As such, he is also used as a checklist against which to evaluate fisheries diplomacy. 
Under the Lome Convention, for example, a sovereign small state, or micro state, has a population of fewer 
than five million people. There are 89 states falling within this category. Of this total, 48 states are 
populated by fewer than 1.5 million (Sutton 1998). 
Polynesia includes the Cook Islands, Tonga, Samoa, American Samoa, Tuvalu, French Polynesia, Wallis 
and Futuna, Tokelau and Niue. Fiji has both Polynesian and Melanesian influences, but historically and 
culturally has been more aligned with Polynesia. Melanesia includes New Caledonia, Vanuatu, Solomon 
Islands and Papua New Guinea. Micronesia includes Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, Palau, the 
Federated States of Micronesia, Marshall Islands, Nauru and Kiribati. 
Crocombe (2001: 18) takes the traditional three-way geographical split in Oceania one split further. He 
believes that Melanesia is divided into Central Melanesia (the Pidgin-speaking grouping of Papua New 
Guinea, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu); fringe Melanesia (West Papua, New Caledonia and Fiji), Polynesia 
and Micronesia. In addition to Crocombe' s geographical split regarding a Pidgin-speaking Melanesian 
identity, Fry (1979: 10) argues that language has also divided the region, for example, the divisions that 
exist between English-speaking Oceania and French-speaking Oceania. 
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the Oceanic states, and differences of opinion between those states with tuna fish stocks and 
those without tuna fish stocks all help to colour regional unity. 14 
According to one observer, Oceanic regionalism is caught up with: 
the paradox of increased bargaining power with the developed world, conflicting national 
interests among partner-states and distributional conflicts over costs, benefits and other 
outcomes of cooperation" (Neemia 1986: 17). 
Further, national interest and cost benefits affect Oceania's regional organisations. They can be 
influenced by factors such as "... personal relationships among national leaders, perceived 
commonalities vis-a-vis other participant nations and historical or geographical ties which bind 
several nations together" (Nee1nia 1986: 112). That said, as Fry (1991: 170-171) argues, the 
advantages of regional co-operation include legitimacy, international instruments and cohesive 
diplo1nacy that works to "affect the grand strategy of great powers". Apart from internal factors, 
there have also been external forces influencing regional co-operation. These forces have been 
driven by Cold War strategic security concen1s or econ01nic or political benefit. 
Part one: Collective Diplomacy to 1980 
This part evaluates the rise of collective diplo1nacy from decolonisation to 1980. This includes 
exainination of the SPC and of the South Pacific Forum (the Forum). 15 Other regionalist 
landmarks such as the Pacific Island Producers Association (PIP A), Air Pacific, the Pacific 
Forum Line (PFL) and the University of the South Pacific (USP) are also discussed. 
Com1nentators, such as Nee1nia (1986) argue that the pri1nary reason for the SPC's 
establislunent was the 1naintenance of 1netropolitan influence and power within Oceania. 16 This 
went hand-in-hand with post-World War II concerns to block communist influences in the 
region. In addition, Australia and New Zealand were looking ahead to a withdrawal of the 
United Kingdo1n's colonial involvement in the region that would secure both countries n1ore 
power and influence over the island states. 17 Other com1nentators concur with this, believing 
that both New Zealand and Australia wanted a say in the post-World War II enviro111nent 
regarding security and by setting up the SPC it established a "regional power structure" (Fry 
1993: 228). 18 The 'Colonial Club' 19 controlled the organisation, its budget and its work 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
See Chapter Three. 
The South Pacific Forum changed its name to the Pacific Islands Forum at the October 1999 Forum 
meeting. 
Fry (1979: 60) has noted that the colonial powers wanted to limit United Nations scrutiny of constitutional 
developments in their colonies and saw the establishment of the SPC as a way of achieving this. Colonial 
powers active in the region at the time included Australia, New Zealand, United Kingdom, France, the 
United States and the Netherlands. The Netherlands was included, owing to its colonial outpost of West 
Papua. Herr (1976: 77) notes that Portugal was not included, although it controlled Timar at that time, and 
in spite of Mr H.V. Evatt' s (Minister for External Affairs, Australia) belief in Timor ' s importance to the 
region. 
As early as 1944, Mr H.V. Evatt determined that Australia should chart its own foreign policy interests in 
the region and "never again" to allow others to control its interests (Herr 1976: 73). 
See also Fry 1991 and Herr 1994. 
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program. The i1nperial powers' vision was clouded by a paternalistic desire for regional order 
that influenced the design and imple1nentation of the SPC 's programs (Fry 1993: 229).2° Fry 
(1979: 66) notes that the SPC's founders wanted indigenous participation at the South Pacific 
Conference. Article IX, Section 2 7 of the SPC' s Agreement states that: 
In order to associate with the work of the Commission representatives of the local 
inhabitants of, and of official and non-official institutions directly concerned with, the 
territories within the scope of the Cmnmission there shall be established a South Pacific 
Conference with advisory powers as a body auxiliary to the Cormnission. 
(Commonwealth of Australia 1997)21 
France and the Netherlands, however, were not happy about indigenous involvement at 
the Conference. The United Kingdom believed those indigenous delegates fro1n the Solo1non 
Islands and the Gilbe1i Islands were "too prin1itive" and sent its own officials to Conferences 
(Herr 1979: 97). Despite these colonial attitudes, indigenous delegates gained valuable 
experience in the workings of a regional co-operative body (Fry 1979). That experience led to 
indigenous de1nands for control of the SPC. According to Fry (1994), a crucial aspect of 
indigenous involve1nent in the SPC was that these delegates represented the founding leaders of 
the independent states of the region. These leaders included Ratu Mara22 of Fiji (granted 
independence in 1970), Tupua Tainasese Lealofi IV of Western Samoa (granted independence 
in 1962, now known as Samoa) and Albert Henry of the Cook Islands (granted self-
determination in 1965). These three delegates played a significant role in cainpaigning for 
indigenous control of the SPC and of future regional organisations.23 
In 1962, indigenous delegates to the Fifth South Pacific Conference chafed at their 
inability to discuss an important regional dispute between the Netherlands and Indonesia over 
the future of West Papua. West Papua was separated from the region without the other 
territories being given the right to protest (Herr 1976: 190-191). Fry (1979: 70) notes that a 
catalyst for indigenous awareness occurred during the 1nid- l 960s. At the Sixth South Pacific 
Conference in Lae in 1965, Ratu Mara led an indigenous assertion of the right for a 1nore 
significant role in the organisation. At that time, Ratu Mara was the Me1nber for Natural 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
The Colonial Club comprised those colonial powers that set up the South Pacific Community and included 
Australia, New Zealand, France, United Kingdom, the United States and the Netherlands. 
See also Alley 1996. 
At the SPC's 25 th anniversary, a retrospective was provided of the projects undertaken since its inception. 
Health: Tuberculosis, Eosinophilic meningoencephalitis; Leprosy; Eye Diseases; Maternal and Child 
Health; Nutrition; Filariasis; Fish Poisoning; Medicinal Plants; Public Health Statistics. Social 
Development: Community Development; South Pacific Literature Bureau; Population Studies; Home 
Economics; Youth Work; Audio-Visual Aids; South Pacific Games; Community Education; Language 
Training; Urban Local Government; South Pacific Arts Festival; Community Education Training Centre. 
Economic Development: Development of Transportation; Business Management Training; Co-operatives; 
Agricultural Extension; Cash Cropping; Village Agriculture; Development of Regional Trade; Fisheries; 
Tourism; Forestry; Tropical Pastures; Control of Pests, Weeds, and Diseases (Corkran 1976: 127). 
His full title is Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara. 
Two other indigenous leaders were also involved, but played a less significant role. They were Prince 
Tu'ipelehake of the Kingdom of Tonga (Brother to the King of Tonga. Tonga was never formally 
colonised) and Hanuner De Roburt, President of Nauru (independent since 1968) (Fry 1994 ). 
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Resources in the Fiji govenunent and, as Fry (1979: 70) notes, a pri1ne force behind the 1965 
creation of PIP A. Described later as a ' rebellion', the actions of the indigenous delegates at the 
Lae conference led to significant change in the power balance within the SPC. This more 
inclusive style of participation in the SPC would challenge "the assu1nptions and values 
underlying the European approach to regionalis1n" (Fry 1979: 70). 
It is apparent fro1n regional observers that those indigenous forces surrounding the 
South Pacific Conference and the SPC were encouraged by Ratu Mara.24 In his push for the 
SPC's politicisation, other indigenous leaders supported Ratu Mara, and the 1965 Sixth 
Conference marked a move towards an indigenous style of regionalism (Herr 1976: 191-192). 
This indigenous style of regionalism "asserted new values based on a different ideological and 
cultural perspective" and envisaged the Oceanic states controlling the regional organisations, 
with "n1ini1num interference in the region by outside powers" (Fry 1979: 72). 
A further effort to bring about indigenous involvement in regional affairs occurred with 
PIP A' s establislunent. PIP A was set up to strengthen co-operation between banana growers and 
their trade relations with New Zealand. The banana-producing states of Tonga, Fiji and Western 
Sainoa ( and later the Cook Islands, Niue and the Gilbert and Ellice Islands) underwent what 
Neemia (1986: 26) calls "so1ne lasting lessons in regional cooperation".25 These lessons 
included the realisation that 
confining membership to island countries would mean a severely limited budget and an 
' association of the weak' and, secondly, that it was essential to have working relations 
with other international organizations including receiving aid from such organizations to 
enable regional organizations to carry out their work programme. (Neemia 1986: 26) 
The 1ne1nbership of PIP A comprised only the Polynesian states, apart from the Micronesian 
Gilbertese, thus it was pri1narily a Polynesian endeavour (Fry 1979: 96). It is Herr' s (1994: 284) 
contention that Fiji, Tonga and Western Samoa "were forced to go outside the SPC ' s framework 
to pursue their economic ambition of higher co1nmodity prices for their agricultural exports" . 
This argun1ent is disputed by Fry (1981: 463), who notes that the work PIP A undertook could 
have been carried out by the SPC, however a regional organisation was established at the 
insistence of Ratu Mara, thus making it "an exercise in self-detern1ination" . Hence, PIP A was 
an important land1nark in the drive for indigenously-controlled regional organisations. Neemia 
(1986) believes PIPA was pivotal in the founding of the Pacific Foru1n Line (PFL), with the 
proposal to establish the PFL agreed to at the 1971 PIPA meeting in Tonga. Herr (1994: 285-
286) claims that PIP A' s brief was confined to the in1provement of banana prices. On the other 
hand, by 1971 Fry (1979: 102) argues that PIPA' s brief included "technical co1runittees, 
24 
25 
Herr (1976: 191-192) believes that there was a further reason for his actions. The United Nations was 
pushing the United Kingdom to grant Fiji early independence in the mid-l 960s. Ratu Mara believed that 
such an occmTence could spark racial confrontation between indigenous Fij ians and Inda-Fijians. Hence, by 
trying to politicise the SPC, he hoped to protect Fiji from the United Nations. 
The Gilbert and Ellice Islands seceded in 1976 and became Kiribati (independent in 1979) and Tuvalu (independent in 1978) respectively. 
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discussions on shipping, bulk purchasing, regional copra processing and the pest and disease 
survey". 
Because of this, PIP A's establishinent can be credited with being the region's first 
indigenously controlled regional organisation and was, it is argued, an important stepping stone 
to further indigenous regional initiatives. Furthennore, PIP A's discussions regarding the 
establishment of the PFL and the range of its brief, politicised the organisation, thus giving its 
indigenous membership the encouragement to pursue their own regional political ( and 
economic) solutions. It is useful to remember that Polynesian society is hierarchically-structured 
and therefore the establishinent and running of a regional Polynesian organisation would not 
have see1ned an alien concept (see Hoadley 1992, an1ong others). The fact that PIPA did 
achieve more than was envisaged is a reflection of the pre-colonial inter-island links that forged 
an,open attitude to other co1mnunities in the region. 26 
By the 10th South Pacific Conference in 1970, Ratu Mara was preoccupied with Fiji's 
i1npending independence. He proposed "an integrated package of six projects for regional co-
operation to the Conference", all of which were focused on Fiji (Herr 1976: 230-231). 
Therefore, Ratu Mara's perception of regionalisn1 was clearly linked to Fiji's own 
development.27 The imperial powers realised that Ratu Mara's pro1notion of a "politically 
motivated comprehensive regional organization" did not include them (Herr 1976: 235). Rather, 
the s1nall states/microstates "felt the need to pool (not "surrender") their sovereignty in a 
political regional organization" (Herr 1976: 235). Iinperial powers, such as France, did not want 
the SPC politicised and preferred to encourage the establishinent of a second regional 
organisation. These preferences were related to France's nuclear testing program in the region 
as well as calls for the independence of its regional colonies. 28 
Leadership was a driving force in the SPC achieving its objectives. One indigenous 
leader in paiiicular has stood out in this regard: he was Macu Salato of Fiji, the SPC's 
Secretary-General from 1975-1979. Kiste (1998: 69) remarks that Salato was "an effective 
advocate for the SPC's c01n1nitment to development at the grass-roots". Throughout this thesis, 
it is demonstrated that leadership can play a crucial role in achieving objectives. Salato had an 
inclusive style of leadership, which enfranchised people at the grassroots, rather than excluded 
them. 
By the late-1960s, indigenous leaders were frustrated in their attempts to voice their 
concerns about France's nuclear testing program in the Pacific at the only regional body, the 
26 
27 
28 
See Chapter Three. 
Crocombe (2001: 612) notes that Ratu Mara was "educated earlier and further" than other indigenous 
leaders of the time and that during the 1970s, Ratu Mara "was skilfully hijacking the lion ' s share" of 
regional co-operation. See also Hoadley (1992: 55). 
At that time France had, and still has, three dependent territories in the region. They are New Caledonia, 
French Polynesia and Wallis and Futuna. 
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SPC. 29 Fry ( 1979: 103) believes that during this period "institutional developments can be seen 
as important expressions of the Islanders' desire to assert indigenous control over regional 
decision-making and activity". The establishment in August 1971 of the South Pacific Foru1n 
(the Foru1n) gave the leaders of the region's independent states a venue for political free 
speech.30 
Australia and New Zealand were invited to become founding members of the Forum in 
1971. Co1nmentators such as Fry (1994) point out that island leaders such as Ratu Mara 
believed that region's sphere of influence would be expanded if it included these two developed 
states in the Foru1n. Further, given the Polynesian identity within New Zealand, and its close 
ties with Oceania, the decision was influenced by that country's "e1npathy with the islands 
region" (Fry 1994: 140).31 The Forum included only those independent states of the region, 
whereas the SPC included all independent states and dependent territories. What the Forum 
1naintained, however, was the geographical boundaries forged by the SPC.32 These boundaries " 
... defined for further generations who was in, and who was out of, 'the region' " (Fry 1991: 
173 ). By denying 1nembership to those colonial powers with interests in the region such as 
France and the United States, the Foru1n was exclusionary, but this is what set the organisation 
apart fro1n the SPC. 
As Herr (1994) points out, the Forum was not founded by way of a formal treaty. As it 
has had no legal personality, members have not been legally bound to meet. In spite of this lack 
of legal personality, however: 
The South Pacific Forum is the apex of regional cooperation in the South Pacific in that 
representation is ahnost always at the level of Head of Government. There is no higher 
regional authority. Its institutional structure includes links with most inter-governmental 
regional organizations in the Pacific at the present time. (Neemia 1986: 26) 
What the Foru1n did have was strong indigenous leaders. As Fry (1979: 121) notes, by 1971 
Ratu Mara was Pri1ne Minister of Fiji and he was being careful not to appear to control the 
regional agenda. In spite of this, his role as Oceania's 'front 1nan' had begun to irritate other 
indigenous leaders. They con1pared him unfavourably with the Westen1 San1oan and Tongan 
leaders, who were seen to have a "more traditional Polynesian political style" (Fry 1979: 121 ). 
As discussed above, leadership is an integral component in regional co-operation. The thesis 
29 
30 
31 
32 
Before 1963, France conducted its nuclear tests in Algeria. France commenced its first testing program in 
French Polynesia on 3 July 1966. France concluded its round of testing in 1975 and thereafter suspended its 
testing in 1992. It resumed nuclear testing in 1995 and, bowing to international pressure, concluded its 
nuclear testing program in 1996 (Ross 1993, Firth and von Strokirch 1997). 
At the first Forum meeting, held in Wellington, New Zealand in August 1971 , Heads of Government from 
the Cook Islands, Fiji, Nauru, Tonga, Western Samoa and New Zealand attended. The Minister for External 
Territories, Mr Charles Barnes, attended from Australia (Herr. 1976: 311 ). 
Australia and New Zealand are members of all of the region 's institutions. These include the Noumea-
based Pacific Islands Secretariat (SPC), 194 7; the Suva-based South Pacific Applied Geoscience 
Commission (SOPAC), 1984; the Honiara-based Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA), 1979; the Apia-based 
South Pacific Regional Environmental Program (SPREP), 1990; and the co-ordinating body of the South 
Pacific Organizations Coordinating Committee (SPOCC), 1988 (Fry 1994: 137). 
See figure Intro. I.at p la of the Introduction. 
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de1nonstrates that a failure 111 leadership can have rainifications for achieving outcomes in 
collective diploinacy.33 
Within three 1nonths of the Forum's establishment, the 1nen1bership agreed that a 
1neeting of trade officials should be convened to discuss "the possibility of establishing an 
econo1nic union for the area" (Fry 1979: 110). These integration ambitions led to the 
establishment of the South Pacific Bureau for Economic Co-operation (SPEC) in 1972.34 
SPEC' s creation was seen as a vehicle to strengthen the expo1i capabilities of me1nber states, 
but it evolved as the Forum's Secretariat. 35 SPEC absorbed the functions of the PIP A, its 
membership agreeing that SPEC co1nprised the san1e membership group, but with a wider 
capacity for activity (Fry 1979: 102).36 
Apart from the integrative objectives or otherwise of the regional leadership, there was 
also the strategy of collective diplomacy with the wider global political economy where a strong 
united front by the Oceanic states had positive results. At the first Forum meeting in August 
1971, leaders expressed their regret at France's atmospheric nuclear testing program in the 
region. It was the first joint action by the Forun1. By the end of that August, France had agreed 
to halt its atlnospheric tests. Ogashiwa (1991: 11) has argued that the widespread protests, 
including those by the Forum, had "contributed to the pressure" (see also Corkran 1976: 177). A 
Resolution drafted by the Foru1n regarding its opposition to nuclear testing resulted in a meeting 
at the United Nations in 1972. The Resolution was subsequently tabled in the General Assembly 
and adopted in November 1972 (Ogashiwa 1991: 11-12). Ogashiwa (1991: 14) believes that 
while France has never agreed with the dangers of nuclear testing, its decision to move its tests 
underground was influenced by world opinion, including that of the Forum. France has been 
c01n1nitted to 1naintaining a presence in the Oceanic region. The cessation of at1nospheric 
testing by the United Kingdon1 in Australia or the United States in Micronesia 1nay have 1nade 
France's decision less difficult. 
Fry (1979: 167-168) illustrates another example of the region's use of collective 
diplomacy. This relates to the fonner Yaounde Convention, which controlled econo1nic 
relations between the previously African colonies of France, Belgiu1n and Italy and the EEC.37 
In 1973, those eligible Oceanic states were invited, along with those eligible African and 
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See in particuiar Chapter Seven. 
One of SPEC ' s first activities was to undertake a review of the Caribbean ' s CARIFTA, to establish whether 
such a free trade area could be appropriate for Oceania (Corkran 1976: 104). 
See Herr (1994). 
Neemia (1986) notes that SPEC ' s mandate developed into areas previously managed by the SPC, for 
example, fisheries and environmental management. This was linked with concerns within the region 
regarding United States and French influence within the SPC over issues such as fisheries and nuclear 
testing (1986). 
Those independent Oceanic states which were members of the Commonwealth were eligible to join this 
club after the United Kingdom joined the EEC in 1973. The former United Kingdom colonies of the 
Caribbean were also included, thus making it the ACP group (Africa, Caribbean and Pacific). 
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Caribbean states, to conclude a new instrument, the Lo1ne Convention.38 It was clear that to 
achieve the region's objectives, it would be necessary to have a united approach to the 
negotiations. Thus, a senior SPEC official headed the Pacific Group Secretariat in Brussels. It 
was only disbanded on conclusion of the negotiations. Ratu Mara was the spokesperson for the 
Pacific Group, and Fry argues (1979: 167-168) that his efforts helped to secure an export 
utilisation scheme for the region. In his analysis of the region's objectives of the Laine 
Convention, Neemia (1986: 80) believes that SPEC's 1nost beneficial role was its co-ordination 
of aid fro1n the EEC under the Lo1ne Convention. The success of Ratu Mara and SPEC over 
these Lo1ne negotiations would have encouraged the region in the develop1nent of its objectives. 
It was also an early indicator for the1n of the power that unity has in multilateral negotiations. 
A further example of the region's achievements in collective diplo1nacy concerned 
those Oceanic states with United Nations 111embership. Their efforts included the decolonisation 
of Oceanic territories and issues of concen1 to small island developing states, as well as the 
United Nations Law of the Sea conference (Fry 1979: 171-172). The Oceanic states of Fiji, 
Papua New Guinea, Tonga and Westen1 Sainoa attended UNCLOS III and they were active on 
issues relevant to the region. For exainple, they promoted the preference for an Exclusive 
Economic Zone (EEZ) over other suggestions.39 Fiji also led the can1paign for the rights of 
archipelagic states (See also Teiwaki 1988, Veitayaki 1995. Also discussed in Chapter Three). 
Regional 111eetings have helped to develop and foster a regional identity. This identity 
has in tun1 given the Oceanic states a degree of cohesion and unity, which has enhanced their 
bargaining power and influence at inten1ational negotiations. A way of ensuring a feeling of 
equal participation has been the rotation of yearly meetings between the Oceanic states, thus 
allowing s1nall island states/microstates to feel as though they are equal players. 
However, achieving the objectives of collective diplomacy have also been hindered for 
a range of reasons, for exainple, national rivalries. This was particularly the case with Fiji's role 
in evolving regional co-operation during the late-1960s and early-1970s regarding the 
University of the South Pacific, SPEC, the SPC Cormnunity Education Centre and Air Pacific. 
In addition to these Suva-based organisations, several United Nations agencies established their 
regional base in Suva (Fry 1979: 240). To other Oceanic states it appeared that regionalism was 
based in Fiji, apart fro1n the metropolitan-influenced SPC, based in New Caledonia. Linked to 
this was the dominant role assu1ned by Fiji and, in particular Ratu Mara, over a range of 
regional activities. 
Another divisive factor in pr01noting collective diplomacy has been the differences 
between the Melanesian and Polynesian groups. Fry (1979: 253) proposes that: 
38 
39 
At the time, those qualifying Oceanic states were Western Samoa, Fiji and Tonga. 
Other ideas included the custodial/preferential school or historical access beyond the territorial sea (see 
Chapter Three). 
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Differences based on culture and appearance are reinforced by geographical separation 
and by the fact that the Melanesian states have only recently enjoyed substantial 
constitutional development whereas the main Polynesian states were the first Islands 
groups to gain political independence. 
After gaining independence and membership of the Foru1n, the Melanesian states voiced their 
criticisms regarding the regional 1novement' s slow pace of progress. These c01nments were in 
addition to Melanesian resentment regarding the superior attitude of the Polynesians towards 
the1n, the inference being that they were "inferior, unsophisticated, and even prin1itive" (Fry 
1979: 254). 
There were differences between the two groups. The Polynesian states achieved 
independence earlier than the Melanesian states. Polynesian society is hierarchical and 
ho1nogeneous, characterised by hereditary aristocracies "supported by a priestly caste and 
elaborate 111ythologies and artfonns" (Hoadley 1992: 15). On the other hand, Melanesian society 
is fractured, with many different local languages and characterised by "more diverse, dispersed 
and individualistic patterns of tribal and family organisations" (Hoadley 1992: 15). The 
Melanesian states of Papua New Guinea, Sol01non Islands and Vanuatu do, however, share a 
co1n1non language, Pidgin. Melanesian society was also 1nost affected by the blackbirding 
activities of Australian traders, by "land alienation" and by a lack of institutional readiness for 
independence (Nee1nia 1986: 112-113). Cultural differences between the two groups were also 
e1nphasised by the early colonisers. For example, Polynesians were considered superior to 
Melanesians because of their hierarchically-organised society and because of their lighter skin. 
Melanesians, on the other hand, were known as headhunters and cannibals, creating the 
perception that they were savage and hostile (Scheyvens 1999: 51 ). 
Linked to these divisive factors has been the disparity in econo1nic development across 
the Oceanic region. As Fry (1979: 258) notes, not only have there been differences in the 
econon1ic base between the states, but there are also differences in the range of econo1nic 
capabilities of these states. Thus, the size of Fiji or Papua New Guinea's econo1ny has been 
bolstered by the fact that they have enjoyed a wider range of activity than say, for example, 
Kiribati or Niue (Fry 1979: 258). These econo1nic differences have had an impact on the 
varying needs of the Oceanic states. For example, the needs of Fiji's 1nore dynainic econo1ny 
brought it into conflict with other Oceanic states when it cainpaigned for accounting and 
engineering chairs at the University of the South Pacific in 197 5 (Fry 1979: 259). 
Finally, the 1notives of the 1netropolitan powers and how they influenced the success or 
otherwise of collective diplomacy during this period require son1e exainination. Co1nn1entators 
such as Fry (1979) highlight four reasons behind the support by Australia and New Zealand of 
regional co-operation in Oceania. First, it was hoped that the provision of econo1nic 
development, would make the region less vulnerable to the advances of the Soviet Union. 
Second, it portrayed a united region, signalling that it was there where decisions were made. 
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Third, the provision of financial assistance ensured Australia and New Zealand could influence 
regional decision-making. Australia and New Zealand hoped in retun1 to engender loyalty from 
the region (Fry 1979: 285-287). 
It is Fry's (1979: 297) conclusion that regionalism during this period became 
increasingly dependent on the involve1nent of the metropolitan powers, particularly Australia 
and New Zealand. Even while the Oceanic states were promoting indigenous control and 
expansion of regional organisations, they were becoming increasingly dependent on the external 
funding and expertise required to fulfil their program requirements. This served Australia and 
New Zealand well because by strengthening regional co-operation through financial assistance, 
the Oceanic region would remain orientated towards the West, an important Cold War reality 
(Fry 1979: 297). Hence, Neemia's (1986: 5) belief that: 
[T]he donors' motives in giving aid are far from wholly compassionate or humanitarian. 
Most aid is intended to promote the donor's interest whether commercial, economic, 
political or strategic. 
Fr01n the region's perspective, Neemia (1986: 111) argues that there is an evaluation 
made by a national goven1ment of "tangible 111easures and non-quantifiable terms" of issues 
such as control (1986: 111). Second, that evaluation is applied to the other participants to 
analyse whether they are "equitably distributed" (1986: 111). Because of the variables of a 
range of issues, Fry (1994: 169) believes that there are questions not only of equity, but also 
whether an individual state could have achieved a "cost effective result outside the regional 
scheme". For exainple, the integration schemes such as "tertiary education, civil aviation and 
shipping indicated the kinds of tensions that would have pulled more ambitious regional 
sche1nes apart" (Fry 1994: 169). National interests could be taken into account once the region 
1noved away fro1n ideas of integration and more towards collective dipl01nacy. Nevertheless, 
even with collective diplo1nacy endeavours, the need for unity still required that the regional 
good should prevail over national interests, for example, the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone 
(SPNFZ) negotiations. 
In conclusion, the economic integration ideas which characterised the earlier years of 
regional co-operation were not feasible for several reasons. One reason was the lack of 
industrialisation in the region (apart from Fiji). A further reason was that trade within the region 
was minimal; as 111any states had the san1e products or processing facilities were not available. 
The disagree1nent within the region regarding a single regional airline was regionalism 's first 
discordant note. By this time, Fiji's promotion of regional co-operation was being perceived by 
other states in the region as Suva-centric, with accompanying control over all aspects of the 
region 's organisations. The decision to pool the region' s shipping resources was another failure 
for those high-level integration proponents, but nevertheless did achieve a limited degree of 
integration. The University of the South Pacific, however, did achieve a high degree of 
integration. What the exercises in integration illustrated were the difficulties of resolving the 
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national interest, the costs and benefits associated with specific integration policies, and notions 
of equity. Where the region was starting to see success, was in the area of collective diplomacy, 
whether at the United Nations or in negotiations with the EEC. Thus, it was in the area of 
collective diplomacy where the region would reach its objectives between 1980 and the mid-
1990s. 
Part two: Collective Diplomacy from 1980 to the mid-l 990s 
From the accounts of regional observers, the period fro1n 1980 to the mid-1990s was 
distinguished by effectiveness in collective diplomacy. The Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA) was 
established in 1979 and thereafter finalised a raft of regional and sub-regional fisheries 
conservation and management instru1nents on behalf of its membership. During the 1980s, the 
region's objectives included: the finalisation of the SPNFZ 1985 (the SPNFZ); the Treaty on 
Fisheries Between the Governments of Certain Pacific Island States and the Government of the 
United States of America in 1987 (Multilateral Fisheries Treaty); and the Convention for the 
Prohibition of Fishing with Long Driftnets in the South Pacific in 1989, (the Driftnet 
Convention). From 1990 to the mid-1990s, several initiatives were finalised. These included 
two regional conventions which entered into force in 1990. The first was the Convention for the 
Protection of the National Resources and Environment of the South Pacific Region in 1986 (the 
SPREP Convention). The second was the Convention on Conservation of Nature in the South 
Pacific (the Apia Convention). The region enjoyed collective diplomacy initiatives at the Fish 
Stocks negotiations (1992-1994);40 at the Earth Summit (United Nations Conference on 
Enviromnent and Development - UNCED) in June 1992 and its work thereafter to implement 
Agenda 21; and the region's collective efforts to halt French nuclear testing, which was 
acco1nplished by January 1996. Part two exainines what regional observers have said about 
some of these collective diplomacy efforts. Collective dipl01nacy in relation to those fisheries 
achieve1nents listed above will be discussed in the forthc01ning Chapters. 
The South Pacific Regional Environment Programme (SPREP) was established in 1982. 
SPREP's role was to develop "regional environmental policies and standards" (Tsamenyi 1999: 
471). By 1990, both the SPREP Convention and the Convention on Conservation of Nature in 
the South Pacific (the Apia Convention) had entered into force. South and Veitayaki (1999: 33) 
note that the SP REP Convention was "a major achieve1nent for the region because of the 
difficult policies that needed to be implemented". The SPREP Convention, for example: 
40 
makes provisions for preventing, reducing, and controlling pollution from vessels, land-
based sources, sea-bed activities, atmospheric sources, dumping and storage of toxic and 
hazardous wastes and testing of nuclear devices, as well as environmental damage caused 
by mining and coastal erosion. (South and Veitayaki 1999: 33) 
Agreement/or the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and 
Highly Migratory Fish Stocks. Known in this thesis as the Fish Stocks Agreement, or the Fish Stocks 
negotiations. Also known as the UNIA (United Nations Implementing Agreement). 
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These provisions were to be undertaken in accordance with the London Dumping Convention. 
The SPREP membership41 has been active on issues relating to climate change, hence 
its active participation at the Rio Conference in 1992, at which the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (the Climate Convention) was opened for signature (Davis 
1996: 2). One specific way the SPREP membership was able to exert some influence at the 
conferences was through the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS).42 According to Davis 
(1996: 2), the AOSIS group played a "key role" at the Climate Convention's negotiations, 
"driven by self-preservation and an acute sense of injustice". Thus, it was able to "significantly 
' influence the Cli1nate Convention despite the limited economic and political clout of its 
individual member states" (Davis 1996: 2-3). The SPREP membership undertook collective 
action within a larger group, AOSIS. Davis (1996: 3) believes that a strong component of 
AOSIS unity was leadership, noting for example, the "gifted" vice Chair of AOSIS, 
An1bassador Tuilo1na Neroni Slade of Samoa, at the 1995 Berlin Climate Convention 
conference.43 Nevertheless, as Bergin and Michaelis (1996: 59) point out, the AOSIS bloc was 
unable to sway Australia's refusal to accept its proposal for a reduction in carbon dioxide 
e1nissions at that Berlin conference. 
The proposal for a South Pacific nuclear-free zone (SPNFZ) was first raised at the 
Foru1n by a New Zealand Labour government in 1975.44 It should be recalled that one of the 
1nain reasons behind the Forum's establishment was the inability of the region's indigenous 
leadership to voice their protests regarding French nuclear testing at the SPC. It was not until 
1983, with the re-election of an Australian Labor govenunent, that the idea was revived, the 
prin1ary purpose being the isolation of France (Alley 1996: 53). Australia's proposal for the 
SPNFZ Treaty had gained Forum approval by 1984 (Fry 1985: 16). The Treaty was opened for 
signature at the 1985 Rarotonga Forum. 
41 
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The SPREP membership includes all independent states and dependent territories of Oceania, as well as 
Australia, France, New Zealand and the United States (South Pacific Regional Environment Programme 
1997). 
The AO SIS group in Oceania comprises Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, 
Marshall Islands, Nauru, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga Tuvalu and Vanuatu. In the 
Caribbean: Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Cuba, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, 
St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago. In the 
Atlantic Ocean: Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, and Sao Tome and Principe. In the Indian Ocean: Comoros, 
Maldives, Mauritius and the Seychelles. In the Mediterranean: Cyprus and Malta. Singapore is the South 
China Sea member. Observers include American Samoa, Guam, the Netherlands Antilles, Niue and the 
U.S. Virgin Islands (Davis 1996). 
Ambassador Slade is now the Chair of AOSIS. He is also the Permanent Representative of Samoa to the 
United Nations and concurrently Ambassador to the United States of America and High Commissioner to 
Canada. He is based in New York. A lawyer by training, Ambassador Slade was formerly Attorney-General 
of Samoa (1976-1982). Before his current appointment (since March 1993) he was a senior legal adviser 
with the Commonwealth Secretariat in London from 1983 to 1992 (Climate Institute 2001). 
In that same year, Fiji, Papua New Guinea and New Zealand achieved endorsement from the United 
Nations for a South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone. The Resolution of General Assembly "was adopted by a 
vote of 110 to 0, with 20 states abstaining, including all of the nuclear powers except China" (Dorrance 
1992: 43). 
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While it would seem the region was united in its nuclear-free zone quest, the truth was 
otherwise. Australia's stand was more 1noderate than that of New Zealand, and the Oceanic 
states were split down a Melanesian/Polynesian divide.45 The Melanesians were more radical on 
the issue, while the Polynesians were prepared to compromise; most of then1 not even wanting a 
Treaty for fear of dismantling regional security arrangen1ents (Fry 1986: 64). Thus, Australia 
and the Polynesians had to con1promise with New Zealand and the Melanesians.46 Ogashiwa 
( 1991: 64) notes that the SPNFZ has been "criticized as partial, ineffective and incomprehensive 
... [but] it is rather successful from the viewpoint of regional cooperation". Thus, the SPNFZ is 
an exainple of a successful regional outcome by the Forum (see also Fry 1985: 18).47 This 
outco1ne would have pleased a sceptical Ken Piddington48 (1985: 52) who1n, when writing of 
the Forum's first fifteen years, was not optimistic of the region's co-operative ability to pull off 
what he tem1ed the "huge co1nplexity" of such negotiations. 
The SPNFZ had the desired effect of halting Japan's plans to dump nuclear waste 
material in the region (Fry 1985: 18). Protests by the Forum and by individual Oceanic states 
since 1980 regarding Japan's "experin1ental" nuclear du1nping proposals for the Marianas 
Trench, resulted in Japan slowing down its plans (Aldridge and Myers 1990: 12). It was the 
SPNFZ, however, that ended any further consideration of the proposals (Ogashiwa 1991: 19). 
As well, pressure by Oceanic states such as Kiribati and Nauru, in conj unction with some 
westen1 European states, sought revision of the London Dumping Convention. At its September 
1985 1neeting, the London Dumping Convention agreed to "suspend all sea disposal of 
radioactive 1naterials pending fu1iher studies" (Power 1986: 458). 
One of the most vexed issues that the region has struggled with since first protesting 
against France's nuclear testing program has been its cessation. While it appears there was 
1ninor success through the Forum's intervention back in the early 1970s to stop France's 
atn1ospheric testing program, its prograin reco1nmenced in 1994, this ti1ne underground (see 
Ogashiwa 1991). Piddington (1985: 48) noted that in spite of"fifteen years of sustained protest" 
by the Foru1n up until 1985 when his report was published, France had refused to reconsider its 
prograin. After twenty-five years of 'sustained protest' by the Forum, the region did see a 
successful conclusion to its relentless collective diplomacy on this issue. France concluded its 
45 
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At the time, the Micronesian entities of Palau, Marshall Islands and Federated States of Micronesia were 
still Trust Territories of the United States. The Northern Mariana Islands was in a Commonwealth 
Covenant with the United States (since 1975) and had no responsibilities for defence or foreign affairs. As a 
point of interest, however, Palua had the world ' s first nuclear-free Constitution, drafted by the Trust 
Territory' s Constitutional Convention in 1979 (Aldridge and Myers 1990: 55-56). 
The Lini Government in Vanuatu, while endorsing the SPNFZ, did not sign, stating that it wanted a 
stronger treaty (Power 1986: 46). Vanuatu ' s actions can be linked to its colonial past. It has " loathed 
foreign interference" (Ogashiwa 1991: 62). 
One observer has raised the issue of the Forum' s legal personality. Power (1986: 457) notes that complaints 
regarding SPNFZ violations can go to the Forum, however, "constitutionally it lacks executive power, 
much less supranational authority". This was discussed above at pages 14 and 23 . 
Ken Piddington, a New Zealand national, helped to establish the Forum Secretariat, the Forum Line and the 
South Pacific Regional Environment Program. 
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nuclear testing prograin in January 1996 (see also Firth and von Strokirch 1997, Alley 1996).49 
According to one observer, the role of the Foru1n was crucial in facilitating this outcome 
(Interview, Ross, October 2000).50 Another observer has remarked that while the Forum's 
efforts to stop nuclear testing "grew marginally" during the Cold War era, "they intensified with 
its departure" (Alley 1996: 53). 
A further exainple of the Oceanic states' use of collective diplo1nacy in the 
environmental arena concerned the United States govenunent's plan to "use Johnston Island as 
a site for the incineration of its che1nical weapons" (Fry 1994: 162). The United States had 
previously stored its che1nical weapons in Germany (East-West Center 1990: 39). Continued 
Oceanic protests regarding the Johnston Atoll Che1nical Agent Destruction system (JACADS) 
led to President Bush inviting Oceanic leaders to Honolulu for a su1n1nit in October 1990. The 
sumn1it's focus was the United States' relationship with the region. It was not just the JACADS 
project itself that raised the ire of Oceanic leaders, but also the fact that it had been "developed 
without consultation with Pacific nations, and the inclusion of 1naterials fro1n Europe in addition 
to those in the Pacific is a particular irritant" (Kiste 1991: 11 ). At the Honolulu sun11nit, 
President Bush conceded that: 
... we plan to dispose of only the chemical munitions from the Pacific Theatre currently 
stored at Johnston Atoll, any obsolete materials found in the Pacific Islands, and those 
relatively s1nall quantities shipped from Germany ... these munitions will be destroyed 
safely, on a prioritized schedule, and that once that destruction is c01npleted, we have no 
plans to use Johnston Atoll for any other chemical munitions purpose, or as a hazardous 
waste disposal site. (East-West Center 1990: 8) 
This concession would see1n to signal success for the region's collective diplomacy efforts. 
However, as Fry (1994: 163) notes, the use of the words "no plans" could allow the United 
States to change its 1nind, should circu1nstances dictate. 
Fro1n 1980 to the mid-1990s were halcyon days for Oceanic regional co-operation. This 
has been demonstrated in the range of objectives related to collective diplo1nacy, rather than the 
integration policies of the earlier era of regional co-operation. Many of these objectives were 
focused on the region's enviro1unental concen1s and de1nonstrate how environmental objectives 
can be a driving force for collective diplomacy. During this period, there was a growing 
realisation within the region of the power of unity in international negotiations. Australia and 
New Zealand encouraged that unity as a means of securing regional stability, as well as a pro-
West stance. By the 1nid-1990s, however, the neo-liberal reform agenda had beco1ne a do1ninant 
feature of both Australia and New Zealand's relations with the Oceanic states. No longer could 
the region expect to benefit fro1n the dynamics of the Cold War enviromnent. 
49 
50 
France, United Kingdom and the United States signed the SPNFZ (or the Treaty ofRarotonga) in Fiji on 25 
March 1996 (Zwim 1996: 19). The Soviet Union (1986) and China (1987) have signed and ratified the 
SPNFZ (Dorrance 1992: 45 and Forum Secretariat 1997). 
Ken Ross is a senior official with the Bureau of External Affairs, Wellington, New Zealand. 
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Part three: Collective Diplomacy from the mid-1990s to 2001 
The focus of regional studies since the mid-1990s concentrates on the inter-connected issues of 
the neo-liberal reform agenda and security. Part three examines what regional observers have 
said about collective diplomacy from the mid-1990s to 2001. The neo-liberal reform agenda, 
with its catch-cry of 'good goven1ance', has preoccupied the Oceanic states since the n1id-
l 990s. One observer has co1nmented that: 
The increased pace and scope of reforms that occurred in the islands from the mid- l 990s 
onwards cannot be explained outside the context of the donor-driven regional reform 
agenda. (Sutherland 2000: 460) 
The range of donors includes states such as the United Kingdom, France, Japan, Germany, 
Australia, New Zealand and the United States. It also includes those development orientated 
banking institutions such as the Asian Development Bank, the World Bank and the Inten1ational 
Monetary Fund (IMF). 
By 1995, with the region's refonn agenda focused on the fisheries, forestry and touris1n 
sectors, the World Bank won an ally in Australia and through this alliance had persuaded the 
Foru1n to lead the regional reform agenda.51 Their aim was to bring about regional economic 
security, in an era defined by competing interests, rather than the bipolar Cold War geopolitical 
standoff (see Fry 1999). Among other initiatives, the Foru1n established the Forum Finance 
Ministers Meetings (FFMM). The FFMM' s ideology would be driven by: 
the need to adopt a global perspective in regard to the development of economic policies, 
in particular ensuring the achievement of 1naximum sustainable economic returns on the 
region's resources, enhancing development of the private sector, responding to changing 
global economic conditions, increasing the level of value-added production, and 
developing regional approaches to international trade. (1994 Forum Communique)52 
How effective has the Forun1 and the FEMM been in guiding the region through this 
regional reform agenda? It has been argued that it is too soon to tell but "that there is no tun1ing 
back" (Sutherland 2000: 4 7 5). In order to 1neet the challenges of globalisation, the donor 
c01n1nunity 1nust "apply pressure" to the Oceanic states (Sutherland 2000: 475) as future 
funding require1nents would be conditional on instituting the reform agenda. Firth (2000: 188) 
has c01n1nented that the region has no choice but to "embrace policies of econo1nic 
liberalization". That said, the Oceanic states "should fear" those features that form part of the 
global econo1ny (Firth 2000: 188). For exainple, free trade, the technological revolution and 
electronic con1merce, and the mobility of capital (Firth 2000: 188).53 
51 
52 
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According to Sutherland (2000: 464), the groundwork was undertaken at the August 1994 Brisbane Forum. 
The Hon. Gordon Bilney, Australia's Minister for Pacific Island Affairs, had focused the meeting on these 
very issues (as well as regional airlines), by adopting, for the first time, a theme for the Forum meeting, 
'Managing Our Resources ' (1994 Forum Communique). 
The FFMM membership was widened at the 1996 Forum meeting to include those Forum ministers with 
economjc responsibilities. The new group is known as the FEMM (Sutherland 2000: 467). 
For an alternative view, see Encontre (1999: 269), who argues that small island developing states (SIDS) 
will benefit from trade liberalisation. Encontre does concede, however, "the extent to which SIDS will be 
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Therein lies the rub. While regional elites have supported the donor co1nmunity's 
demands to impose a regional reform agenda, the general populace has been excluded from the 
process.54 Part of the regional reform agenda includes the highly emotive issue of land tenure. 
This issue is region-wide and without being privy to the reform process, the general populace 
has been alarmed at losing control over what is a backbone to their cultural identity, custom and 
security (see Hunt 1998: 129-132).55 As Sutherland (2000: 476) notes: 
Reductions in government expenditure will inevitably affect the capacity of the state to 
deliver, particularly on its welfare functions. As cost recovery principles take effect, the 
poor, the weak and the low-paid will beco1ne increasingly disadvantaged, also 
heightening the risk of social disaffection and political instability. Private sector growth 
may well occur but is unlikely to be large enough to absorb the swelling ranks of the 
unemployed. 
Foreseeing a positive regional outcome thus becomes questionable. The elite have been co-
opted and therefore lacked strength in their collective negotiations with the donor community. If 
the general population has been excluded in any discussion or involvement in decision-making 
by the regional leadership, then the legiti1nacy of these processes is doubtful. The crucial point 
argued by Sutherland (2000: 459) regarding the regional reform agenda is that the process has 
been "driven primarily by external forces, particularly donors". Fro1n Sutherland's analysis it is 
detennined that the agenda has not been effective for two reasons. First, that the process was not 
inclusive and second, that it was an agenda imposed on the region by global forces. 
It is clear that fro1n the n1id-1990s to 2001 there has been a radical departure fron1 the 
previous eras of integration policies and collective diplomacy in Oceania. Instead, the post-Cold 
War fixation of donors and the development-banking sector of the need by the region to adopt 
the attributes of the neo-liberal refonn agenda has resulted in a decline in the effectiveness of 
collective diplomacy. It is argued that because the refonns demanded of the region by donors 
and banks were iinposed and not inclusive, regional co-operation was undermined. What does 
this n1ean for n1y sub-set of broader processes and propositions relating to collective fisheries 
diplo1nacy? Has this sector also witnessed a period of decline? The following Chapters 
den1onstrate that this sector has also declined. 
This Chapter has examined theories about regionalism at the global and regional levels 
in an effort to understand how we can apply it to collective diplomacy in the fisheries sector. 
Such an exainination helps to explain the specific tasks of this thesis. These tasks are twofold. 
54 
55 
able to benefit from these developments will depend on their capacity to manage the transition to situations 
of greater competition in the global economy". 
When Port Moresby' s general populace discovered that the Papua New Guinea government was about to 
accede to World Bank and IMF strictures and privatise government institutions, as well as reform 
traditional land tenure, riots ensued in which four protestors died (Healy 2001 ). This outcome is at variance 
with Macdonald ' s (1998: 39) analysis of the earlier financial crisis in Papua New Guinea in 1996-1997, 
after which the government backed away from its rejection of World Bank conditions. Macdonald believes 
that the crisis "led to a public appreciation of the issues involved and of the necessity for reform". 
See Crocombe (2001, Chapter 11) for a discussion on the complexity ofland tenure in Oceania. 
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First, to search for the reasons why the effectiveness of collective fisheries diplomacy in 
Oceania had 1nore than two decades of cu1nulative success, which went against conventional 
understandings of the role of small states/microstates in their relations with larger and more 
powerful states. Second, in the light of the region's history of co-operative outcomes, to 
understand why, in Oceania's more recent history, the effectiveness of collective diplomacy has 
declined. 
The Forum membership realised its collective force on a range of issues, during an era 
that global regionalism observers alternatively argued was highlighted by a decline in collective 
diplomacy. Thus, Oceanic regionalism went against the grain of regionalism experiences 
elsewhere in the world, 1naking a study of Oceanic regionalis1n different to what we might 
expect. By the mid-1990s, the region could be proud of its achieve1nents in collective 
diplomacy. 
Analysis of the region's reform agenda since the n1id-1990s suggests that leadership is 
an i1nportant ingredient in collective diplomacy. If the leadership within the region has not 
involved the general populace in the iinposed process of reform can collective diplomacy occur? 
Supporters of 'new regionalism' argue that the 1990s has seen a resurgence in regional co-
operation after its failures of the 1970s and the 1980s and after this 'new regionalis1n' is all-
inclusive - the political, econo1nic, social and environ1nental sectors. What this Chapter has 
de1nonstrated, however, is that Oceanic regionalisn1 had en1braced these sectors in the 1970s 
and the 1980s, thus 1naking the region ahead of its time. The strong leadership displayed by 
indigenous figures in the 1970s and 1980s is also an important aspect of collective diplomacy. 
For exainple, leaders such as Ratu Mara and Macu Salato of Fiji, Tupua Tan1asese Lealofi IV of 
Samoa and Albe1i Henry of the Cook Islands. Has the quality and strength of leadership within 
the region undergone a decline? Fro1n interviews with observers, such as Ross (2000), this 
would appear to be the case. 
Nee1nia (1986) suggests that equity is a fu1iher issue for the regional level that also has 
application at the global level. How i1nportant is equity? Does it have the ability to split regional 
unity in relation to fisheries co-operation? Could individual perceptions over equity cause a 
decline in collective fisheries diplo111acy? Are there other issues, son1e more in1portant than 
others? For exainple, were external forces influential in affecting collective diplomacy? 
Australia and New Zealand subsidised regional organisations and their objectives as a means of 
encouraging stability and pro-West leanings. If Australia and New Zealand's approach has 
shifted frmn a tin1e when their support and funding was unquestioned, to a time when support 
and funding are conditionally provided, then surely such change has the capacity to erode 
collective diplo1nacy? If collective diplomacy becon1es conditional, then collective diplo1nacy 
could decline. Does this have application to collective fisheries diplomacy? The thesis will 
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demonstrate that there are clear parallels to be drawn between the experiences of collective 
diplomacy in general and collective fisheries diplomacy in particular. 
This Chapter highlights the multi-layered framework which will be used throughout this 
thesis. To explain effectiveness, it is necessary to examine the global, the regional and the local 
conditions which help explain effectiveness. These conditions include the role of Australia and 
New Zealand in their relations with the Oceanic states; the idea of leadership and its importance 
to the goal of effectiveness; the issue of equity between developing states; the interaction of the 
Oceanic states with the wider geo-political community; and the importance of national interests. 
Crucial to these conditions is the thesis ' s focus on change over time, rather than a static 
approach, which gives no account of shifts in relations between states. 
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Pre-UNCLOS tuna exploitation in Oceania: a short history 
I-Kiribati used the ocean and its resources for a variety of purposes. The sea was a provider of 
food, a source of spiritual and physical satisfaction, an arena for recreation, a medimn for travel 
and adventure and a source for other basic necessities such as medicine and construction. The 
traditional uses of ocean resources are very much alive, though some have been lost or become 
superseded in the inevitable process of social change (Teiwaki 1988: 3). 
This Chapter provides an overview of Oceanic pre-colonial and colonial settlement, with a 
specific focus on indigenous resource management, as well as fishing state operations and 
do1nestic fisheries involve1nent to 1980. In pre-colonial times, subsistence fishing was, for the 
n1ost part, carried out judiciously in accordance with prevailing cultures. Contact with 
Europeans brought changes, including the introduction of a money economy, which led to 
islander com1nunities selling their fish and other products, such as copra, for cash (McDaniel 
and Gowdy 2000). This has been called Oceania's first era of globalisation, as it entered the 
global political econon1y (Firth 2000). This globalising trend was reinforced by the decision of 
the i1nperial powers to am1ex Oceania, the result being a heightened degree of influence and 
control by European traders and settlers of their co1nrnercial interests (Firth 2000). 
The late- l 920s 1narked the emergence of Oceania's involvement in the global tuna 
econo1ny with the introduction of small-scale pole and line skipjack fishing operations by 
Japanese interests in Micronesia (Peattie 1988). Technological advances in tuna fishing, 
accmnpanied by a growing de1nand for tuna products and shifts in global weather patten1s had, 
by the 1970s, led to the growing interest of other foreign fishing fleets (Fujinami 1987, Matsuda 
1987, Doulman 1987d, Riepen 1987).1 
The Chapter is split into three sections. The first section examines the pre-colonial 
objectives smTounding conservation and managen1ent of fisheries resources, that is; 
sustainability, a fair return, domestication and indigenous control. Demonstrating these 
historical objectives is crucial to the work of this thesis because it illustrates that in 
conte1nporary tin1es the people of the Oceanic region are merely trying to reclaim the control 
they once had over an important natural resource. The second section looks at the growth in 
c01nn1ercial operations by the major fishing states frmn the 1920s through to 1980. This section 
illustrates the control that the fishing states exerted over the tuna resource's commercial 
exploitation as the Oceanic c01nn1unities were absorbed into the global tuna economy. The third 
section charts the parallel history of Oceania's domestic tuna industry and the development of 
joint ventures. What emerges from this section is how the limited infrastructure and resources of 
the region were no coin petition against the investment capacity of the fishing states. 
The fishing states with operations in Oceania during this period were China, Taiwan, Japan, Republic of 
Korea (Korea) and, by 1980, the United States. 
36 
Pre-UNCLOS Tuna Exploitation in Oceania 
The Chapter endorses Epeli Hau'ofa's (1994, 1998) argu1nent that while outsiders 1nay 
view Oceania as a disparate group of isolated islands the reality was far different in pre-colonial 
times, when inter-island voyages linked the island cultures of Oceania. This pre-colonial period 
marked the emergence of an informal regional identity. Once c01nmercial tuna fishing 
operations co1n1nenced, however, Oceania's abilities to control such a fiercely contested pelagic 
resource were limited and their pre-colonial conservation and manage1nent culture was 
diminished by fishing state operators with no sense of a conservation or 1nanage1nent ethic.2 The 
necessary infrastructure and investment required ensured that during the colonial and 
decolonisation eras, powerful fishing states controlled the global tuna economy, leaving 
Oceania unable to halt the exploitation of its tuna resource. 
Section one: Pre-colonial Oceania 
Oceanic crossings fro1n Asia to Greater Australia began 50,000 years ago, when Papua New 
Guinea was part of the Australian mainland. The crossings were 1nade on bainboo rafts, which 
are still used today in Asia and in Fiji and Papua New Guinea. The raft evolved into dugout 
canoes 8,000 to 10,000 years ago and fro1n there into outriggers. These rafts and canoes were 
essential to the South East Asian and Oceanic hunter and gatherer cultures. The outriggers were 
used by the islanders for exploratory sea voyages to other islands in Oceania to establish 
settle1nents. Tuna fishing by islanders was 1nade possible by ocean-going outriggers and the 
fishing techniques of the Manus Island people, situated off the northern coast of New Guinea, 
illustrates how tuna have been harvested for thousands of years, using deep-sea outriggers.3 
The Melanesians, who originated from the same stock as the Australian aborigines, 
n1igrated fro1n New Guinea across to New Ireland 33,000 years ago and down to Buka in what 
is now the Solo1non Islands 29,000 years ago. A second wave of migration from Asia occurred 
4,000 years ago and settle1nents sprang up in Vanuatu, Fiji and New Caledonia. These Lapita 
1nigrants brought with them pottery technology and they explored other uninhabited islands 
such as Tonga and San1oa, where their pottery making died out. This new culture became what 
we now tern1 as Polynesian and it dispersed over the next 2,000 years to include the Society 
islands (Tahiti and Moorea) and Hawai'i. The last great voyage undertaken by Polynesian 
n1igrants, around AD900, was to settle New Zealand. Melanesians started to migrate to the 
region now known as Micronesia 3,000 years ago (Crocombe 2001, Denoon et.al. 2000, Irwin 
1996, Thon1e and Raymond 1989. See also Bowdler 1997, Spriggs 1997 and Tyron 1997). 
According to Crocombe (2001: 4 7), the western Micronesians may be related to people from the 
southen1 Philippines and eastern Indonesia, however, Palauans may also be related to people 
from the Sepik area of Papua New Guinea. 
2 
3 
Pelagic fish are "( of marine life) belonging to the upper layers of the open sea" (The Australian Concise 
Oxford Dictionary, Third Edition). 
Among many others, see Crocombe 2001 , Denoon et.al. 2000, Irwin 1996, Thome and Raymond 1989. 
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To the islanders of these three main cultural groupings of Melanesia, Polynesia and 
Micronesia, there were no borders.4 The sea was also their home. For example, there is evidence 
that the Tongans, "who were among the greatest navigators", undertook yearly sea voyages to 
Fiji, Samoa and 'Uvea (Crocombe 2001: 48). D ' Arey (1997: 77) argues that there were several 
groups within Oceania that "exercised political influence on their archipelagos because of their 
naval strength". These groups included "Bau in Fiji, Manono in Samoa, the Ha' apai group in 
Tonga and the Roviana Lagoon in the Solomons" and D ' Arey (1997: 77) believes that these 
groups deserve further investigation as states that ruled over the seas, or "thalassocracies" . Inter-
island trade flourished, although Crocombe (2001: 48-48) notes that a phase of bad weather 
around 1300 could have resulted in "the loss of long-range voyaging skills", as traditions in 
long-range voyages did not recur after that time. 5 Nevertheless, the inter-island money network 
(which was still in use early in the twentieth century), linking Palau with Yap and "all the 
islands of the Carolines as far east as Truk, a distance of roughly 1,500 kms" appears to go back 
as far as 1200 (Berg 1992: 150-151 ).6 
Fish remained the islanders ' staple source of protein. The inhabitants of Melanesian 
islands blessed with large lagoons relied on reef fish, or in-shore fisheries. As a necessity, 
Micronesian and Polynesian islands with smaller lagoons ventured out beyond the reef in search 
of pelagic fish, such as tuna. This necessity for fish 1neant that for many communities in 
Oceania there was no difference between tenure of the land and the claiming of terrestrial 
resources and tenure of the sea and the accompanying right to its resources. Because it was 
bound by custom, it gave the right to extraction a "custodial, rather than possessive attitude of 
people towards their resources" (Ruddle 1989b: 71 ). Custo1nary control by communities, chiefs 
or fan1ilies extended outwards to the reefs and seawards.7 Indeed, the social hierarchy of sea 
rights in some Oceanic communities has depended on the "chronological order in which their 
ancestors settled on an island ... or in a village" (Ruddle 1989b: 71 ). This social hierarchy was 
instrumental in overseeing, for the most part, judicious extraction of the region ' s fisheries 
resources;8 however, there were instances of very non-environmentally-friendly activities.9 
Overall though, Johannes (1978: 356) believes that Oceania's "marine conservation measures, 
when applied judiciously, served the purposes for which they were designed". 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
Polynesia means ' many islands ', Micronesia means 'tiny islands ' and Melanesia means ' black islands ' 
(Kiste 1994: 6) . 
This ' phase ' of bad weather around 1300 comprised a "wet period, presumably associated with an 
abnormally high frequency of tropical cyclones ... a prolonged period of catastrophic rainfall", lasting for 
around one hundred years. The "human behavioural changes" among the people of Fiji and Hawaii could 
well have been caused by the devastation of agricultural terracing (Nunn 1993: 11 ). 
This tribute system comprised stone and shell money. 
These traditional fishing rights are more correctly termed ' customary marine tenure ', or CMT. 
Johannes (1978 : 353) lists the following conservation methods of the indigenous Oceanic peoples. These 
include: closed areas; closed seasons; setting free a portion of the catch; the holding in enclosures of the 
excess catch; bans on catching small fish; restrictions on inland lagoon fishing; restrictions on taking sea 
birds and/or their eggs; fish trap restrictions; turtle egg bans; bans on taking turtles on the beach; and bans 
on frequenting favourite spots on turtle nesting beach. 
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Oceania's weather conditions made storage of food crops difficult. The region regularly 
endured ( and continues to endure), droughts, cyclones and tsunami, which annihilated fragile 
food crops and livestock. 10 In pre-colonial ti111es, the islanders fished by hand-line or a short-
. line-and-fishing-pole in the mangroves, lagoons, reefs and offshore (seaward, beyond the reef). 
For exainple, Teiwaki notes that 
The sea was an mtegral part of the I-Kiribati culture. The relatively mfertile and 
inhospitable atoll environment and the ubiquity of the surroundmg ocean, with its 
potentially useful resources, virtually compelled the I-Kiribati to turn towards the sea to 
satisfy his material and psychological needs (1988: 1). 
In Nauru too, men went "in outrigger canoes beyond the reef to catch the prized bonito11 and 
yellowtail" (McDaniel and Gowdy 2000: 24). 12 The iinportance of fish to the islanders can be 
n1easured by the fact that they received up to 90% of their animal protein from fish, Joham1es 
(1978: 350) noting that there were three catalysts that had an irrevocable i111pact on this 
traditional conservation and management culture. First was the move to "money economies". 
Second was the disintegration of "traditional authority". Third was the "in1position of new laws 
and practices by colonial powers". No longer was Oceania shielded from outside forces by its 
perceived isolation. These catalysts marked Oceania's gradual integration into the global 
political econon1y. 
Contact with the outside world occurred from the 111id-1700s, when 111issionaries, 
traders, whalers and beachcombers arrived in Oceania. 13 It seems that the early Europeans were 
astounded by the prowess of the indigenous canoes, some of which were over thirty metres in 
length and which were able to "sail rings around their own more ponderous vessels" (Irwin 
1996: 43). Trade flourished in such diverse areas as whaling, beche de mer (sea-slugs/sea 
cucu111bers ), tortoise shell, sandalwood, copra, planters, labor recruiters and shark fins. 14 As 
contact increased between the region and European, Chinese and Japanese traders, Oceania 
"becaine 111ore integrated with the 111ain international trade routes". Coaling stations were also 
established in the region with the advent of steain-powered shipping in the second half of the 
nineteenth century (Browne and Scott 1989: 1 ). 
9 
10 
II 
12 
13 
14 
For example: catching porpoises for their teeth; letting much of the meat rot; the use of poisons throughout 
Oceania; discarding excess fish, or wasting, including at feasts ; unrestrained turtle egg collection; and 
breaking up coral to extract the fish (Johannes 1978: 355). 
McDaniel and Gowdy (2000: 66) point out that Oceanic states, such as Nauru, are mainly affected by La 
Nifia weather patterns and its resultant droughts. 
Bonito is a tuna-type tropical fish with mackerel-like stripes (Australian Concise Oxford Dictionary). 
It is noted by McDaniel and Gowdy (2000: 24) that it was taboo for women to ocean fish and women were 
also forbidden from eating " [S]peared fish and those caught in traps along the reef' . 
In isolation, Spain established colonial rule in Guam in 1565 and in the Northern Mariana Islands in 1668 
(Hezel 1995). 
For example, whalers were in regular contact with the islands of Rendovo and Simbo in the Solomon 
Islands. During the mid-l 800s, " [S]several thousand Polynesians were working at any one time on the 
whalers" (Crocombe 2001: 56, 62). 
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The imperialist expansion into Oceania from the late nineteenth century occurred at the 
insistence of settlers, who wanted protection of their business activities (Firth 2000: 181 ). 15 The 
islands were divided into French, Dutch, Spanish, German and British possessions. Colonial 
governments needing cash to meet the demands of running their administrations hastened their 
integration into the global political economy. For example, settlers exported sugar, copra, 
tobacco, rubber and coffee. Minerals such as phosphate, gold and nickel were also mined and 
exported (Firth 2000: 184). As Firth (2000: 184) comments, these developments caused 
upheavals in Oceania, as men in their thousands left to work on plantations elsewhere in 
Oceania or Queensland in the fifty years leading up to 1914. Worse however, according to 
Croco1nbe (2001: 63 ), was 
the Peruvian slave trade which, between 1862 and 1864 took 3,843 Polynesian and 
Micronesian slaves from Easter Island, Tuamotu Islands, Cook Islands, Tokelau and 
Krribati, to Peru. Few survived the new diseases, malnutrition and maltreatment. The 
British and French navies stopped the trade in 1864. The last ship was told to return its 
passengers to Krribati, whence they had been taken, but the captain dumped them in the 
northern Cook Islands where their descendents live today. 16 
Approxi1nately 60,000 indentured Indians were imported to the e1nerging colonial society in Fiji 
to work on the sugar plantations. This society eroded the authority of traditional life by 
transferring power to new systems (Crocombe 2001: 63). These new systems included the cash 
economy and acceptance by the islanders of the new syste1ns was not willing, but essential. It 
has been said that early in the twentieth century, Nauruans laughed when they saw "the white 
1nan who fished when he was not hungry. But soon, some Nauruans were fishing to sell their 
catch to foreigners" (McDaniel and Gowdy 2000: 133). Until 1962, when Western Samoa17 
became independent, the colonial authorities maintained economic and political control over 
their jurisdictions, accon1panied by a gradual devolve1nent of administrative functions to 
indigenous officials (Browne and Scott 1989: 2-3). 18 
Section one exainined the pre-colonial settling of Oceania, including accounts of inter-
island contact, which helped to construct a sense of informal regional identity. The Oceanic 
settlers linked culture to fishing and illustrated for the most part a conservation ethic to conserve 
and manage the ocean's resources. This ethic is linked to those objectives that the Oceanic 
region strives to regain in conte1nporary times, that is; sustainability, a fair return, domestication 
and indigenous control. Inter-island trade did create a bartering economy, including stone and 
shell money. Through indigenous participation in a cash econo1ny, however, a disintegration of 
15 
16 
17 
18 
Brown and Scott (1989: 2) believe a further reason for the establishment of colonial administrations was the 
uncertainty felt by Australia and New Zealand regarding "the growing power of France and Germany". 
Other examples of Oceanic population movement in the 1800s were the "Solomon Islanders, Ni-Vanuatu, 
Tuvaluans and I-Kiribati who worked in Fijian plantations, or the Solomon Islanders, New Guineans and 
Micronesians who worked in Samoa. Cook Islands who went to work in Tahitian plantations or guano 
mines in the Line Islands. I-Kiribati working in Hawai ' i, Fiji and Tahiti, Niueans in Tonga and Samoa, 
Tuvaluans in Samoa and Fiji, Micronesians in Hawai ' i and Samoa, as well as the phosphate mines of 
Angaur, Nauru and Banaba" Crocombe (2001: 63 , 64). 
Knovm now as Samoa. 
See Appendix A for a breakdown and history of colonial interests in Oceania. 
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traditional authority and the imposition of colonial laws and practices, Oceania was gradually 
integrated into the global political economy. 
Section two: Foreign commercial tuna operations from the 1920s to 1980 
Japan started small-scale pole-and-line activity in Micronesia by the late-1920s, however, it was 
not until the 1930s that Japan ' s commercial tuna harvesting began, in large part to satisfy a 
growing demand at home for processed tuna products (Peattie 1988: 139). Before this, Japan' s 
tuna industry had been concentrated around its coastal and offshore zones (Bergin and Haward 
1996: 13). By the 1960s, the Republic of Korea (Korea) and Taiwan had joined Japan in 
commercial tuna operations in Oceania, with the United States fleet operating in the region by 
1980.19 This section outlines the history of each of these major fishing states in the region in the 
decades to 1980.20 This historical examination demonstrates that the capital resources required 
to fund longline or purse seine operations precluded the participation of Oceanic societies. 
Japan 
In any bilateral or multilateral fishing negotiations 1n Oceania, Japan always argues that 
historical catch levels should be taken into consideration when calculating catch limits (Tarte 
1999a: 11). This is because Japan has the longest record of any fishing state for tuna operations 
in the region, which have helped to supply a Japanese diet reliant on fish as an important source 
of protein since ancient times. Prehistoric skipjack remains have been found in shellmounds 
excavated from northeastern Honshu. While Shoguns in times past paid high prices for fast 
delivery of skipjack during its peak time of late spring to enjoy eating the fish raw, it is 
nowadays considered "the basic food of the poor of Japan" (Borgstrom 1964: 46). By the 1880s, 
Japan had founded its first fisheries training school and its fishermen were encouraged by the 
government to operate offshore, Fujinami (1987: 58) noting that 
With government financial support, the first engine was installed on a skipjack pole-and-
line vessel in 1903, the first refrigeration equipment in 1907 and the first radio in 1918 
(1987: 58). 
At the conclusion of World War I, Japan was granted "trusteeship over 14,000 islands including 
the Marianas, Carolines and the Marshall Islands" of the Oceanic region north of the Equator 
(Waugh 1994: 14).21 By late 1928, an Okinawan settler in Chuuk (on the island of Wonei) had 
commenced operations with one boat and ten crew to harvest and process bonito (Hezel 1995: 
19 
20 
21 
Other fishing in Oceania is undertaken by regional coastal states. For example: Australia, ew Zealand, 
Indonesia, the Philippines and France (active in ew Caledonian and French Polynesian waters) (SPC 
Yearbook 1998). 
Russia is not included in this assessment, as its fishing in the region did not start until 1985, when Kiribati 
negotiated an access agreement with Russia (Riepen 1987: 171). 
The islands known as the Carolines included Palau and those islands comprising the Federated States of 
Micronesia which were separate entities until the 1986 Compact of Free Association, (1986). The Federated 
States of Micronesia, a federation, comprises the four states of Yap, Chuuk, Pohnpei and Kosrae. The 
capital, Palikir, is located on the island of Pohnpei. 
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186). Other small-scale commercial operations had followed by 1930. Full-scale commercial 
operations by Japanese pole and line fishing vessels did not begin until the early 193 Os, after at 
least eight years of research had been undertaken by the Japanese colonial administration on the 
extent of Micronesia' s 1narine resources (Peattie 1988: 138). Having established the extent of 
the resource, an influx of Japanese fishermen and fishing companies ensued. 
While some of the fish caught was sold at local fish markets, the majority of the catch 
was processed into katsuobushi for Japan' s domestic market.22 By 1937, not only were there 
"fifteen hundred Japanese ... employed in the fishing industry" of Chuuk, (Hezel 1995: 187) but 
katsuobushi had become the "fourth largest commodity by volume exported from Micronesia" 
(Peattie 1988: 139).23 By the late 1930s, there were more than three hundred Japanese vessels 
fishing in the Carolines, employing 3,000 Japanese, with the fishing sector earning 
approximately three million yen a year (Hezel 1995: 188, 195).24 25 26 This growing success 
story of the Japanese tuna industry in Micronesia faded with the onset of World War II when the 
Micronesian region bore the brunt of much severe fighting between Japan and the allied 
?7 forces. -
After World War II, Japan lost its Micronesian territories to the United States and it was 
forbidden from fishing beyond the MacArthur Line (Borgstrom 1964, Waugh 1992).28 To help 
alleviate food shortages which lasted well into the 1950s, the Japanese government allowed 
general fishing licenses to be transferred to offshore or distant water licenses (Fujinami 1987: 
5 8). In spite of the resistance by the United States government, General MacArthur, who was 
the head of the Supreme Command of Allied Powers (SCAP) in Japan, encouraged the 
rebuilding of Japan' s fishing vessels to bolster self-sufficiency in foodstuffs. By the 1950s, 
Japan 's prewar fleet levels had been regained (Scheiber 1998: 4). The restrictions of the 
MacArthur Line were lifted in 1952 and by the early 1960s, the Japanese fleet was fishing for 
22 
?' 
_.) 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
Katsuobushi is flaked tuna much used as flavouring in soup (Hezel 1995: 186). Making katsuobushi is a 
"laborious process", which involved cleaning, gutting and beheading the skipjack, which was then boiled 
and boned. After this, the fish was dried in sheds and smoked for several weeks until it "became hard as 
wood". The product was then shipped to Japan where it was shaved "into the family soup" (Peattie 1988: 
139). The finished product was also known as "skipjack stick" (Borgstrom 1964: 86). 
Peattie (1988: 139) adds that more than 2,000 tonnes of katsuobushi were exported annually to Japan by 
1937. As an aside, the other principal exports included sugar, phosphate and copra (Peattie 1988: 150). 
\Vaugh (1992: 172) believes that by the late 1930s, "nearly 8,000 Japanese fishermen" were fishing in the 
waters of Micronesia. Doulman (1987b: 36) puts the figure of Japanese tuna fishermen in Micronesia by 1938 at in excess of 7,600 . 
By the end of the 1930s, there were almost 20,000 resident Japanese in Palau (Hezel 1995:203). By 1940 
Japanese settlers totalled 77,000, compared with the static Micronesian population (since 1935) of 
approximately 50,000. The Japanese population in Micronesia reached its peak in 1942, when 96,000 were 
recorded as settlers (Peattie 1988: 160). 
The Showa 14 (1939) Exchange rate per 100 yen: average US$27(.505) ew York, Source: Honpo Keizai 
Tokei vol. 8 (ISB I4-906330-35-5). Compiled by ihon Ginko Chosakyoku. Many thanks to Ms Shinozaki, 
ational Library of Australia, who provided this information to Toshio Takagi, Japanese Collection 
Librarian, Menzies Library, Australian 1ational University (by email communication 4.3.2001). 
The Japanese navy and army had bases in Micronesia (Peattie 1988: 257). 
Scheiber(l 998: 4) notes of "the limits placed on Japanese fishing recovery by the "MacArthur Line" (the 
line demarcated in the orthem Pacific which served as a limit upon how far out to sea the deepwater fishing fleets were permitted to sail)' . 
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tuna once 1nore in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean (WCPO) region. Japan established 
bases in Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Ainerican Sainoa, 
French Polynesia, Vanuatu and the Solomon Islands (Fujinami 1987: 60, Doulman 1987b: 36). 
The growing demand for tuna products in Japan resulted in the industry's worth soaring in 
comparison to the world average and the Japanese fleet expanded accordingly (Fujinan1i 1987: 
59). During this period, the fleet targetted longline albacore fishing, for processing at tuna 
canneries in American Sainoa, Hawai'i and the West Coast of the United States (Waugh 1994: 
14, Douln1an 1987b: 36). Fujinami (1987: 59) observes that the 
enlargement and enhancement of Japan's tuna fleet were facilitated by technological 
advances in boatbuilding, fish detecting, vessel positioning, navigation, land-to-ship 
communication, and postharvest handling. 
With success can1e competition and tuna longline vessels fro111 Taiwan and Korea entered the 
WCPO for a share in the resource's profits. 
The newcomers concentrated on longline albacore fishing and Japan, consequently, 
began to specialise in the high-value sashimi product (Douln1an 1987b: 36). This was 111ade 
possible by improvements in the new ultra-low freezing technology (ULT) systen1 that upgraded 
Japan's distant water fleet and obviated the need for expensive island bases as the catch had to 
be landed in Japan for delivery to the market (Fujinami 1987: 60). The pole and line Japanese 
fleet was still concentrated on tuna for the canned 111arket and while prices rose during the 1960s 
and into the 1970s, there was often a shortage of baitfish.29 By 1976, as a result of erratic 
baitfish supplies and the "demonstrated labor and fuel efficiency of purse seine fishing", the 
Japanese fleet con1111enced large-scale purse seine operations in the WCPO (Douln1an 1987b: 
37, Waugh 1992: 173).30 
In that saine year, the face of global fisheries began to change radically as coastal states 
co111n1enced extended jurisdiction claiins over their offshore waters, known as their Exclusive 
Econon1ic Zones, (EEZ). Japan claimed its EEZ in 1977 and felt the repercussions for its fleet 
operating 
in the coastal waters of over 5 0 states in the Pacific and Indian Oceans, Southeast Asia, 
N01ih A1nerica, Central and South A1nerica, Europe and Africa. However, operations in 
most of these areas were relatively unimportant in comparison with tuna operations in the 
Pacific Ocean (Fujinami 1987: 61). 
The claiins for extended EEZ jurisdictions by coastal states "anticipated the outco111e of the 
conference" of the 1973-1982 UNCLOS III negotiations (Akehurst 1991: 180). Japan realised 
that to maintain access to coastal states' fishing zones, it would be necessary to "conclude 
access agreements with them to exploit their tuna resources" (Fujinami 1987: 61). In 1978, 
Japan concluded access arrangements with Papua New Guinea, Kiribati and Solomon Islands 
(Tarte 1998a: 90). In 1981, these arrange111ents were extended to the Marshall Islands, Palau and 
29 
30 
Baitfish is a small fish harvested from island lagoons. 
The fleet had also been hard-hit by global oil price increases (Fujinami 1987: 61) . 
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the Federated States of Micronesia (Tarte 1998a: 91). The associated costs for Japan, along with 
rising fuel charges, increased vessel prices and vessel maintenance disbursements, higher 
operational expenditure and an altered pattern of food consumption, necessitated the 
restructuring of Japan 's tuna vessels, which was completed by 1981-82 (Fujinami 1987: 61). 
Japan' s decision to recognise a coastal state ' s extended jurisdiction was motivated by 
self-preservation. It was nevertheless greeted favourably in Oceania, in comparison to the 
actions of the United States (see below). At that time access fees amounted to around three 
percent and, (in spite of the continued over-fishing and illegal fishing which was endemic at that 
time), it represented a sizeable outlay for the Japanese tuna industry, which had never before 
paid to fish in the EEZ of the region. It was one of the main reasons for the restructuring of the 
tuna fleet and it changed forever the modus operandi of Japan's fishing operations in Oceania. 
This brief examination of Japan' s fishing history in Oceania demonstrates the 
importance of these fishing grounds to Japan as a result of growing demands in its domestic 
market. Sashimi does not have a long history in Japan, its popularity emerging with the ULT 
advances in the 1960s. Once consumers had acquired the taste for sashinii, however, demand 
increased rapidly. Statistically, male, middle-aged men consume the most tuna, "as a 'treat' to 
be enjoyed with sake" (Owen and Troedson 1994: 236). After retirement, however, women and 
men consume similar amounts of tuna (Owen and Troedson 1994: 236, see also Bergin and 
Haward 1996: 28-30). Consumer demand for tuna in Japan has continued to grow due in large 
part because it has an ageing population. Given the importance of tuna to the Japanese market, 
its industry has been concerned to ensure stability and regulation of imports, a growing feature 
of Japan ' s tuna trade. Japan has been keen to maintain good relations with its Oceanic partners, 
for example, agreeing to pay access fees in the light of EEZ declarations by the island states. It 
has not been considered a generous exchange, due, in large part, to the Japanese government's 
insistence on tying aid programs to those countries with which it has fisheries access 
arrangements. 
Republic of Korea (Korea) 
Korea had begun commercial long-line operations in Oceania by 1957, second only to Japan 
(Riepen 1987: 166), Haward and Bergin (199 6: 82) noting that "[F]from the late 1950s, Korea' s 
distant water tuna fishery developed in parallel with Japan" . The Korean and Japanese fleets 
competed for albacore caught in the area between Kiribati and the Cook Islands and destined for 
the "canning light meat packs" markets of the United States and Europe (Waugh 1989: 328). 
Japan \¥as the chief recipient from the late 1950s when Korea' s tuna production started to 
expand. This was "fostered by Japanese interests keen to maximise Korea' s relatively lower 
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costs" (Haward and Bergin 1996: 21). The expansion of Korea' s fleet was "dramatic", growing 
from "none in 1955 to 30 in 1965 to a maximum of200 in 1975 (Riepen 1987: 167).31 32 
When the global canned albacore market slumped in the mid- l 970s, the Korean fleet 
moved from longline to purse seine operations, funded by Japanese companies as well as the 
purchase of second hand Japanese vessels (Haward and Bergin 1996: 59). Korean purse seine 
fishing started in 1979 when Dongwon Industries bought a second-hand boat from Spain 
(Haward and Bergin 1996: 59), however, the Koreans have generally used United States-built 
purse seine vessels and utilised helicopters to spot tuna aggregations (FF A 1988: 94 ). It suited 
Japanese trading companies to encourage Korea' s purse seine expansion because of limits 
placed on purse seine vessel licences by the Japanese government (Schurman 1998: 114). From 
the early-1980s, Korea also entered the sashimi market, a move made possible by Korea' s lower 
operating costs, in comparison with Japan, and because the Korean fleet had been previously 
contracted and financed by Japanese trading companies (Doulman 1987b: 38). As Comitini 
(1987: 265) has remarked, however, the Korean longline fleet had achieved independence from 
Japanese trading companies by the 1980s. 
Korea' s lower operational costs have resulted in higher access fees for the Oceanic 
states, a consideration when analysing costs and benefits to the region. In addition, Japanese 
imports of Korean tuna have undercut those of the Japanese fleet. Thus, the Japanese tuna 
industry has faced a multi-faceted attack on its industry. First, it had to share the fishing 
grounds, and then it had to compete ,vith access fee levels and competition in the marketplace. 
All of these factors ,vere to impact on the future viability of the Japanese purse seine fleet. 
Taiv.. an 
The tuna industry in Taiv,ran dates back to the Japanese occupation in the early 1900s, "when 
s1nall longliners v,rere used to catch tuna in the surrounding seas" (Ho 199 5: 5 9). The industry 
was "entirely controlled by the Japanese" and it was not until the early 1960s that expansion of 
Taivlan ' s distant water fishing operations commenced (Ho 1995: 59). At that time, the 
government approved the importation of second-hand longline boats and the World Bank 
provided loans for longline vessel construction. The Taiv.ranese longline fleet commenced 
operations in the V/ CPO in 1963 , targetting albacore and yellowfin for the canned tuna industry 
(Hmvard and Bergin 2000: 35, Riepen 1987: 169). Aside from this , there has been a local 
market in Taiv,ran for sashimi since the mid-l 950s, , hich has been "dominated by fresh chilled 
product" (Haward and Bergin 1996: 125). 
By 1973, Tai, -an ' s Oceanic fleet had risen to around 200 vessels, however, because of 
oil price increases and the crash of the albacore market, Taiwan ' s longline industry started 
31 
32 
The PC Yearbook, alternatively, notes that there were 2 vessels in 1958, 33 in 1965 and 253 in 1975. The 
SPC figures shmv that 1976 was the peak year with 257 vessels (1998: 35). 
Kent (1980: 60) notes that the expansion of Korea's Iongline industry was also accomplished "with the 
cooperation of United States tuna processors". 
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declining from the mid- l 970s. While Japan had 1nade ULT operations for longliners available to 
Taiwan from the 1960s, it was not until the early 1980s that Taiwan's ULT ventures expanded 
(Haward and Bergin 1996: 140, Riepen 1987: 169). Like Korea, Taiwan's operational costs are 
less than Japan's and the Taiwanese fleet has been frequently contracted and financed by 
Japanese trading co1npanies (Douhnan 1987b: 3 8). 
Taiwan's purse seine industry started in 1980-81 with vessels imported from Japan. As 
with Korea, Japanese industry was keen to support expansion of Taiwan's purse seine fleet 
because of limits placed on purse seine licences by the Japanese goven1ment (Schunnan 1998: 
114 ). Taiwan's purse seine fleet develop1nent was also helped by its economic boom, brought 
about by expansion of capital into vessel construction "a1nong other activities" (Schurman 1998: 
114 ). It also followed the United States practice of using helicopters to spot fish aggregations. 
Like the Korean purse seine fleet, the Taiwanese purse seine fleet "has close ties with U.S. 
processors" (Douhnan 1987 d: 141 ). It is clear that, like Korea, Taiwan's longline fleet was 
dependent on the Japanese 1narket and Taiwan's purse seine fleet was dependent on the United 
States 1narket. 
United States 
The An1erican Tunaboat Association (ATA) has been a powerful lobby group since its inception 
in 1921 as the An1erican Fishennen's Protective Association in San Diego. It has involved itself 
with pro1notion of that country's tuna industry by 
fostering the exploration and development of new fisheries, conducting research, 
improving the technology of fishing, seeking legislation favorable to the tuna industry, 
and participating in international negotiations for licensing agreements (Felando 1987: 
93). 
Members of the ATA had two forays into the waters of the WCPO during the 193 Os, which 
confinned the region's rich tuna stocks. AT A tuna boats were requisitioned for service during 
World War II and supplied fish to United States troops stationed in the region (Felando 1987: 
93). 
After World War II, the AT A supported tuna research and survey programs in the 
region, which resulted in the Van Cainp cannery being established in American Sainoa and in 
operation by 1953. It is still in operation. By 1957, the first tuna purse seiner was developed and 
within five years, 97 former "bait boats had been converted to seiners, 3 newly built seiners had 
entered the fleet, and 8 1nilitary vessels had been converted to seiners" (Felando 1987: 99).33 
These conversions were considered necessary if the United States fleet wanted to remain 
competitive in the face of cheap Japanese tuna imports (Doulman: 1987d: 134). By 1972, the 
United States fleet had made extensive exploratory fishing trips to the region. After observing 
33 While American technology had spearheaded development of purse seiners earlier last century, it was not 
until 1925 that fishermen started using purse seiners in the Eastern Pacific and not until the 1950s that a 
more aggressive attitude was taken to expanding this fleet (Doulman 1987d: 134). 
46 
Pre-UNCLOS Tuna Exploitation in Oceania 
Japanese fishing methods, decisions were made regarding alterations to the purse seine nets to 
suit better the fishing conditions in a region where the "water was clear and the thermocline 
deep" (Felando 1987: 101). The United States fleet decision to move into westen1 Oceania was 
given impetus because of the "onset of the 1980-81 El Nifio" (Doulman 1987d: 138). 
Purse seine activity in New Zealand and Papua New Guinea waters during 197 4-197 5 
spearheaded the United States tuna industry's expansion into the WCPO and by 1980, the ATA 
was in negotiation with the governments of Palau, the Federated States of Micronesia and the 
Marshall Islands. It was the first multilateral arrangement "of its kind" (Felando 1987: 103), 
however, as Doulman (1987b: 46) notes, all negotiations between the island states and the 
United States were undertaken with the ATA. While coastal states globally had begun asserting 
EEZ by 1977, the United States remained isolated, asserting that "coastal nations did not have 
exclusive rights over highly migratory species while they were within their EEZs" (Van Dyke 
and Nicol 1987: 106).34 This position led to confrontation in Oceania in the 1980s, when the 
United States fleet continued to harvest tuna within a coastal state's 200-inile EEZ without 
agree1nent. 35 
This section has charted the history of fishing state participation 111 Oceania's tuna 
fisheries fro1n the 1930s to 1980. While historically Japan has been the focal point of 
operations, particularly regarding the fresh or frozen sashimi market, the United States cam1ed 
tuna 111arket has also been very reliant on supplies from the region. Japan provided support for 
the develop1nent of the Taiwanese and Korean fishing industries to ensure stability of supply to 
its do1nestic market of fresh and chilled tuna. What this section highlights is the inter-
connectedness and dependency of Japan and the United States on supplies of longline and purse 
seine caught tuna fr01n Oceania. It was only after 1977, however, that the states of the region 
were able to declare an EEZ and try to negotiate for access fees. Set by the Japanese at three 
percent, these fees could not be considered a fair retun1, given the lack of regulatory machinery 
to curtail illegal fishing activities. In addition, the Oceanic states were denied any control over 
the sustainability of the resource, a pre-colonial objective of their custodial responsibilities. 
Section three: Domestic commercial tuna operations and joint ventures to 1980 
Oceania's cam1ed tuna industry has changed dramatically from its inception during the 1950s, 
with observers suggesting that the industry 
34 
35 
has metamorphosed from a vertically integrated industry in which the two primary tuna 
conswning nations (the USA and Japan) produced tuna for their own home markets, into 
one which is increasingly global and competitive, and characterized by the economic 
independence of the actors located at different points along the 'commodity chain' 
(Schunnan 1998: 120). 
Under pressure, however, from its own fishing industry for protection of the United States EEZ, Congress 
passed the 1976 Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act (the Magnuson Act). The Act did 
exclude tuna, but resulted in concerns by Americans of Japan's bluefin tuna fishing around New England ' s 
waters (Van Dyke and Nicol 1987: 109). 
This is examined in more detail in Chapter Three. 
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While Schurman refers to the "economic independence of the actors", I would suggest that the 
industry has evolved into economic interdependence, given Japan' s reliance on the stability of 
tuna imports, and the United States ' need for a steady supply of tuna for its canned tuna market. 
The fact that Japanese industry had invested in Korea' s and Taiwan's fleet expansion also 
suggests an interdependent relationship. 
In the 1960s, the global demand for canned tuna outstripped the availability of raw tuna 
supplies. To co1nbat this, United States tuna processing companies (Bumble Bee, Van Cainp 
and Star-Kist) developed strategies that would not only secure supplies, but would also secure 
processing and distribution into the 1970s (Schunnan 1998: 121). During the 1960s and the 
1970s, multinational corporations, attracted by the robust fishing stocks in Oceania, indirectly 
financed or directly initiated ventures, though 
as a general rule, the multinationals miniinized their financial exposure in the region so 
that they could relocate their operations at little or no financial loss should market 
conditions change - as they did for the canning industry in the early 1980s - or should 
cheaper alternative raw materials become available (Doulman and Kearney 1987: 27). 
Until 1980, the production and market-base for a specific tuna product was undertaken by the 
same state. For example, United States tuna boats caught the tuna that was processed in United 
States caiu1eries and consumed by A1nericans. In the same way, Japanese vessels caught the 
111ajority of its do1nestic require1nents (Hudgins and Fernandez 1987: 289). Since 1980, Hudgins 
and Fernandez believe this situation has been irrevocably altered. The "sophisticated 
inten1ational enviromnent" 1neans 
tuna consumed by U.S. consumers may have been harvested in the western Pacific, 
transshipped to Thailand, canned in a plant leased to a multinational. Tuna harvested by 
the Japanese fleet may be shipped or traded worldwide by maguro shosha, specialist tuna-
trading companies (Hudgins and Fernandez 1987: 289). 
Until the 1980s, three United States corporations and ten Japanese corporations were 
involved in Oceania' s joint venture tuna industry. The Japanese were "single investors, joint-
venture paiiners, or consortiu1n participants" (Doulman and Kearney 1987: 30). United States 
involven1ent centred on its territory of American Samoa because of the security for United 
States investors. The United States has had what is referred to as a "go-it-alone" style (Douhnan 
and Kearney 1987: 31). These differences de1nonstrate the 
c01nmitment of the Japanese corporations to their ventures in the region .. . more long 
term and more closely aligned with the interests of Pacific island countries (Doulman and 
Kearney 1987: 28). 
This said, there is no doubt that Japanese ventures in the region were primarily concerned with 
their own national interests and costs and benefits. Any benefits to the Oceanic states would 
have assisted their cause, but would not have driven it. The rising costs associated with fuel 
prices, the introduction of access fees, the added competition of Korean and Taiwanese vessels 
and increased levels of catch, led to United States c01npanies selling boats and the Japanese fleet 
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moving to decentralise. "Fro1n this point on, harvesting tuna for the cannery business became a 
poor, if not losing, proposition" (Schurman 1998: 121-122). 
The seemingly infinite stocks of tuna led Oceanic governments and entrepreneurs to 
1nake decisions about establishing domestic tuna operations that would prove disastrous. As 
Waugh (1989: 333) argues, "Tuna fishing and processing is a highly-capital intensive business, 
best suited to the larger capital-rich countries". From the 1970s, in an effort to bring about 
greater local participation in the tuna industry, Oceanic states lobbied for investment, 
"supported by - 1nostly - foreign loans, grant funds , pay1nents in kind and local public equity 
capital" (van Santen and Muller 2000: 13). This resulted in the Oceanic states competing with 
each other for 
investment in vessels, processing plants, transship1nent facilities and general port 
infrastructure. These investments competed head-on with well established, global tuna 
industries (Waugh 1989: 333). 
In spite of this situation, by the early 1980s, so1ne Oceanic states were participating in purse 
seine harvesting for cam1ed tuna operations. The situation was compounded by the poor growth 
figures for Oceania fro1n the early 1980s (Schunnan 1998: 128). As well as poor growth figures, 
Oceanic states suffered from "lack of capital, expertise, freehold land and infrastructure" 
(Cartwright 1999: 7), resulting in "public sector vested interests" propping up those do1nestic 
ventures (van Santen and Muller 2000: 13). While there has been a level of competition between 
the Oceanic states for a share in the tuna industry, there has also been inter-state co-operation, 
Douhnan and Kean1ey (1987: 16) noting that 
[A]a striking feature of fishing and processing arrangements in the Pacific islands region 
is the extent to which several countries are cooperating in the develop1nent of their 
respective tuna industries. For example, the Fiji cannery is, or has been, supplied with 
tuna from fleets based in Kiribati, Papua New Guinea, Tonga, and Tuvalu in addition to 
its own fleets. 
There are reasons why some of the Oceanic states were 1nore successful than others in 
establishing do1nestic or joint venture operations. Son1e states are not geographically suited to 
tuna operations, for example, Niue, whose rugged cliff coastlines precludes commercial fishing 
operations (Kent 1980: 46). Other states lack the rich fishing grounds required for profitability, 
for exainple, the Cook Islands or Nauru (Kent 1980: 18, Douhnan and Kearney 1987: 16). For 
others like French Polynesia, the "deep clear waters have low levels of nutrients" (Kent 1980: 
21). 
During the period up to 1980, 1nost tuna operations were longline, with purse seine 
fishing only e1nerging in the latter stages. A complicating factor for longline fishing is the 
require1nent for baitfish, which is harvested in the lagoons of baitfish-rich states, such as Papua 
New Guinea, Fiji or the Solomon Islands. States such as Kiribati, San1oa and Tonga were 
hainpered in the development of a longline skipjack industry because of their lack of baitfish 
supplies (Kent 1980, Teiwaki 1988). Kiribati, however, did establish a milkfish fanning 
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research program as an alternative to baitfish (Johannes 1989: 96). Other reasons for the lack of 
commercial tuna fishing development in, for example, Kiribati, included the i1npact on local 
fishermen and the lack of indigenous involve1nent (Teiwaki 1988: 53-58). This lack of 
indigenous involven1ent has clear implications for the lack of indigenous control or 
domestication of the industry. This illustrates where costs and benefits have been analysed as 
not being in the national interest, for example, the negative impact for local fishennen. 
Several island states were attractive to foreign and do1nestic investors. These were 
states with good supplies of baitfish, rich fishing grounds, good econon1ic climate for 
invest1nent and a co1nfortable political environment. Nevertheless, tuna operations in these 
states have not been i1n1nune to failure or difficulty. These states included A111erican Samoa, 
Fiji, Papua New Guinea, the Sol01non Islands and Vanuatu. Their tuna operations will be 
exa1nined individually. This examination is important because it de1nonstrates that these 
operations were controlled by external forces, thus resulting in a lack of indigenous control or 
true domestication of the tuna industry. 
American Samoa 
The geographical proxi1nity of A1nerican Samoa to rich albacore, bigeye and yellowfin fishing 
grounds was a primary reason for establishing tuna cannery operations there. As a United States 
teITitory, it has a "privileged position with respect to United States import duties" (Kent 1980: 
15-16). Hence, its canned tuna can enter the United States market duty-free.36 While the first 
tuna cannery built at Pago Pago in 1949 was abandoned, the Van Camp co1npany later 
purchased it, and canning operations had begun by 1954. Star Kist co1nmenced its operations in 
Pago Pago in 1963 (Schug and Galea'i 1987: 197).37 The A1nerican Samoan government's aim 
was to ensure that its nationals would not only work in the cam1eries, but also harvest the tuna. 
The Van Can1p co1npany provided a longline vessel in 1961 and An1erican San1oans crewed as 
trainees. Because of "long fishing trips and rigorous working conditions", however, the 
An1erican San1oans lost interest and the project was dismantled in 1963 (Schug and Galea'i 
1987: 197). By the 1970s, the two cmu1eries employed approxitnately 1,200 people, mostly 
fro1n Smnoa and Tonga, but Korean and Chinese resident aliens also worked in the canneries 
(Kent 1980: 16). 
A1nerican Smnoa's co1npetitive tuna processing operations were 1nade possible by the 
advantageous customs regii11e, which allows preferential access to the United States do1nestic 
canned tuna n1arket. In tun1, this access provided long-term security to the United States tuna 
fleet, given the fall-off in tuna supplies in the eastern Pacific and the move to rich fishing 
grounds in the WCPO, close to Alnerican Samoa's processing operations. It also maintained a 
36 
37 
Exports from American Samoa could enter the United States duty free " if the foreign component value of 
the product is less than 50 percent of its market value" (Schug and Galea' i 1987: 192). 
Star-Kist became a wholly-owned subsidiary of H.J. Heinz Company in 1963 and the Van Camp Sea Food 
Company was bought by Ralston Purina Company (Schug and Galea' i 1987: 192). 
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stable supply of canned tuna to the world's largest canned tuna market. In addition to these 
economic considerations, it was seen as a safe political regime, which encouraged the expansion 
of the United States' canned tuna industry. 
Fiji 
Fiji's colonial ruler, the United Kingdom, guided the do1nestic tuna industry before its 
independence in 1970. By 1963, Fiji had established a pole and line fleet to harvest skipjack 
(Doulman and Kean1ey 1987: 10). In February of that year, the Pacific Fishing Co1npany, Ltd 
(PAFCO) was established at Levuka as a freezing and transshipn1ent base for longliners in 
Oceania. Japanese interests owned the majority of the company, with 16.7% "subscribed locally 
by private interests in Fiji (Kent 1980: 19, see also Veitayaki 1995: 56).38 The PAFCO cannery, 
set up by C. Itoh, was in operation by 1974 (Hunt 1999: 574).39 In 1975, the Ika Corporation, a 
wholly-owned Fijian co1npany was established, geared to "improving skipjack tuna processing 
by assisting the nation to 1neet PAFCO fish demands" (Veitayaki 1995: 57). It had its own pole-
and-line boats, crewed by Fijians and supplying, by contract, its catch to the PAFCO cannery 
(Kent 1980: 20-21). Waugh believes that while the Corporation, using its own and other 
chartered vessels, supplied tuna to P AFCO for processing, it has not proved a successful venture 
(Waugh 1986: 28). From the above, it can be seen that local interests in PAFCO amounted to 
only 16. 7% of the joint venture. This resulted in P AFCO being controlled by foreign interests. 
Indigenous control or domestication was not achieved. 
Papua New Guinea 
Papua New Guinea's tuna industry was controlled by its Australian colonial ad1ninistration 
before its 1975 independence. A pole and line fleet was established in 1970 to harvest skipjack 
(Douln1an and Kean1ey 1987: 10). By 1977 Papua New Guinea was "described as the world's 
third largest producer of skipjack, but this changed dramatically by late 1977, when "catch rates 
declined sharply" (Kent 1980: 30). Before its 1981 collapse, the fleet's expansion reflected 
"strong inten1ational de1nand for canning material, extensive and accessible baitfish resources, 
and year-round tuna fishing conditions" (Doulman and Kearney 1987: 14-15). During the early 
1970s, joint ventures "developed rapidly", between colonially-administered Papua New Guinea, 
three Japanese co1npanies and one Alnerican - Star-Kist Papua New Guinea Pty Ltd (Kent 
1980: 30).40 The failure of the domestic pole and line fleet provides an exainple of how, in this 
case, cli1natic conditions adversely affect the ability of a newly-independent Oceanic state to 
asse1i indigenous control and domesticate an in1portant natural resource. While Kent (1980: 30) 
notes that joint ventures "developed rapidly" in the 1970s, a closer look at the ownership of 
38 
39 
40 
This included 33.3% subscribed by C. Itoh & Company of Osaka, 25% by Nihon Ryokoku Kaisha of 
Tokyo and 25% by Banno Company of Osaka (Kent 1980: 18). 
Due to heavy losses, in 1987 it was taken over by the Fijian government (Hunt 1999: 574). 
The three Japanese ventures included Kyokuyo Co. Ltd, Kaigai Gyogo Kabushiki Kaisha, Hokoku Marine 
Products Co. Ltd, Nippon Suisan Kaisha Ltd, C. Itoh & Co. Ltd (Kent 1980 :31 ). 
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these ventures suggests that ownership and therefore control, rested finnly with the external 
partners.41 The establish1nent of joint ventures did not 1nean joint 1nanage1nent or control. 
Solomon Islands 
The United Kingdo1n controlled the Solo1non Islands tuna industry until its independence in 
1978. The Taiyo Fishing Company of Japan conducted a survey in the Solomon Islands in 1971, 
which resulted in a joint venture being signed between the Solo1non Islands Goven1111ent and the 
Co1npany in 1972.42 The Japanese parent co1npany, Taiyo Gyogyo was 
established in the 1880s as a fa1nily firm and has evolved into the world's biggest fishing 
multinational with many subsidiaries and joint venture agreements (Barclay and 
Wakabayashi 2000: 2). 
Because of overcapitalisation by domestic skipjack operations in Japan, Taiyo Gyogyo, among 
others, had started looking for investment opportunities abroad (Barclay and Wakabayashi 
2000: 2). Fro1n the Solo1non Islands government's perspective a joint venture could be a way of 
"generating foreign exchange income" and that "fisheries 1nust be 'right' for an island nation in 
the westen1 Pacific" (Hughes 1987: 205). Following the survey, Solo1non Taiyo was established 
to facilitate "the processing and marketing of skipjack tuna" and a shore base at Tulagi was 
opened in 1973. A katsuobushi plant was established in 1974 at the Tulagi facility, with a daily 
processing capacity of four tonnes (Douhnan and Kearney 1987: 21). The co1npany established 
a second base at Noro in New Georgia Island in 1976, with a brine freezer, cold storage plant 
and an arabushi processing plant.43 The Noro tuna cannery opened in 1980 (Kent 1980: 36). 
Fron1 the mid-1970s, Solomon Islands' officials "becaine more active in managing and 
directing STL" (Hughes 1987: 211 ). This included employing 1nore local crew, improving shore 
living conditions and negotiating baitfish agreements with customary owners. Difficulties were 
experienced with cultural clashes between employees, which included the murder of one worker 
(Hughes 1987: 211). The joint venture gave Taiyo "a base in the Pacific, a good supply of 
baitfish and an effective 1neans of competing with other Japanese companies operating out of 
Fiji, Papua New Guinea and Vanuatu" (Waugh 1986: 12). There is no doubt that an analysis of 
the costs and benefits associated with the Sol01non Taiyo cannery can1e out in the Japanese 
company's favour. There has been controversy over the years regarding the supply of baitfish 
with local co1nmunities con1plaining about the levels of baitfish taken from lagoons, their 
principal subsistence fishing grounds. It has been the most criticised aspect by Solomon 
41 
42 
43 
For example, Gollin Kyokuyo (Niugini) Pty Ltd was 100% owned by Kyokuyo Co Ltd of Japan and Gollin 
Investment Pty. Ltd. of Australia. Carpenter Kaigai (Papua New Guinea) Pty. Ltd. was 75% owned by 
Kaigai Gyogo Kabushiki Kaisha and 25% owned by W.R. Carpenter P.N.G. Ltd. New Guinea Marine 
Products Pty. Ltd. was 100% ovmed by Japanese Interests. Star-Kist Papua New Guinea Pty. Ltd. was 
100% owned by Star-Kist Inc., California (Kent 1980: 31). 
This survey had come about through what Hughes describes as a "chance meeting with a Solomon Islands 
official" (1987: 205). 
Arabushi is a semi-processed type of katsuobushi. The tuna is loined and trimmed, then laid on trays for 
smoking (Ashenden and Kitson 1987: 238). 
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Islanders of the joint venture (Barclay and Wakabayashi 2000: 5). Baitfish agreements with 
custo1nary owners ( as noted above) did help alleviate this irritation. 
For the Sol01non Islands, the joint venture enabled exploitation of "deeper-water species 
such as yellowfin, albacore ... and in addition, to obtain better use of canning facilities in the 
off-season when skipjack catches were slu1nping" (Waugh 1986: 12). Solomon Taiyo has not, 
however 
greatly contributed to the transfer of technology, management skills and technical skills, 
nor has it greatly contributed to the training of Solomon Islanders (Waugh 1986: 12). 
With this deficiency in mind, a private co1npany, the National Fisheries Development Limited 
(NFD) "was established in 1977 to encourage localization of the skipjack fishing industry- that 
is, to increase participation and control by Solo1non Islanders" (Kent 1980: 3 7, see also Waugh 
1986: 12). The NFD bought a boatyard at Tulagi and, with an Asian Development Bank (ADB) 
loan, organised the construction of fishing boats.44 Solomon Taiyo has an interest in NFD, 
which was contracted to supply its tuna catch to Solomon Taiyo for processing (Kent 1980: 7, 
Waugh 1986: 12. 
The Solo1non Taiyo joint venture represents the 1nost committed operation of its kind in 
Oceania. In spite of increased local involve1nent in the venture, however, it was still controlled 
by Japanese interests. Furthermore, by 1naintaining an interest in NFD, Solomon Taiyo could 
also control its tuna operations. By not being involved with the loan for construction of the 
fishing boats, however, Solomon Taiyo could benefit from whatever fish NFD harvested 
without financial com1nitment. 
Vanuatu 
Control of Vanuatu' s tuna industry rested with the British and French Condominium, until its 
independence in 1980. A joint venture involving Japan, the United Kingdom and the United 
States interests established the South Pacific Fishing Co1npany (SPFC) in 1957 at Palekula in 
Southeast Espiritu Santo. Initially, the 1najor shareholders were Mitsui and Co1npany holding 
76% and the Vanuatu goven1lllent holding 9% (Riepen and Kenneth 1989: 131). The Company 
provided a land base for freezing, for cold storage of the catch from longliners operating 
in the area and for shipment to markets and canneries in the United States, Japan and 
Europe (Kent 1980: 28). 
To start with, the base housed approxi1nately twenty Japanese longliners, harvesting albacore 
for the white 1neat tuna market in the United States (Riepen and Kenneth 1989: 131). The 
Palekula base provided "unloading and transshipping wharves, a 2508 tonne cold store, two 
slipways, workshops, a fishing gear store and fuel bunkering facilities" (Philipson 1989: 25). 
Philipson goes on to note that the Koreans took over from the Japanese in 1967 and then the 
44 The ADB was reportedly very keen to become involved. It saw the project as "a way to increase lending 
both to the fisheries sector and to the Pacific islands and as a counter to what it felt was excessive 
dependence on Japanese technical support in fisheries development" (Hughes: 1987: 209). 
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Taiwanese took over in 1975 (see also Riepen and Kenneth 1989: 131). The Santo venture was 
affected by American Samoa's tuna prices, with Santo's tonne per tuna price being set to the 
American Sainoan price by 1975 (Kent 1980: 28, Philipson 1989: 25). It is estimated that the 
facility had "a total freezer capacity of 6,000 tonnes" and was "capable of handling 25,000 
tonnes of tuna per annum" (Doulman and Kearney 1987: 18). By the late 1970s, the facility was 
in decline. 
Vanuatu' s do1nestic industry was the least successful of the states under review in this 
section. This was due to the less-rich fishing grounds of Vanuatu's EEZ in comparison to Fiji, 
Papua New Guinea or the Solomon Islands, two of whom are Parties to the Nauru Agreement 
(PNA) members.45 As well, Vanuatu provided transshipping facilities, whereas An1erican 
Sainoa, the Solo1non Islands and Fiji each had processing capacity. Because of Papua New 
Guinea's rich fishing grounds, processing plants in the region, for example, in Fiji, could be 
well-supplied. For these reasons, Vanuatu never achieved the success of the other states 
evaluated in this section. 
It is clear to see why so1ne states were advantaged in the search for joint ventures or 
more likely to attract invest1nent. For example, rich fishing grounds, proximity to processing, 
good port facilities, and stable governn1ents. Apart from American Samoa, the states in this 
discussion were colonies and forn1er colonies of the United Kingdo1n and had in place 
developed govenunent infrastructure and flourishing settler populations.46 American Sainoa, as 
a territory of the United States, also had a stable government and a secure economic 
environ1nent from which the United States tuna fleet could benefit. 
This Chapter aimed to fulfill several tasks. The first was to outline the pre-colonial era's 
indigenous conservation of fishing and illustrate how, through supplying fish to settler 
comn1unities for example, the island communities entered the westen1 cash economy. Through 
pre-colonial inter-island contacts the region developed a sense of informal regional identity 
which would serve them well when they later became involved with formal regional co-
operative endeavours. This pre-colonial discussion demonstrates how the four objectives of 
effective regional co-operation that dominate contemporary analysis of the region's tuna 
resource originates in pre-colonial. Sustainability of fisheries was ensured through a 
conservation ethic that goven1ed marine resource extraction. A fair return to island com1nunities 
by way of future resource protection was ensured through judicious control. The extraction of 
marine resources was domesticated and under indigenous control. 
The second task was to outline the activities of fishing states operating in the EEZ of the 
Oceanic states. This exainination de1nonstrated how major fishing states, such as Japan and the 
45 
46 
The PNA is a sub-regional group within the FF A, whose members have rich tuna grounds. PNA members 
include Papua New Guinea, Palau, Marshall Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Kiribati, Nauru, 
Solomon Islands and Tuvalu. 
That said, Vanuatu was a condominium, with the United Kingdom and France sharing responsibility. 
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United States were dependent upon Oceania's tuna resource for supplying the fresh or frozen 
domestic sashimi market in Japan, or for the canned tuna market in the United States. In 
addition, the entry by Korea and Taiwan into the region's tuna industry signalled to Japan that 
while it could not compete with the lower operating costs of either of these two states, it could 
control their operations by providing financial assistance. By doing so, Japan could ensure the 
stability of its tuna i1nports. 
The third task was to establish how, through the development of joint ventures and 
domestic participation, the indigenous 1narine culture which had prevailed for many centuries 
was di1ninished. It was through interaction in the global tuna economy, for example, that the 
region became part of the globalising era. This interaction necessitated the development of a 
1noney econo1ny, a disintegration of traditional authority through involvement in the 
commercial sphere and the introduction of new laws and practices designed to integrate the 
island c01n1nunities with prevailing attitudes elsewhere in the world. Those Oceanic states with 
rich tuna stocks were not in control of joint ventures or other fishing state operations active in 
their EEZ. Rather, fishing states exerted control over their activities by being the dominant 
shareholders. The development of joint ventures in Oceania is interesting because it highlights 
the more conservative approach taken by the United States tuna canning industry in comparison 
to the 1nore development-focused approach of the Japanese. Furthermore, the Oceanic states 
lacked the capital infrastructure necessary to develop a strong, vibrant domestic industry 
capable of co1npeting with the fishing states. 
While the examination of the domestic industry stops at 1980, it is evident that these 
newly-e1nerging independent states thought they could see costs and benefits associated with 
their desire to participate in what appeared to be an infinitely wealthy resource. For those states 
with tuna stocks, access to processing facilities, good port facilities and a strong stable 
government, there see1ned some likelihood that joint ventures or domestic participation could 
pave the way for the development of a long-term industry. The idea that the Oceanic states 
could participate fully in their tuna industry was a dreain that came with independence. Those 
four objectives of effective regional fisheries co-operation that preoccupy the contemporary 
aspirations of the region have re-emerged fron1 the colonial era and owe their existence to their 
pre-colonial conservation ethic. This Chapter has demonstrated how the island communities 
lived with this conservation ethic and how it was lost after their integration within the global 
tuna economy. The fo1ihcoming chapters demonstrate how the region has striven to regain that 
ethic through collective diplomacy aimed at asserting control of the tuna resource in the face of 
the activities of powerful fishing states. 
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From Chapter Two's exainination of fishing state activities it is clear that until the late-1970s, 
their activities were largely unchallenged by the island states. The vessels caine and they fished 
at will. Freedom of the high seas meant that the sea's resources were free for all, res nullius, 
apart from the three-111ile territorial liinit, and even that could be bridged unopposed, if the fish 
schools were closer to shore. 1 When it became clear during the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea (UN CLOS) III negotiations (1973-1982) that developing coastal states would 
press for inclusion of 200-nautical 111ile Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs ), the story of tuna 
fleet operations in Oceania irrevocably became more complex. 
The UNCLOS negotiations were important to the regional debate on the need to 
establish an organisation to co-ordinate the activities of tuna fleets in the region and to provide 
assistance to individual member countries in their negotiations with fishing states. The 
establislunent of the Formn Fisheries Agency (FFA) in 1979 and the finalisation of the 
UNCLOS in 1982 occurred within a cli111ate of Cold War geopolitics and the continuing 
decolonisation of Oceania. Between 1980 and the mid-l 990s, the FF A finalised a series of 
1nultilateral treaties designed to achieve the objectives of collective fisheries diplomacy. This 
Chapter concludes that the establislunent of the FF A and the finalisation of the UN CLOS were 
se111inal events that allowed a re-emergence of that pre-colonial conservation ethic which had 
been repressed during the colonial years of fishing state activities. 
The Chapter is split into four sections. The first section provides a perspective on global 
pre-UNCLOS fishing and examines the UNCLOS negotiations up until the finalisation of 
UNCLOS III. This section demonstrates the dogged position of the fishing/maritiine states 
regarding the freedon1 of the high seas, pre-UNCLOS. It was through their participation at 
UNCLOS III negotiations that the newly-independent Oceanic states realised the possibilities of 
co-operative action. The second section examines the history of the FF A. This section 
de1nonstrates the cun1ulative achievements in the effectiveness of collective fisheries 
diplo111acy, 111ade possible by the e111erging UNCLOS regime. The third section examines 
various FFA-initiated regional and sub-regional instruments. These include the negotiations to 
conclude the United States n1ultilateral fisheries treaty with the FF A member-states and its 
grounding in Cold War politics. These multilateral treaties and instruments were finalised to 
help the FFA reach those objectives, for example, sustainability, a fair return, domestication and 
indigenous control. It is not enough to finalise those treaties and multilateral arrangements. Such 
arrangements have to contain substantive provisions to support conservation and management 
objectives and have to be capable of enforce111ent or have a likelihood of influencing behaviour. 
See discussion below at section three on the defiance of 200-nautical mile EEZ and 12-nautical mile 
territorial sea by the United States tuna fleet in Oceania until the mid- l 980s. 
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The fourth section studies the region's co-operative efforts to conclude the Driftnet Fishing 
Convention and illustrates the emerging environmental norms that helped the region to achieve 
its objectives in relation to collective fisheries diplomacy. The region's failure to finalise 
albacore manage111ent arrangements with Japan, Korea and Taiwan is also examined. Such a 
failure represents an example of the conditions that can limit successful achievements. The 
Chapter demonstrates specifically how the region's involvement at the UNCLOS III 
negotiations, the establish111ent of a regional fishery organisation, the FF A, and the 
implementation of regional and sub-regional agreements, supported the region's effectiveness in 
collective fisheries diplomacy. 
Section one: The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UN CLOS) 
While the concept that the sea was free to all had appeared in the Institutes and Digest of the 
Byzantine E111peror, Justinian, published in 533AD, by 1598 Alberico Gentili had introduced 
the concept of territorial waters. It was left to Hugo Grotius, a Dutch jurist and the father of 
inten1ational law, (1583-1645), to define marine customary law in 1609 (Gosselin 1988: 43, 
Cicin-Sain and Knecht 1998: 68). Grotius believed that 
state practice had since developed allowing states to forbid foreigners fishing at their 
coasts, to cannon shot, or even beyond (Gosselin 1988: 43).2 
Thus, there were "two distinct jurisdictional regimes; the territorial sea and the high seas" 
(McRae and Munro 1989: 97). Within the territorial sea, a state had absolute ownership of its 
resources, whereas the high seas were "open to all" (McRae and Munro 1989: 97).3 In the 
United Kingdo111, Jaines I instituted that country's "first formal act of marititne sovereignty" in 
1609, which required foreign boats to seek and be given approval for annual fishing licences in 
order to curtail overfishing by foreign vessels (Gosselin 1988: 45). This act of maritime 
sovereignty prevailed during an era of 
imperial maritime powers ... namely, the Dutch and the British [who] had the military 
might to protect the right of their connnercial vessels to sail unrestrained throughout the 
oceans (Van Dyke 1993: 14).4 
By 1860, however, multilateral agreements had become a frequent necessity to help solve 
"pressing com111unal problems" (Gosselin 1988: 71). One of the most important of these 
n1ultilateral agreements was the 1882 North Sea Fisheries Convention, concluded between the 
2 
3 
United States Secretary of State, Thomas Jefferson asserted in 1793 that the state had jurisdiction to "the distance of a cannon shot from the shore within one marine league, or three miles" ( Gosselin 1988: 73 ). 
"The three-mile limit was supposedly set by the distance which an eighteenth-century cannon could reach" (Keohane and Nye 1989: 91). 
The development of the concept of the :freedom of the seas was in direct defiance of a papal bull decreed by Pope Alexander VI in 1493, which stated that "all lands west of the Azores would be Spain' s and all lands 
east of that line ... would appertain to Portugal. Soon, Spain was claiming exclusive navigation rights to the 
western Atlantic Ocean ( challenging the exploratory voyages of the English) and Portugal was claiming the 
same rights for the South Atlantic and Indian Oceans" (Cicin-Sain and Knecht 1998: 68). 
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United Kingdom, Denmark, France, Holland, Spain, Norway and Germany. This Convention 
was "the earliest international agreement regulating fishing activity conducted solely on the high 
seas" and "remained in force until 1964" (Gosselin 1988: 85-86). 
The maintenance of res nullius came under increasing scrutiny, particularly in the post-
World War II environment. Fishing states were called upon to exercise "reasonable use ... with 
due regard for the interests of other nations" (Sutherland 1985: 1). By 1951, the supre1nacy of 
the 1nariti1ne powers was shaken by the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case (United Kingdom v. 
Norway). The Inten1ational Court of Justice (ICJ) found in Norway's favour for a four-1nile 
fisheries zone, "exclusively for use by its own people" (Gosselin 1988: 184). The United 
Kingdom had argued for a three-mile limit and reacted with alarm to the ICJ' s decision 
(Gosselin 1988: 184, Harris 1991: 354-362).5 By 1952, several South American states, including 
Chile, Ecuador and Peru had asserted 200-nautical mile zones, in spite of objections by the 
United States.6 The American Tunaboat Association (ATA) negotiated with these states and 
concluded "mutually acceptable regulations lasting until the 1960s" (Gosselin 1988: 232). 
The first United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS I) was held in 
Geneva in 1958 and it adopted four conventions. These were: The Convention on the Territorial 
Sea and the Contiguous Zone; the Convention on the High Seas; the Convention on the 
Continental Shelf; and the Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of 
the High Seas (Churchill and Lowe 1981: 14).7 In spite of the adoption of the four Conventions, 
the Conference's inability 
4 
5 
6 
7 
to agree on a maximum breadth for the territorial sea meant no agreement could be 
reached on major issues such as parameters of exclusive or preferential fishing rights (Gosselin 1988: 33 8). 
Smith (2000: 14) notes that in the Dutch maritime economy of the 16th and 17th century, "industrialisation 
began first of all in fisheries, commercial shipping, naval activity and associated areas such as fish 
processing and shipbuilding". 
See also Akehurst (1991: 8, 33). 
While the South American states had "negligible continental shelves", their assertion of a 200-nautical mile 
zone had come about from the proclamation in 1945, by the United States President, Truman, that "the 
resources of the extensive continental shelf of the United States were national property" (Churchill and 
Lowe 1983: 3 ). Because of President Truman's proclamation, African states too declared "territorial seas of 
50 or 200 miles, endangering the freedom of navigation of navies as well as commercial fleets" (Mann 
Borgese 1996: 3 ). President Truman 's proclamation ended the period since the 1600s of "stability" in the 
concept of freedom of the seas (Cicin-Sain and Knecht 1998:69). The Truman proclamation resulted in an 
"alarming" increase in fishing disputes between the United States fleet and South American states, for 
example " [I]in 1947 Peru arrested its first U.S. tuna vessel; by 1954, 20 tuna vessels had been seized by 
Peru, Ecuador, Columbia, El Salvador and Panama . .. and between 1979 and 1983, a total of 79 vessels 
were seized by a diverse range of countries including Canada, Costa Rica, Mexico, Venezuela, Columbia, 
Papua New Guinea and Ecuador, resulting in fines totalling in excess of US $13 million" (Waugh 1989: 31-
32). This was also known as "gunboat diplomacy" (Keohane and Nye 1989: 102, but see also pages 93-94). 
The Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas came into force in 
March 1966. A coastal state had jurisdiction over its territorial sea and, outside of that, fishing states had 
freedom of access (Kent 1980: 68). This Convention, however, was considered to be "too weak to prevent 
further overfishing" (Mann Borgese 1993: 23 ). The Geneva UN CLOS negotiations became known as the Geneva Conventions. 
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Because of this inability, a second conference, UNCLOS II, was convened in 1960 not only to 
address this issue, but "also the associated question of fishery limits" (Churchill and Lowe 
1981: 14).8 It was also realised that states were able to "pick and choose among the four 
conventions", which produced a "frag1nented system" (Mann Borgese 1993: 23). The UNCLOS 
II conference failed, by one vote, to "adopt a compromise formula providing for a six-mile 
territorial sea, plus a six-1nile fishery zone" (Churchill and Lowe 1981: 14, Gosselin 1988: 
353).9 
H.E. Ambassador Arvid Pardo of Malta made the plea for a further conference in 
November 1967 at the United Nations General Assembly. Pardo "drew the attention of an 
incredulous world community to the vast resources at the bottom of the deep sea" [ calling for] 
"a resolution declaring the seabed and its resources to be the common heritage of humanity" 
(Mann Borgese 1993 : 26 and 1996: 4). 10 Pardo's vision of a common heritage "sounded 
egalitarian enough to attract" the attention of the Group of 77 (077) (Friedhein1 1987: 86), 11 a 
group established in 1964 by seventy-seven developing countries. 12 These developing coastal 
states believed that by holding another conference, they could gain recognition of 200-nautical 
1nile EEZs. This had i1nplications particularly for fishing states, such as the United States, 
whose vessels continued to insist on their right to fish to the limit of the three-mile territorial sea 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
See also Akehurst (1991: 168). 
After the conclusion of UNCLOS II, Norway declared a twelve-mile fisheries zone, stating that it was 
"valid under customary international law, at least for countries whose coastal population was highly 
dependent upon fisheries" . New Zealand claimed a twelve-mile fisheries zone in I 965, with Australia 
following suit in 1967 (Gosselin 1988: 377). 
In support of Pardo ' s plea, the General Assembly passed a Resolution in 1970, the "Declaration of 
Principles Governing the Sea-Bed and Ocean Floor and the Subsoil Thereof, Beyond the Limits of National 
Jurisdiction (Res. 2749, XXV), in support of the common heritage principle" (Kent 1980: 158). More than 
a century ago, "the Challenger expedition discovered the presence of potato-sized nodules scattered across 
large areas of the sea bed, mainly beyond the geological continental shelf at depths of around 3,500 metres" (Churchill and Lowe 1983: 155). The nodules included cobalt, manganese and nickel. As well, component 
metals include titanium, palladium, platinum and gold. There are important concentrations of these nodules 
in the central Pacific, between Hawai'i and Micronesia (Wenkam 1974: 104). To claim an EEZ, an island 
must be inhabited. It has been important therefore to lay claim to uninhabited islands. The United States has done so, to many islands either uninhabited or those which have been uninhabited for most of time. These 
islands include Johnston Island, Kingman Reef and Palmyra Island (all south ofHawai ' i). Other 
uninhabited islands under dispute include the Spratlies and the Paracels, Clarion Island, and Clipperton 
Island. Clipperton, an island with "potentially-rich zone of polymetallic nodules" has been disputed 
between France and Mexico (For an in-depth analysis of this dispute, see Van Dyke and Brooks 1979). 
It may have sounded egalitarian to some, but to others the idea was farcical: 
"A bunch of bleeding hearts at the United Nations introduced a resolution which everybody laughed at 
initially to give the deep seabed beyond the Continental Shelf to the United Nations so that they could lease 
it and use the proceeds to buy javelins for the people of Ghana. I guess I would say that if you have the 
skill, guts and intelligence to go beyond the present legal limit of the Continental Shelf as defined in the 
Convention, go to it, until you run head on into somebody. Then you can sit down and talk about it. If you 
tum the seabed over to the United Nations, which has no respect for private property, which is bankrupt and 
cannot govern its own finances and which does not know the meaning of sanctity of contract, it would be 
abhorrent. We will resist this effort ... "(The Ocean and the Investor, (1969) New York: Dean Witter & Co. p 121 in Kent 1980: 159). 
The G77 is a coalition of Third World states which "provides the means for the developing world to 
articulate and promote its collective economic interests and enhance its joint negotiating capacity on all 
major international economic issues in the United Nations system" (see http://wvvw.2:77.org/). 
59 
Oceanic states in ascent 
(Friedheim 1987: 86). 13 It was also argued that the Geneva Conventions had been "overtaken by 
events, both scientific and political" (Harris 1991: 348). For example, mariti111e developments 
such as new technology for exploratory 111ining of the seabed and continental shelf, over-fishing 
and pollution concen1s. 14 
During the 1960s, the maritime capabilities of the Soviet Union had increased and it 
wished, along with the United States to preserve "the ocean status quo", namely freedo111 of the 
high seas (Friedheim 1987: 85). In spite of their Cold War differences, the two superpowers 
shared a co111111on goal; their military activities required "uni111peded transit passage through 
straits used for inten1ational navigation" (Friedhei111 and Akaha 1984: 13). By 1970, however, a 
growing band of newly independent members of the United Nations had begun calling publicly 
for a review of the 1958 UNCLOS. These calls led to UN CLOS III being convened in 1973. 
The Conference had two 111ain groups, the developing states, who "were clearly in the 
avant-garde of innovation", and the developed, maritime states, "in defense of the status quo" 
(Mann Borgese 1996: 5). The fonner group was known as the Group of 77 (G77) that tried, in 
finalising the Convention document, to "ensure that non-111ining states would benefit from 
resources extracted fro111 the deep sea-bed" (Miller 2000: 236). 15 Not just this, however, but the 
aim of the G77, in NIEO tenns, was to insist upon "a redistribution of benefits from North to 
South" (Friedheim and Akaha 1984: 12). Friedheim and Akaha (1984: 12) point out that 
developing states felt the prevailing inten1ational political econo111y disadvantaged them, as they 
were reliant on Northern econo111ies. For example, the North supplied "high-priced industrial 
products" and that the South supplied "the relatively cheap raw 111aterials" (Friedhei111 and 
Akaha 1984: 12). 
The second group, that of developed states, was concen1ed that the "liinits of national 
jurisdiction had to be stabilized to protect the freedo111 of navigation of the great naval powers" 
(Mann Borgese 1993: 23). 16 It was a ti111e of change as the supremacy of the maritin1e powers 
was being eroded. This erosion was evidenced, for exan1ple, by the delays at UNCLOS III 
13 
14 
15 
16 
These were mainly the Latin American States of Chile, Ecuador and Peru. 
Sutherland (1985: 2) notes that there were " [C]conflicting political considerations, limited institutional 
authority, disagreements about catch allocations, problems of enforcement" which militated against 
" international co-operation" . The biggest issue, however, was still the "traditional high seas philosophy". 
Cox (1979 376-378) has analysed the NIEO and its origins from the 1973 Algiers conference of the 
nonaligned states. At the first level, the NIEO is a " series of specific demands and considerations embodied 
in ... official documents adopted by international conferences". At the second level, it is "a negotiation 
process . .. between countries of North and South" . At the third level, it is a "debate about the real and 
desirable basic structure of world economic relations". At the fourth level it concerns "the form of 
knowledge appropriate to understanding these issues" (1979: 376-378). The proposals to establish an NIEO 
was discussed at a special session of the United Nations in 1975 which "generated an intragovernmental 
debate about policies towards the Third World in general" (Keohane and Nye, 1989: 35, 36). Put simply, 
the NIEO debate centred on "the distribution of power among states, with the developing countries 
pursuing a more favourable distribution of power (Oman and Wignaraja 1991: 111). 
The traditional maritime states were also concerned to halt what they termed "creeping jurisdiction" (Friedheim 1987: 85). 
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caused by consensus decision-making, rather than by majority voting to confirm decisions as 
· 171819?0 had previously occurred at UNCLOS I and II. -
Early into the UN CLOS III negotiations, agreen1ent was reached ( and endorsed by both 
the Soviet Union and the United States) regarding the rights of coastal states over resources 
within an Exclusive Economic Zone of 200-nautical miles from the territorial sea baseline ( an 
EEZ).21 Both Cold War superpowers were willing to concede EEZ rights as a trade-off for 
inten1ational navigation rights (Friedheim and Akaha 1984: 13). This agreement was important 
to the Oceanic states, given their vast sea area.22 The two superpowers also agreed with the 
implen1entation of a 12-nautical mile territorial sea and a "formal affirmation of rights of 
1novement through straits and archipelagos" (Friedheim 1987: 91). 
The conference's negotiations on the issue of highly migratory fish stocks and 
straddling fish stocks hit a stumbling block in 1981 when the United States' Reagan 
Administration declared its intention of undertaking a "policy review of the entire draft 
Convention" (Friedheim 1987: 104 ). The United States 1naintained that highly migratory fish 
stocks, for example, should not fall within the Convention's ambit. Rather, they should be 
considered separately and should be managed through an appropriate inten1ational organisation. 
It took the United States a year to review the draft Convention, during which time the other 
conference participants had strengthened their positions and were positively disposed towards 
finalising the negotiations, with or without the United States (Friedheim 1987: 104 ).23 24 
17 
18 
19 
20 
2 1 
22 
24 
The developed countries had approached the UN CLOS III negotiations with the belief that traditional forms 
of voting procedures would apply, however, "when they perceived the hostility of a substantial majority to 
traditional international law, they quickly embraced the notion of decision by consensus or near consensus" (Friedheim 1987: 88). 
There were also difficulties at UNCLOS III regarding seabed mining (Akehurst 1991: 169, Churchill and 
Lowe 1981: 16-17). The seabed mining issue, under Part XI of the UN CLOS, was a major impediment for 
the United States and other developed states. To satisfy the developed states, it was renegotiated as the 
Agreement relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea of JO December 1982 in 1994 (Part XI Agreement). 
There are global consortiums interested in the extraction of seabed minerals. Companies from the United 
States, the United Kingdom, France, Canada, Japan, Belgium and Italy are involved. The 1958 Convention 
agreed that the seabed minerals issue was "subject to the general principle of the :freedom of the seas" (Churchill and Lowe 1983: 157). While the majority of developed Western states have affirmed this view, 
it is not the view of the developing states, which comprise the majority of members at the United Nations. 
While the developed states wished this issue to proceed slowly at UNCLOS III, developing states had an 
alternative view. They wished the issue to be moved quickly through the negotiation process to not only 
secure "agreed principles but . .. an international organisation with wide powers to regulate sea-bed 
mining""(Churchill and Lowe 1983: 158). 
Mann Borgese (1996: 6-7) argues that the Part XI Agreement was in "flagrant violation of international law 
... [and] it creates an International Seabed Authority which is not viable. For example, the chambered 
voting system allows the industrialised members to block Council decisions, as well as other 
"contradictions and weaknesses which will be hard to live with" . 
The definition of baseline under UN CLOS III is the same as was negotiated for the 1958 Geneva 
Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, that is "the normal baseline is the low-water 
line" (Kent 1980: 151). 
See map of the region at Figure 1.1 , page 1 a of the Introduction. 
Some observers have said that the 1982 UNCLOS "represents a constitution for the world's oceans. Not 
only are the rights of nations relative to the ocean and its resources carefully spelled out, but also the duties 
and obligations of nations are made clear" (Cicin-Sain and Knecht 1998: 71). 
As at August 2002, the United States is yet to ratify the UNCLOS. 
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So what was achieved at the UNCLOS III? Achievements include: a twelve nautical 
mile territorial sea, extending from the territorial sea baseline;25 a contiguous zone, with an 
outer limit of 24 nautical miles from the territorial sea baseline;26 a 200-nautical 1nile exclusive 
econo1nic zone, with jurisdiction over non-highly migratory species, extending from the 
territorial sea baseline;27 a continental shelf with an outer limit of 200 nautical miles from the 
territorial sea baseline, or beyond, to the outer edge of the continental margin - see Article 7 6, 
UNCLOS; and the high seas to lie beyond the EEZ or continental shelf (UNCLOS 1982).28 
There are crucial issues under the UNCLOS in relation to the EEZ activities of fishing 
states in Oceania. One of the most important issues relating to fisheries access and management 
is that of the distinction between sovereignty and sovereign rights.29 The distinctions between 
'sovereignty' and 'sovereign rights' are complex. The following is offered as an interpretation. 
Sovereignty 1neans a state has exclusive rights, legal supremacy and powers over its lawful 
jurisdiction. Alternatively, sovereign rights prescribe control over a specific issue as a 
consequence of sovereignty. For example, Australia's sovereignty over its territorial sea means 
it has the sovereign right to exploit its resources as it sees fit, or as may be allowed under 
international law.30 Another i1nportant issue under the UNCLOS is the requirement that coastal 
states finalise fishing access arrangements with fishing states if their domestic harvest of the fish 
stocks is less than the Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY).31 Both of these issues had 
ran1ifications for the Oceanic states through their declarations of EEZs. 
The issue of highly migratory stocks was not resolved at UNCLOS III; it was only 
referred to under Article 64, which notes that32 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
3 1 
32 
The coastal State and other States whose nationals fish in the region for the highly 
migratory species ... shall co-operate directly or through appropriate international 
organizations with a view to ensuring conservation and promoting the objective of 
While the coastal state has sovereignty over this zone (including airspace), it does allow for the right of 
innocent passage by foreign vessels. 
A contiguous zone is an area beyond the territorial sea where the coastal state may exercise its rights 
regarding customs, immigration, or sanitary laws. 
A coastal state has sovereign rights of exploration, exploitation, conservation and management of the living 
or non-living natural resources. 
The high seas "may be used freely by the ships of all nations". A vessel on the high seas is subject to 
international law and to the laws of the specific Flag State. While traditional flag states have rules and 
regulations regarding the operations of vessels flying its flag, flags of convenience (FOC) states have fewer 
scruples. For example, FOC vessels can be used to avoid paying taxes or minimum wages, or defy rules 
regarding "ships ' lights, safety regulations, the slave trade, compulsory insurance, ' pirate ' radio stations, 
pollution and the conservation of fisheries" (Akehurst 1991: 182). See also Van Fossen (1992) for a 
specific study on Oceanic FOCs. 
See Akehurst (1991: 15-19 and Churchill and Lowe (1983: 130-132) for discussions on sovereignty and 
sovereign rights. 
I was grateful for advice on this issue from Judith Swan, (Consultant, SwanSea Oceans Environment Inc., 
Nova Scotia) and Mark Gray (Executive Officer, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Canberra). 
My thanks to Lorraine Elliot (Fellow, Australian National University) for her suggestion that the issues of 
MSY and the distinction between sovereignty and sovereign rights be made more explicit in this thesis. 
Munro (1989: 21) notes that "[T]to distant water fishing nations engaged in harvesting tropical tuna, the 
claim that coastal states should be able to lay claim to tuna resources off their coasts seemed particularly 
radical. The tuna fisheries had, after all, been developed by distant water fishing nations and were still 
dominated by them". 
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optimum utilization of such species throughout the region, both within and beyond the 
exclusive economic zone. In regions for which no appropriate international organization 
exists, the coastal State and other States whose nationals harvest these species in the 
region shall co-operate to establish such an organization and participate in its work. 
The developing coastal states at UNCLOS III believed that highly migratory fish stocks 
(including tuna), were "simply so1ne among many transboundary resources" (Munro 1989: 21). 
Alternatively, fishing states, headed by the United States criticised this approach, claiming that 
highly migratory fish stocks "should continue to be regarded as international com1non property 
and should be 1nanaged by international organisations" (Munro 1989: 21).33 34 The United States 
later conceded the rights of the Oceanic states over highly migratory stocks with the finalisation 
of the Multilateral Fisheries Treaty in 1987 (see section three below). 
A 1najor criticism levelled at the Convention by Arvid Pardo is that the Convention 
document does not enc01npass an holistic, overarching syste1n, which includes "scientific 
research, the development and transfer of technology, transport on sea and on land, processing, 
trade, and 111arketing" (Kent 1980: 151). It is instead foccussed narrowly on production (Kent 
1980: 151). Furthermore, while developing coastal states believed they would gain from an 
extended 200-nautical mile EEZ, it is larger developed states that have been the major winners. 
For exainple: the United States gained 2,222,000 square miles; Australia gained 2,043 ,300 
square miles;35 Indonesia gained 1,577,300 square miles; New Zealand gained 1,409,500 square 
miles;36 and Canada gained 1,370,000 square miles (Kent 1980: 154). 
In the Western and Central Pacific Ocean (WCPO), the United States has claimed a vast 
area, thanks to Hawai ' i, and United States control over the islands of Midway, Wake, Palmyra, 
as well as a "string of uninhabited atolls" (Dolman 1985: 59). France, with its dependencies of 
French Polynesia, New Caledonia and Wallis and Futuna, has gained a combined extended 
jurisdiction in excess of seven million square kilo1netres (Dolman 1985: 59). That said, Japan 
was a big loser, as "nearly half of its marine fisheries production has been from the coastal 
waters of other nations" (Kent 1980: 154). Until 1974 Japan opposed the concept of an EEZ. At 
that tin1e, Japanese do1nestic politics were dominated by the needs of its distant water fleet for 
unencun1bered access to the EEZ of other coastal states in as far as their three-1nile zones. The 
bulk of Japan ' s fish supply (approximately 43.7% in 1974) caine from those coastal states ' 
waters (Friedheim and Akaha 1984: 4). It is not surprising, therefore, that Japan "was the sole 
opponent of the 200-nautical mile exclusive econo1nic zone proposal" at the UNCLOS ill 
negotiations in 1974 (ABARE 1988: 282). That said, while Japan publicly opposed the 
33 
34 
35 
36 
What the United States wanted "was an IA TTC-type organisation in which distant water fi shing nations 
would share, if not dominate, the management of the resource" (Munro 1989: 21 ). (IATTC: Inter-American 
Tropical Tuna Commission) 
The issue of highly migratory fi sh stocks was later tackled in the Agreement for the Implementation of the 
Provisions of the United Nation Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 Deceniber 1982 relating to the 
Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (the Fish 
Stocks Agreement). See Chapter Four. 
Australia claims Norfolk Island, Lord Howe Island and the Macquarie Islands (Dolman 1985: 59) . 
New Zealand claims Kermadec Islands, Chathan Islands, Auckland and other islands (Dolman 1985: 59). 
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introduction of 200-nautical 1nile EEZ enclosures, privately vanous ministries and industry 
knew that Japan's isolation was not tenable (Fukui 1984: 47). The reason Japan maintained its 
public stance was because 
They could plausibly tell the angry fishermen, when the inevitable occurred, that they had 
done all they could to prevent the EEZ's [sic] and were not responsible for the problems 
that would result from worldwide adoption of such zones (Fukui 1984: 47)37 
Not only was Japan isolated on its anti-EEZ position, but it was also forced into accepting the 
regi1ne for a number of reasons. For exainple: the Soviet Union, the Republic of Korea and 
China had arrested Japanese vessels for entering their 200-nautical mile EEZs; the increased 
co111petition with Japan's EEZ by the Soviet Union and the Republic of Korea; and the denial of 
access to their EEZs by the United States and the Soviet Union (see ABARE 1988, Friedhei111 
and Akaha 1984). 
Attendance at the UNCLOS III negotiations was restricted to those independent Oceanic 
states that had either the economic resources or suitably qualified personnel able to attend. For 
exainple, while Kiribati achieved independence in 1979, it was felt the negotiations were too 
advanced and too technical for its officials to participate and do1nestic issues both leading up to 
and i1nmediately following independence precluded attendance (Teiwaki 1988: 60).38 The 
Oceanic states of Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Tonga and Westen1 Samoa did attend and played an 
active role in relevant aspects of the negotiations.39 Fiji's senior representative to the UNCLOS 
III negotiations was H.E. A111bassador Satya Nandan, who chaired the negotiations for the Fish 
Stocks Agreement and who later becaine the Director of the Inten1ational Seabed Authority in 
Jamaica (Veitayaki 1995: 18).40 
The United States Trust Te1Titories of Micronesia were not independent states at the titne 
of the UN CLOS III negotiations . It was apparent to those territories that their interests diverged 
fr01n those of the United States. While Micronesia did attend the UNCLOS III negotiations, it 
"did not achieve the full contracting party status" it had requested, but was rather accorded 
observer status "with no right to vote" (Kent 1980: 44).41 42 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
There were other complicating factors behind Japan 's quandary over the EEZ regime. When Japan 
introduced its 200-nautical mile fishing zone in 1977, because of shared access, it excluded " South Korean, 
Chinese and Taiwanese boats and large areas west of Japan from the restrictions" (ABARE 1988: 282). 
Japan shares EEZ claims to the East China Sea with the Republic of Korea, the People's Republic of China 
and the Republic of China. There are considerable oil reserves in the East China Sea (Friedheim and Akaha 
1984: 10). This makes any negotiations and claims very sensitive. 
Before 1979, the United Kingdom had represented Kiribati at the UNCLOS III negotiations. 
Fiji was the very first state to ratify the UNCLOS III (Veitayaki 1995: 18). 
Nandan also chaired the negotiations between 1997-2000 to conclude the Convention/or the Conservation 
and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific (WCPF Convention). 
An important side effect of Micronesia' s attendance at the UN CLOS III negotiations was the realisation of 
the "practical importance of retaining authority over foreign affairs" (Hezel 1995: 360). It resulted in the 
United States agreeing in 1978 that the Compact should be amended to reflect Micronesian control over 
foreign affairs. 
By October 1977, the Congress of Micronesia had passed legislation for 200-nautical mile EEZ around its 
islands. Suddenly, " [L]land poor Micronesia had become ocean-rich", giving the Micronesian islands rights 
"to nearly two million square miles of sea (Hezel 1995: 360). 
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Together with Tonga and Western San1oa, Fiji pr01noted the preference for an EEZ 
arrangement over other suggested arrangements at the UNCLOS negotiations.43 With New 
Zealand's support, they drafted a proposal regarding the importance to Oceania of an EEZ 
arrangement (Teiwaki 1988: 72-73). The Oceanic states had two major concerns in their pursuit 
of EEZs. The first concern related to growing populations, the accompanying stress on inshore 
fish stocks and attempts by island governments to persuade them to fish further out to sea. The 
second was a growing unease at the increasingly 'high tech' nature of fishing state vessels 
c01npeting with artisanal fishennen (Leaney 1994: 160). 
The draft proposal on an EEZ arrangement was incorporated into the Convention and 
gave the Conference an insight and "appreciation of the special needs of the South Pacific 
islands" (Kullenberg 1999: 851 ). Thus, the EEZ regime has been crucial to the pursuit of 
equality in the oceans, because they "cover about 8% of the earth's surface, 25% of global 
primary productivity and 90% of the total fish catch" (Kullenberg 1999: 851 ). Not least, 
however, as many of the Oceanic states were not yet independent or represented at the 
conference, the arguments put forward regarding EEZ jurisdiction at the UNCLOS negotiations 
by New Zealand, Fiji, Tonga and Sainoa "[E]epitomised the underlying com1nunal spirit and 
togethen1ess characteristic of the islands of the South Pacific region" (Teiwaki 1988: 72). 
Another contribution made by the Oceanic delegates at the conference related to the 
special concerns of archipelagic states.44 As Teiwaki (1988: 81) notes, this matter had been a 
controversial one, between "the archipelagic states and the mariti1ne powers since the Hague 
Conference of 1930".45 Maritiine powers such as the United Kingd01n and the United States 
protested that the clai1ns of archipelagic states "would result iI1 areas which had previously been 
high seas or territorial seas becoming inten1al waters" (Teiwaki 1988: 81). This had relevance to 
areas around the Philippines and Indonesia that were traditional shipping corridors (Teiwaki 
1988: 82). At UN CLOS III, the archipelagic states of Fiji (led by Satya Nandan), the Philippines 
and Indonesia, as well as Mauritius, joined forces to negotiate a suitable text regardiI1g the 
special rights of archipelagic states. After intense negotiations between the archipelagic states, 
the United States and the Soviet Union, agreement on the text was reached, "with the exception 
43 
44 
45 
These included a custodial/preferential arrangement a view liked by Canada and the United States. Another 
view was the right of a coastal state to "extend its fisheries jurisdiction beyond the limits of its territorial 
sea", but that the coastal state had to take into consideration "historic" access of fishing states (McRae and 
Munro 1989: 99). This latter option was the basis of the Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (United Kingdom v. 
Iceland). These disputes were known as the "cod wars" (see Akehurst 1991: 180, Churchill and Lowe 
1983: 270, 293 , Keohane and Nye 1989: 96). This third view was preferred by Japan and the Soviet Union 
(Leaney 1994: 161). 
Article 46 of the UNCLOS stipulates that an" 'archipelago ' means a group of islands, including parts of 
islands, interconnnecting waters and other natural features which are so closely interrelated that such 
islands, waters and other natural features form an intrinsic geographical, economic and political entity, or 
which historically have been regarded as such". 
The Hague Conference was the result of years of reports on issues, such as "territorial waters, piracy, 
exploitation of marine resources, and the legal status of State-owned merchant ships". Unfortunately, 
however, the Conference was not able to agree on "a convention on territorial waters. Nevertheless, the 
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of the Philippines" (Teiwaki 1988: 82, Veitayaki 1995: 18). In this way, the participation by the 
Oceanic states at the UNCLOS III negotiations made a difference. Furthermore, their 
participation gained them valuable experience in multilateral negotiations. 
It is interesting to reflect on why the United States and Japan gave way on the EEZ 
issue, which would change forever the way fishing was undertaken in the region. First of all, the 
United States did not agree, at that conference, to the rights of coastal states over highly 
migratory fish stocks. The United States did agree to 200-nautical 1nile EEZs, for very clear 
reasons, as illustrated above. It gained sovereign rights over vast sea areas, based on Hawai'i 
and its other islands in the Pacific - Palmyra, Wake and Midway. As regards Japan, it had 
i1nportant ( and politically strong) coastal fishing industries that would have lobbied hard for an 
EEZ. In addition, Japan was also reliant on fishing access to other coastal states. 
Section one charted the history of the negotiations to conclude the UNCLOS. The 
history demonstrates the shifts in global norms in relation to the rights of coastal states over the 
rights of the traditional 1nariti1ne powers for unfettered access to waters in as far as three 1niles. 
There was no consideration by fishing states regarding conservation and managen1ent measures 
when fishing in close to the shores of a coastal state. It took nine years of negotiations to 
conclude UNCLOS III and while so1ne of the measures reflect the rights of coastal states, the 
regin1e also accords increased jurisdiction to developed coastal states with the resource capacity 
required to 1nanage their extended zones. 
The section outlined the involve1nent of newly independent Oceanic states at the 
UNCLOS III negotiations and how they worked co-operatively to have their concerns addressed 
in the Conference's text. There is no doubt that the UNCLOS III experience gave the1n an 
opportunity to develop co-operative abilities. These negotiations were an important step in the 
region's plans to establish a regional fisheries organisation to help manage and conserve their 
1narine resources. There were fears in Oceania about fish stocks being over-exploited by the 
blatant harvesting of tuna by foreign fleets fishing, in son1e cases, just beyond the reef.46 47 The 
conclusion of UN CLOS regime marked a seminal event in the region's abilities to re-introduce 
that pre-colonial conservation ethic that had guided 1narine exploitation. 
Section two: The history of collective fisheries diplomacy in Oceania 
At the South Pacific F oru1n meeting in Nauru in 197 6, two papers were presented for 
consideration by delegates regarding Law of the Sea issues, one by the Prime Minister of Papua 
46 
47 
articles drawn up by the Conference surfaced at UNCLOS I (Churchill and Lowe 1983: 13-14). See also 
Keohane and Nye (1989: 93). 
See the South Pacific Forum' s "Summary Record" of its 1976 meeting (South Pacific Bureau for Economic 
Co-operation). 
See the discussion in Chapter Three, regarding the activities of the United States fleet. Also see Friedheim 
and Akaha (1984: 4) regarding Japan ' s 'need ' for access to coastal states ' waters in as far as the three-mile 
zone. 
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New Guinea and the other by the Prime Minister of Fiji.48 Papua New Guinea's paper, entitled 
"Environmental Conservation in the South Pacific", was notable because it connected fisheries 
issues with environmental conservation.49 The paper also highlighted the importance of co-
operation and co-ordination of the independent island states, and emphasised a "common 
purpose" of F orun1 States (Paragraph 19, Su1nmary Record of the Seventh South Pacific F orun1 
1976: 3).50 Under Agenda Ite1n 6: Law of the Sea, the Fijian Prime Minister tabled a paper 
concen1ing the UNCLOS negotiations. It 1nentioned the "possible establishment of a South 
Pacific Regional Fisheries Organisation" (Paragraph 4 7, Sumn1ary Record of the Seventh South 
Pacific Forum 1976: 7).51 The Forum meeting adopted a declaration which highlighted "the 
importance they attached to develop1nents taking place at UNCLOS III" as well as initiating a 
meeting to discuss these issues further (Sutherland 1985: 13-14).52 Herr (1994: 287) believes 
that the EEZ concept "had a magnetic attraction" for the Oceanic states particularly those that 
lacked land-based natural resources. 
That "1nagnetic attraction" translated into a meeting that took place in October 1976 at 
which Me1nber states tabled three decisions. The first decision was to declare 200-nautical mile 
EEZs. The second was to "harmonise" the region's fisheries policy in pursuing a "co-ordinated 
approach in their negotiations with dwfns"53 (Kent 1980: 166). The third was agreement in 
principle for the establishment of a regional fisheries organisation to "promote conservation and 
rational utilization" of the region's fish stocks (Kent 1980: 166).54 The South Pacific Bureau for 
Econo1nic Cooperation (SPEC) offered the meeting two options regarding the "nature and 
men1bership of the proposed organization" (Nee1nia 1986: 33). The first option called for the 
inclusion of all interested states to conserve, 1nanage and properly utilise their living resources, 
thereby adhering to the Article 64-type organisation envisaged by the UNCLOS. The second 
option was n1ore narrowly defined as "maximising benefits for the coastal nations", which 
would secure "1naxin1u1n concessions fro1n foreign fishing nations" (Nee1nia 1986: 33-34). 
Thus, the second option did not conform to an Article 64-type organisation, instead being 
region-orientated (Nee1nia 1986: 33-34).55 It is clear there were different goals for each of these 
options and therefore, national interests, including costs and benefits, would be factors in 
detennining which of the two options was preferred. 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
Island states that were, at that time, members of the United Nations included Fiji, Papua New Guinea, 
Tonga and Western Samoa, all "had the benefit of keeping up with contemporary developments with the 
Law of the Sea (Teiwaki 1988: 106). 
New Zealand had presented papers to the Forum in 1973 and 1974 regarding foreign fishing "and the need 
to police fishing grounds in the South Pacific (Haas 1989: 114 ). 
See also see also Sutherland (1985: 13) and Sutherland and Tsamenyi (1992: Chapter 3). 
The South Pacific Commission (SPC) had convened "several technical fisheries meetings, beginning in the 
late 1960s" (Haas 1989: 114). Furthermore, in 1970 the South Pacific Fisheries Development Agency was 
established by the SPC in liaison with the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) (Haas 
1989: 114). 
See also Teiwaki (1983: 106). 
' dwfns ', or 'DWFNS ' stands for distant water fishing nations. Throughout this thesis, I refer to them as 
' fishing states ' . 
See also Sutherland (1985: 14) and Gubon (1987: 246). 
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The fishing states that attended that meeting, namely the United States, Chile, France, 
the United Kingdo111, Japan and Korea, preferred option one. Many Forum members preferred 
option two. Central to the differences was the United States ' determination to consider highly 
migratory fish stocks separately and the equal detennination by the Oceanic states to have them 
included in their national jurisdictions (Neemia 1986: 34). In addition, Japan did not recognise 
coastal state jurisdiction over highly migratory fish stocks (Tarte 1998a: 98). By the time of the 
Port Moresby South Pacific Forum meeting in August 1977, however, fractures had appeared 
between island govermnents regarding the inclusion or otherwise of fishing states in the new 
organisation. At the signing of the South Pacific Forun1 ' s Port Moresby Declaration in 1977, it 
was i111plied that the second option was being considered (Kent 1980: 168). 
A Foru111 follow-up meeting took place in Suva in Nove111ber 1977 at which 
representatives frmn the United Kingdom, France, Chile and the United States attended, 
"purportedly to represent the nonsovereign territories they administered in the region", and 
Japan attended as an observer (Gubon 1987: 247).56 The United States continued to insist on the 
separateness of highly 111igratory stocks and on the related primacy of the United States Fishery 
Conservation and Management Act of 1976 (the Magnuson Act), Section 202e which states 
the United States shall not recognize the clailn of any foreign nation to an exclusive 
economic zone ( or equivalent) ... if such nation - ( 1) fails to consider and take into 
account traditional fishing activity of fishing vessels of the United States ; (2) fails to 
recognize and accept that highly migratory species are to be managed by applicable 
il1ternational fishery agreements, whether or not such nation is a party to any such 
agreements (United States Government 1996, see also Kent 1980: 169). 
By the South Pacific Forum 1978 meeting in Niue, however, disunity among the 
oceanic states had becon1e apparent (Sutherland 1985: 14, Fry 1981: 471). There was also 
hostility towards the United States for trying to force its views on the Oceanic states regarding 
highly 111igratory skipj ack tuna stocks, the 111ain resource that the FF A would be "controlling" 
(Fry 1981: 4 72). The Prune Minister of the Solomon Islands, Peter Kenilorea, argued that 
We do not interfere in the coal mines of America - why should America be able to 
interfere in the fisheries of the independent Pacific Forum countries? (in Kent 1980 : 169). 
The central theme rum1ing through the two options to be considered by the Forum 
111e111bers was the "distir1ction between conservation and 1nanagement" as well as the "precise 
scope of the co-operative duty" (Sutherland 1985: 14 ).57 The two options split the Oceanic 
states. Option one was favoured by fishir1g states, as well as Australia, ew Zealand, Westen1 
Sarnoa, the Cook Islands and Niue. Apart fro111 Western Samoa, a fonner ew Zealand colony, 
55 
56 
57 
See also Teiwaki (1983: 106). 
See also Sutherland ( 1985 : 26). 
Sutherland and Tsamenyi (1992: 27) discuss the implied differences between management and 
conservation, utilising the Concise Oxford Dictionary 's interpretation. That is, "to 'manage' is to organise, 
regulate, take control of, while the verb 'conserve' means to "keep from harm, decay, loss, especially with 
a view to later use" . 
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the two other Oceanic states were, at that time, dependent territories of New Zealand and were 
not those with rich tuna resources. The second option was favoured by Fiji, Papua New Guinea, 
Nauru, Tonga, Kiribati and the Solomon Islands, most of who1n had substantial tuna resources. 
Dolman (1985: 52) believes that the dispute was, however, based on "different 
interpretations of self interest". The larger islands felt confident in their abilities to exploit the 
fisheries the1nselves, thus obviating the need for fishing states in the region. The small states, 
with fewer resources and limited inten1al capacity, believed their advantage lay in selling 
licence fees to fishing states and therefore saw advantage in their inclusion in a regional 
agreement. While this provides one view of the debate, it is essential to consider other factors: 
the Cold War politics of the period; the decolonisation process in the region at that ti1ne; the 
divergent interests of those Oceanic states with fish and those without fish; and the national 
interests of fishing states and other regional powers. 
What 1nost island governments sensed was the influence exerted by the United States 
over Australia and New Zealand concerning defence and political issues and how this might 
reflect the power balance within a regional fisheries organisation that included fishing states. 
Some Forum states were "uneasy" about the possibilities of adverse influence on decision-
1naking within the new organisation (Herr 1994: 287). Others reflected that by including fishing 
states like the United States within the organisation, 1night "oblige it to control its fishing fleets" 
in the region (Neemia 1986: 35). Another element to the debate was the refusal by the United 
States to concede the rights of coastal states to conserve and manage highly migratory stocks in 
their EEZs. 
All differences aside, the 1978 Niue Forun1 meeting closed with an agreed upon 
resolution to establish a regional fisheries organisation along the lines proposed in the Port 
Moresby Declaration of 1977 - the second option (Kent 1980: 170). This was followed-up at 
the July 1979 Honiara Fonnn meeting, where the decision to uphold that Declaration was 
approved by Island leaders. In August 1979, The South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency 
Convention entered into force (Teiwaki 1988: 107, Herr 1990: 5).58 In doing so, Herr (1990: 5) 
believes the region deliberately chose to adopt an insular perspective regarding its fisheries 
policies with fishing states. Furthermore, by going along that route, Herr argues that the region 
deliberately chose to control its fisheries resources, including the highly migratory fish stocks, 
within 200-nautical 1nile exclusive econo1nic zones that would "derive maxi1nu1n financial 
benefits" fron1 foreign fishing fleets (Herr 1990: 5). This would not be possible within the 
frainework of an Article 64 organisation (Gubon 1987: 248). I question the use of the word 
58 There was the distinct possibility that a coalition, including Papua New Guinea and Fiji, would agree to 
form their own fisheries organisation, should the United States be allowed to participate. This controversy 
was running in tandem with growing cultural supremacy battles between Polynesia and Melanesia over 
issues such as leadership of SPEC(Fry 1981 : 472-473). 
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"insular" in Herr's argument. The Oceanic states were very aware of exten1al forces. 
Furthennore, given their inter-island pre-colonial contact, and with it their informal regional 
identity, they were not ignorant of or indifferent to other cultures. It was a deliberate decision, 
1nade in the context of prevailing geopolitical dynamics, to keep the me1nbership within the 
region.59 This does not signify insularity. Furthermore, as Bergin (1994b: 2) states, "as an 
organisation it does not have to concern itself with suspicion and non-cooperation among 
DWFN members".60 
The region needed a strong, cohesive body which would achieve objectives, such as the 
conservation and manage1nent of the region's tuna fishery. The decision to follow option two 
also 1neant that those states that had originally favoured option one realised that their specific 
interests were not those which would advance the common interest of the region. Sainoa, the 
Cook Islands and Niue were all to argue later against the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone 
(SPNFZ), reflecting a 1noderate, pro-United States attitude.61 Nevertheless, as with the later 
SPNFZ, these states conceded their specific interests to the good of the region. 
The Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA) became an organisation that co1nprises the Forum 
Fisheries Con11nittee (FFC) and a Secretariat, which is answerable to the FFC (Sutherland and 
Tsamenyi 1992: 46). The FFC decides on the appointment of the Director and Deputy Director 
of the FFA. Both anns of the Agency are "designed to be consultative and advisory", with 
neither ann having the "power to determine the allowable catch or allocate the surplus catch to 
foreign countries" (Van Dyke and Heftel 1981: 18). These functions are the responsibility of 
individual island 1ne1nbers, who then advise the FF A of specific management decisions taken 
regarding issues such as catch quotas (Gubon 1987: 254). Funding for the FFA is received fron1 
Australia (26%), Canada (12%), New Zealand (7%) and contributions from other members. 
Japan has funded adviser positions, as has the United States and the Commonwealth Secretariat. 
Other donor funding has been received fro1n Canada, China, Korea and Taiwan. Cash income 
has also been generated fro1n registration fees and administrative costs associated with the 
Multilateral Fisheries Treaty (FFA Annual Report, 1998c: 24-25, 3 7). 
The functions of the FFC include: fonnulating policy and administrative principles for 
the FF A; "providing a f orun1" to facilitate discussion regarding shared fisheries resources; 
operational functions in line with the Convention; and facilitating "coordination and 
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While other regional and international organisations cannot be members of the FF A, they do attend 
meetings as observers. These include the member organisations of the South Pacific Organisations Co-
ordination Committee (SPOCC).59 Other organisations include: the European Commission (EC); 
Commonwealth Secretariat, Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO); International Centre for Living 
Aquatic Marine Resources (ICLARM); United Nations Development Programme (UNDP); Overseas 
Fishery Co-operation Fund (OFCF); and representatives of parties to the Convention on the Conservation 
of Antarctic Living Marine Resources (CCAMLR) (Aqorau 1998: 93). Observers attending FFA meetings 
have included the officials from the dependent territories of American Samoa, French Polynesia and New 
Caledonia. 
DWFN - distant water fishing nation. 
See Chapter One. See also Fry 1986. 
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cooperation" within the region regarding fisheries 1nanagement, dealings with fishing states; 
monitoring, control and surveillance; trade-related functions of fish processing; and access to 
regional jurisdictions by fishing states 01 an Dyke and Heftel 1981: 18). To further these 
functions, the PFC meets once a year and makes its decisions by consensus. Where consensus 
cannot be reached, the Convention allows for motions to be passed by two-thirds of those 
1nembers present, thus marking a departure from the 'Pacific Way' 62 (South Pacific Formn 
Fisheries Agency Convention, 1979). 
The operations of the Secretariat are to: "collect, analyze and distribute information on 
living 1narine resources, especially the highly migratory species; collect and disseminate 
infonnation on 1nanage1nent, legislation, and agree1nents adopted by other countries; provide 
assistance in the development of fisheries policies, negotiations, issuances of licenses, 
collections of fees, surveillance and enforce1nent;63 and establish working arrange1nents with 
regional and international organizations, especially the South Pacific Co1TI1nission" (South 
Pacific Fonun Fisheries Agency Convention, 1979). Thus, the operations of the Secretariat are 
focused on the technical aspects of the FF A's require1nents and are supplemented by scientific 
studies undertaken by the SPC (Fong 1993: 132). These studies have also allowed for co-
ordination between the SPC, FF A and the University of the South Pacific (USP) regarding 
"research and educational programmes" (Teiwaki 1988: 107).64 
What en1erges fron1 the above tasks is that these 1nultilateral activities are 1nore cost-
effective than could be achieved unilaterally, therefore, following a costs and benefits approach, 
it is in the national interest of individual Oceanic states to support the organisation. By lin1iting 
the 111e1nbership to the region, the organisation has been able to focus on achieving conservation 
and manage1nent objectives. Hence, while fishing states, under the FFA's Convention, can 
become a Party, this has not occurred, suggesting the "belief that their exclusion continues to be 
in the interests of Men1ber States" (Sutherland and Tsainenyi 1992: 45). This "exclusion" has 
1neant that the FF A has not been preoccupied with the "suspicion and non-cooperation" of 
fishing state 1ne1nbership (Bergin 1993: 5). 
So1ne observers believe that the FF A's operations have been "facilitatory" to the needs 
of its 1nembership (Sutherland 1985: 43 ). Others consider that this facilitation aspect extends to 
"regional co-operation with other non-regional organisations", as well as exten1al aid 
organisations which fund regional marine programs (Teiwaki 1986: 107). Both are correct. The 
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The 'Pacific Way" was a term coined by Ratu Mara at the 1965 Lae SPC Conference where the so-called 
' rebellion ' by indigenous participants was staged. The 'Pacific Way' promotes "tolerance and decisions by 
consensus" (Hoadley 1992: 55). 
As an example of the service provided by the FF A to its members, detailed below is an account of help 
given to Kiribati. "The FF A was actively involved in the provision of essential services to the development 
of fisheries in Kiribati, including the provision of expert advice in the access negotiations with DWFNS, 
providing a data base for fisheries information on economic, management and legal matters; establishing 
working arrangements with regional and international organisations and conducting training programmes 
on issues of concern to the members" (Teiwaki 1986: 107). 
See also Neemia (1986: 34-35). 
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FF A is renowned globally for its efforts to co-ordinate regional fisheries policies as well as 
being considered "a unique regional organization" because of its twofold purpose of co-
operation, and technical advice/assistance (Gubon 1987: 254 ). 
At this point, it is interesting to reflect on Axline ' s argu1nent regarding the failure of 
1nany regional co-operative ventures globally during the era known as ' old regionalism' . Axline 
( 1994a: 4) has referred to these failures as casualties of the Cold War, the "double oil shock, 
increasing debt burden, and contraction of world-wide trade" . According to Axline, it was only 
in the 1990s, in the post-Cold War era, that 'new regionalism' emerged, on a different standing 
to that of ' old regionalis1n ' . This argument is referred to below in the context of the various 
regional and sub-regional instru1nents effected by the FF A. At this juncture, it is sufficient to 
point out that Oceania was different. The Cold War cli1nate in the region enhanced, rather than 
din1inished attempts by the Oceanic states to strengthen their position in the global political 
econon1y. The finalisation of the UNCLOS and the establishment of the FFA were primary 
vehicles used by the region to achieve its objectives of collective fisheries diplo1nacy. 
Section three: Regional and sub-regional fisheries arrangements 
Shortly after the 1979 establishment of the FF A, a sub-regional group of 1nember states formed 
the Parties to the Nauru Agreement (PNA Group).65 These states included the Federated States 
of Micronesia, Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, Nauru, Papua New Guinea and the Solomon 
Islands.66 The PNA states had noted the time taken to establish the FFA and, being the states 
with the richest tuna fishing grounds in the region, were determined to protect their tuna 
resources, in line with the new UNCLOS regin1e of extended jurisdiction (Doulman 1987e: 
258). Other FFA n1en1ber states were invited to join the PNA Group, and the FFA "was also 
n1andated to serve as secretariat" for the PNA Group (Teiwaki 1986: 108).67 . The PNA Group 
was established in 
an attempt to strengthen the bargaining position of Island nations by regulating the issue 
of fishing licences to foreign cmnpanies and thus prevent DWFNS playing Island nations 
against one another in access negotiations (Teiwaki 1986: 108). 
Thus, individual states had a co1nn1on interest in establishing the PNA Group. After its 
establislunent, the PNA Group finalised two i1nportant initiatives. The first initiative was the 
65 
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67 
See Appendix C fo r an outline on the regional and sub-regional arrangements which have been finalised. 
These include: The Nauru Agreement Concerning Co-operation in the Management of Fisheries of 
Common Interest, 1982 (otherwise known as the Parties to the Nauru Agreement, or the PNA Group); An 
Arrangement Implementing the Nauru Agreement Setting Forth A1inimum Terms and Conditions of Access 
to the Fisheries Zones of the Parties; Second Arrangement Implementing the Nauru Agreement Setting 
Forth Additional Terms and Conditions of Access to the Fisheries Zones of the Parties; Palau Arrangement 
for the Management of the Western Pacific Purse Seine Fishery Palau Arrangement; Federated States of 
Micronesia Arrangement for Regional Fisheries Access; the Niue Treaty on Co-operation in Fisheries 
Surveillance and Law Enforcement; the Treaty on Fisheries Between the Governments of Certain Pacific 
Island States and the Government of the United States of America; and The Convention for the Prohibition 
of Fishing with Long Driftnets in the South Pacific Region. 
Tuvalu joined the PNA in 1991. 
See also Tarte (1 998a: 98). 
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Regional Register, which would control the access to the region ' s waters by interested foreign 
fleets. The second initiative was the harmonised terms and conditions of access with which 
those fleets had to comply. The two initiatives will be discussed and analysed below. 
First Implementing Agreement68 
The First Iinple1nenting Arrangement in 1982, "provides for the establishment of a regional 
register of foreign fishing vessels to be maintained by the FFA" (Aqorau 1998: 112). The 
Regional Register had a controversial beginning, with Japan and the American Tunaboat 
Association (AT A) strongly resisting the initiative, stating that it was " illegal, discri1ninatory, 
and unenforceable" (Douhnan 1987e: 262). It is a require1nent of the Regional Register that all 
fishing vessels wishing to operate in the EEZ of PNA states have to be recorded and issued with 
a licence, before concluding access agreements. Applications must include a recent photograph 
of the vessel, with its call sign and name clearly displayed (Aqorau 1998: 226). The database 
includes "infonnation about the vessel owners, operators, 1nasters and provides a history of any 
changes in that information" (Aqorau 1998: 226). The Regional Register is kept up to date and 
if violations occur, the vessel is penalised and, in extreme cases of illegality, is struck off the 
register, losing its "good standing" (Tarte 1998a: 99). Being struck off the Regional Register 
applies when 
an operator is found to have carried out unlicensed fishing, presented inaccurate or 
incomplete catch logs, fished in a closed area or within the territorial waters of a member 
country or coffilnitted any other offence against the fishing laws of the member country; 
and either not complied with any judgment handed down by a court (such as payment of 
compensation) or evaded trial (Tarte 1998a: 99). 
Once struck off, the vessel is unable to be re-registered "until its standing on the register is 
restored" (Douhnan 1987e: 262). 
Another aspect of the Regional Register is its e1nphasis on con1pliance, which rests 
solely with either the Flag State, or the fishing association to which the vessel belongs. The 
concept of the Flag State is meant to 
compel the flag-state to accept some degree of responsibility for the compliance of its 
vessels with the fisheries laws and regulations of the coastal states (Tsamenyi and Blay 
1989: 47). 
Because of this, the Regional Register has been a positive factor of the effectiveness of the 
"regional regime for the management off oreign fishing vessels" and has been taken up by other 
regional fishing organisations, such as the Caribbean Community (CARlCOM) and a sub-
regional West African fisheries co1nn1ission (Aqorau 1998: 227-228). The Regional Register is 
considered a substantive provision within a meaningful multilateral treaty, with a punitive 
68 An Arrangement Implementing the Nauru Agreement Setting Forth Minimum, Terms and Conditions of 
Access to the Fisheries Zones of the Parties. 
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mechanism in the case of 111isdemeanours that include sanctions such as fishing vessels being 
struck off the Regional Register. 
For exainple, the Regional Register's worth was illustrated when United States purse 
seiners, Ocean Pearl (1985) and Priscilla M (1986) were both threatened with being struck off 
the Regional Register for violating the terms of their access arrangements (Doulman 1987 e: 
262). The United States fleet operators may have calculated the costs and benefits of defying the 
principles underlying the Regional Register. Nevertheless, the fact that the United States 
Govem111ent was, at that time, negotiating a multilateral fisheries treaty with the region 111ay 
have swayed that Govermnent from taking punitive action against individual Oceanic states ( see 
pp 25-29 below). 
Second Implementing Agreement69 
The Second Implementing Agree111ent of the Nauru Agreement in 1990, contains additional 
hannonised 111init11um terms and conditions of access for fishing vessels. These include a 
prohibition of transshipment at sea; and an obligation by vessel operators to pay travel costs, 
provide acco111modation and provide full insurance for observers. In addition, the provision of a 
vessel 111onitoring syste111 (VMS) on the vessel is required, "in anticipation of developments in 
c0111111unications in technology" (Aqorau 1998: 114 ). The Second Implementing Agreement 111et 
strong opposition fro111 fishing states, such as Japan (Tarte 1998a: 100). While these 
Imple111enting Agreements were sub-regional arrangements finalised under the PNA Group ' s 
auspices, the FF A has applied them as minimum tenns and conditions (MTC) for all its 
111e111bers for use in negotiations with fishing states (Herr 1990: 10, Cartwright 1999: 5). Not 
only was it a show of unified strength to the fishing states, but it was also an indication of their 
detennination to achieve the objectives of collective fisheries diplo111acy, that is: sustainability, 
a fair return, do111estication and indigenous control. 
Observers have argued that schisn1s have appeared within the PNA Group, which have 
detracted from its success. This includes the decision by the Marshall Islands and Papua New 
Guinea to "defect" from the 1983 ATA agreen1ent (Teiwaki 1998: 112). There has also been a 
"tendency for island states to renege" on some of the PNA Group ' s decisions (Tarte 1998a: 99-
100). This has occurred when fishing states have "refused to comply with the require111ents and 
threatened to fish elsewhere" (Taiie 1998a: 99-100). As Aqorau (1998) and Tarte ( 1998a) both 
note, however, this refusal was countered by the introduction of the Second Implementing 
Agreement. In relation to the defection by the Marshall Islands and Papua New Guinea, Teiwaki 
(1988: 12) argues that Kiribati was not able to 111ake such a decision, given its reliance on 
fishing access pay111ents. Papua New Guinea has other rich natural resources and the Marshall 
Islands, at that tin1e, was still a Trust Territory of the United States, and in receipt of significant 
69 Second Arrangement Implementing the Nauru Agreement Setting Forth Additional Terms and Conditions of 
Access to the Fisheries Zones of the Parties. 
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financial support. Furthen11ore, as Tarte (1998a: 99) points out, in the early 1980s, the tuna were 
abundant, forcing coastal states to compete for access fees. This situation left individual 
Oceanic states vulnerable to the persuasive tactics of fishing states to accept the minimum 
access payments. In spite of these cracks in the PNA's armour, however, they were not enough 
to bring down the apparatus of regional fisheries co-operation. Rather, it would seem that the 
objectives of collective fisheries diplomacy were maintained during this period of innovation. 
Why? The strength of the PNA Group seems sufficient to bear the co1npeting de1nands of 
national interests. That it is able to do so is a reflection of the strength of the effectiveness of 
regional co-operation. 
As well as these two Iinplementing Agree1nents, the PNA Group has also finalised two 
other, stand-alone Anangements. The first of these is the Palau Arrangement for the 
Management of the Western Pacific Purse Seine Fishery (Palau Anangement), which came into 
effect on 28 October 1992. The second is the Federated States of Micronesia Arrangement for 
Regional Fisheries Access (FSM Anangement) that caine into effect in September 1995. These 
Anangements were finalised to highlight the iinportance that the PNA 1nembers placed on 
encouraging "domestic based and local fishing vessels" (Swan 1997: 7). 
The Palau Arrangement70 
The decision by the PNA Group to finalise the Palau Anange1nent was a "precautionary move" 
as concerns heightened in the late 1980s regarding the stock levels of yellowfin and bigeye tuna 
(Cartwright and Uherbelau 1998: 10).71 At that time, there was disquiet regarding the over-
harvesting of these stocks (Cartwright and Uherbelau 1998: 10, Aqorau 1998: 116). In line with 
Articles 56(1) and 61 of the UNCLOS, the Palau Anange1nent placed limits on fishing effort 
and the nu1nber of vessels (205 cunently), licensed to fish in the EEZs of 1nember states.72 It 
was presun1ed that by cutting effort, catch rates would increase over the mediu1n to long tenn 
(Ca1iwright and Uherbelau 1998: 10, Aqorau 1998: 116). The Palau Anange1nent applies not 
just to the EEZ of n1e1nber states, but also to the "adjacent high seas in the Western Pacific 
where purse seine vessels operate" (Article 1. l(a) of the Palau Anange1nent). The "special 
interest" of adjoining coastal states to high seas is also affirmed in the Anangement (Preainble, 
Palau Anangement). The Palau Anangement is reflective of the pre-colonial conservation ethic 
of Pacific island societies regarding their custodial responsibilities towards marine resources. It 
represents the objectives of collective fisheries diplomacy as its aim is the sustainability of the 
resource, ensuring a fair return fro1n fishing states and increasing indigenous control. It also 
de1nonstrates a detennii1ant in evaluating effectiveness, that is, substantive provisions in 
meaningful treaties. 
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Palau Arrangenientfor the Management of the Western Pacific Purse Seine Fishery (Palau Arrangement) 
The Palau Arrangement was opened for signature on 28 October 1992 and entered into force on 1 
November 1995. 
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While the fishing states were not happy initially with the Palau Arrangement, relations 
have improved. The very fact that fishing states were not happy with the Arrangement signals 
that it was _designed to limit over-harvesting, in other words, ensuring the resource's 
sustainability. Cartwright and Uherbelau (1998: 10) note that since the mid-1990s, the 
Arrangement has also had an "ancillary purpose". It has been used as a manage1nent tool to 
decrease the level of foreign fleet operators and encourage the number of domestic vessel 
licences. In doing so, the region was achieving another objective of collective fisheries 
diplomacy, that of domestication. The Palau Arrangement has had to take account of other new 
instru1nents such as the Fish Stocks Agree1nent (see Chapter Four). Aqorau and Bergin (1997: 
178) believe that the Palau Arrangement "is a bold atte1npt by the Nauru Group to manage the 
skipjack and yellowfin fishery". In light of the Group's n1anage1nent attempts, given the 
changing circu1nstances of tuna operations in the region, for exan1ple, the l\11--ILC process 73 and 
the entry of Spain, there was a recent re-evaluation undertaken of the Palau Arrange1nent. 74 It is 
obvious that for the Palau Arrange1nent to demonstrate effective outcon1es, it is necessary for it 
to operate in tande1n with other sub-regional and regional initiatives. 
The FSM Arrange,nent75 
In July 1993, "the Solomon Islands requested access for two of its purse seiners to fish in the 
Federated States of Micronesia, Kiribati and Nauru (Aqorau and Bergin 1997: 41). The request 
generated interest in the region and was discussed further at the Fish Stocks 76 negotiations in 
March 1994. The idea resulted in Kiribati providing a draft agreement at a meeting of the 
Parties to the Nauru Group (PNA) in April 1994 (Aqorau and Bergin 1997: 41). The FSM 
Arrange1nent encourages fishing state vessel owners to base their operations within the region.77 
Once their eligibility has been assessed, these locally-based fishing state operators are entitled to 
access within the EEZs of the PNA Group at a discounted fee of 5% of the catch (Hunt 1996: 
9).78 Access for these domestic-based operations are on terms no less favourable than those 
operating under either bilateral or 1nultilateral arrange1nents (Cartwright and Uherbelau 1998: 
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Parties to the Palau Arrangement include the Federated States of Micronesia, Marshall Islands, Nauru, 
Palau, Papua New Guinea, Tuvalu, Kiribati and the Solomon Islands 
Multilateral High Level Conference on the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks 
in the Western and Central Pacific (MHLC process took place between 1994-2000) 
Report undertaken by G. Geen on behalf of the FF A (1999). One issue raised by Geen is the fact that 
although the cap is set at 205 vessels, as at 1999 there were only 177 vessels seeking allocation. Although 
new entrants (such as Spain) have concluded bilateral arrangements with a PNA member, they are not 
permitted allocation under the Palau Arrangement. 
The Federated States of Micronesia Arrangement for Regional Fisheries Access (the FSM Arrangement). 
Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and 
Highly Migrat01y Fish Stocks (the Fish Stocks Agreement). 
The FSM Arrangement opened for signature on 30 November 1994 and came into force on 23 September 
1995. 
Parties to the FSM Arrangement as at May 1998 include the FSM, Kiribati, Nauru, Palau, Papua New 
Guinea and the Solomon Islands (Cartwright and Uherbelau 1998: 5). 
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6). 79 The benefits accruing to the Oceanic states from do1nestic-based operations could be 
significant. While Hunt (1996: 9) argues that most of the PNA 1nember states lack the 
infrastructure necessary to service purse seine operations, if joint venture initiatives can be 1nade 
attractive enough for fishing state operators to re-base locally, then funds can flow to strengthen 
infrastructure and support. As Aqorau and Bergin (1997: 55) note 
the future growth and e1nployment prospects of FF A member countries is likely to be 
based firmly on the development of domestic tuna industries, including shore-based 
industries to service the growth of locally based vessels. 
Because of this, however, the FSM Arrange1nent represents an atten1pt by the Oceanic states to 
regain indigenous control over marine resources, one of the objectives of regional fisheries co-
operation. 
The enf orcen1ent provisions of the two Implen1enting Agreements that are linked to the 
Palau Arrangement and the FSM Arrangement are managed through specific strategies. The 
first is the Regional Register, discussed above. The second is through the minimu1n terms and 
conditions (MTC) applying to fishing state vessels operating in the region. The various 
procedures put in place to comply with the MTC are those involving monitoring, control and 
surveillance (MCS). FFA members have "adopted several procedures" to support their 
manage1nent of MCS policies (Aqorau 1998: 232, see also Aqorau and Bergin 1997). 
These manage1nent procedures include the FFA's administration of the Regional 
Register, as discussed above. A Minute of Agree1nent was signed with the United States State 
Depa1in1ent regarding co-operation in monitoring and surveillance of fisheries in the WCPO, 
which was further enhanced by the Lacey Act. Republican Congress1nan John Fletcher Lacey 
authored the Lacey Act. It can1e into force in 1900 and prohibits the "interstate and inten1ational 
trade in illegally taken wildlife" . 80 It was an1ended in 1981 and 1988 "to prohibit the 
in1portation of fish caught illegally to the US" (Aqorau 1998: 232). Under the Lacey Act, FFA 
states, in conjunction with the United States, can 
seek the prosecution of foreign fishing vessels which infringe their fisheries laws and who 
subsequently attempt to discharge fish caught illegally at U.S. ports (Aqorau 1998: 232). 
The Lacey Act has provided a significant deterrent to illegal fishing activity or 'bad actors ' in 
fishing and has facilitated itnproved con1pliance rates in the WCPO (Aqorau 1998: 233). This 
demonstrates the achieve1nent of another objective of collective fisheries diplo1nacy, that of 
sustainability. 
Another management procedure uses the FF A to co-ordinate between the Australian, 
New Zealand and French airforces for 1,200 hours of aerial surveillance activities in the WCPO. 
Aerial surveillance activities are undertaken in conjunction with the Pacific Patrol Boat Prograin 
(PPBP). The FF A acts as a centre hub to provide analysis of sightings using its database (Forum 
79 See also Aqorau (1998 : 124-130). 
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Fisheries Agency 19966 ). Twenty-two patrol boat vessels have been supplied to FF A 1ne1nbers 
by the Australian Govenunent to help with maritime surveillance of their EEZs. This prograin 
com1nenced in 1987 when the first boat was handed over to Papua New Guinea. 81 The purpose 
of the PPBP is to provide fisheries protection within the EEZs of Oceanic states, but as well the 
boats can be used for "search and rescue, medical evacuations, hydrographic surveying, anti-
smuggling and sovereignty patrols" (Bergin and Bateman 1999: 555). Bergin and Bate1nan 
(1999: 563) argue that the introduction of the PPBP progran1 has recognised an increase in 
access rights fees for the Federated States of Micronesia from US$2.1 million in 1979 to 
US21.2 million in 1994. Thus, illegal fishing state activities are monitored and controlled 
through the PPBP and associated maritime surveillance tools. This de1nonstrates effectiveness 
of collective fisheries diplomacy, in relation to sustainability and a fair return. In the period 
1990-1996, fines of US 1. 8 million were paid to the Federated States of Micronesia (Bergin and 
Bate1nan 1999: 555). The payment of these fines also den1onstrates the effectiveness of this co-
operation; that is, fines are a sanction and a result of a meaningful a1Tange1nent, in this case, the 
PPBP. Both the increases in access fees and the payn1ent of fines have demonstrated how the 
PPBP prograin has achieved the objectives of regional co-operation. 
Niue Treaty 
The Niue Treaty on Co-operation in Fisheries Surveillance and Law Enforcement was signed in 
1992 and entered into force in 1993 .82 Under the Treaty, FFA members "share their assets for 
fisheries surveillance and enforcement purposes" (Aqorau 1998: 236). This includes the 
"en1powennent of each other's officers to perfonn enforcement duties, enhancement of 
extradition procedures and evidentiary provisions" (Aqorau 1998: 236).83 This Treaty has been 
in1portant to the FF A n1en1bers, given their "sparse surveillance capabilities" (Bergin 1993: 16). 
For exan1ple, Tuvalu and Tonga have concluded a subsidiary agreen1ent to the Treaty. Under the 
agreement, Tonga leased a crewed PPB to Tuvalu for patrol activities in Tuvalu's EEZ (Bergin 
1993: 17). The Niue Treaty de1nonstrates objectives of collective fisheries diplomacy, that is; 
sustainability, a fair retun1 and indigenous control. 
A further initiative is the backing of a regional observer progra1n and establishment of 
several national observer programs. Under bilateral aITange1nents, observers are placed on board 
vessels and given access to the "com1nunication facilities, any part of the vessel and catch and 
reporting logs" (HeIT 1990: 262). For the 1nost part owners, who are responsible for all costs 
associated with hosting observers on board, have provided satisfactory co-operation. The 
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See http ://w,vvv.awionline.org/pubs.quarterlv/. 
Under the PPBP vessels supplied per country are: Papua New Guinea (4); Vanuatu (l) ; Samoa (1), 
Solomon Islands (2); Cook Islands (l) ; Tonga (l); Federated States of Micronesia (3); Marshall Islands (l ); 
Kiribati (1), Fiji (1), Tuvalu (l); Palua (1) (Bergin and Bateman 1999: 557). 
Niue Treaty on Co-operation in Fisheries Surveillance and Law Enf orcement. 
See also the Forum Fisheries Agency (1996b ). 
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observer prograin is reviewed annually under the terms of the FSM Arrangement (Aqorau 1998: 
129, Bergin 1993: 14, Cartwright and Uherbelau 1998: 12).84 The fact that vessel operators have 
provided satisfactory co-operation speaks to the achieve1nent of the objectives of collective 
fisheries diplomacy for monitoring the extraction activities of individual vessels, thereby 
helping sustain the resource and facilitating a fair retun1. 
A 1najor initiative by the FF A to assist with MCS strategies is that of the Vessel 
Monitoring Syste1n (VMS). The VMS is a co1npliance measure that is quickly beco1ning 
standard ainong global fishery zones, for example, the European Union, the United States, 
Australia, New Zealand and South Africa (Director's State1nent, Forun1 Fisheries Agency 
1999b: v). In the early-1990s, FFA me1nber countries decided to "it11plement a regional VMS" 
as a strategy to help manage tuna fishery stocks in EEZ jurisdictions, its role being to support 
existing surveillance assets such as patrol vessels, surveillance flights and regional 
observers that currently operate across an area of approximately 30 million square 
kilometres (Director's Statement, Forum Fisheries Agency 1999b: v). 
This initiative requires vessels fishing in the region to be fitted with a s1nall transponder ( a 
VMS) which uses satellite-based teclu1ology to transmit "position and catch data to FF A 
headquarters" (Bergin 1993: 17).85 The VMS can monitor many aspects of illegal fishing taking 
place within the FF A region. These include: illegal fishing by unregistered foreign vessels 
within the FF A region; illegal fishing by FF A registered vessels within the FF A region; illegal 
fishing by FF A registered vessels in closed waters; mis-reporting of catch by area, species 
and/or weight; non-reporting of catches; dumping of damaged fish and bycatch; and illegal 
transship1nent at sea of catch (Foru1n Fisheries Agency 1996b ). 
To help achieve better compliance through the VMS system, it is incorporated with the 
other MCS strategies. These include the logbook catch records; observer program catch reports; 
at-sea and in-port it1spections; aerial surveillance; patrol boat operations; fishing vessel register; 
fishing license conditions and "comprehensive national legislation, preferably consistent across 
the region" (Foru1n Fisheries Agency 1999b ). The VMS is in the process of being implemented 
regionally. Its regional implementation has been one of the hardest innovations to sell, not just 
to states within the region, but to fishing states, which have not been averse to pressuring 
Oceanic states against the i1nple1nentation of the system.86 Fishing states have been against 
installing VMS because of its surveillance capabilities. 
At this point, it is useful to recap on collective diplo1nacy in the region from 1980 to the 
1nid-1990s. This differed from earlier co-operative atten1pts that focused on regional integration 
strategies. Collective diplo1nacy came of age with, for example, the UNCLOS negotiations, the 
84 
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86 
See also Forum Fisheries Agency Report No. 97/09. 
" . .. beacons (ALCs or Automatic Location Communicators) [are placed] on vessels ... [that] indicate 
position, speed and course of such vessels 24 hours a day" (Cartwright and Uherbelau 1998: 12-13). 
See discussion at p 158 of Chapter Six regarding Japan ' s attempts to pressure states like Kiribati over the 
implementation of a VMS. 
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Lome Convention, the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone (SPNFZ), and the Driftnet Fishing 
Convention. Collective diplomacy owed its strength to the strong indigenous leadership of 
people such as Ratu Mara of Fiji. Another important ingredient was the Cold War geopolitical 
environment, which encouraged the aims of the region through generous aid disbursement and 
the support of regional developed states, such as Australia and New Zealand. Together with the 
wave of decolonisation in the region, these ingredients combined to bring about a rise in 
collective diplo1nacy that went against the grain of what was occurring elsewhere in the world. 
Axline' s theory of 'old regionalism' is contrary to the reality of regional co-operation in 
Oceania in the 1980s and into the 1990s. The "double oil price shock, increasing debt burden, 
and contraction of world-wide trade" (Axline 1994a: 5) did not affect the cu1nulative effect of 
collective diplo1nacy enjoyed by Oceania during this period. Instead, this period 1nerely 
signalled a change in the relationship between Oceania and the global political economy. 
These factors were also enmeshed with the FF A and its cu1nulative achievements in 
achieving the objectives of collective fisheries diplomacy. Thus, Australia and New Zealand 
encouraged the introduction of a raft of regional and sub-regional arrange1nents. In the Cold 
War environment, they were a way of strengthening western ideals, particularly after the United 
States finalised the Multilateral Fisheries Treaty with the region. Strong indigenous leadership 
was evident in fisheries policies, for example, the role of Satya Nandan at the UNCLOS 
negotiations and his role in the development of regional fisheries policies. It was through these 
factors , which owed their origins to the strong pre-colonial custodial approach to fisheries 
conservation and manage1nent, that the region was able to achieve these objectives of collective 
fisheries diplomacy, that is; sustainability, a fair retun1, domestication and indigenous control. 
Multilateral Fisheries Treaty87 
After years of defiance regarding the rights of coastal states over highly migratory fish stocks, 
the United States yielded to the clai1ns of the Oceanic states and finalised a Multilateral 
Fisheries Treaty. That Treaty is concerned with purse seine fishing with the PNA Group, but it 
also comprises an aid co1nponent that is distributed to all the independent states of the region. It 
is the only 1nultilateral treaty the region has finalised and represents a land1nark in Cold War 
relations between the United States and the FF A membership. 
As noted in the first section, the historical concept of freedom of the high seas and the 
introduction of the Magnuson Act were in conflict with resolutions agreed at the UNCLOS III 
negotiations which proclaimed that coastal states could claim an extended jurisdiction of 
sovereign rights, an EEZ. The insistence by AI11erican Tunaboat Association (ATA) vessels that 
they could fish within the 200-nautical 1nile limit, and someti1nes within the twelve-nautical 
1nile territorial sea, was a dismissal of the UNCLOS-based claims of coastal states (Hughes 
87 The Treaty on Fisheries Between the Governments of Certain Pacific Island States and the Government of 
the United States of America. 
80 
Oceanic states in ascent 
1987: 214. This resulted in many United States vessels being impounded in South American 
states and, during the early to mid-1980s, being arrested in the Oceanic region (Hughes 1987: 
214 ). What made the United States administration do a complete reversal and finalise a 
multilateral treaty with the region? There are two main reasons which are given, both of which 
provide rational explanations for the decision. 
The first reason is the most commonly propounded theory, Oceania's Cold War. 
Richard Holbrook, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs in the United States 
State Departn1ent noted in 1978 that 
there is a reservoir of great goodwill towards the United States among the peoples of the 
South Pacific and this enhances the prospects for cooperative relations between them and 
the United States (Kiste 1991: 5). 
This goodwill, originating fro1n the United States participation in the Pacific conflict to end 
World War II, had all but disappeared by the early 1980s (Van Dyke and Nicol 1987).88 
Although coastal states globally had been declaring 200-nautical n1ile EEZ jurisdictions from 
the late 1970s, because the United States was not a signatory to the UNCLOS, it did not 
consider it should be bound by its requirements (Van Dyke and Nicol 1987: 109). ATA vessels 
adhered instead to the prescriptions of the Magnuson Act which upheld that tuna are highly 
1nigratory and can be fished at will, or through an appropriate international organisation. 
Fmihermore, if a coastal state arrests a United States tuna vessel while fishing within its EEZ, 
the 
Secretary of State notifies the Treasury Department to take "necessary and appropriate 
action" to embargo that nation's fish products" (U.S. Code, vol. 16, sec. 1825 (a)(4)(c) in 
Van Dyke and Nicol 1987: 109). 
Because of the changes in prevailing weather conditions in the Eastern Pacific (El Nino) and the 
difficulties being experienced by the United States fleet in securing access arrange1nents with 
Mexico and Costa Rica, the fleet 1noved to the WCPO.89 By 1984, the fleet harvested 66% of its 
total catch fro1n the WCPO region (Doulman 1987d: 151). Fishing access agreements were 
finalised between individual Oceanic states and the ATA, not the United States government. 
Doulman (19 87 d: 151) has noted that the access fees paid at that ti1ne by AT A vessels were 
lower than Japanese fees (Tarte 1998a: 100). Further, by paying access fees , the ATA was 
acknowledging recognition of "coastal state rights to the tuna in their exclusive economic zone 
and "de facto international acceptance" of such rights (Taiie 1998a: 101 ). 
Between 1982 and 1986, four United States tuna vessels were impounded in Oceania. 
These were the Danica in Papua New Guinea in 1982, the Jeanette Diana in the Solomon 
88 
89 
In a Letter to the Editor of a Papua New Guinea newspaper, Times, it noted that "My admiration for the 
greatest nation in the world today - the United States - is gradually waning. [I]f I were in Yankee land .. . I 
wouldn ' t even dream of trespassing on dear ole Billy Carter' s farm" (Van Dyke and Nicol 1987: 112). 
See among others, Herrick (1997: 84-85). Aqorau and Bergin (1997: 175) suggest other reasons, for 
example, the growth of fleets from Latin America and the negative publicity in relation to the bycatch of 
dolphin with yellowfin tuna. 
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Islands in 1984 and the Ocean Pearl and Priscilla Min the Federated States of Micronesia in 
1985 and 1986. In 1982, Papua New Guinea arrested the United States purse-seiner, the Danica, 
carrying 600 tonnes of tuna, within its 200-mile zone. The United States itnposed sanctions on 
fish products from Papua New Guinea, but these were revoked once the boat had been resold to 
its owners for a small percentage of its worth (Waugh 1992, Van Dyke and Nicol 1987). The 
Jeanette Diana was arrested by the Solo1non Islands government in 1984 for fishing illegally 
within its 200-mile zone. This latest defiance caused alarm within the region, given that a 
second United States vessel, the Carol Linda had been caught within Kiribati's twelve-mile 
limit. Helicopters had been seen off the Solomon Islands coast, an indication of purse seiner 
activity. The Solomon Islands court fined the captain and owner of the Jeanette Diana and 
confiscated the vessel, the gear, the helicopter and the catch for sale locally. Hughes (1987: 214) 
notes that the owner and 1naster of the vessel "did their cause little good by deriding the High 
Court of Solo1non Islands as a kangaroo cou1i". The United States govenunent imposed 
sanctions on the Solon1on Islands and offered compensation to the boat owners. The sanctions 
were lifted once the vessel had been sold back to its owners. It has been said that the "Solon1on 
Islands never regained the loss of its US$10 million trade with the United States" (Waugh 1992: 
175)9°. 
The Ocean Pearl, caught fishing illegally in the Federated States of Micronesia in 1985, 
escaped after "threatening to drop a speed boat rigged to its boom on top of the boarding party" 
(Waugh 1992: 175). There were moves to ren1ove the vessel from the FFA' s Regional Register, 
however, the owners paid the US $500,000 fine. Observers have commented that it was a 
co1nn1on sight throughout Oceania to see foreign vessels fishing just outside the reefs, well 
inside twelve-mile territorial waters (Waugh 1992: 175). When the logbook was exmnined for 
the Ocean Pearl, investigators discovered that another United States purse seiner, the Priscilla 
M, had been "fishing extensively in the 200-mile zone" of the Federated States of Micronesia 
during 1986. Not least, it was found that the vessel had also "fished in the 12-inile territorial sea 
adjacent to the state of Yap" (Van Dyke and Nicol 1987: 114). The owners paid a US$400,000 
fine as well as a US$58,000 license fee. The more restrained approach taken by both sides was 
due in no sn1all pmi to the negotiations which were under-way between the United States and 
the region to conclude a multilateral fishing treaty (Van Dyke and Nicol 1987: 114-115). 
In the aftem1ath of the 1984 Jeanette Diana incident, the Solon1on Islands, "threatened 
to invite the Soviet Union to fish in its waters" (Sutherland and Tsmnenyi 1992: 68).91 This was 
cmnpounded by the fishing agree1nent signed between Kiribati and the Soviet Union in 1985. 
Teiwaki (1988: 96-97) argues that other conce1ns drove Kiribati to take such action. For 
exa1nple, it was seen as a release from the dependency of British aid; the pro1nise of self-
sufficiency; and reflected the fact that Australia, the United States, New Zealand and Fiji all had 
90 
91 
See also Van Dyke and Nicol (1987). 
See also Waugh (1992: 175). 
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relations with the Soviet Union (Teiwaki 1988: 96-97). During 1985, the Soviet Union also 
approached Fiji, Tuvalu, Papua New Guinea, and Vanuatu regarding fishing access 
arrange1nents. Matters escalated when the Soviet Union set up a South Pacific Branch within its 
Foreign Ministry in 1986 and signed a fishing agreen1ent with Vanuatu 1987. This latter 
develop1nent raised alarm in Washington, Canberra and Wellington as it also "granted p01i 
access to Soviet vessels and landing rights to the Soviet national airline" (Sutherland and 
Tsainenyi 1992: 68). While these incidences of Soviet Union 'penetration' into the region went 
through until 1987, as far back as 1982, 1nembers of the United States Congress had advocated a 
treaty with the Oceanic states. It was believed the treaty should follow the pattern established 
under the Nauru Agreement and 
[DJ demonstrate the willingness of the United States to cooperate fairly and justly in the 
conservation and management of international fisheries stocks and to encourage the 
rational use of such resources by [United States] fishermen while still helping the small 
developing countries ... to make use of, and prosper from the use of, their own natural 
resources (United States Congress1nan Paul McCloskey Jr., 128 Congress Records 3948, 
in Sutherland and Tsamenyi 1992: 67). 
There is a second argument advanced regarding the turnaround in United States policy 
regarding the managen1ent of highly 1nigratory fish stocks within a coastal state ' s 200-mile 
EEZ. One observer (Interview, Ross, October 2000).92 suggests that the United States Secretary 
of State at that time, George Shultz, was keen to finalise the Multilateral Fisheries Treaty 
because it was a low cost initiative and it made the United States look good in the region. Not 
just this, but it was a "slap in the face for Australia and New Zealand" because of their stand 
regarding the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone (SPNFZ) and visits by United States nuclear-
powered ships. It was also a "smack on the botto1n for the ATA" (Interview, Ross 2000) Given 
the Cold War political climate it is quite plausible that the low-cost 'look good ' rationale of the 
United States gove1nment could have been bound up with its decision to conclude the 
Multilateral Fisheries Treaty. In that bipolar enviro11111ent, the United States was able to achieve 
c01nplete rehabilitation in the region, thwart any ideological advances by the Soviet Union, 
protect its tuna industry and retain its hege1nonic status in furthering its regional security aims. 
The idea of it being "a slap in the face for Australia and New Zealand" is 111ore proble1natic. 
Both of these states were concen1ed by the Soviet Union' s interest in the region and the 
finalisation of the Multilateral Fisheries Treaty would have allayed their concen1s. The "slap on 
the botto1n" for the AT A could well have been true. The fishing practices of ATA 111embers had 
not shown the United States in a good light, and sections of the Administration may have been 
aiu1oyed at having to clean up in the wake of AT A operations in Oceania. 
FF A me1nbers commenced discussions on the Multilateral Fisheries Treaty in late 1983. 
From 1984, ten negotiating rounds took place to develop a multilateral treaty that "would 
provide for, as well as goven1, the operation of the U.S. purse seine fleet" (Doulman 1987b: 
92 Ken Ross works for the Bureau of External Affairs, New Zealand. 
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48).93 While the comn1itment on both sides appeared high, progress was slow and an agreement 
was not finalised until 1987 (Doulman 1987b: 48, Herr 1990: 299). The inclusion, from round 
five in 1985, of a senior State Department official in the United States' delegation was 
"triggered" by the fisheries agreement between Kiribati and the Soviet Union and its related 
"strategic considerations" (Van Dyke and Nicol 1987: 117).94 95 Issues requiring negotiation and 
agreement included: the licensing and the Regional Register of fishing vessels; closed and 
limited areas; catch reporting; and licensing fees (Van Dyke and Nicol 1987: 117). 
After intense negotiations, both sides agreed on US$60 million in licencing fees over 
five years, for a guaranteed minimu1n of thirty-five vessels (Van Dyke and Nicol 1987: 120). 
This realised an access fee of around 9%. The tenns of the Multilateral Fisheries Treaty 
provides that each of the sixteen-1ne1nbers of the FF A will receive a n1inimun1 portion. The 
residual 85% is apportioned according to where the fish were caught (Van Dyke and Nicol 
1987: 121 ). The Multilateral Fisheries Treaty has been hailed as a "milestone" in the region's 
co-operative efforts (FFA Report No. 97/09: Annex A). As Bergin also notes (1994b: 2), "the 
treaty was undoubtedly the PICs96 most successful venture in fisheries diplomacy". 
Its prin1ary significance was the acceptance by the United States of the sovereign rights 
of the region's coastal states to manage highly migratory fish stocks (Herr 1990: 300-301). In 
fact, the United States Congress ainended the Magnuson Act in late 1990 to "recognize EEZ 
state jurisdiction over 1nigratory species" (Kiste 1991: 9). The Multilateral Fisheries Treaty also 
reasserted the status of the United States as the region's hegemonic power, it halted any advance 
by an ideological opponent in Oceania and it provided long-term security for its tuna industry. 
Based on these outcomes, the Multilateral Fisheries Treaty is a very effective (and, for an 
economy of considerable size, an inexpensive) method of securing the United States 
rehabilitation in the region. From Oceania's perspective, it provides a sizeable long-tenn 
injection of funding and it has improved the region's perceptions of United States involvement 
in Oceania. 
Perhaps one of the 1nost important aspects of the Multilateral Fisheries Treaty is the 
FFA's ability to analyse the data provided by the United States fleet and to compare it with the 
data provided by other fleets operating in the region. This enables the FF A to estiinate the catch 
levels of those other fleets. Thus, the FF A can detennine the extent of illegal fishing conducted 
by other fishing states and take action against them, using the regional and sub-regional 
instru1nents as outlined above. 
93 
94 
95 
See also Van Dyke and Nicol (1987: 117). 
A Pacific commentator noted in relation to the Soviet Union-Kiribati access agreement: "The US 
delegation was led by a new face, Ed Derwinski, sent by Secretary of State George Shultz specifically to 
confound the Russians by getting a treaty concluded as fast as possible. Island delegates told Islands 
Business that they had never found the American side more amendable (Van Dyke and Nicol 1987: 118. 
citing from Islands Business, 1985, 27). 
The Deputy Assistant Secretary for Oceans and Fisheries Affairs led the United States delegation to the 
negotiations ((Van Dyke and Nicol 1987: 117). 
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The success of the FF A's membership in concluding the Multilateral Fisheries Treaty is 
extraordinary for several reasons. First, they were dealing with a Cold War superpower, in a 
dynamic geopolitical environment. Second, the region was not just negotiating with a 
superpower, but also with a superpower whose emphatic stand, up until that point, was the 
denial of coastal rights conservation and manage1nent of highly migratory tuna stocks. Third, as 
illustrated above, the ability of individual Oceanic states to thwart abuses of their sovereign 
rights over their EEZs by the United States fleet had not been successful. It became successful 
when the FF A and its 1nembers negotiated as a single, powerful entity. Once again, the idea 
espoused by 'new regionalism' adherents that regional co-operation during this period was in 
decline, has been repudiated. Axline (1994b: 25) argues that regional organisations 1n a 
developing region, such as Oceania 
are generally composed of states that are small, economically underdeveloped and 
militarily weak [and that, therefore,] the 'outside world' will have a relatively large 
impact on events in the region ( 1994a: 25). 
This 1nay be true, but what the above discussion demonstrates is that when these s1nall states 
unite, they can acquire enough strength and power to counter a Cold War superpower. This of 
course is countered by the fact that the United States saw clear advantage in negotiating the 
Multilateral Fisheries Treaty. 
Section four: Other multilateral negotiations 
Driftnet Fishing Convention97 
The success of the Multilateral Fisheries Treaty emboldened the FF A 1ne1nbers to negotiate a 
n1ultilateral treaty with Taiwan for its longline albacore fleet. The origins of the region ' s 
can1paign to conclude a treaty with Taiwan were linked with concen1s sten1ming fro1n the late-
1980s regarding the use of driftnets in large ocean areas (Wright and Doulman 1991: 3 07).98 
Japan had been the first fishing state to undertake driftnet operations in Oceania in 19 83. This 
type of operation was seen to be 1nore cost effective and operators, "faced with a cost squeeze" 
believed that driftnets would help to n1aintain their viability (Wright and Doulman 1991: 307). 
The nets are "deployed at depths of about 10 metres and may be up to 50 kilometres in 
length" (Tarte 1998a: 130) and were popularly known as "the wall of death" (Veitayaki 1994: 
3 8). In Oceania, driftnet fishing practices targetted surface-swin1ming albacore tuna. While 
previously longliners had targetted deep swimming albacore, by the late-l 980s, driftnet and 
trolling n1ethods were being used to harvest surface-swimming juvenile albacore (Cartwright 
96 
97 
98 
PI Cs - Pacific Island Countries. 
The Convention for the Prohibition of Fishing with Long Driftnets in the South Pacific Region. 
For an in-depth analysis of the driftnet issue, see Wright, A. , and Doulman, D (1991), "Drift-net fishing in 
the South Pacific: from controversy to management", Marine Policy, Vol 15, No. 5, pp 303-337. 
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and Uherbelau 1998: 11).99 One of the reasons for the dramatic increase in driftnet fishing 
activity in the region was the United States' decision in 1988 to close its EEZ to foreign fleets, 
as well as the Soviet Union placing restrictions on foreign access to its EEZ. This resulted in 
driftnet fishing operations shifting to the high seas (Taiie 1998a: 130). By early 1989, there 
were 60 Japanese driftnet vessels and 60 Taiwanese driftnet vessels, covering the region's ocean 
expanse of "30,000 1niles ... each night" (Veitayaki 1994: 101). The FFA aired three major 
concen1s it had with driftnet fishing practices. One, there was increased pressure on the stock 
and an associated danger of over-fishing. Two, the proble1ns associated with the significant by-
catch of seabirds, non-target fish species and marine mam1nals (see Bergin 1997). Three, the 
navigational hazard posed by driftnets and the potential for continued (ghost) fishing after loss 
(Cartwright and Uherbelau 1998: 11). 100 101 
The Tarawa Declaration was finalised at the South Pacific Forum in July 1989. The 
Declaration highlighted the region's disquiet; asked for the co-operation of the inten1ational 
co1n1nunity to ban driftnet fishing; and praised Korea's actions for ceasing the practice and 
requested Japan and Taiwan follow suit (Cartwright and Uherbelau 1998: 11). 
In Noven1ber 1989, a conference was convened in Wellington, New Zealand at which 
the Convention for the Prohibition of Fishing with Long Dri.ftnets in the South Pacific was 
drafted and which subsequently can1e into force on 17 May 1991 (Wellington Convention). The 
ban includes driftnet fishing within the EEZ of FF A 1nember states, as well as the adjacent high 
seas. At the United Nations General Assembly in November/December 1989, the United States 
tabled a Resolution which was co-sponsored by Australia, Papua New Guinea, Fiji, the 
Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, Zaire, Mauritania and New Zealand. The Resolution called for the 
cessation of driftnet fishing (Sutherland and Tsamenyi 1992: 85, Fong 1993: 137).102 Japan 
argued for "n1ore scientific research" before banning the practice (Tarte 1998a: 132). The 
General Assen1bly accepted a compromise Resolution which proposed a "moratoriu1n on all 
large-scale driftnets on the high seas by 30 June 1992" (Tarte 1998a: 132). Aqorau (1998: 138) 
notes that it was the first time that the General Assembly had been "used to resolve a specific 
tuna fisheries proble1n" and highlighted the inten1ational support that the region received from 
its "intensive political and dipl01natic lobbying" before the General Assembly. Taiwan agreed to 
stop its driftnet fishing in the region fron1 30 June 1991 (Sutherland and Tsamenyi 1992: 82, 
Fong 1993: 137). 
99 
100 
101 
102 
The trolling method of fishing for tuna entails the use of a baited line, being drawn along in the water 
behind the fishing vessel. 
Bycatch included turtles, dolphins, small whales and seabirds (Sutherland and Tsamenyi 1992: 80). 
Ghost nets include those which have been abandoned by their owners and which "continue to catch fi sh as 
they drift about the seas or roll about the ocean floor in the fishing grounds" (Veitayaki 1994: 42). 
The United States was committed to the Tarawa Declaration. Its House of Representatives passed 
Resolution 214 in November 1989 "in part endorsing the declaration". The Resolution was passed 
unanimously. In 1990, changes were made to the 1976 Magnuson Fisheries Management and Conservation 
Act, and "drift-net fishing was formally brought into line with the international stance taken by the USA on 
this issue" (Wright and Doulman 1991: 318). 
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Japan had two problems with the General Asse1nbly' s co1npromise Resolution. First, it 
believed that before a moratorium was agreed to that scientific research should be conducted 
into the allegedly dangerous practice. Second, Japan was against any form of control by coastal 
states of high seas fishing (Tarte 1998a: 132). By the South Pacific Forum 1neeting in August 
1990, however, Japan had agreed to cease driftnet fishing in the 1990-91 season and had called 
for the establish1nent of a management regime for albacore tuna. Japan' s decision to desist from 
driftnet fishing in Oceania resulted because of lin1ited inten1ational support. Korea and Taiwan 
were not inten1ationally influential and the United States had threatened trade sanctions. Tarte 
(1998a: 134) also believes that the driftnet-fishing group within Japan's distant water fleet was 
not influential and the situation was compounded by the hostility of its longline and pole-and-
line fleets. Thus, so1ne powerful interests helped to persuade the Japanese goven11nent. 
Following the driftnet fishing ban, negotiations between Japan and the FFA to finalise 
management arrangements for albacore failed because of "conflicting objectives of the Agency 
and Japan" (Tarte 1998a: 134). These conflicting objectives included the insistence by Japan 
that management be across the entire stock, that is, all tuna species, both within the EEZ and 
high seas. Japan also stipulated that it was to be an Article 64 organisation with only those 
coastal states with albacore stocks involved, therefore not an FF A-wide regin1e (Bergin 1993: 
13 ). The FF A maintained that it would not include EEZ albacore fishing, only fishing conducted 
on the high seas, that the FF A is the authority for concluding negotiations and that it would not 
be an Article 64 organisation. The differences were not compatible. 
The negotiations between the FF A and Taiwan, which commenced 111 1992, have 
produced a Draft Agree1nent between the FF A and the Taiwan Deep-Sea Tuna Boatowners and 
Exporters Association regarding longline albacore fishing. One of the major hindrances to 
concluding the Agreen1ent has been the status of Taiwan in the region. While Palau, Marshall 
Islands, Nauru,103 Solomon Islands and Tuvalu have all had diplo1natic relations with Taiwan; 
other oceanic states recognise China and have not been ainenable to finalising a Goven11nent-to-
Goven11Tient Treaty. To date the Treaty has not been concluded. A treaty was also discussed 
between the Korean tuna industry and the FF A in 1994. To date nothing has been finalised and 
the FFA is concen1ed by the poor record of co1npliance de1nonstrated by Korea' s fleets which 
would need to improve before negotiations went any further (Aqorau 1998: 171). 
The FF A also conducted 1nultilateral discussions with some fishing states (Korea, 
Taiwan and Japan) to conclude a 1nultilateral agree1nent for southern albacore tuna. The 
discussions rose out of the Driftnet Fishing Convention which called on all parties to develop 
1nanage1nent and conservation strategies for the southern albacore tuna. The FF A had hoped for 
a con1prehensive arrangement which would included the 
103 Nauru switched from recognition of Taiwan to recognition of China in July 2002. See Pacific Islands 
Report 21.7.02, online< http ://pidp.eastwestcenter.org. 
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preservation of their sovereign rights over the resources within the EEZ; maximisation of 
benefits from the exploitation of the resource; ensuring the conservation of the resource, 
and control over the management regime on the high seas (Aqorau 1998: 150). 
Three consultations took place between late 1989 and late 1990 (Fong 1993: 139). Once again, 
the discussions between the FF A members and the fishing states stalled on the differing views 
regarding an Article 64 organisation, as proposed by the fishing states and the FF A's insistence 
on a more non-formal, high seas-only regi1ne for albacore (Aqorau 1998: 150). 
The FFA's skills in multilateral negotiations failed in these above examples regarding 
albacore 1nanagen1ent.104 Japan has distinct interests in the region's tuna fishery and has 
maintained a tight grasp on bilateral fisheries access arrange1nents because of its practice of 
linking these arrange1nents to aid. That is why a region-wide (1nultilateral) agreement would not 
help Japan's interests in the region. This is at variance with the Multilateral Fisheries Treaty 
between the United States and the FF A member states. The United States fleet does not operate 
in all EEZs in the region, only those where its purse seiners can harvest tuna. Japan has argued 
that while the provisions of the Multilateral Fisheries Treaty may appear generous, a component 
of that payment is aid. This is not denied. The difference, however, is that through a 1nultilateral 
treaty, the aid component can be distributed more fairly, than through a bilateral arrangements, 
where aid is provisional on fisheries access, at the right price. 
In relation to achieving the objectives of collective fisheries diplomacy, the Multilateral 
Fisheries Treaty provides an outstanding exainple. Looking at those aspects which de1nonstrate 
the effectiveness or otherwise of collective diplomacy in achieving objectives, the Treaty has 
helped the region control legal fishing activities through its reporting requirements. It has 
substantive provisions that support sustainability, a fair return and indigenous control. Back-up 
sanctions include the threat of being struck off the Regional Register. The Treaty was negotiated 
in the geostrategic context of the Cold War, which was arguably a central consideration of the 
United States when considering its finalisation. 
Chapter Tlu·ee has outlined the politics of the region's tuna fishing industry since the 
UNCLOS III negotiations. The history of the UNCLOS negotiations de1nonstrates the 
objectives of the traditional maritime states and those of the developing coastal states. What 
can1e out of these negotiations was the realisation by the Oceanic states that with unity co1nes 
power. At the negotiations, the leadership of Satya Nandan of Fiji den1onstrated effectiveness, 
by drafting articles in relation to the rights of archipelagic states and the primacy of an EEZ 
regime. It was during the UNCLOS negotiations that the Oceanic states realised the importance 
of the emerging regime to the region. Thus, the decision to set up the FF A reflected changing 
global environmental norms. The inflexible attitude of the United States in disallowing the 
104 The experience, particularly that relating to the negotiations between the FF A and Japan has relevance to 
the 1\11-ILC negotiations, concluded in 2000. Japan maintained an antagonistic stance regarding those 
negotiations, in spite of their article 64 status and has yet to sign the WCPF Convention (see Chapter Five). 
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rights of coastal states over conservation and managen1ent of highly 1nigratory fish stocks 
within an EEZ resulted in the organisation being confined to Forum me1nbership. 
By focussing the membership on the Forum states, the organisation was 111ore able to 
111eet the needs and aspirations of its men1bers and thus realise the objectives of collective 
fisheries diplomacy. These objectives occurred during what was considered an era of ' old 
regionalis1n', which witnessed the failure of regional co-operative ventures elsewhere in the 
world (see Axline 1994a). 
The range of regional and sub-regional instru1nents put in place by the FF A or the PNA 
Group de1nonstrates why the organisation was able to re1nain central to the needs of its 
n1embers. One, the activities undertaken by the FFC and FF A Secretariat are undertaken at 
considerably less cost than could have been achieved unilaterally, thereby increasing the 
organisation's value to individual me1nbers. Two, for the 1nost part, national interests have been 
subsu1ned for the good of the region. This was illustrated by those more pro-United States 
Forum members yielding to the regional interests in denying fishing states membership of the 
FF A. Three, the interests of the United States, were served by finalising a Multilateral Fisheries 
Treaty. These interests included strategic, international relations, the stability of its tuna fleet, 
and its inten1ational reputation. Four, through the implen1entation of such a Treaty, the region 
has benefited by the curtailtnent of illegal fishing effo1is of so-called 'bad actors' in the region. 
Five, the success of the region's cainpaign to ban driftnet fishing illustrates the power of 
en1erging enviro1unental norms regarding fishing practices. It also 1nade the world aware of the 
in1portance the region placed on environmental concen1s. Six, it should not be forgotten that 
regional powers, such as Australia and New Zealand were prepared to support the Oceanic 
states and their goals for fisheries conservation and 1nanage1nent. The Cold War environment 
was to the region ' s advantage and once the United States had beco1ne a ' good actor', it also 
accorded the region the suppo1i it required, for exan1ple, in relation to driftnet fishing. Seven, 
the indigenous leadership of the region should be highlighted. Delegates to the UN CLOS, such 
as Satya Nandan of Fiji, were high-profile, articulate and single-minded in their pursuit of 
regional goals. They succeeded in putting the region ' s concen1s on the global 1nap. On the 
downside, the failure by the region to conclude negotiations with Japan, Taiwan or Korea 
regarding an albacore management regime has highlighted the differences between the 
objectives of collective fisheries diplon1acy and the views of the fishing states. For example, the 
insistence by fishing states on finalising an Article 64-type arrangement for albacore 
1nanagement with only those coastal states with albacore being included. Furthermore, fishing 
states wanted the 1nanagement regime to be across the entire stocks, both within EEZs and the 
high seas. This ran counter to the region ' s insistence on sovereign rights with an EEZ and that 
the albacore 1nanagement an-ange1nent be concluded region-wide. 
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In conclusion, Cold War geopolitics helped to define the paraineters of tuna fishing in 
the region. The region's incorporation into the global tuna econo1ny was cen1ented with the 
emergence of the UN CLOS regime and its de1narcation of 200-nautical 1nile EEZ jurisdictions. 
During this period, the region realised its objectives of collective fisheries diplomacy as 
illustrated by its implementation of regional and sub-regional instruments. It was unfettered 
high seas fishing within the region, however, which n1arred those EEZ achievements. 
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The politics of tuna operations in Oceania 
The previous Chapter demonstrated that by the mid- l 990s fishing state operations 1n the 
exclusive economic zones (EEZs) of Oceanic states had beco1ne increasingly regulated and 
n1onitored. This has been achieved through the provisions of the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the establishment of the Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA) and the 
cu1nulative achieve1nents of the objectives of collective fisheries diplomacy. The FFA 1ne1nber 
states remained co1n1nitted to those objectives, that is; to achieving resource sustainability, 
securing a fair return fr01n fishing states, do1nestication and indigenous control of the tuna 
industry. 
Co1nbined with the region's atte1npts at regulating the operations of the fishing states 
were its continued atte1npts at involve1nent in joint venture operations and its encourage1nent of 
domestic participation in the tuna industry. These atte1npts were not only a reflection of the 
region's objectives, but they also reflected the region ' s pre-colonial custodial approach to 
1narine resources. The region's pursuit of implen1enting regulatory conservation and 
manage1nent measures did not translate into any kind of control over joint venture operations or 
a significant growth in domestic tuna industries fro1n the 1980s to the mid-l 990s. 
Chapter Three's purpose was to de1nonstrate those aspects which demonstrate the 
effectiveness or otherwise of collective diplomacy in achieving objectives, for example, the 
various regulatory conservation and manage1nent 1neasures at the global, regional and sub-
regional level. This Chapter pauses for reflection. For example, what iinpact did the changing 
global tuna econon1y have on the region's tuna industry and in particular, the operations of the 
fishing states? What was the geostrategic context under which fishing operations took place 
between the 1980s and the 1nid-l 990s? 
To exainine these issues the Chapter comprises two sections. The first section examines 
the activities of fishing states in Oceania from the 1980s to the mid- l 990s. There was continued 
interest in tuna harvesting in the region shown by the fishing states, combined with over-
capacity of fleets, a constriction in profit 1nargins and a heightened intrusion of environmental 
considerations. Therefore, the region's tuna industry had bec01ne very competitive and sensitive 
to any changes in the global tuna economy. The section demonstrates that the environment of 
the global tuna econ01ny did not provide encourage1nent for the development of joint ventures 
in the region. The second section continues Chapter Two ' s discussion on joint ventures and the 
do1nestic tuna industry from the 1980s to the 1nid- l 990s. Joint ventures in the region have only 
realised s1nall gains in the level of do1nestic participation in the tuna industry. This has been 
influenced by the changing global tuna econo1ny, which has affected Oceania' s endeavours to 
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both invest in the infrastructure to support a domestic tuna industry and to maximise the 
region's benefits and involvement. 
The Chapter concludes that from the 1980s to the n1id-1990s, achieving those objectives 
of collective fisheries dipl0111acy did not translate into a strengthening of d0111estic involvement 
in joint ventures or an encouraging level of indigenous control. Inappropriate investn1ents, poor 
advice, insufficient knowledge about the com111ercial aspects of tuna fishing and the global tuna 
econo111y in which the region has had to compete have all contributed to a less than opti111um 
outcome. 
Section one: Foreign commercial tuna operations from the 1980s to the mid-1990s 
The FF A was established in 1979 and thereafter instituted meaningful regional and sub-regional 
instru111ents that 111attered, with back-up sanctions. The conclusion of the UN CLOS in 1982 had 
led to fishing states, such as Japan, agreeing to 200-nautical 111ile EEZs and paying access fees 
for the right to fish. One of the 111ain opponents of the new regi111e, the United States, had 
backed down by 1987 when the Multilateral Fisheries Treaty was concluded with the FF A 
111embership, thereby agreeing to coastal states' sovereign rights over highly migratory tuna 
within 200-nautical 111ile EEZs (Van Dyke and Nicol 1987). 
There were still renegade fishing states, such as Taiwan and the Republic of Korea 
(Korea), who were prepared to under-report and to fish illegally in the region, but whose 
activities would be highlighted by the Multilateral Fisheries Treaty's co111pliance require111ents. 1 
These requiren1ents include the observer program, co111prehensive log-book data, and the Vessel 
Monitoring System (VMS). Together with the implementation of the Pacific Patrol Boat 
Program (PPBP) and the introduction of aerial surveillance flights, a 111ore regulatory 
enviromnent had e111erged. This is reflected in the increased fees to the region between 1980 and 
1993.2 This should not disregard, however, the stresses and strains that the fishing states were 
undergoing, which had an i111pact on their operations, and their relations, in the region. These 
included such issues as subsidies, ageing fleets, fleet overcapacity, over-supply, crew shortages, 
increased co111petition and tight profit margins. The 111ajor fishing state operations will be 
discussed below. These states include China, Japan, Korea, Soviet Union, Taiwan and the 
United States. 
China 
According to the SPC3 Yearbook (1998: 27), China com111enced its operations in the Western 
and Central Pacific Ocean (WCPO) in 1988 with seven longliners. Its fleet peaked in 1994 with 
2 
3 
See Forum Fisheries Agency (1996b ). 
By 1993, annual access fees amounted to: Japan US$22. l 6 million, United States US$18 million, Taiwan 
US$10.72 million, Republic of Korea US$8.12 million, Other US$1.26 million (Maxwell and Owen 1994: 
16). This compares with, for example, the US$27.3 million that Japan paid to the Oceanic states for the four 
years between 1978-1982 (Togolo 1987: 58) 
Secretariat of the Pacific Community (SPC). 
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456 longliners. An FFA observer notes that with the wind-down of Korean, Japanese and 
Taiwanese vessels in the region, there is an opportunity for China to take over as the major 
Asian tuna harvester (Interview Clarke April 2001).4 While Japan has been the fore1nost Asian 
influence in Oceania to date, China re1nains an unknown force. One observer likens the 
relationship between Japan and China as maintaining a "watching brief on each other's areas of 
influence within Oceania" (Fry 1999: 18). 
China's expansion has had an i1npact on Japan's sashimi market, with 1narked increases 
111 landings over the 1990-1993 period. By 1994, Chinese longliners based in Micronesia 
numbered 200, with two Chinese co1npanies, the Koen and the Kakwan being the fore1nost 
operators in the WCPO (Bergin and Haward 1996: 48). Prior to 1994, China negotiated through 
a Taiwanese co1npany operating in the Micronesian region, but in 1994 it negotiated directly for 
access agree1nents with the Marshall Islands and the Federated States of Micronesia (Forum 
Fisheries Agency Director's Report 1994/1995: 8). This reflects the co1nplex inter-co1u1ected 
nature of the tuna industries of Taiwan and China. For exainple, observers have suggested that 
Taiwanese capital could finance the expansion of China's tuna fleet with ULT5 technology 
(Haward and Bergin 1996: 170).6 
Although China has not been a major player to date in the region, there are indications 
that it will bec01ne one during the twenty-first century. The challenges associated with feeding a 
large population will drive Chinese fleets to rich fishing grounds. This will inevitably lead the1n 
to the WCPO, financed by, in all probability, Taiwanese 1noney. Taiwan could assume with 
China the same role that Japan had earlier assumed with both Taiwan and Korea. That is, 
Taiwanese business interests could finance the development of China's fishing fleet, which 
would operate at a very c01npetitive level. 
Japan 
Japan prefers bilateral over multilateral fisheries aITangements because greater leverage and 
influence can then be applied to the recipient requiring aid (Tarte 1998a: 205). The Japanese 
Goven11nent ad1nits, "the state of a country's fisheries relationship with Japan could influence 
the priority of an aid project" (Bergin and Haward 1996: 74). Other Japanese aid to the region is 
chaiu1elled through regional organisations such as the Pacific Islands Forum and the SPC, the 
latter organisation being iI11portant because of its Tuna and Billfish Assessment Progran1 
research facility (Tarte 1998a: 201 ). 
4 
5 
6 
Les Clarke works at the FF A. 
Ultra-low freezing technology (ULT). 
Haward and Bergin (1996: 171) include the following footnote: " It should be noted that Japanese officials 
are particularly concerned about the growth and the sustainability of China' s operations in the Western 
Pacific, many of them operating under Taiwan trading companies. Japan does not believe that China will 
continue to increase its effort in the Western Pacific as they have done in recent years. Japanese officials 
also note that China' s catch is being landed at many ports and catches are not being reported accurately. 
Import data only does not report the port of shipment, not the actual catch, nor always who is actually 
catching. Some Japanese fishery scientists believe that China is 'secretly ' fishing for tuna" . 
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Japan has been vocal in its support for an UNCLOS Article 64 regional organisation 
which would con1prise fishing and coastal states.7 Its refusal to finalise a multilateral fisheries 
treaty with the region stem1ned fr01n UNCLOS Article 64 concen1s. Japanese fishing policy 
strategies are c01npounded by its own do1nestic problems, which have had an i1npact on its 
distant water fishing fleet operations. The so-called "bubble economy" of the 1980s gave way to 
econo1nic recession and a slu1np in fishery products de1nand by the 1990s (Taya 1995: 52). 
Japan's fishing fleet restructuring policies, which have been under-way since 1976, compound 
this situation. These policies are considered essential because of diminishing profitability and 
the economic viability of its fleets and include re1noving older, more inefficient vessels. Other 
constraints relate to rising fuel costs, burgeoning labour costs, increased fleet operation costs, 
higher access fees, and the lower overheads enjoyed by some of its competitors, for exan1ple, 
Taiwan and Korea.8 
With the introduction of the UNCLOS and 200-nautical 1nile EEZs, Japan's fishing 
strategies shifted to the high seas, in an attempt to avoid coastal state regulations. At that time, it 
was estin1ated that "thousands of fishermen" were put out of work and "hundreds of vessels" 
scrapped (Bergin and Haward 1996: 94). The negotiations for the Fish Stocks Agreement sought 
to 1nanage high seas fishing, one reason why Japan has opposed its in1plementation (see Chapter 
Five). Japan ' s longline fleet in the region peaked at approximately 120 vessels in 1965. Its 
global longline fleet was measured at between 1,400 and 1,600 during the 1970s. Most of these 
vessels (994 in total) were listed on the Regional Register (Riepen 1987: 163-164). By 1996, 
Japan's longline fleet had contracted by over 70% to 216 vessels (FFA 1998: 39). Japan' s purse 
seine fleet in the region went from 4 vessels in 1969, peaked at 39 vessels in 1988 and had 
declined to 31 vessels in 1995. Pole and line vessels in the region totalled 622 in 1953, peaked 
at 715 in 195 5 and had declined to 173 by 1995 (SPC Year book 1998). These figures 
den1onstrate Japan ' s static purse seine operations in the region, but highlight its dwindling pole 
and line operations, in the face of teclu1ology and efficiency gains in other sectors of the tuna 
industry. The static purse seine figures reflect the growing unprofitability of Japan ' s fleet, in 
con1parison to, for example, Taiwan. 
Although Japan tries to control the expansion of other fishing fleets to li1nit over-
fishing, it still needs to protect its supply. For exainple, in 1993, "Japan produced about 22 
percent and consu1ned 31 percent of the total tuna production in the world market" (Haward and 
Bergin 1996: xv). Because of Japanese fleet restructuring, however, " [I]i1nports have more than 
doubled, by 104% in the past ten years and now almost equal domestic supply" (Haward and 
7 
8 
See Chapter Five. 
See Tarte (1998a pp 121-122) for a discussion on Japan ' s fl eet restructuring and associated problems. Other 
emerging competitors include Indonesia, Philippines and Thailand (Tarte 1998a: 121 ). 
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Bergin 1996: xv).9 Two reasons given for these changes are the strong yen and rising production 
costs in Japan. 
Since Japan came out of recession in the early-1990s, domestic consu1nption of tuna has 
risen drmnatically (Taya 1995: 53). This is due in part to the diversification in tuna products, the 
spread of supennarkets launching low-cost tuna products and Japan ' s inland dwellers gaining 
increased access to fresh tuna due to use of super-chilled refrigerators (Taya 1995: 53). 
Therefore, Japan needs to maintain a fine balance between its domestic and imported catch 
levels. Too much tuna flooding the Japanese market fro1n producers such as Taiwan and Korea 
could lead to a collapse in the price of tuna and with it the viability of Japanese companies and 
the industry as a whole. 
Since the late-1970s, fishery expenditure by Japanese industry "has exceeded fishery 
receipts" (Campbell and Nichol 1994: 47, see also ABARE 1988: 285). As well, observers 
highlight the "negative rates of return for skipjack pole-and-line and longline vessels" 
(Cmnpbell and Nichol 1994: 47). 10 This said, Japan's purse seine industry continues to be 
profitable (Bergin and Haward 1996: 87). Bergin and Haward (1996: 87) point to the vertically 
integrated structure of the Japanese fishing industry, enabling losses made in one sector to be 
offset in another. The Japanese government is influenced by concerns over employ1nent and 
"political pressure fro1n cooperatives and prefectures" which are responsible for the livelihoods 
of fishing communities (Ca1npbell and Nicholl 1994: 4 7). As well, there is a desire by the 
govern1nent to retain a presence in those fishing grounds where it has traditionally fished, even 
before EEZ jurisdictions (Cmnpbell and Nicholl 1994: 47). In Oceania, those fishing grounds 
include Micronesia. 
Another related issue is the pre-occupation with food security in Japan. Although the 
post-war generation is less preoccupied with this mentality, it is still reflected in government 
thinking (Haward and Bergin 1996, see also Cmnpbell and Nicholl 1994). To take account of 
these influences, it is necessary for the Japanese govenunent to intervene in the market. This 
intervention is smnetimes referred to as subsidies. Whether these subsidies con1e in the form of 
"price support sche1nes, favourable credit status and soft loans, insurance assistance and 
subsidies"; they help to prop up the market (Campbell and Nicholl 1994: 48). 
These pressures on the industry have i1nplications for the way in which Japan interacts 
with the Oceanic states. They go some way to answer why Japan is a difficult fishing state with 
which to negotiate. These include its stubbornness over access fees increases, finalising 
1nultilateral treaties, criticisn1s over purse seine manage1nent arrangements, high seas fishing 
within Oceania, and the iinple1nentation of an Article 64-type organisation (Tarte 1998a). For 
all Japan' s rhetoric, however, it is hypocritical. Japan pays Australia 11 % in access fees for tuna 
9 
IO 
Imported tuna went from 135,000 tonnes in 1985 to 275,000 tonnes in 1994 (Haward and Bergin 1996: xv) . 
Citing Matsuda and Ouchi (1984 - unavailable). 
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considered of inferior quality to that harvested in Oceania (Crocon1be 2001: 333). Japan pays 
the Oceanic states approxi1nately 5% access fees, which are tied to its aid prograin. 
There is no doubt that the Japanese tuna industry is co1nplex. Competition fro1n other 
lower-cost fishing states active in Oceania has resulted in political and economic intervention. 
As will be discussed in Chapter Five, historical catch record is the strongest argmnent on which 
Japan rests its case for allocation of tuna stock quota in the region. It needs to maintain a stable 
tuna supply for its domestic 1narket. Korea and Taiwan do sell the majority of their tuna catch to 
Japan, however, the growth in the tuna industry elsewhere in the world could create 
competition, particularly for the highly prized sashimi market. 
Japan captures the global market for sashimi and while it 1night concede 11 % to 
Australia, Japan is not prepared to do so for the Oceanic states. Its bargaining power through 
bilateral access arrangements ensures that the region, for the most part, is acquiescent, thus 
ensuring aid provisions. Some states in the region do not have the luxury of being able to tum 
down vital econo1nic revenue. As Bergin (1994b: 3) notes, 
Japan is highly dependent on access to the region and it will only be through a 
1nultilateral arrangement that higher access fees will be realisable in practice. 
Because Japan is concerned pri1narily with the PNA group, it tries to ensure it remains on good 
relations with those states. It could not afford to give in to Papua New Guinea's de1nands, 
however, as it would have resulted in a do1nino effect throughout the PNA group.II That is why 
bilateral access agree1nents remain Japan's tru1np card in its relations with the region's tuna-rich 
states. 
Papua New Guinea's refusal to countenance Japan's "package" provides an example of 
an Oceanic state that is not prepared to sacrifice national interest for the sake of revenue. Given 
Papua New Guinea's position as one of the influential members of the PNA, this suggests that 
the PNA's co1nn1itn1ent to sustainability and a fair retun1 are strongly grounded. This issue has 
relevance to the study of the Convention for the Conservation and Management of Highly 
Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific (the WCPF Convention) negotiations 
in Chapters Five and Six. 
Republic of Korea (Korea) 
Korea's longline operations in the WCPO started in 1958 with two vessels. It peaked in 1974 
with 220 vessels and in 1995 totalled 154 vessels. Figures for Korea's purse seine industry show 
that activity com1nenced in 1980 with two vessels. The fleet expanded to 39 vessels in 1990 and 
then decreased to 30 vessels in 1995 (SPC Yearbook 1998). The FFA's insistence on fishing 
11 Papua New Guinea has resisted Japan ' s hard-line approach to access payments since 1989. Papua New 
Guinea was demanding 10%; Japan was conceding 4%. Among the factors which influenced Papua New 
Guinea' s steadfast refusal to concede was the uncompromising, antagonistic style of the Japanese 
negotiator, Norio Fujinami (Tarte 1998a: 111-118). 
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fleet co1npliance with the Vessel Monitoring System (VMS) discouraged Korean operators and 
so1ne moved to the Indian Ocean, where co1npliance is still lin1ited (Haward and Bergin 1996: 
4-20). Nevertheless, because of increased labour and fuel costs associated with distant fishing 
operations in the Indian and Atlantic Oceans, the Korean fleet is focussing its energies in 
Oceania (Wildman 1993: 98). 
The Korean fleet's reputation in the region is dainaged not least because of its defiance of 
management and conservation concen1s. This creates difficulties for the Korean fleet to gain 
access to Oceanic fishing grounds. While there is now a "substantial improve1nent" in data 
supplied fro1n the Korean purse seine operators, the "catch reporting of the longline fleet 
re1nains very poor" (Director's Report to the FFC: 1995-1996). This state of affairs is 
compounded by the lack of 
on-shore Korean investment in the region, in either the purse seine or longline fisheries. 
This again will not help Korean vessel owners secure the longer term access to the region 
that they desire (Director's Report to the PFC: 1995-1996). 
Oceanic observers are critical of Korea's lack of investn1ent in the region, in comparison with 
other Asian fleets, such as China, Taiwan and J apan. 12 Compounding this is the Korean fleet's 
poor compliance history in Oceania (Forum Fisheries Agency 1996b). 
There has been a substantial rise in Korea's do1nestic de1nand for frozen sashimi, which 
has occu1Ted at the same tune as "declining prices in the Japanese market" (Haward and Bergin 
1996: 20-43). Korea experiences similar problems to those of Japan regarding its tuna industry. 
These include crew difficulties, with many young Koreans disinterested in entering the fishing 
industry because of its perception as the four 'd's', that is: dirty, difficult, dangerous and distant 
work. It is a govermnent require1nent that half the vessel crew is Korean and problems of 
incompatibility are experienced between Korean and the foreign crew co1nponent. Other 
proble1ns include the increased con1petition from other fishing fleets, for example, Taiwan and 
Indonesia. Securing access to EEZ fishing has also been costly for the Korean fleet, which 
records a 290% ii1crease in fees between 1990 and 1991 (Wildman 1993: 94 ). This 1nay be due 
to greater vigilance on the part of coastal states. The Oceanic states have uncovered 
considerable infonnation because of the Multilateral Fisheries Treaty, which highlights under-
reporting and failure to rep01i. 
Since 1992, Japan has also sought to set a quota on the li1nits of imports from Korea as 
well as Taiwan. That said, many Korean fishing fleets, and in particular, small operators, have 
close links with Japanese trading houses, which gives them preferential access to Japan's 
n1arkets. Son1e analysts put the figure of Korean vessels supplying their catch to Japanese 
trading companies around 80% (Haward and Bergin 1996: 38-55). Other problems relating to 
Korea's tuna fishing industry include an ageing fleet, reduced catch levels, which also mean 
12 WCPF Preparatory Conference (Prepcon) interviews April 2001. 
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constricted profits, a decrease in Japanese market prices, co1nbined with higher operational 
costs, including labour. One side effect of labour costs has been the reflagging of its fishing 
vessels to FOC registries (Haward and Bergin 1996: 78). 
Because of a pessimistic outlook, Japanese investment in Korea' s fishing sector is 
declining and several big Korean fishing co1npanies are in the process of restructuring and 
1noving to other 1nore profitable aspects of the industry, for example, food processing and fish 
i1nporting (Haward and Bergin 1996: 63). This leads to perceptions of an unstable Japanese 
market and makes the Korean fishing sector vulnerable regarding its level of exposure to the 
Japanese market. 
Korea's fishing fleet is not well-regarded by the region. Its willingness to comply with 
conservation and 1nanage1nent principles is dismal and its illegal fishing practices ean1 it the 
dubious title of 'bad actor'. While Korea pays the Oceanic states up to 6% in access fees , this 
needs to be weighed up against its 'bad actor' reputation. Even Korea, however, has felt the 
weight of increased monitoring control and surveillance (MCS) measures in the region, 
evidenced by reductions in its illegal fishing operations (Forum Fisheries Agency 1996b ). 
Soviet Union - Russian Federation 
During the earlier part of the nineteenth century, Russian navigators, traders and scientists 
undertook exploratory trips to the Oceanic region (Crocombe: 1987: 187, Henningham 1995: 
94). The Soviet Union's tentative twentieth century steps into Oceania were not marked by an 
enthusiastic welcome. The Soviet Union negotiated with Tonga in 1976 to set up an Embassy 
and a fishing fleet base, to gain landing access for Aeroflot, to facilitate crew changeovers, build 
a dock and develop Tonga's airport. Australia stepped in to the Cold War breach to dissuade 
Tongan authorities from proceeding with the negotiations by providing an increase in aid and 
support to Tonga (Henninghain 1995: 95). The Soviet Union found it difficult, pre-Gorbachev, 
to 1nake headway in f orn1alising its relations with the Oceanic states, who were not about to sell 
out to co1mnunism and were wary about aid (personal communication, Fry, 05.08 .2002). 
When the Soviet Union signed the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone (SPNFZ) in 1986, 
the Soviet Union "gained a favourable image" in the region (Hoadley 1992: 49). These 
developn1ents were compounded by the actions of two powers in paiiicular, France and the 
United States. France had not endeared itself to the region by refusing to negotiate with the 
Kanaks of New Caledonia regarding their decolonisation aspirations. Moreover, it had not 
helped its cause by bo1nbing Greenpeace' s flagship , Rainbow Warrior in Auckland's harbour. 
To 1nake 1natters worse, the United States was seen by the region as unsupportive over this 
issue, as well as continuing to support the flagrant illegal fishing by its fleets in Oceania. In this 
geostrategic conte:x.1:, Kiribati agreed to a fishing access arrangement with the Soviet Union in 
1985 which was followed by its agreement with Vanuatu. While Australia and New Zealand 
had cautioned Kiribati and Vanuatu about the Soviet Union, both island states felt confident of 
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their abilities to deal with the Soviets. Neither arrange1nent was ultimately "cost-effective" and 
neither was renewed (Henningha1n 1995: 95). There was also resentment on the part of those 
Oceanic states when it was learnt that New Zealand had finalised a fishing agree1nent with the 
Soviet Union (Henningham 1995: 95). In 1990, the Russian Federation opened a dipl01natic 
n1ission in Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea and negotiated a fisheries arrangement (Dorrance 
1992: 132-133). The fisheries deal was not finalised, however, because of "suspicions about 
Soviet intentions" (Henningham 1995: 97). 
The Soviet Union ' s WCPO purse seine operations commenced in 1985 with 5 vessels. 
Later, as the Russian Federation, its fishing activities peaked in 1993 with 8 boats. In 1994, its 
last year of activity, it had 4 purse seine vessels fishing in the WCPO (SPC Yearbook 1998). 
From these figures, it is concluded that the Russian fleet's level of activity was 1nini1nal. During 
this period, there were ideas put forward regarding a "subregional multilateral access 
arrange1nent involving Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu" (Doulman 1991: 
82). Nothing ca1ne of these ideas. 
While the Soviet Union/Russian Federation has had a short-lived exposure in the 
region, it has had an i1npact - a financial one. The suspicious nature of the Cold War 
geostrategic environ1nent secured an increased level of interest in the region by the 1netropolitan 
powers. In answer to the Soviet intrusions into Oceania, for example, Japan initiated a new 
policy for Oceania, the Kuranari Doctrine, which doubled . Japan ' s "official develop1nent 
assistance to the region ... interpreted as ... strategic aid" (Tarte 1998a: 150). The conservative 
nature of the Oceanic states was reflected in their reticence to promote Soviet fishing operations 
in the region, particularly when they realised that Cold War politics would work in their favour 
financially. The Soviet fishing expansion was minimal, but Westen1 policy-makers were blinded 
by paranoia and threw n1oney at the region to win friends. 
Taiwan 
Taiwan ' s longline fleet activity in the region co1n1nenced in the WCPO in 1964 with 12 vessels 
and peaked in 1976 with 194 vessels in operation. By 1995, its Oceanic fleet was reduced to 62 
vessels. Its purse seine activities, on the other hand, increased drainatically from 3 vessels in 
1983 , to 42 vessels in 1995 (SPC Yearbook 1998). The growth of Taiwan' s fi shing fleet results 
in it being second to Japan in the world ' s tuna fishing fleets , with Taiwan leading the albacore 
fleets (Ho 1995). That said, the Taiwanese albacore catch, which peaked in the 1nid-1970s, had 
halved by 1990-1996 (Haward and Bergin 2000: 36). Japanese fears that Taiwan ' s continued 
increases in supply of sashimi tuna 1night destabilise this vulnerable market led to an agreement 
being concluded in 1994 between the Federation of Japan Tuna Associations and the Taiwan 
Deep Sea Tuna Boatowners and Exporters Association. This resulted in the introduction of a 
voluntary i1nport quota for the Taiwanese catch. Taiwanese officials concede that there would 
be a "a big mess" if the quota is exceeded (Haward and Bergin 1996: 130). There is growing 
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concen1 in Taiwan regarding its dependency on a single sashimi tuna market, which resulted in 
a concerted d01nestic cainpaign to interest Taiwanese in the product. Taiwan's longline sashimi 
1narket to Japan amounts to approximately 99% of its catch. If the Japanese market price 
contracts, then Taiwan's fleets suffer (Haward and Bergin 2000: 37-39). 
Since the Palau Arrangement, Taiwanese purse seine vessels operating in the WCPO 
have c01ne under increasing pressure to base their vessels locally. This initiative is to encourage 
joint ventures with the region (Haward and Bergin 1996: 143). Ting Hong Oceanic Enterprise 
has been the 1nost i1nportant Taiwanese sashimi operation in Oceania. During the early-1990s, 
the co1npany had 
dock-side packing facilities in Yap, Chuuk, Pohnpei and Korea in FSM, Majuro in the 
Marshall Islands and in Honiara, Solomon Islands ... It owns three 727 cargo planes for 
shipping carton packed fresh tuna from various base ports to Guain and Saipan for 
connection to scheduled airlines (Haward and Bergin 1996: 142). 13 
The Taiwanese fleet is also concerned about the rise in Chinese fleet numbers in the Federated 
States of Micronesia and Palau. As well as these pressures there are: labour shortages for both 
skilled and unskilled vessel crew; continuing depressed tuna markets which result in higher 
operational costs; co1npetition fro1n countries with cheaper overheads (for example, Indonesia 
and the Philippines); and increasing pressure to confonn to compliance measures. Since the 
early-1990s, approval has been given for Taiwanese fishing vessels to be crewed by 50% 
foreign workers, rather than the 33% previously. China is a major crew provider for Taiwanese 
vessels (Wild1nan 1993: 125). Observers note that Taiwan has the "advantage of access to 
virtually li1nitless crew fro1n mainland China" (Haward and Bergin 2000: 33). 14 Other factors 
affecting profits and operational viability include d01nestic factors such as the sudden interest 
rate rises "from 6.3 to 11.13 percent between April and July 1989" (Haward and Bergin 2000: 
42). This was compounded by a 30% increase in the cost of insurance premiu1ns within a short 
space of tin1e (Haward and Bergin 2000: 42). 
Taiwan's lack of diplomatic status influences its abilities to be a contracting party to 
inten1ational, regional and sub-regional fisheries manage1nent regimes, despite its desire to do 
so.
15 Taiwan's fishing sector complains that it is prepared to take note of govern1nent policy if 
its govenunent is able to participate fully in inten1ational fisheries bodies. The sector argues that 
without that paiiicipation, it feels Taiwan's fleet is not treated fairly as regards quota allocation. 
Observers believe that Taiwan's 1nembership of international organisations would "make it 
13 
14 
15 
Because of legal action regarding its fishing activities, as well as its refusal to use local transshipment 
facilities, Ting Hong was asked to leave the FSM in 1994/1995. 
There are, however, problems experienced on board because of the "significant wage differential between 
Chinese and Taiwanese deckhands (Haward and Bergin 2000: 42). 
While the United Nations does not recognise Taiwan, "the designation of fishing entities" within the 
Agreement has "enabled Taiwanese scientists to present date on Taiwanese catches" . Taiwan is also a 
participant in the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC) and the Inda-Pacific Tuna Program (IPTP). 
Taiwanese scientists are also observers at the International Commission for the Convention of Atlantic 
Tunas (ICCAT) (Haward and Bergin 1996: 159). 
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easier for govermnent to exercise greater control over industry" (Haward and Bergin 1996: 
150). 
Haward and Bergin (1996: 150) note that the Taiwanese government is aware that its 
fleet drags its feet in relation to compliance and realises that its participation in international 
fisheries bodies could be enhanced if it collected statistical data. One advantage of Taiwan's 
tuna industry, in comparison to that of either Japan or Korea, is its lower overheads, particularly 
for crew. Taiwan is also aware that reflagging vessels to FOC registries works against its good 
standing in the international cominunity. 16 As regards the Taiwanese fishing industry's use of 
open registries, an industry official notes that son1e members of Taiwan's tuna fishing industry 
had not always been 'good students' of Taiwan's international relations and had caused 
'many headaches' for government. These problems are associated with the recognition 
issue and Taiwan's desire to be seen as a 'responsible fishing nation" (Haward and Bergin 
1996: 150) 
While this public attitude regarding FOC registers will help maintain Taiwan's share of the 
global tuna inarket, its activities in Oceania, at least in the early- l 990s, were not ain1ed at 
1naintaining good standing in the region. For example, Taiwanese fleet under-reporting of catch 
was esti1nated at 79% in 1990. By 1993, however, this figure had dropped to 49% (Forun1 
Fisheries Agency 1996b).17 In the 1996 Director's Report to the Foru1n Fisheries Committee 
(PFC), it was stated that the "abys1nal reporting behaviour" of the Taiwanese longline fleet is 
the "principal reason" behind the region's attempts to conclude a multilateral treaty with Taiwan 
(PFC 1996: I 0). That said, the region has not been able to finalise a treaty with Taiwan. The 
region' s fisheries conservation and 1nanagement principles have seen a reduction in Taiwan's 
' bad actor' habits, but not enough for it to concede a Treaty. 
Of the 1najor fishing fleets operating in the region, Taiwan's operations are the 1nost 
price-competitive. This is due to its ability to access China's unskilled labour market. Although 
this helps n1ake its operations c01npetitive, it also makes Taiwan' s tuna industry the 1nost 
vulnerable to the vagaries of the Japanese consumer. As it exports almost its entire sashimi 
catch to Japan, it is exposed to any fluctuations in the Japanese 1narket. 
United States 
Because the United States' interests in the region are primarily strategic, it is necessary to 
exa1nine the full range of those interests to gain an understanding of how the United States ' tuna 
fleet operates within its geostrategic goals. By 1986, the United States had finalised Compacts 
of Free Association with the Federated States of Micronesia and the Marshall Islands. The 
Compacts incorporated socio-economic develop1nent funding, defence and strategic access, but 
16 
17 
It is believed that between 80-100 Taiwanese long-line vessels are reflagged (Haward and Bergin 1996: 
165). 
Using the same source, Japan ' s under-reporting was 15% and Korea' s was 28% in 1990. As regards non-
reporting, Japan was 31%, Korea was 75% and Taiwan was 5% in 1990 (Forum Fisheries Agency 1996b). 
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also support for some political independence, for exainple, in relation to foreign affairs. Integral 
to United States geostrategic considerations is its Kwajalein Atoll facility in Marshall Islands, 
This facility works as part of the United States Department of Defense ' s missile-defense 
research program. As Dorrance notes 
The Kwajalein Missile Range facility in the Marshall Islands will remain essential so long 
as there is a need to test ICBM delivery vehicles and to develop the Strategic Defense 
Initiative (1992: 63). 
K wajalein Atoll in the Marshall Islands has been an itnportant site for the United States for 
decades and re1nains so. 18 Under the Bush Administration, there were missile tests during 2001 
that involved the destruction of a mock warhead, launched from the Vandenberg Air Force Base 
in Califon1ia, by interceptors launched fro1n the Kwajalein Atoll. 19 Because of this continued 
con1n1itment to develop the strategic defence shield, the Micronesian region re1nains a 
geostrategic outpost for United States interests. 
There is also another aspect of the region's strategic importance to the United States. 
During the Pacific War, the United States Navy was denied Asian access by the occupying 
Japanese forces (Hezel, 1995, Peattie 1988). This goes some way to understanding the United 
States ' disquiet at the UN CLOS negotiations over loss of freedo1n of the high seas and the fears 
regarding closure of EEZ and archipelagic waters.20 While "Rights of innocent passage" 
(UNLCOS Article 52) clearly enunciates the shipping rights of all States to enjoy innocent 
passage, the i1nportance of freedom of access through archipelagic straits such as those of 
Indonesia should not be underestitnated in relation to United States geostrategic interests.21 
These straits give access to its fleets en-route to the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf. 
As part of the United States co1nn1it1nent to the region, it had discussed the ' bad actors ' 
of fishing in re1narks aired at an informal meeting of the yearly United States/FF A Multilateral 
Fisheries Treaty talks in late 1991.22 At those talks, the United States raised its frustration at the 
defiance of son1e fishing states to adhere to the co1npliance 1neasures that the United States fleet 
had taken on board as part of the Multilateral Fisheries Treaty. Those re1narks were the first 
steps towards the Convention on the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish 
Stocks in Western and Central Pacific Tuna (WCPF) negotiations. While politically 1notivated, 
18 
19 
20 
2 1 
22 
In 1948, Kwajalein housed the displaced Bikini people, who were fo rced off their island by United States 
atomic bomb tests. In 1954, atomic bomb-affected islanders from Rongelap were also housed on Kwajalein. 
During those years of atomic bomb tests, K waj alein was used as a staging area and support base for the 
United States military. In 1959, Kwaj alein was selected as the "target site fo r the United States 
intercontinental ballistic missile program". Marshallese workers on Kwajalein were moved to the nearby 
island of Ebeye (Bezel 1995: 275). 
See the Pacific Islands Report 15 July 2001 , online< http ://pidp.ewc.hawaii .edu . 
See the UNCLOS regarding "rights of innocent passage", Articles 52, 53 , 54, 58, for example. 
Innocent passage extends to the right of a vessel not just to travel through the territorial sea, but to stop and 
anchor, as needed by navigation, or by necessity, in times of distress or danger (see Churchill and Lowe 
1983: 64). 
Personal comrnucation with Transform Aqorua, Legal Counsel, Forum Fisheries Agency. 
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the transfonnation by the United States fro1n 'bad actor' to ' good actor' regarding its fishing 
activities in Oceania has resulted in the region gaining, for the most part, a strong ally. 
That said, it has been observed that while the Multilateral Fisheries Treaty was 
"satisfactorily resolved in 1987 . . . some of the public relations damage lingers" (Dorrance 
1992: 98). The public relations damage refers to wide-held beliefs in the region that the United 
States not only supported French nuclear testing in French Polynesia, but also that it had backed 
French colonial policies in New Caledonia. Dorrance (1992: 100) argues that the failure by the 
United States to correct these allegations highlights its deficient atte1npts at "public dipl01nacy" 
within Oceania. A summit was held between the United States and the Oceanic states in October 
1990, led by President George Bush. At that su1nmit, initiatives were announced to promote 
relations between the parties. 23 The region was not seduced by the Bush rhetoric. There was no 
United States support for the South Paci.fie Nuclear Free Zone (SPNFZ), no agree1nent to 
influence French thinking on its nuclear testing program and the United States upheld its view 
that there was insufficient evidence to support global warming environmental policies 
(Dorrance 1992: 104 ). Island leaders were also critical of United States support favouring the 
north Pacific and the lack of aid to those states south of the Equator (Hoadley 1992: 40). 
While these experiences highlight the United States' public relations deficiencies in its 
dealings with the region, the i1nportance of the region for its fishing fleet remains constant. This 
is despite the decline in the number of vessels and the fleet's comn1ercial viability (DF AT 
12.02.98). The United States purse seine fleet rose fro1n 3 vessels in 1976 to peak at 62 vessels 
in 1983 and to decline to 44 vessels by 1995. Its purse seine fleet was regulated following the 
October 1986 conclusion of the Multilateral Fisheries Treaty, which allows for up to 50 of its 
purse seiners to fish within agreed areas of the FF A region.24 Since the Multilateral Fisheries 
Treaty, the fleet's n1ost productive year was 1994, when 49 vessels were operating in the region 
(SPC Yearbook 1998). 
The main thrust of United States foreign policy in Oceania since the Cold War has been 
the Multilateral Fisheries Treaty. Apart from guaranteeing access to its fleet, it has helped to 
pro1note the United States as a friend of the region, given that the aid component of that Treaty 
is distributed region-wide. As the United States provides continued support under Compact 
arrange1nents for the Micronesian region, an area over which it has defence and strategic 
control, the Multilateral Fisheries Treaty is a cheap method of gaining the support of other 
Oceanic states. 
23 
24 
These initiatives included: a reduction in use of the chemical weapons disposal unit on Johnston Atoll; 
establishment of a Joint Commercial Commission; establishment of a Asia-Pacific Growth Fund and 
Environmental Investment Fund; promotion of United States investors to the region; extension of the 
Multilateral Fisheries Treaty; USAID private sector aid for agriculture and marine resource development; 
and education exchange programs in the region (see Hoadley 1992: 39-40, Dorrance 1992: 104-107). 
There are closed areas of the FFA region to the United States fleet, including Tonga's EEZ. 
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This section illustrates the extent of fishing state operations in Oceania fro1n the 1980s 
to the mid- l 990s. The competitive nature of the industry has led to restructuring and indeed, 
restrictions being placed by Japan on the supply of tuna. These include the issue of FOC vessels 
and their catch, as well as li1niting the level of imports from sources such as Taiwan and Korea. 
This is done to 1naintain market stability and therefore it is in the interests of Taiwan and Korea 
to comply, given their high exposure to Japan's sashimi 1narket. The section also highlights the 
importance of the region's tuna fishing grounds to these fishing states. The back-up sanctions of 
the real threat of being struck off the Regional Register has brought about greater compliance. 
This is demonstrated in the decrease in illegal fishing activities by two of the most notorious 
' bad actors' in the region ' s tuna fishery, Taiwan and Korea. 
This section also illustrates that it is not just fish which drives the relations between the 
region and fishing states. It is evident that the Multilateral Fisheries Treaty is a byproduct of the 
geostrategic context in which the United States' operates in the region. To an economy the size 
of the United States, the costs associated with the Treaty are a s1nall price to pay for the 
continued access that it guarantees. Nevertheless, the Treaty and its provisions, provide a 
de1nonstration of what can be achieved by substantive provisions in 1neaningful treaties with 
back-up sanctions. 
Section two: Domestic commercial tuna operations and joint ventures from the 
1980s to the mid-1990s 
This section exa1nines joint ventures and the domestic tuna industry to establish why these areas 
have only realised s1nall gains in the level of domestic participation in the tuna industry. There 
are several reasons for this. For example, these activities have been influenced by the changing 
global tuna econon1y, which in tun1 has affected Oceania's attempts to both invest in the 
infrastructure to support a don1estic tuna industry and to maxiinise the region 's benefits and 
involve1nent. While there were joint ventures in operation during this period, these favoured the 
foreign partners and were not as successful as would have been imagined, given the rich tuna 
stocks in the region. 
The development of national fisheries programs has been encouraged at the regional 
level, through the FF A (Herr 1990: 180). These programs have been ai1ned at either joint 
ventures or develop1nent of domestic tuna industries. Funding during the 1980s originated from 
not just the FF A, but also the South Pacific Commission (SPC), and the United Nations Food 
and Agriculture Organisation (F AO) and the United Nations Development (UNDP) Programme 
Regional Fishery Support prograinme. The F AO/UNDP funding has either been disbursed 
directly to national govenunents, or channelled through the FF A. Herr (1990: 3 82) believes that 
these arrangements have "paid handso1ne dividends in tenns of assisting and promoting general 
development and economic expansion in national fisheries sectors". Thus, the development of 
joint ventures and domestic tuna industries is driven at the region level and has had an impact 
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on the size and workload of the FF A. Therefore, regional objectives and the develop1nent efforts 
of joint ventures and domestic tuna industries are linked. 
Gert van Santen and Philipp Muller (2000: 13) note that the Oceanic states have sought 
foreign loans and grants, as well as local public equity into funding joint ventures and their 
domestic tuna industries over the past thirty years. In so doing, they were encouraged by aid 
donors, who stressed the develop1nent of local industry to limit the region's exposure to exten1al 
forces. Not only did these decisions result in rivalry between the Oceanic states over vessel 
purchase, processing plants, transshipment facilities and port infrastructure, but they had to 
contend "with well-established, global tuna industries" (van Santen and Muller 2000: 13). As 
well as these rivalries, however, the region has to contend with the changes in the global tuna 
econo1ny. 
For exainple, the United States fleet decreased by 50% over the period 1976-1986 due 
in large part to the increasing competition fro1n the lower-cost Taiwanese and Korean fleets 
(van Santen and Muller 2000: 13). By the mid-to-late-1980s, Japanese trading companies had 
cut their financial links with Korean and Taiwanese companies. More i1nportant, however, was 
decision by canneries to trade on the spot market for its supplies, rather than directly with 
fishing fleets. This exposes the fleets to a higher level of risk, as well as creating a fiercely 
con1petitive caiu1ery 1narket. Thus, by the early-l 990s, when the Oceanic states enthusiastically 
took up loans and entered the tuna market, they did so at a very aggressive time in a less 
profitable sector of the tuna commodity chain (Schurman 1998: 122). The Oceanic states did not 
have the opportunity to participate in the more profitable sector of the commodity chain. This 
sector is connected with "raw material trading and retail/distribution" (Schunnan 1998: 122). It 
centres a1nong "large multinational corporations or trading co1npanies with long histories in the 
industry and strong links to their buyers . . . and the distribution sector concentrated on "fewer 
than a dozen 1nultinationals and Japanese trading companies" (Schurman 1998: 123). Therefore, 
the Oceanic states' relative low level of capital exposure to the industry means that the only 
option available to the1n is to participate at the harvesting and transshipment stage of the 
comn1odity chain. 
It is not just the exten1al factors of the global tuna economy, however, that collude to 
restrain the region' s develop1nent of a domestic tuna sector or successful joint ventures. The 
lack of do1nestic infrastructure is related to a complex set of local factors , which also hinder 
private sector develop1nent in the islands. One of these is land tenure. Traditional land tenure 
arrangements in many of the islands make it difficult for land to be sold, or leased long-term, 
therefore making it difficult to use land to gain credit. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) 
points out that 
[P]private indigenous financing in the Pacific is, however, constrained because traditional 
tenure over land immobilizes the local land lease market and therefore the expansion of 
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the domestic property market and its use as collateral for commercial credit (ADB 1997: 
24). 
In defence of traditional land tenure, however, it does provide indigenous islanders with an 
extended family base where subsistence living has few costs. Land tenure gives these 
communities a security that others elsewhere in the developing world lack. Develop111ent 
agencies, such as the World Bank, have tried to dis111antle land tenure as a condition of 
providing loans to Papua New Guinea 
The first and short-term strategy is to forcibly evict communities from land targeted for 
key development projects, such as dams, plantations, and 1nines. The second, medium 
term strategy is to offer schemes such as the World Bank's Land Mobilisation Programme 
to induce people to give up control over their land in exchange for promises of 
' development ' (World Bank Watcher appeared in Pacific Islands Monthly, 31.5.2001). 
Capital is another limiting factor for the region's private sector to become involved in the 
tuna industry, as the tuna industry is 
comparatively expensive to enter; it is capital intensive, high risk, and highly competitive 
without private, tradable resource rights ... [T]tuna catches are unpredictable and world 
tuna prices are subject to marked fluctuations resulting from worldwide shifts in the 
balance of supply and demand, a factor beyond the control of even the large tuna firms (ADB 1997: 27). 
As noted in Appendix B, the costs associated with buying a longline vessel can an1ount to 
between US$500,000-US$600,000, with a second-hand vessel costing US$300,000. Purse seine 
vessels can cost between US 13-US$18 million new, with a second-hand vessel costing up to 
half of this figure. Purse seine nets can add US$5 00,000-US$600,000 (FF A 1998). Securing 
loans in Oceania to purchase these vessels is a prohibitive proposition. 
A further limiting feature for pursuing regional participation is the lack of skilled labour 
1n the industry. While there are maritime schools established in the Federated States of 
Micronesia, Marshall Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Papua New Guinea, Tonga and Tuvalu, these are 
generally focused on 111erchant seamen. Oceanic states are dissuaded fron1 entering the tuna 
industry because of 
the lack of local skills training, the relative wages, and the employment policies that favor 
government employment; as well as the arduous nature of the work involved (ADB 1997: 
25). 
Other factors which inhibit participation include relative isolation, lack of domestic 
infrastructure, " low levels of private sector finance", and a "lack of entrepreneurial experience 
and manage111ent skills" (FAQ 1997: 29). This has not stopped the majority of the island states 
fron1 trying to enter the tuna industry. 
In 1993 there were 1,300 tuna vessels operating in the region. Of that figure, however, 
the don1estic fleet numbered 17 purse seiners, 26 longliners and 42 pole and line vessels 
(AID AB 1994:7). The AID AB report notes that by 1994, the FF A had reported that 
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few, if any ... have met the expectations of their Pacific island partners in terms of 
generating profits and employment, or providing the level of training required for nations 
to allow them to play a larger role in the fishing operations or the management of the 
company. Of the purse seine joint ventures currently operational in the region, most are 
heavily in debt and hard pressed to cover their day to day operating costs (AIDAB 1994: 
13). 
Reasons why joint ventures have failed include 
inexperienced government-appointed directors, loosely drafted agree1nents, political 
intervention, and a lack of understanding of overseas industry connections of the foreign 
partner (Doulman 1989: 36). 
By exainining more closely individual joint ventures, as well as do111estic tuna operations, it 
bec0111es clear that while Doulman's analysis is right, there are also local factors to be 
considered, as well as the global tuna economy. The following discussion highlights the joint 
ventures and don1estic operations active in the region since the 1980s to the mid-1990s. 
American Samoa 
Pago Pago re111ains the centre for the United States fleet's regional canning operations, although 
some fish is transshipped to canneries in Puerto Rico. Fishing and cam1ing remain American 
San1oa's 111ajor industry, given its duty free access to the United States domestic market 
(Crocombe 2001: 400). By 1985, approximately 27% of the "e111ployed labor force in the 
territory was engaged in tuna processing" (Schug and Galea'i 1987: 195). Aside from this, the 
approxi111ately 2,000 Korean i111111igrants who have settled in American Samoa and married 
local people have been associated with the cam1ing industry. The industry e111ploys around 
4,000 workers, who, apart fro111 i111migrant workers, are drawn from Sainoa (Crocombe 2001: 
54). Local A111erican Samoans are 111ore likely to be drawing goven1ment benefits (Croco111be 
2001: 400, 525). As is the case with other tuna canning operations in the region, for example, 
PAFCO's cannery in Fiji and Soltai in the Solomon Islands, the work women do is largely 
unskilled and lowly-paid (Croco111be 2001: 127). 
Federated States of Micronesia 
The Federated States of Micronesia established the National Fisheries Corporation (NFC) in 
1989 to facilitate the develop111ent of a do111estic tuna fishery (F AO 1998£). According to 
Schunnan (1998: 115), until 1995 the goven1111ent had invested more than US$120 111illion in 
the develop111ent of a domestic industry. This has been supplen1ented by an Asian Development 
Bank (ADB) US$6.5 111illion develop111ent loan to boost the d0111estic long-line fleet, "targeting 
the fresh sashimi 111arket" (F AO 1998f: 3 ). The NFC finalised an agreement in 1994 with a 
group of Japanese tuna fishing companies. For exainple, Nikkatsuren invested in NFC and a 
separate Japanese company was set up to provide "guidance, funds and air freight connections 
to Japan" (Tarte 1998a: 126-127). Japanese vessels fishing in the Federated States of 
107 
The politics of tuna operations in Oceania 
Micronesia ' s EEZ harvest the tuna destined for airfreighting to Japan. The first consignment 
was exported to Japan in February 1995 (Tarte 1998a: 126-127). 
Tarte (1998a: 127) notes that the joint venture arose out of Japanese concerns regarding 
Taiwanese and Chinese fleet activity in the area. These fleets had "contributed to the expansion 
of fresh tuna exports to Japan and put increased pressure on the fresh tuna 1narket in Japan", 
thus 
[T]the objective of the ' cooperation' is stated clearly to be gaining ' influence ' with the 
FSM government on the question of limiting access of Taiwanese and Chinese vessels, 
while ' stabilising' Japan' s own access arrangements (Tarte 1998a: 127). 
Fu1ihermore, as Doulman (1998: 9) argues 
[W]what must be realised is that for government, the profit centre for the venture is in-
country, while for the partners it is likely to be a centre outside the country- either the 
parent company or an affiliate company. 
Self-interest by joint venture partners is not unexpected but there are two prongs to it. The first 
is to protect the Japanese company concerned and the second is to deny other fleets the saine 
level of access. A by-product of this self-interest is to put pressure on the local partner, in this 
case, the Federated States of Micronesia govermnent, to support Japan' s two goals. The NFC 
also finalised joint ventures with two other government-owned companies, the Caroline Fishing 
Corporation (CFC) and the Yap Fishing Corporation (YFC) . A further state-owned enterprise, 
Westpac was a joint tuna venture with United States interests (FAO 1998f: 4). 
The other domestic operation is the Pohnpei Fisheries Corporation (PFC), which buys 
those tuna identified as "not of sufficiently high quality to justify air freighting" (F AO 1998f: 
4). The tuna is processed into "vacuum-packed fresh and frozen loins and smoked fish" (FAO 
1998f: 4). This operation is tern1ed a "white elephant" because it was initially set up to process 
reef fish, rather than tuna. "For this reason it cannot operate at maximum efficiency" 
(Micronesian Se1ninar 8.9.1993). It is suggested that even if PFC did operate efficiently, its 
success is reliant on purchase of fresh tuna, as PFC has no vessels itself (Micronesian Seminar 
8.9.1993). 
Other aspects of the tuna industry which have the potential to be financially lucrative 
include "port infrastructure, and cold storage and transship1nent facilities", which return a better 
outco1ne (Schurman 1998: 117). Even here, Schurman (1998: 117) notes, there is reluctance by 
do1nestic-based fleets to use the "fuel , foodstuffs , bait and ice" . This is largely because foreign 
transshippers fear erosion of their own profits. In this respect, "the largest foreign longlining 
co1npany in the country", Ting Hong, refused to use the domestic facilities as part of the 
Federated States of Micronesia' s push for fishing access (Schurman 1998: 117). Consequently, 
Ting Hong left.25 The lack of a sizeable private sector in the Federated States of Micronesia has 
25 As Schurman ( 1998: 117) notes, while Ting Hong has owned some boats, it "mainly contracts with Chinese 
longliners, and makes most of its money as a transshipper. 
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led to the goven1ment investing in the tuna industry. This has not been a successful 111arriage, 
although NFC has survived. Compounding this is the leverage applied by Japan and Ting Hong 
regarding pre-eminent protection of their own industries over that of the country in whose 
waters they are operating. Those negative aspects aside, the Federates States of Micronesia is 
geographically advantaged, given its proxi111ity to major transshipping ports, such as Guam and 
Saipan, although the limited runway on Pohnpei does restrict aircraft size. In 1995, it was 
estimated that the 260 vessel domestically-based fleet, co111prising local and foreign vessels 
contributed approxi111ately US$68 111illion to the country's coffers (F AO 1998f: 5). 
The Federated States of Micronesia has one of the richest tuna fishing grounds in 
Oceania. Their experiences in establishing a domestic tuna operation illustrate the difficulties of 
participation in the global tuna econo111y. If the foreign investor in a joint venture is not 
genuinely focused on the operation, but rather on protection of its own market, then the chances 
of success are marginal. As has been discussed earlier, in spite of the enthusiastic support of 
donors and banks, the downturn in the tuna 111arket in the 1990s did not help those Oceanic 
states keen to enter the industry. 
Fiji 
The ailing PAFCO was taken over by the Fiji Goverm11ent in 1986 and began to show a profit. 
Hughes (1987: 212,221) has suggested that during its less-profitable years, when C. Itoh owned 
P AFCO, it was used as a transfer-pricing facility. 26 An i111portant element in the viability of 
P AFCO relates to its preferential access to the European Union states, under the Lome 
Convention. Like the Solomon Islands, Fiji concentrates on the top end of the canned tuna 
n1arket, particularly the United Kingdo1n where pole-and-line caught fish commands premiu111 
prices. Until the early 1980s, PAFCO was not a successful venture (Waugh 1986: 28). By 1986, 
however, the Fiji govenunent had obtained a controlling share in the venture with the sell-out by 
its joint venture partner, C. Itoh (Veitayaki 1995: 56). Veitayaki believes the proble111s 
experienced by the enterprise until the end of that decade comprised 
the acceptance of the product, the marketing of the products overseas, competition from 
other canneries, lack of skilled manpower and lack of capital (1995: 57). 
The P AFCO cannery, located on the island of Ovalau is now 98% Fiji government-owned. 
Ovalau villages and private investors own the remaining 2% (Hunt 1999: 574). Supplies of tuna 
are either i111ported fro111 Pago Pago or sourced fro111 local long-line vessels (Hunt 1999: 573). 
The F AO (1998e: 4) identifies fisheries products (fresh and processed) as being the fourth 
biggest export after sugar, gold and garments, with the "ex-vessel value of the tuna fishery" 
worth approximately US$40 to US45 million in 1995. 
26 See Hughes (1987: 212, 221) for a discussion on the transfer pricing arrangements of Solomon Taiyo. 
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The largest Fijian operator for sashimi grade tuna is the Suva-based Fiji Fish C01npany 
Ltd, which operates 33 long-line vessels, 12 being owned by the Company and the re1nainder 
operating as joint ventures or contract vessels. According to Hunt (1999: 574), Fiji Fish "has 
den1onstrated a high level of efficiency in catching and processing" because it has the "high 
level of management" demanded by industrial fisheries. Veitayaki ( 1995: 60) notes the 
co1npetitive nature of the industry and the ability of a company, such as Fiji Fish, to meet the 
extensive demands placed on it by fresh tuna overseas markets, such as Japan (1995: 60). 
P AFCO, like Solo1non Taiyo, has been assisted by the Lome Convention and its policy 
of preferential access arrangements for goods originating fron1 developing states such as those 
of Oceania. During the period under discussion, the Fijian tuna industry has demonstrated an 
ability to grow and beco1ne a viable income generator. This is helped by the central location of 
Fiji in the region, its reputation for secure invest1nent, its educated workforce and a higher 
degree of local capital for investn1ent than other Oceanic states. An objective of the FF A has 
been to provide support to national govem1nents like Fiji ' s, to assist and pro1note 
general development and economic expansion in national fisheries sectors. It has also 
provided the necessary backup support and technical assistance to enable national 
administrations to develop the infrastructure and expertise to meet the 1nany challenges 
posed by the rapid growth of their fisheries (Herr 1990: 382). 
Through the provision of such funding, indigenous control of a fisheries organisation like 
P AFCO has been encouraged. This demonstrates the effectiveness of regional fisheries co-
operation through an organisation like the FF A to achieve the goals of its 1nembers. 
Marshall Islands 
As the centre of the United States strategic interests in Oceania, the Marshall Islands will remain 
i1nportant to its future defence policies, particularly in relation to its K wajalein missile range. 
The EEZ of the Marshall Islands is an i1nportant tuna fishing ground. In the early 1990s, a joint 
venture with a United States company established a longline fishing base, which included 
"vessel provisioning and fish processing facilities" at Majuro (FAO 1998h: 3). Subsequently, 
the joint venture 1noved into Chinese hands and by the 1nid-1990s incorporated n1ore than 150 
Majuro-based Chinese longliners, exporting tuna to Japan (FAO 1998h: 3). 
The Marshall Islands is an i1nportant PNA 1nember. Its rich fishing grounds should 
mean that domestic operations are viable. By the mid-1990s, the Marshall Islands economy was 
undergoing restructuring, which had a negative affect on the development of a domestic tuna 
industry (see Bank of Hawaii Report 1.5.01). 
Papua New Guinea 
While purse seine and longline activities are on the increase, the pole and line industry had 
failed by 1981. By 1984, the pole and line operation, known as Papua New Guinea Tuna 
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Fisheries Pty Ltd (PNGTF), had resu1ned, but on a smaller scale, "financially and logistically 
backed by Japan's Okinawan prefectural government" (Doulman and Kean1ey 1987: 15). By 
1985, there were 9 pole and line vessels operating in Papua New Guinea, selling approximately 
50% of the catch to P AFCO, with 30% being bought by Japan and Thailand (Douhnan and 
Kearney 1987: 15). A Japanese/Australian corporation established a katsuobushi plant in 1971, 
which was subsequently bought out by Star-Kist (Papua New Guinea) Pty Ltd in 197927 and 
resulted in the plant's closure. While it was thought the plant would reopen under the aegis of 
PNGTF in 1985, this did not eventuate (Doulman and Kean1ey 1987: 21). 
In spite of increased levels of monitoring, control and surveillance, countries like Papua 
New Guinea continue to experience illegal fishing. For example, in 1994 there were 16 fishing 
vessels "involved in PNG goven11nent claiins for compensation for illegal fishing" (ADB 1997: 
8). This may have affected a decision in inid-1995 by Papua New Guinea to tenninate foreign 
fleet licenses, to help expand its domestic longline fleet. When atte1npts were made by foreign 
fleet long-liners to operate under "local charter arrangements", this section of the industry was 
regulated to prevent all but "bona fide d01nestic entrants" (FAO 1998b: 3). A total of 11 
longline vessels were licensed in 1995, with the higher quality catch air-freighted to Japan and 
the lower quality catch either air-freighted to Australia, or sold domestically. There are two 
cam1eries in operation in Papua New Guinea. One cannery in Lae processes iinported frozen 
1nackerel; the other cannery in Madang processes tuna. The Madang operation, RD Tuna 
Cannery, is a new joint venture with Philippine interests (F AO 1998b ). 
Papua New Guinea's atte1npts to develop its do1nestic operations have been 1nade 
possible because the country has other natural resources, for example, petroleu1n, gold and 
copper. This is also reflected in its earlier decision to stand firn1 with Japan over access fee 
levels (Tarte 1998a: 111-118). As a tuna-rich PNA n1e1nber, Papua New Guinea has been one of 
the 1nost vocal island states in trying to assert increased don1estication and indigenous control 
over its marine resources. This is reflected in the collective diplo1nacy undertaken by the PNA 
group at the MHLC negotiations (see Chapter Seven in particular). 
Solo,non Islands 
By the 1nid- l 980s, the tuna industry in the Solon1on Islands provided work for 7% of the 
population (approxi1nately 1850 people). Fixed assets included two shore bases, forty fishing 
vessels (twenty-eight of the1n locally-owned), with two majority-owned locally incorporated 
fishing companies (Hughes 1987: 203). By then, approximately 40% of export ean1ings for the 
Solo1non Islands was coming fr01n the tuna industry. The e1nbargo imposed on the Solomon 
Islands government by the United States over the arrest of the Jeanette Diana, however, created 
a further burden on an increasingly depressed iI1dustry (Hughes 1987: 214). 
27 This company is I 00% American owned (Kent 1980) 
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Three fleets are operating in the Solomon Islands pole and line fishery. These include 
the 6 vessels operated by National Fisheries Development (NFD) which, while Solon1on 
Islands-based, is owned by the Canadian company, BC Packers. The second fleet is the 
Japanese-based group (Cmnpbell and Hand 1998: 423). During 1989-1993, the Japanese fleet 
con1prised 77 vessels, however, this has decreased to 39 vessels. The third fleet is the Sol01non 
Taiyo (Soltai) joint venture and co1nprises 20 vessels (Cmnpbell and Hand 1998: 423). During 
1994, for exmnple, Soltai and NFD operated 27 pole and line vessels, of which 12 were 
"chartered Okinawan vessels (FAO 1998d: 3). Tuna caught by the Soltai venture is canned at 
Noro and then shipped to the United Kingdon1. This 1narket does not accept purse seine-caught 
canned tuna, whereas both NFD and BC Packers supply the Japanese canned tuna 1narket, 
which does accept purse seine-caught tuna (Campbell and Hand 1998).28 
Soltai's Japanese partner changed its name in 1993 fro1n Taiyo Gyogyo to Maruha. The 
Solon1on Islands goven1ment was concen1ed that Maruha would pull out of the joint venture to 
focus on its n1anufacturing and 1narketing of marine products (Barclay and Wakabayashi 2000). 
While other Japanese joint ventures in the region had failed by the mid 1980s, the fact that the 
Noro facility was shore-based gave the Solo1non Islands venture a distinct advantage (Barclay 
and Wakabayashi 2000).29 In 1995, the facility included 
two wharves for landing catches, one each for purse seiners and pole and line 
boats ... there was a cold storage capacity of 800 tons, an 110 ton brine tank, and a 35 ton 
icemaking machine for keeping fish cool on the way to the freezer ... there is an 
administration block, a sewerage treatment plant, a place for the slip and repair of boats, 
dining halls, storage for food, fuel and equipment, a welfare centre, a clinic, shops, etc 
(Barclay and Wakabayashi 2000: 4). 
These observers note that as well as the substantial shore-based facility, there are other factors 
which have ensured the life of the joint venture. These include the Japanese goven1ment's 
involve1nent in the region, which is linked to the intercom1ectedness of Japanese industry and 
govermnent; a thriving global market in green/dolphin friendly tuna products; and the 
advantages for developing countries under the Lome Convention (2000: 4).30 These advantages 
include preferential access for goods fr01n the Oceanic states to the European Union. 
In spite of these advantages, in the years between 1987-1997, Schurman notes that 
Soltai has recorded a profit only once (1998: 117-118). Reasons given for this deficiency 
include 
28 
29 
30 
Barclay and Wakabayashi (2000: 5) have pointed out that the European and North American markets are 
prepared to pay more for an environmentally friendly, or green, tuna product, harvested using the pole-and-
line technique, rather than the indiscriminate technique of purse-seining which allows a significant bycatch. 
Barclay and Wakabayashi (2000: 4) note that other Japanese oceanic joint ventures had been mothership-
based, so that when things went wrong, it was easy to pull out of the venture. 
See Ta.tie ( 1998a: 5) on the close relationship and links between Japanese industry and government. As an 
ACP member, the Solomon Islands can gain access to the European markets free of the 24% tariff which is 
applied to non-ACP members. 
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a flawed financial structure and an adverse combination of catch rates , market conditions, 
and exchange rate movements [ compounded by] [T]transfer pricing on the part of the 
Japanese partner was also a problem (Hughes 1987: 210-222). 
While Schunnan (1998: 6) argues that Solo1non Taiyo has not been the success the goven11nent 
had desired, Barclay believes that in spite of the difficulties faced, the joint venture has 
survived, providing thousands of jobs, contributing to the econon1y and facilitating 
technological transfer Approxin1ately 2,496 people are en1ployed by Soltai (F AO 1998d: 4). 
Campbell and Hand (1998: 423) have conducted an economic analysis to the issue of 
technological transfer, concluding that the Solo1non Islands has not received "any on-going 
benefits of technology transfer in return for concessional access to their waters". Furthermore, 
the "annual cost of concessional access to tuna resources in the SIFZ is equivalent to O. 7 percent 
of the SI Goven11nent' s am1ual revenue", which represents a "significant opp01iunity cost" to 
the Solon1011 Islands govenunent (Cainpbell and Hand 1998: 423). In the face of these 
argmnents, therefore, it see1ns that while there have been some advantages for providing local 
employn1ent, the financial retun1s have been 1ninimal for what has been concessional access. 
Solo1non Taiyo represents the major joint venture undertaken by any of the Oceanic 
states. The debate over its viability and retun1s to the Sol01non Islands is ongoing. By securing 
concessional access in the 1970s, the con1pany has been able to hold off any other con1petitors. 
Had the Sol01non Islands EEZ been open to other co1npetitors, the state could have gained 
increased econ01nic revenue fro1n access fees. On the other hand, the cannery has provided an 
incon1e for hundreds of local workers, who may not have gained anything fro1n access fee 
pay1nents. For the period under review, Solomon Taiyo represents the clearest opportunity for 
any Oceanic state to gain indigenous control over a joint venture and with it, the domestication 
of its tuna industry. In s01ne ways, this joint venture achieved for Japan what the Multilateral 
Fisheries Treaty achieved for the United States. That is; access to rich fishing grounds for its 
fleet, provision of regular cash injections into the Solomon Islands, and the en1ploy1nent of 
hundreds of local workers, thus de1nonstrating Japan' s friendship towards the region. In other 
words, a cost-effective public relations exercise. 
Chapter Four has provided an opportunity to reflect on the practical realities within the 
region 's tuna industry during a period of strong regulatory growth. What is evident from this 
Chapter is that regional fisheries conservation and 111anage1nent 1neasures did not correlate with 
an increase in an Oceanic state ' s pa1iicipation or financial gains over extraction of this resource. 
The various regional regulatory regi1nes did give the Oceanic states the encouragement and the 
possibility of developing local industries. Changing factors in the global tuna political economy, 
however, such as oil prices, ageing fleets , crewing costs, weather patterns, subsidies and an 
over-supply of tuna to the 1narket, placed financial constraints on their effective participation in 
this industry. 
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Fishing states, for their part, are also pressured, not just by the increasingly regulated 
environ1nent in which they fish, but also by factors which are beyond their control. Fleet 
activities in Oceania have not been immune to the changes in the political tuna economy that 
constrain econ01nic return and contract expansion and development of the industry. Japan's 
control of the sashimi market highlights the reliance of the Asian fleets in particular on 
supplying this market. 
While the United States is not immune to these tensions, its fishing operations in the 
region are made more co1nplex by its geostrategic concen1s. The United States fleet ' s record of 
con1pliance under the tenns of the Multilateral Fisheries Treaty benefits the region by helping to 
analyse the operations of other fishing states in the WCPO. This helps to achieve the objectives 
of collective fisheries diplomacy, that is; sustainability, a fair return, domestication and 
indigenous control. 
The lack of real interest by fishing states to invest in joint ventures with the Oceanic 
states has been disappointing, but understandable in the changing political tuna econ01ny. As 
was de1nonstrated with the Japanese joint venture with the Federated States of Micronesia, 
do1nestic priorities will always con1e before the concerns of the junior partner, an Oceanic state. 
The poor outcome regarding do1nestic operations in the region is not surprising, given the 
factors required for success. Land tenure continues to be a controversial issue in relation to on-
shore developn1ent and infrastructure, as well as the limited Oceanic capital investment, human 
resources, entrepreneurial skills and relative isolation. While countries such as the Federated 
States of Micronesia and the Marshall Islands are advantaged because of their proximity to the 
Asian 1narket, even they have difficulties in establishing and maintaining operations. Fiji, on the 
other hand, should have been in a better position to expand its domestic industry because of its 
central location in the region, its educated workforce, its ability to attract overseas investment 
and the level of investment that is available locally. 
The difficulties faced by the region relate to the lower-value and higher risk sector of 
the c01n1nodity chain to which the region is relegated. The harvesting and transshipment stage 
of the chain is vulnerable to capricious weather conditions, fleet purchase and maintenance, 
capital investinent, transshipment facilities and airfreight availability. Vessel purchase is 
prohibitive, even for industrial econo1nies and the costs involved in maintaining, crewing and 
supplying the vessels has seen contraction of powerful fishing states, such as Japan, Korea and 
Taiwan. 
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For the period under review, the Oceanic states have had mixed success in pursuing 
joint ventures and do1nestic tuna industries. The operations of the fishing states demonstrate that 
even for the more industrialised states, the tuna industry is very competitive, with low profit 
1nargins. For these reasons, it is easier to achieve those objectives of collective fisheries 
dipl01nacy that relate directly to the substantive provisions in meaningful treaties, for exainple, 
sustaining the resource and securing a fair return. 
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The double-edged sword 
The FFA's efforts at collective fisheries diplomacy were challenged by an additional 
inten1ational regi1ne. That regime was the 1995 Agreement for the Implementation of the 
Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December, 1982 
relating to Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (the Fish Stocks 
Agree1nent). By supporting that Agreement the Oceanic states were conceding the requirement 
to co-operate with fishing states that 1night extend to the establislunent of a suitable 
organisation, as laid down in Article 64 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS) and Article 8.1 of the Fish Stocks Agreement. 1 Their support of the Fish Stocks 
Agree1nent led to the December 1994 1neeting between the Foru1n Fisheries Agency (FFA) 
1nembership and interested fishing states to discuss the future n1anage1nent of the region's tuna 
industry. That n1eeting and subsequent negotiating rounds2 resulted in the Convention on the 
Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central 
Paci.fie (the WCPF Convention). 
Chapter Five is divided into two sections. The first section exainines the negotiations to 
conclude the Fish Stocks Agreement. The section demonstrates the active participation by the 
Oceanic states at those negotiations and their co-operative effo1is in having measures, i1nportant 
to the region, inserted into that Agreement's text. In the light of that Agreement, section two 
explores the first two MHLC negotiating rounds to conclude the WCPF Convention and 
highlights the specific issues of itnportance to both fishing and coastal states. The Chapter 
concludes that the participation by the Oceanic states in the Fish Stocks negotiations see1ned to 
contribute to Oceania's objectives of collective fisheries diplomacy. This mon1entum from the 
Fish Stocks Agree1nent was n1aintained in the early rounds of the negotiations to conclude the 
WCPF Convention. The five further negotiating rounds are exainined in Chapters Six and 
Seven. 
Section one: Negotiating the Fish Stocks Agreement 
The finalisation of the UNCLOS in 1982 did not resolve the issue of either highly 1nigratory 
fish stocks or straddling fish stocks. For example, during the negotiations to conclude the 
UNCLOS, there was recognition that shared stocks would "constitute a major resource 
2 
Article 64 (UNCLOS) states that " [T]the coastal State and other States whose nationals fish in the region 
for the highly migratory species listed in Annex 1 shall co-operate directly or through appropriate 
international organizations with a view to ensuring conservation and promoting the objective of optimum 
utilization of such species throughout the region, both within and beyond the exclusive economic zone. In 
regions for which no appropriate international organization exists, the coastal State and other States whose 
nationals harvest these species in the region shall co-operate to establish such an organization and 
participate in its work". 
The negotiating process was known as the Multilateral High-Level Conference on the Conservation and 
Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific (MHLC) 
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1nanagement problem" (Munro 1999: 5). Shared stocks are those fisheries "which cross the EEZ 
boundary into the EEZ (EEZs) of one or more neighbouring coastal states" (Munro 1999: 4). In 
contrast, straddling fish stocks, such as pollack, jack mackerel, cod and orange roughy, high 
seas anadro1nous stocks, such as salmon, or highly migratory fish stocks, such as tuna, 
swordfish, marlins or frigate n1ackerel, were not considered significant issues (Barston 1995: 
160, Burke 1994: 84-5, Munro 1999: 5).3 Straddling stocks "are to be found both within the 
EEZ and the adjacent high seas" (Munro 1999: 4).4 Highly 1nigratory stocks "naturally move to 
and fro1n the EEZ and the adjacent high seas" (Munro 1999: 4). As Barston notes, straddling or 
highly 1nigratory fish stocks "account for around 10% of world food supply" (1995: 159). 
In the decade following the 1982 UNCLOS, an escalation of disputes ensued over these 
stocks. In the case of the North-west Atlantic (Grand Banks) straddling turbot stocks, it resulted 
in the Canadian military shooting at a Spanish fishing vessel, the Estai, and its subsequent arrest 
(Burke 1994: 85, Day 1995).5 There was growing international recognition that the ability of 
coastal states, including those of Oceania, to manage either straddling stocks or highly 
1nigratory stocks was tenuous in the face of increasing levels of fishing state activity on the high 
seas (Schrain Stokke 2000: 206).6 Those levels of fishing state activity had risen not only 
because of the UN CLOS' prescriptions on EEZ fishing, but also because 
rising competition, higher operational costs and lower yields, [meant] fishing companies 
have since introduced a wide range of new technologies enabling them to find, catch and 
process fish in concentrations or at depths which previously would have been impossible 
or uneconomic (Schram Stokke 2000: 206). 
Because of the improvements in gear technology, concerned coastal states began to call for 
lin1its to be placed on high seas fishing (Barston 1999: 334, Van Dyke 1994: 1). The most 
concerned coastal states included Argentina, Australia, Canada, Chile, Iceland and New 
Zealand. Those states which were responsible for 90% of distant water fishing were Russia, 
Japan, Spain, Poland, the Republic of Korea (Korea) and Taiwan, with the United States and 
China not far behind (Earth Su1nmit +5 1997). 
3 
4 
5 
6 
These stumbling blocks, however, resulted in the disputes between Russia and the United States in the 
Bering Sea regarding pollack; the cod and turbot wars of the Grand Banks in the Northwest Atlantic; and 
the conflict surrounding the orange roughy stocks located between Australia and New Zealand (Burke 
1994: 84-85). 
Anadromous stocks "spawn in fresh water but spend most of their life in the sea" (Churchill and Lowe 
1983: 207). 
See also Day 1995, Munro 1999, O 'Reilly Hinds 1995, Roughgarden and Smith 1996 among others, for 
discussion on the Grand Banks controversy). In the wake of sustained overfishing of the Grand Banks, 
Canada "prohibited its own citizens from fishing for cod and other groundfish in the Canadian exclusive 
economic zone in the Atlantic, and, as a result, more than 35,000 fishers and fisheries workers have lost 
their jobs" (Van Dyke 1994: 30). 
By mid-1993 in the United States "fisheries for Atlantic haddock, cod and flounder and for Pacific salmon 
virtually collapsed. Iceland cut back its domestic fishing by 50 per cent because of depleted stocks" (Earth 
Summit +5 1997: 3). 
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Under the UNCLOS, developing coastal states, such as the island states of Oceania, 
were given sovereign rights over an extended jurisdiction of 200-nautical 111iles.7 They were, at 
the saine ti111e, however, confronted with severe resource capabilities. These included financial, 
human and infrastructure, that limited their ability to exercise those sovereign rights over the 
activities of fishing states active not just within the EEZ, but in high seas pockets or on the high 
seas, adjacent to an EEZ.8 The United Nations General Assembly Resolutions on high seas 
driftnet fishing in 1989 and 1991 supported the concept of the 'precautionary principle' even 
where there is no "adequate scientific evidence" to support any necessity for it (Burke 1994: 
109). The concept of the precautionary principle also arose at the 1991 Session of the 
Com111ittee on Fisheries (COFI) at the F AO, within the context of its discussions on driftnet 
fishing (Douhnan 2000: 3). 
The two types of "precautionary reference points" originated fr0111 the UNCED 
negotiations and referred to "conservation ( or li111it)" and "111anage111ent ( or target) (Hayashi 
1995: 56). The precautionary approach was to replace the "traditional concept of MSY" 
(111axi111mn sustainable yield), which is not considered adequate in "an era of poor resource 
condition" (Hayashi 1995: 56). Thus 
[C]conservation reference points set boundaries for safe biological limits within which the 
stocks can produce MSY, while management reference points are intended to meet 
management objectives ..... States shall take measures to ensure that such reference points 
will not be exceeded, and in the event they are exceeded, States shall, without delay, take 
the specified action to restore stocks (Hayashi 1995: 56-57). 
As Tarte (1998a: 129) points out, the burden of proof under the precautionary principle rests 
with fishing states, not coastal states. 
Conservation and 111anage111ent of straddling and highly migratory fish stocks is also 
included in Paragraph 17.50 of Agenda 21, "the blueprint for action adopted at the end of the 
UN Conference on Environment and Develop111ent" (UNCED) held at Rio de Janeiro in June 
1992 (de Fontaubert 1995: 80). Canada attempted to have the issue of a regime to govern highly 
111igratory and straddling fish stocks discussed at that Rio de Janeiro UNCED n1eeting. All that 
was achieved, however, was Paragraph 17.50 of Agenda 21 that recom111ended the convening of 
an inter-govemn1ental conference to negotiate such a regime (de Fontaubert 1995: 80). 
7 
8 
I discussed in Chapter Three an understanding of the differences between 'sovereignty' and 'sovereign 
rights '. To recap on that understanding, sovereignty means a state has exclusive rights, legal supremacy and 
powers over its lawful jurisdiction. Alternatively, sovereign rights prescribe control over a specific issue as 
a consequence of sovereignty. An example given to me is that Australia's sovereignty over its territorial sea 
means it has the sovereign right to exploit its resources as it see fit, or as may be allowed under 
international law. I was grateful for advice on this issue from Judith Swan and Mark Gray. See Akehurst 
(1991: 15-19) and Churchill and Lowe (1983: 130-132) for discussions on sovereignty and sovereign rights. 
Several oceanic states have high seas pockets that link them at the outer limits of their EEZ. For example, 
between the Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru, Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, Fiji and 
Tuvalu. There are also pockets between Kiribati, Tokelau and Tuvalu, between Palau, Federated States of 
Micronesia and Papua ew Guinea. Before 1994, several other coastal states (Argentina, Canada and 
Chile) had finalised national legislation which authorised "action against foreign vessels on the high seas to 
enforce international requirements in some circumstances" (Van Dyke 1994: 4). 
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There is no doubt that the divergent interests of coastal and fishing states prevented the 
UN CED meeting's ability to negotiate such a controversial issue. On the one hand, fishing 
states were concen1ed at any atte1npt by coastal states to extend jurisdiction beyond their 200-
nautical mile EEZ, so-called 'creeping jurisdiction'. On the other hand, coastal states, such as 
those of Oceania, wanted so1ne kind of binding agree1nent that would recognise the highly 
migratory nature of s01ne fish stocks and the need to protect the1n on adjacent seas. There were 
also coastal states, such as Canada, which had concen1s regarding straddling stocks.9 The United 
Nations convened the Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks 
in New York in July 1993 (the Fish Stocks Conference). 10 de Fontaubert notes 
[T]the stage was then set for a number of countries with diverging interests to attempt to 
settle their differences and put an end to years of overfishing, and try to prevent the total 
collapse of some of the most connnercially valuable stocks (1995: 81 ). 
The Fish Stocks Conference 
According to Barston (1999: 335), states attending those conference negotiations fell into four 
1nain groups. The first group comprised the "extre1ne" coastal states of Chile, Col01nbia, 
Ecuador and Peru, combined with the "activist" coastal states of Canada, Argentina and 
Norway. This disparate grouping was unified because of a co1n1non stance on coastal states' 
sovereign rights as well as the "special rights" for high seas areas adjacent to their EEZ regions. 
The second group included the high seas fishing states of Japan, Republic of Korea and Poland. 
This group received encourage1nent from states such as Ukraine, Thailand and the People's 
Republic of China on issues such as the due regard for the rights and responsibilities of flag 
states and their refusal to allow high seas arrests by coastal states. The third group co1nprised 
the "moderate reformist" coastal states of Australia and New Zealand. Both states were also 
supportive of the developing Oceanic states at those negotiations. I I A fourth group included the 
Russian Federation, the European Union and the United States. Barston notes that the United 
States had an "uneasy" role because while on the one hand it supported a balanced coastal and 
fishing state international agree1nent, on the other hand, it had sensitive multilateral 
arrange1nents with the FFA as well as the Russian Federation (1999: 33 5). 
Alternatively, de Fontaubert (1995: 81) outlines the positions of just two groups, the 
coastal and fishing states. For example, coastal states were calling for flag state responsibility on 
9 
10 
11 
See Tarte ( 1998a: 13 7-13 8) for a discussion on this issue. 
Subsequent sessions were held in March 1994, August 1994, March-April 1995, and a final session in July-
August 1995 (Freestone 1999: 145, Barston 1999: 335). 
According to Mary Harwood, there were three people who assisted the Chair of the negotiations (Satya 
Nandan) in preparing advance drafts of the text of the Fish Stocks Agreement - herself, Michael Lodge 
(whom, at that time was Legal Counsel, Forum Fisheries Agency and the FF A's adviser at the 
negotiations), and Talbot Murray (a member of New Zealand's delegation). Harwood believes that the 
region achieved strong outcomes at those negotiations because all FF A representatives worked together to 
"hunt as a pack" on issue such as compliance and data collection (Interview October 2001). Mary Harwood 
works at the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forests Australia (AFFA). Harwood was second in 
charge of Australia' s delegation to the Fish Stocks Agreement. 
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the adjoining high seas, s01ne were even "willing, if all else failed, to take 1natters in their own 
hands" ( de Fontaubert 1995: 81 ). These states would have represented the more radical elements 
in Barston's analysis of coastal states. Fishing states were opposed to this call, fearing ' creeping 
jurisdiction' over and above the UNCLOS provisions. As well, fishing states also wished that 
coastal states would take responsibility to ensure "c01npatible 1neasures" in EEZ jurisdictions 
(de Fontaubert 1995: 81). These concen1s clashed with the belief of coastal states in the 
inviolability of their sovereign rights within an EEZ (de Fontaubert 1995: 81). 
The role of the European Union at the Fish Stocks negotiations is also relevant. The 
central focus was Spain, a fishing state whose activities had resulted in military intervention by 
Canada regarding its continued exploitation of the diminishing turbot stocks of the Grand 
Banks. As a member of the European Union, Spain demanded its support. A condition of its 
entry into the European Union had been the proviso that it would not fish in European Union 
waters, but rather in distant waters for a specific ti1ne. This led to Spain over-fishing in Namibia 
and Canada (de Fontaubert 1995: 79). At the begi1u1ing of the Fish Stocks negotiations, the 
European Union's position was hard-line as it had "little choice but to defend one of its 
members, which had been cornered into this position by a decision of the Union" (de Fontaubert 
1995: 85). Later into the negotiations, however, due in no small part to the extended European 
Union' s 1nembership which now included Sweden, the hard-line was softened because of 
Sweden' s historical attempts to 1neet head-on "inflexible" fishing states (de Fontaubert 1995: 
85). 
The Chair of the Conference, Ambassador Satya Nandan of Fiji, 
Proved to be masterful in accommodating the concerns of all sides, drawing extensively 
from all sources of expertise - be they the FAO experts, national delegates, or certain 
NGO representatives, and rekindling the process when it was faltering. His handling of 
the outcome issue was also astute, and he created quite a ripple when he first issued the 
new negotiating text in the form of an Agreement, albeit a Draft Agreement. Predictably, 
some of the DWFNs were up in arms claiming that they had never agreed to such an 
outcome, but the Chair had foreseen that they would eventually see it as in their interest 
and agree to it (de Fontaubert 1995: 87) . 
Nandan' s achievement in finalising a document which was neither too strongly worded for the 
consu1nption of fishing states, nor too weakly worded for the benefit of fishing states is hailed 
by de Fontaubert (1995: 87). While this seems c01nmendable, it demonstrates the importance 
that was accorded the conunercial interests of the powerful fishing states. 
The participation by the Oceanic states at the Fish Stocks negotiations was noted and 
co1nmended by Victorio Uherbelau, Director of the FF A in his Annual Report of 1994/1 995 , in 
which he stated 
FF A member countries have participated fully in the process leading up to the 
Conference, as well as the Conference itself. Indeed, as the Conference has continued, 
FF A member countries, as a group, have taken an increasingly active and significant role 
in the key group of "like-minded countries" and have successfully influenced the 
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direction of the Conference in a way that has been favourable to the interests and needs of 
Small Island Developing States (1994/199 5: 14 ). 
Given Uherbelau's position, it is natural that he would support his organisation, however, 
Harwood points out that the region "hunted as a pack" at the negotiations, thus supporting 
Dherbelau's clai1ns (Interview, October 2001). Furthennore, the Forum Fisheries Co1nn1ittee 
(FFC) held a caucus each mon1ing to discuss issues of in1portance to the group (Harwood, 
Interview, October 2001 ). It is i1nportant to note that this group included those tuna resource-
rich Oceanic states, for exainple, Fiji, Kiribati, Papua New Guinea and the Federated States of 
Micronesia. Furthermore, in an analysis of the Fish Stocks Conference, it was noted by the 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) that the 
FF A member countries, acting as a tightly coordinated and clearly focused block, had a 
major influence on the conference outcomes. Many facets of the agreement reflect the 
strong technical and policy inputs made by FF A members and the persistence of the 
region in pressing for practical solutions of global application (25.8.1995). 
The Fish Stocks Agreen1ent has several important features. One, it nnposes new 
conservation obligations for the 1nanage1nent of highly migratory and straddling fish stocks, 
utilising the precautionary approach, both within and beyond EEZ jurisdictions. Two, it iinposes 
requirements for fishing states to supply data on fish stocks, for exainple, bycatch, catch levels, 
discards and details on fishing effort. Three, it provides for the establishment of quotas and 
allows for boarding and inspection by parties to a regional organisation. Four, it calls for the 
establish111ent of regional fishing organisations to facilitate co-operation and conservation of the 
stocks. Five, it tackles proble1ns caused by the persistence of unauthorised fishing by allowing 
only those States that have agreed to 1nanage1nent and conservation measures to have access to 
fishing grounds. Six, following on fro1n this, the Fish Stocks Agree1nent sets out procedures for 
ensuring co1npliance with its provisions, including the right to board and inspect vessels 
belonging to other States. Finally, it provides 1nechanis1ns for the dispute resolutions to 
facilitate con1pulsory and binding peaceful settlen1ent of disputes between States (Fish Stocks 
Agree1nent 1995, Earth Sumn1it +5). 
In analysis of the Fish Stocks Conference, de Fontaubert argues that it 
adopted a very compatible approach by adopting a set of very general principles that are 
designed to be applied through the regional arrangements and organizations which, under 
the Agreement, will be strengthened, or created when they are not already in place (1995: 
84). 
As Mann Borgese has pointed out, however, fishing and coastal states alike were not quick to 
support the new regime, in spite of having just co1npleted the negotiations (2000: 769). 12 The 
12 For entry into force, the Fish Stocks Agreement required thirty ratifications. The Fish Stocks Agreement 
entered into force on 11 December 2001 with thirty-one ratifications. In order of ratification, these are: 
Tonga, Saint Lucia, United States of America, Sri Lanka, Samoa, Fiji, Norway, Nauru, Bahamas, Senegal, 
Solomon Islands, Iceland, Mauritius, Federated States of Micronesia, Russian Federation, Seychelles, 
Namibia, Iran, Maldives, Cook Islands, Papua New Guinea, Monaco, Canada, Uruguay, Australia, Brazil, 
Barbados, New Zealand, Costa Rica, Malta. The thirty-first ratification was the United Kingdom, which, on 
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fishing states were reluctant to support the Agreement because they insisted that the regime be 
across the range of stocks, that is, high seas and EEZs and were still reluctant to "renounce their 
freedom to fish" (de Fontaubert 1995: 84). The coastal states were protective of any attempt to 
deny them sovereign rights over their EEZs (de Fontaubert 1995: 84). 13 
Aftermath of the Fish Stocks Agreement 
One fishing state that has been uncomfortable with this Agreen1ent is Japan. Japan's problems 
with the Fish Stocks Agreement arose at a tin1e when its fishing industry was under "increasing 
econo1nic pressure", and Japan was facing adverse inten1ational opinion regarding its high seas 
fishing (Tarte 1998a: 138). Japan argued for "mini1nu1n restrictions regulating high seas 
fishing", contending that increased restrictions would impose difficulties upon its fleets (Tarte 
1998a: 138). These restrictions include the watering down of regulatory 1neasures such as 
monitoring control and surveillance (MCS) of fleet activity by the regional organisation, coastal 
states or other fleets. MCS 1neasures include boarding and inspection and the observer program. 
Japan favours the establislunent of regional fisheries institutions, in which it, as a 
fishing state, has an allocation of quota, preferably based on historical access. Such a syste1n 
lin1its the expansion of coastal states' domestic fleets and is, therefore, at variance with the 
objectives of collective fisheries diplomacy in Oceania (See Herr 1990). Japan is also an 
opponent of the precautionary approach, a principle adopted by the Fish Stocks Agreement and 
taken up by the FF A 1ne1nbership. 
Japan's aversion to the Fish Stocks Agreement and the concept of the precautionary 
approach is at odds with the FFA membership and the United States. For the Oceanic states, that 
Agree1nent is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it gives added weight to the provisions of 
the UNCLOS, goes some way to alleviating their concerns regarding high seas fishing and 
facilitates a regirne of flag state responsibility. 14 On the other hand, it also creates an extra 
burden on the already stretched resources of the FF A membership. For example, in order to 
con1ply with Articles 5 and 6 of the Fish Stocks Agreement, coastal states are to put in place 
13 
14 
behalf of Pitcairn, Henderson, Ducie and Oeno Islands, Falkland Islands, South Georgia and South 
Sandwich Islands, Bermuda, Turks and Caicos Islands, British Indian Ocean Territory, British Virgin 
Islands and Anguilla, ratified the Fish Stocks Agreement on 10 December 2001 (see Oceans and Law of the 
Sea, online< http://wvvw.un.org (date accessed 30 April 2002)). 
Under Article 56.1 (a) of the UN CLOS it states that "sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and 
exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the waters 
superjacent to the sea-bed and of the sea-bed and its subsoil, and with regard to other activities for the 
economic exploitation and exploration of the zone, such as the production of energy from the water, 
currents and winds 
Flag state responsibilities laid down in the Agreement incorporated the 1993 F AO Compliance Agreement, 
which outlines" .. . the duty of parties to exercize effective jurisdiction over high-seas fishing operations by 
vessels flying their flags .. . (Schram Stokke 2000: 19). The Compliance Agreement notes that 'Each Party 
shall take measures as may be necessary to ensure that fishing vessels entitled to fly its flag do not engage 
in any activity that undermines the effectiveness of international conservation and management measures (Article III 1 (a)). 
122 
The double-edged sword 
harmonised conservation and n1anage1nent standards for their EEZs that incorporate the 
precautionary approach. These standards are to apply across the whole region. 
As important as this task is, of greater i1nportance is the fact that the FF A is not 
considered a co1npetent body to provide fisheries conservation and n1anagement, as laid down in 
Article 64 of the UN CLOS and Article 8 of the Fish Stocks Agreement. Such a con1petent body 
requires the co-operative n1e1nbership of both fishing and coastal states with co1npetency for 
conservation and management. The obligation to co-operate, as laid down in the UNCLOS, is 
strengthened in the Fish Stocks Agreement, Article 8, paragraph 4, which states 
Only those States which are members of such an organization or participants in such an 
arrangement, or which agree to apply the conservation and manage1nent measures 
established by such organization or arrangement, shall have access to the fishery 
resources to which those measures apply. 
Instead, the FF A operates as 
an effective organization in coordinating the Pacific island states' policies and enhancing 
cooperation among them, especially in their relations with DWFNS (Aqorau and Bergin: 
1998: 28). 
Through their participation at the Fish Stocks Conference, Oceanic states realised that additional 
regional n1achinery would be required. Fishing states such as Japan were becon1ing more vocal 
in their den1ands for an inclusive regional organisation to conserve and 1nanage the region' s 
tuna resource. During an Inter-Sessional Consultation for the negotiations to conclude that 
Agree1nent, held in February 1995, Japan supported a United States position that "1nembership 
or participation in subregional or regional fisheries 1nanagen1ent organisations or arrangements 
should be compulsory" (FFA Sun11nary Repo1i February 1995). 
In part to gain the upper hand, the FF A n1oved to initiate discussion with fishing states 
by holding a Multilateral High Level Conference (MHLC) at FF A headquarters, Honiara, 
Solomon Islands in Dece1nber 1994. Following that n1eeting, the February 1995 Foru1n 
Fisheries Agency Su1nn1ary Report notes 
FF A member countries will need to make further progress in developing appropriate 
regional mechanisms for conservation and 1nanagement of highly migratory fish stocks. 
That further progress resulted in the WCPF Convention. 
The sh01icon1ings of the UN CLOS to deal comprehensively with the issue of straddling 
or highly 1nigratory fish stocks had ramifications for fishing state operations in the years 
following 1982. Rather than seeking fishing access agree1nents, or being bound by EEZ 
regulatory 1neasures, 1nany operators took their vessels to the high seas. The proble1n was that 
straddling stocks lie between the high seas and EEZs and highly migratory stocks swi1n vast 
distances through high seas and EEZs. Coastal states, such as Canada, had closed its most 
i1nportant straddling stock fishery because of overfishing and still boats fished in defiance. 
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While Barston ( 1999) outlines four different negotiating groups at the Fish Stocks 
Convention which came together with joint interests, there was a clear divide between fishing 
and coastal states. By working co-operatively at those negotiations, coastal groups, such as the 
FF A 111e111bership, were effective blocs, moving crucial issues forward such as the precautionary 
approach; data provisions and flag state responsibilities. 
The FF A, as an organisation, is also under scrutiny when analysing the outcomes fro111 
those negotiations. Did the organisation achieve its objectives? These objectives include 
regulating high seas fishing, specifically adjacent to EEZs. The Fish Stocks Agreement requires 
fishing states to provide the region with data on bycatch, discards, fishing effort and catch 
levels. These issues reflect those specific compliance and data collection measures that the 
regional 111embership campaigned for at the Fish Stocks negotiations (Harwood, Interview, 
October 2001 ). It paves the way for an Article 64-type organisation, an outcome not necessarily 
to the liking of the Oceanic states. So, yes, through collective diplo111acy, the organisation did 
achieve regional objectives. In doing so, however, it opened the door once more on the question 
of the inclusion of fishing states in a regional fisheries organisation. It is clear that Nandan, as 
the Chair, pushed the region into negotiations in relation to a co-operative arrangement with 
fishing states. 
Section two: Negotiating the Convention on the Conservation and Management of 
Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific15 
When the FFA was established in 1979, the structure of the organisation did not meet the 
require111ents laid down in Article 64 of the UNCLOS. 16 For example, the organisation 
co111prises only the region's coastal states, with no membership by interested fishing states. It is 
also a consultative body, which advises its 111e111bers, but leaves it to them to apply conservation 
and managen1ent n1easures. With the commence1nent of the Fish Stocks Agreen1ent's 
negotiations in 1993, there was growing awareness in the region of the need for a co-operative 
111anage111ent regi111e for its tuna fishery. As de111onstrated in previous Chapters, the Oceanic 
states had effectively pro111oted the objectives of collective fisheries diplo111acy by the 111id 
1990s. It prepared then1 for negotiations with interested fishing states to finalise a tuna fisheries 
conservation and 111anagen1ent convention for the Western and Central Pacific Ocean (WCPO). 
From December 1994 until Septen1ber 2000, these achievements would be tested through the 
seven negotiating rounds of the Multilateral High-Level Conference on the Conservation and 
Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific 
(MHLC). 17The MHLC process would result in the Convention on the Conservation and 
1 S 
16 
17 
The WCPF Convention. 
For discussions on this debate see, among others, Aqorau 1998, Herr 1990, Sutherland, 1985, Sutherland 
and Tsamenyi 1992, Van Dyke and Heftel 1981. 
The first round in December 1994 was simply known as The Multilateral High-Level Conference on South 
Pacific Tuna Fisheries. 
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Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific (the WCPF 
Convention). 
The purpose of the second section 1s to exain1ne the first two rounds of these 
negotiations (MHLC 1-2). The section is divided into two parts. The first part exan1ines the 
MHLC 1 negotiations. The MHLC 1 negotiating round was an exploratory session between the 
FF A 1ne1nbership and interested fishing states. The second part examines the MHLC2 
negotiations. The MHLC2 was a preliminary session that cuhninated in the Majuro Declaration. 
Part one: An Appraisal of MHLCJ, Honiara, 5-9 December 199418 
In Dece1nber 1994 the FF A membership held a meeting with fishing states regarding "effective 
regulation of fishing fleets operating in the region" (Tarte 2001 a: 9). Effective regulation, an 
integral part of conservation and 1nanage1nent, had been a goal of the FF A and its 1ne1nbers 
since the establishment of the organisation in 1979. First, it was supp01ied by the conclusion of 
the UNCLOS in 1982. Second, the idea of establishing a co-operative body between the region 
and fishing states had been raised infonnally by the United States delegation to the Multilateral 
Fisheries Treaty talks with the Formn Fisheries Committee (FFC) in Dece1nber 1991.19 The 
proposal ste1nmed from "concen1s that the United States fleet was being placed at a co1npetitive 
disadvantage" (Kaufinan 1994: 11 ).20 Third, it was supported by the conclusion of the 
negotiations for the Fish Stocks Agree1nent, which had been underway since July 1993. As 
discussed in section one above, the FF A membership had been an active participant at those 
negotiations. Fourth, the issue of fisheries 1nanagement had been a focus of the Leaders' 
discussions at the August 1994 Brisbane South Pacific Forum. The FFA 1nembership had 
resisted previous attempts by the fishing states to conclude an Article 64-type arrange1nent 
because of the potential for such a body to reduce PIC control over the fisheries resources 
within their exclusive economic zones (DFAT 15.12.94). 
As discussed above, the Fish Stocks Agree1nent is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it 
regulates fishing state activities on the high seas. On the other hand, however, it requires co-
operative action between fishing and coastal states, specifically between the FF A 1ne1nbership 
and those fishing states operating in the region. 
18 
19 
20 
Delegations which attended that meeting included the FFC membership, Japan, People's Republic of China (China), Republic of Korea (Korea), the United States and the Philippines. It had been expected that 
Taiwan would attend. The politics surrounding its nomenclature of "Chinese Taipei", however, led to its 
last-minute refusal to participate at that meeting. This issue remained a problem throughout the 
negotiations. 
Personal communication with Transform Aqorau, May 2002. 
In particular, transshipment was seen as one main reason behind the United States encouragement of the 
talks. Transshipment at sea by Taiwanese and Korean fleets enabled them to harvest more fish because of 
increased fishing time. As well, transshipment at sea was a means of disguising the true level of catch and 
thereby avoiding paying access fees. It also created difficulties in determining accurate scientific 
assessment of catch and effort (anonymous). Alternatively, it was believed that the Japanese fleet "was the 
most orderly, professional and law-abiding" (anonymous). 
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Back in May 1994, an agenda had been agreed between the FFA, Japan and the United 
States for a high-level fisheries 1nanagement conference. Invitations were sent out to the FF A 
1nembership and interested fishing states (FFC 24 1994: 9-10). Known now as the MHLCl, that 
December 1994 meeting, held at the FFA's headquarters at Honiara in the Solomon Islands, 
represented a new era in co-operative relations between the region and fishing states.21 The 
MHLC process represented the first negotiations of their kind in global tuna fisheries 
1nanage1nent which followed the prescriptions of the Fish Stocks Agreement. The first round of 
negotiations focused on technical issues. The Chair, Ambassador Robin Yarrow of Fiji, notes 
that 
[I]it is emphatically not a Conference to discuss broader issues relating to the 
management of highly migratory fish stocks throughout the region. Such issues are 
complex and politically sensitive. It may well be that, to the extent that the issues are left 
unresolved by the ongoing discussions in the United Nations, they will need to be 
addressed at some stage in the future (MHLC 1 Conference Secretariat, 1995: 23). 
In a repo1i prepared for the FFC before the MHLCl, Kaufmann (1994: 12) observes that the 
purpose of the 1neeting was to consider "hannonising access arrangements on tenns equivalent 
to those of the U.S. fleet". It was not to be a venue to discuss "cooperative management 
arrangen1ents" (Kaufinann 1994: 12). The Depart1nent of Foreign Affairs and Trade (15.12.94) 
notes that Australia's approach to the MHLC was to "work with other FFC me1nbers and the 
FF A Secretariat to lin1it discussion on Article 64 issues". The conference would be framed as a 
"one-off confidence building exercise" between the delegations (DF AT 15 .12.94 ). 
The MHLC 1 negotiations stand apart. At the time, there was uncertainty as to how 
future management arrangen1ents would evolve. There was a gap between the MHLC 1, held in 
Decen1ber 1994 and the MHLC2, held in June 1997. During that intervening two and a half year 
period, technical sub-co1n1nittees evaluated n1anagement proposals. The i1nportant issues 
discussed at that MHLC 1 meeting included multilateral versus bilateral arrangements; sovereign 
rights and highly 111igratory fish stocks; and the rights of the flag state. These issues are 
exainined below. 
Multilateral v. bilateral agree,nents 
The August 1994 Brisbane South Pacific Forum's the1ne of '1nanaging our resources ' resulted 
in the Leaders' adoption of a regional policy preference for multilateral fishing access 
agree1nents. Australia, the United States and New Zealand refer to the primacy of this approach 
in their MHLC 1 Country State1nents, as do several of the Oceanic states. On the other hand, 
several of the Parties to the Nauru Agreement (PNA) states, such as the Federated States of 
Micronesia, the Marshall Islands, Kiribati and Nauru make no such endorsement. It must be 
reme1nbered that for these states, the concept of being worse off under multilateral agreements 
21 Multilateral High-Level Conference on South Pacific Tuna Fisheries, Honiara, Solomon Islands 5-9 
December 1994. The words "High-Level" referred to the fact that attendance "was at ministerial, 
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is a very real issue. For states such as Kiribati and the Federated States of Micronesia 1n 
particular, tuna is their only natural resource. This aversion to multilateral agreen1ents 1s 
fostered by Japan, which 1naintains a greater leverage over those states through bilateral access 
arrangements. 
In a meeting held before the MHLC 1, the PNA group put forward the idea of a 
1nultilateral head agreement, which would incorporate terms and conditions of access. There 
would then be subsidiary, bilateral arrangements, which would be responsible for determining 
access fees. It was argued by the FF A Secretariat and Australian Goven1ment officials that an 
approach of this type 
fails to take advantage of the combined negotiating strength which the Pacific Island 
Countries (PICS) possess as a cohesive whole (DFAT 15.12.94). 
Papua New Guinea, also a PNA member, endorsed the Multilateral Fisheries Treaty with the 
region.22 Its Country Statement at MHLC 1 notes that a multilateral treaty is "the right approach 
to manage1nent of tuna resources in the region" . Papua New Guinea points out, however, that 
"the treaty has not worked as far as do1nestication of the tuna industry is concerned" (MHLC 1 
1995: 41). Papua New Guinea is critical of the fact that one of that Treaty's aiins is to encourage 
don1estic participation in the tuna industry. It amounts to more than rhetoric in terms of 
proposed shore-based facilities, although 1naking investment pay in the region is no easy task 
(Interview, Cartwright, May 2001 ). 23 
Sovereign rights and the highly migratory fish stocks 
In Japan' s Country Statement, the Fish Stocks negotiations are raised, together with Japan' s 
belief that the tuna stocks ' 
conservation and management require coherent and compatible approach throughout their 
migratory range [and] is not simply legally required by international law, but it is also a 
scientific and even a practical "must" (MHLCl 1995: 35). 
Japan believes a single regi1ne should apply for tuna stocks, both in-zone (EEZ) and high seas. 
This belief would be restated throughout the MHLC negotiating process and is in sharp variance 
with the views of the FFC bloc and the advice of the FF A Secretariat. The bloc remains 
c01nmitted to the inviolability of a coastal state ' s in-zone sovereign rights. Australia and New 
Zealand were initially supportive of the Japanese view that the new regime should manage the 
stocks in their entirety. National tuna management plans were, therefore, considered to be 
22 
23 
ambassadorial and senior offi cial levels" (Tarte 2001 a: 9). 
It must be remembered that Papua New Guinea has refu sed Japan access to its EEZ since the late 1980s, 
after Japan refused to pay a higher access fee. In mid 2001, inconclusive talks were held between the two 
countries regarding a new bilateral agreement (see Pacific Islands Report, 18 July 2001, online< 
http://vvvV'..v.p idp.ewc.havvaii.edu 
Cartwright is a former Deputy Director of the FFA and was an FFA Secretariat observer at the MHLC 
process. 
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inappropriate, given the highly migratory nature of the stocks (Interview, Cartwright, May 
2001 ). This view diverges from the Fish Stocks Agreement, which states 
[C]conservation and management measures established for the high seas and those 
adopted for areas under national jurisdiction shall be compatible in order to ensure 
conservation and management of the straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish 
stocks in their entirety. (Article 7.2, the Agreement). 24 
By MHLC2, Australia and New Zealand had conceded the Oceanic states' view that national 
tuna 1nanage1nent plans were appropriate.25 Their concession had been noted in FFC Talking 
Points prepared in 1995, which states that 
We are mindful of the region's international obligations under UNCLOS III. That said, 
we do believe however that the region should not concede sovereignty to the DWFNs for 
those tuna resources which are predominantly taken within the EEZ's [sic] of the PICs. 
Management decisions for these resources should res [sic] with the region, and the region 
alone (Talking Points, FFC Subcommittee on Future Management Arrangements 
(Undated Preliminary Report, p I)). 
Rights of the flag state 
The issue of flag state enforcement on the high seas was raised in Korea's State1nent, its views 
differing frmn those of the FFC bloc. Regarding the 1nonitoring, control and surveillance (MCS) 
of vessels on the high seas, the Fish Stocks Agree1nent (Article 18.3g(i) states that 
the implementation of national inspection schemes and subregional and regional schemes 
for cooperation in enforcement .. . including requirements for such vessels to pennit 
access by duly authorized inspectors from other States. 
Korea has yet to ratify the Fish Stocks Agreement and, as regards MCS, its 
data continues to be the most inaccurate of all the fishing fleets. Their reporting behaviour 
reflects the poor reputation that the Korean operators have established in the region (FFA 
Director's Annual Report 1994/95: 8). 
Thus, the region does view the Korean tuna industry with favour. This is not only because of its 
poor MCS record, but also because of its poor investment record in the region. Until the Korean 
govenunent has so1ne authority and influence over its tuna fishing industry and invests in the 
region, it will not be viewed favourably by the FF A membership. 
Aftermath 
As the MHLC 1 were the first negotiations of their kind between fishing and the FF A 
1nembership, the delegations merely aired preli1ninary views. The MHLC 1 did, however, 
achieve results. For exainple, the negotiations highlight the importance of unity within the FFC 
bloc in that they 
24 
25 
Australia ratified the Agreement in December 1999. New Zealand ratified the Agreement in April 2001. 
This view was set out in a report for the FFA by Kaufmann, (1994: 10) which states: "The need to develop 
tuna management plans for the region that detail economic, social and conservation objectives ... [A]all 
tuna fishing effort under national jurisdiction should fall under the management plans". 
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imposed a tight structure ... they worked off an agreed set of points for each agenda item. 
The extent to which this unified approach held throughout the meeting was quite notable 
... [it] did contribute to the presentation of a unified front to the DWFNS (DFAT 
15.12.1994). 
From these co1nments, it is evident that the region was united in its approach at the MHLC 1 and 
not divided by national interests. The bloc had not been pushed into discussions regarding an 
Article 64-type organisation by the fishing states, but had rather signalled the need for technical 
1neetings to discuss the shape of future 1nanagement arrangements. This was in line with the 
region ' s wish to take matters slowly and carefully. That is why fishing states, such as Japan, 
were disappointed with that December 1994 MHLC 1neeting. Japan had hoped to push the 
region down the track towards an Article 64 organisation, but this hope was derailed by the 
region's unified approach on this issue. 
The MHLC 1 delegations agreed to convene two technical consultations. The first would 
focus on the develop1nent of the Vessel Monitoring Syste1n (VMS), later held in Septe1nber 
1995 and November 1996. The second consultation would consider options regarding fishing 
catch and effort data retrieval, held in July 1996 (Cartwright 1999: 18, Tarte 1998b: 6). The 
FFC decided to set up a sub-com1nittee, comprised of its me1nbers, "to consider future fisheries 
manage1nent arrangements in the region" (Tarte 2001 a: 10). It was to include examination of 
[E]existing institutional arrangements in the region, to assess the impact of international 
developments, to identify and assess possible alternative institutional approaches to tuna 
management in the South Pacific, and to recommend strategies for the region (Tarte 
2001a: 10). 
Consultations and Sub-Committees leading to the MHLC2 
By the time the FFC ' s sub-co1nmittee had met for the third time 1n February 1996, it had 
identified the structure, functions and options for establishing a regional tuna management 
arrangement. Also identified were strategies for liaison with fishing states that had been 
identified in a Review undertaken by Geen and Bergin (1995).26 The region decided that a 
second 1nultilateral high-level conference should be convened to negotiate high seas issues with 
the fishing states in accordance with Article 8 of the Fish Stocks Agreement. It had been agreed 
at FFC26 that commit1nent to the convening of the second conference would be based on 
member countries ' long term goal of developing their domestically-based fishing industry 
and the phasing-out of the foreign-based fleet" (PFC 26 1995: 16). 
Another commitment focused on the strengthening in-zone arrangements, which involved 
convening a Ministerial-level FFC meeting. Both initiatives were to take place in early to mid-
1997 (Tarte 2001a: 12, FFC Sub Committee Meetings: March 1995, October 1995 and February 
1996). 
26 A recommendation of the Sub-Committee on Future Management Arrangements was that the Oceanic 
Fisheries Programme of the South Pacific Commission (SPC) be transferred to the FFA. 
129 
The double-edged sword 
As the 1996 year progressed concerns were raised by several members of the FFC as to 
whether fishing states should be involved in the region ' s develop1nent of tuna manage1nent 
arrangements, as stipulated by the Fish Stocks Agree1nent ' s duty to co-operate. This reflects one 
side of the double-edged sword. A n1eeting held in Tokyo, Japan in May 1996 to explore the 
possibilities of establishing a Northern Pacific fisheries management regime heightened these 
concerns. Other states present at that Tokyo meeting included China, Taiwan, Korea, Mexico, 
Canada and the United States.27 It was feared that such a regime could "engulf' the WCPO 
(Tarte 2001a: 12). Australia' s State1nent to FFC 29 spoke of these concerns and notes the 
urgent need for us to be in a position to engage distant water fishing nations and other, 
non-FF A coastal states and territories in meaningful dialogue ... and be prepared to 
discuss matters relating to the management of tuna stocks (FFC 29 1996b: 44). 
Because of these concen1s, a meeting of the FFC in inid-1996 decided to 
combine the two initiatives, thus DWFNS and Pacific island coastal states would together 
build comprehensive 1nanagement and conservation arrangements for the region ' s tuna 
stocks, throughout their migratory range (Tarte 2001 a: 12). 
The Majuro South Pacific Foru1n, held in Septe1nber 1996, endorsed the Marshall Islands' 
initiative to convene a 1ninisterial 1neeting. The meeting would "advance the process" of 
concluding a sustainable fisheries management regime in the region (Foru1n Communique 
1996). It also endorsed the Marshall Island's offer to hold a second MHLC. These initiatives 
were to occur 
in conjunction with the development of national tuna management plans by FF A member 
states, which would include the setting of provisional total allowable catches (TA Cs) 
within waters under their respective national jurisdiction (Tarte 200 la: 12). 
The FFA -qirector' s Annual Report of 1996/97 urged its member to identify the Total Allowable 
Catch (TA Cs), within an overall EEZ manage1nent plan. This would comple1nent "their 
con1mit1nent to cooperate with other states and DWFNS" as laid down in the UNCLOS and the 
Fish Stocks Agreen1ent (FF A Director's Annual Report, 1996/97). The Australian goven11nent 
had noted that 
[T]the region 's ability to make an ilnpression on the DWFNS, to advance their objectives, 
and to adequately handle difficult issues, will depend largely on the level of cohesion 
demonstrated by the PICs (DFAT 1994). 
The cohesion demonstrated by the region at the Fish Stocks Conference and later at MHLC 1 put 
the Oceanic states in a strong position to 1naintain the mo1nentu1n, and their influence over the 
MHLC negotiating process. 
The Oceanic states realised that Article 8 of the Fish Stocks Agreement called for co-
operation "through appropriate subregional or regional fisheries manage1nent organizations or 
27 The Tokyo meeting was titled the "Interim Scientific Committee for Tuna and Tuna-like Species in the 
North Pacific Ocean" . The species included swordfish, bigeye and northern bluefin tuna. At that meeting, 
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arrangements" (Aqorau 1998: 284). The period between the MHLCl and the MHLC2 had been 
used to examine future manage1nent options, as well as to convene technical consultations 
regarding VMS and stock analysis.28 By June 1997, the region was ready to sit down with the 
fishing states and discuss the options available, without commitment. Their experiences with the 
fishing states had made them cautious. In particular, Japan's refusal to enter into a multilateral 
agree1nent with the region made the island states "wary" of any kind of refonn to the status quo 
of the region's conservation and 1nanagement measures (Aqorau 1998: 284). 
Part two: An Appraisal of MHLC2, Majuro, June 199l29 
The preferences of the Oceanic states regarding the pace of the MHLC2 were dissi1nilar to those 
of the fishing states. Concerns were raised separately by Japan regarding the proposed agenda 
for the MHLC2 and the draft Declaration, which the FFC had prepared. It considered both as 
being "too vague" (Tarte 1998b: 7). Japan had clear ideas about what it wanted out of the 
MHLC2. These were 
to deliinit the objectives of cooperation ... water down references to application of the 
precautionary approach and to the provision of technical and financial assistance to the 
small islands states ... sought to stall iinplementation of the regional monitoring syste1n 
and to protect its vessels from what it saw as undue enforcement measures (Tarte 1998b: 
7). 
Japan and other fishing states at the Majuro 1neeting would require patience. The United States 
believed that the draft conservation arrangements should apply throughout the range of the 
species, both within and beyond 200-nautical miles. The United States supported Japan's claims 
that the 111anagement regin1e should include EEZs. 
Taiwan was under no misapprehension regarding the FFC's position in relation to its 
attendance at future MHLC negotiations. It was stipulated in a letter from the FFA Director to 
the Ainbassador of the En1bassy of the Republic of China that the name "Chinese Taipei" was 
considered the "only acceptable option" (FF A 3 .12.96). Taiwan was suspicious that Australia 
had influenced the FF A's decision before the MHLC 1 regarding its nomenclature of Chinese 
Taipei (DFAT 14.12.94). By February 1997, however, Taiwan had agreed to its nomenclature 
28 
29 
Japan proposed extending the membership to Indonesia, the Philippines, Palau, Kiribati and the Federated 
States of Micronesia (FFC 29 1996: 11-12). 
The SPC in Noumea held the 1996 Technical Consultation on the Collection and Exchange of Fisheries, 
Data, Tuna Research and Stock Assessment. It considered such issues as: the data requirements for stock 
assessment work; current data deficiencies; data verification, validation and security; current arrangements 
for conducting tuna research and stock assessment; and future arrangements for data exchange, tuna 
research and stock assessment (FFA Director ' s Annual Report 1996/97: 21). 
States that attended MHLC2 were: Australia, Taiwan, Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, 
French Polynesia, Japan, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, New Caledonia, New Zealand, Niue, Palau, 
Papua New Guinea, China, Philippines, Korea, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, United States, Vanuatu, 
Wallis and Futuna and Western Samoa. Indonesia was unable to attend. Observers included Canada, FAO, 
Forum Secretariat, FFA, IATTC, SPC, SOP AC, and USP. 
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(DF AT 26.02.97). Taiwan attended the MHLC2 and all successive negotiations as Chinese 
Taipei, thereby acceding to China's diplomatic pressure. 
Australia believed that the agenda for the MHLC2 should be kept as "siinple and 
general as possible" (DF AT 17.01.97). This was to avoid giving the fishing states the 
iinpression that the Oceanic states were "pre-cooking the meeting's outcome" (DFAT 17.01.97). 
Procedural issues were not to be considered as a separate agenda itein. This could "bestow 
MHLC2 with more auton0111y as an independent process than FF A inembers were prepared to 
acknowledge at this stage" (DF AT 17.01.97). Most important, however, was Australia' s opinion 
that to "inaxi111ise" the FFA inembership's "control of the process", the MHLC2 111eeting should 
be regarded as a "one-off, Foruin initiated gathering that inay generate some of its own 
1110111entu111" (DFAT 17.01.97). 
Australia's views were indicative of the uneasiness within the region regarding control 
over the MHLC process. While they were willing for the negotiations to be an opportunity to 
exchange the kinds of views expressed at the MHLC l, it was felt that the negotiations could 
eliminate the in-zone sovereign rights of the Oceanic states. This is a crucial issue for the 
region. The FFC 
agreed to a consensus position ... which was to aim for a declaration stating the 
commitment of all parties to cooperate in regional arrangements in order to achieve 
compatible management measures (in zone and high seas) ... wide application of the 
precautionary approach, sharing of fisheries data and cooperation in MCS ... special 
impmiance to the region was explicit recognition of their sovereign rights to manage, 
exploit and conserve resources within EEZs (Tarte 1998b: 7). 
The FFC wanted the FF A to play an important role in facilitating "the consultation and 
negotiation process" (Tarte 2001 a: 15). While there were differences of opinion regarding the 
form of future 111anage1nent arrange111ents within Oceania leading up to the MHLC2 111eeting, 
the FFC presented a regional bloc to achieve its agreed ai111s for the Majuro negotiations. It was 
not, however, the intention of the FFC to move too quickly at Majuro. 
By late 1996, it was evident that the FF A wanted to secure the services of H.E. 
A111bassador Satya Nandan, a Fiji national, to Chair the MHLC process. In his December 1996 
State111ent to the General Asse111bly on item 28: Law of the Sea, H.E. Ambassador Laurence 
Edwards of the Marshall Islands to the United Nations notes 
[T]the proud heritage of the Pacific has been capped this year by the election of H.E. 
Ambassador Satya N andan of Fiji to the post of Secretary General of the International Sea 
Bed Authority ... Mr President, as you are well aware, Ambassador Nandan was a most 
able Chairman of the process which led us to the adoption of an Agreement on Straddling 
Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Stocks (Republic of the Marshall Islands, 9 December 
1996). 
FFC30 in January 1997 agreed to invite Nandan to chair the MHLC2 negotiations. By then, 
Nandan had confinned his availability for the position (DFAT 14.1.1997). His selection was, 
according to one observer, "an inspired choice", given his "expertise and achievements" in the 
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UNCLOS process, his Chairing of the Fish Stocks negotiations, and his solid ties to Oceania 
(Tarte 2001a: 14).30 In his Opening Statement to the MHLC2 negotiations on 10 June 1997, 
N andan noted that twenty years previously he had prepared a paper which had been presented at 
the 1977 Port Moresby Forum. That paper had advocated the establislunent of a regional 
fisheries agency (FFA). Nandan com1nented that the years between the establislunent of the 
FF A and the MHLC2 negotiations had not been wasted. That time had allowed for better 
relationships to be fonned between the Oceanic and fishing states, as well as a greater 
understanding by the region of what was involved to 1nanage its tuna resource. To enable "free 
and frank discussion" to take place, Nandan suggested that there be no record of the proceedings 
(MHLC2 1997: 8-11). 
Nandan's view that over an eighteen-year period a better relationship had been forged 
between Oceanic and fishing states is at odds with the analysis by Geen and Bergin (1995) in 
their Review of Tuna Manage1nent Arrangements in the Central Western Pacific. On the 
question of joint 1nanage1nent decision-making structures between the region and fishing states, 
the authors believe that 
At this stage, the relationship between the DWFNS and the FF A member countries is 
probably not sufficiently developed to enter into such arrangements, even in cases where 
they are seen to be desirable for conservation of certain tuna stocks. DWFNS, for their 
part, would be unlikely to demonstrate the necessary sensitivity to the concerns ofFFA 
me1nbers or the willingness to make concessions that would meet the needs of island 
countries for control of resources within their zones (Geen and Bergin 1995: vi-vii). 
This analysis is supportive of the view that the region already had in place effective regional 
mechanisn1s to ensure fisheries conservation and management. On the other hand, to bring 
about the acceptance by fishing states of conservation and management measures it was 
necessary to involve them in those 1neasures, through a co-operative n1echanis1n, such as a 
regional organisation. 
Japan's Country Statement at the MHLC2 meeting was blunt in its assessment that little 
had been achieved since the MHLC 1. Japan considered the most i1nportant issue that the 
1neeting should discuss was the "frainework ... of the conservation and management measures" 
regarding the stocks concerned (MHLC2 1997: 33). Japan's State1nent was also disn1issive of 
the principles of the UN CLOS and the Fish Stocks Agree1nent, believing that "we should start 
addressing ourselves to the real proble1ns of the conservation and management of the highly 
1nigratory species" (MHLC2 1997: 34). This includes stocks in their entire range, both high seas 
and in-zone. Both Japan and Korea 1nade specific mention of the system already in place 
30 Tarte noted that Nandan led Fiji ' s delegation to the UNCLOS III negotiations between 1973-1982. He " .. . 
played a key role in resolving issues relating to the EEZ concept .. . helped lay the groundwork for the 
declaration of EEZs by Pacific island states and for the establishment of the FF A ... Later served as an 
Under Secretary General for the Law of the Sea ... [and was] elected head of the International Seabed 
Authority" in 1996 (Tarte 2001a: 14). 
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in the region for Total Allowable Catch (TACs). Both countries disagree with TACs being laid 
down for highly 1nigratory stocks. They dispute the practicalities of setting a TAC for EEZ 
zones. Rather, Korea and Japan believe the TAC should apply throughout the region (MHLC2 
1997: 34). 
Korea's Statement supported Japan's criticis1ns regarding tuna fishing conditions in the 
region, questioning the Vessel Monitoring System (VMS), the region's demands for higher 
access fees, the "tough requiren1ents for fishing", and the "over-regulation and excessive 
responsibility" regarding skipjack, yellowfin and albacore (MHLC2 1997: 38). Korea argued 
that these resources "are self-renewable, and we can exploit them in virtual perpetuity" 
(MHLC2 1997: 38). Korea's Statement, however, does note that the Fish Stocks Agreement, 
with its e1nphasis on the precautionary approach and transparency, will "contribute to the 
realization of sustainable fisheries" (MHLC2 1997: 3 8). Korea then 1naintains that a "prudent" 
approach should be adopted regarding i1nplementation of that Agreen1ent and the application of 
the precautionary approach (MHLC2 1997: 38).31 Korea's State1nent notes that "owing to their 
d01nestic situations" many countries are not prepared to ratify the docu1nent (MHLC2 1997: 3 7-
38). The Korean fleet's disregard for MCS measures is explained by the official Korean line that 
it is possible to exploit the tuna "in virtual perpetuity" (MHLC2 1997: 37-38). 
Korea and Japan were the two 1nain dissenting voices heard at the MHLC2 negotiations. 
Taiwan (Chinese Taipei being its formal n01nenclature ), merely notes that any "one-sided tenns 
and conditions proposed unilaterally by one particular block of nations" would not necessarily 
be in its long-term interests (MHLC2 1997: 28). Rather, fishing and coastal states need to co-
operate over "sensible and feasible conservation and manage1nent" ideas (MHLC2 1997: 29). 
Taiwan had been anxious for inclusion in the Fish Stocks Agreement and was incorporated as a 
'fishing entity'. This gives it some degree of legitimacy in the global fisheries arena. It was keen 
to be included, for the saine reasons, in the WCPF Convention.32 
As a 1najor fishing state active in the WCPO, the United States is careful to be 
supportive of Oceania in order to protect its fleet's access under the Multilateral Fisheries 
Treaty. There is, however, still a hint of political exigency about the priorities for the United 
States in the region. The United States' State1nent notes that it is 
31 
32 
important to our foreign policy to maintain this close relationship and to do what we can 
to promote economic development among Pacific Island States. The tuna stocks of the 
region are clearly of key economic importance to island economies (MHLC2 1997: 49). 
Korea, like Japan, has signed the Fish Stocks Agreement, but has not ratified it. 
Taiwan has used other fishing regimes to try to gain state recognition. For example, it has filed an 
application to join the CCSBT (Commission for the Convention of Southern Bluefin Tuna). "The CCSBT 
is seeking a solution between Taiwan's desire to use CCSBT membership as diplomatic recognition of its 
"statehood" (CCSBT membership is limited to states) and diplomatic consideration to China" (Yoichiro 
Sato, The Japan Times: 7 June 2001). 
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Another ele1nent of United States interest in the MHLC process was the need to see "sound 
conservation" of the region's fisheries stocks (MHLC2 1997: 49). These 1nigratory stocks travel 
through United States waters and are harvested by its fleet. The "sound conservation" aspect 
also supports national interest, for example, the well-being of me1nbers of the United States 
fleet. Another element is the "economic health of our own tuna industry" (MHLC2 1997: 49). 
The United States is, therefore, preoccupied with national interests, both economic and strategic. 
The Country State1nents of the Oceanic states note their concerns in relation to the 
interests of s1nall island states being protected in developing the necessary capacity to fulfill 
their obligations under the UNCLOS and the Fish Stocks Agreen1ent. While not a regional 
micro state, Papua New Guinea made specific reference to the needs of small island states in its 
State1nent. Kiribati's closing remark, however, highlights its national interest, re1narking that 
[W]while Kiribati fully support [sic] the concept of the future management arrangement, 
we would like to reserve our position on particular issues which we consider purely of 
national interest (MHLC2 1997: 3 6). 
Throughout the MHLC process and in fisheries negotiations generally, Kiribati's need to 
"reserve" its position has been a negative factor. However, Kiribati is dependent upon fisheries 
access pay1nents. These reservations are, therefore, paramount to Kiribati. 
Notwithstanding the airing of divergent preliininary stands at the MHLC2, the 1neeting 
adopted (by accla1nation) the Majuro Declaration. The Declaration represents the first 
agreement between Oceanic and fishing states regarding the region's fisheries resources. It is 
also the first time that tenets underpinning the Fish Stocks Agreement were used, "thus the 
region was a test case for the iinplementation of this new inten1ational regime" (Tarte 1998b: 8). 
The Majuro Declaration calls on fishing and coastal states alike to finalise the WCPF 
Convention within three years. It is to be fashioned on the requirements of the Fish Stocks 
Agreement. These requirements include 
a mechanism for the conservation and management of highly migratory fish stocks in the 
region ... to cooperate effectively in the conservation and management of highly 
migratory fish stocks ... through application of the precautionary approach ... to [ensure] 
that conservation and management measures for highly migratory fish stocks in areas 
under national jurisdiction and those for the high seas are compatible ... collect and share 
... complete and accurate data concerning fisheries activities ... cooperate in monitoring, 
control and surveillance of fishing activities ... provide financial scientific and technical 
assistance to Pacific island developing States and territories to enhance their ability to 
conserve, manage and sustainably use the highly migratory fish stocks of the region (Majuro Declaration). 
It is significant that fishing states agreed to the Majuro Declaration. The Declaration is tied to 
the principles of the Fish Stocks Agree1nent. Neither Japan nor Korea has ratified that 
Agreement, yet they agreed to the Majuro Declaration. Their disagreement at later negotiating 
rounds over measures relating to the Fish Stocks Agreement caused controversy, particularly as 
they had agreed to the Majuro Declaration. Perhaps they considered the Majuro Declaration as 
' soft law', and not binding, different to the 'hard law' of the Fish Stocks Agreement? Aqorau 
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(2002: 1) discusses the differences between soft and hard law in inten1ational fisheries 
instruments, noting that 
Some of these instruments reflect "soft law". These are represented by declarations, 
statements of principles, code of conducts or international plan of actions. Some 
instruments are "hard law" and are manifested in the fonn of international treaties that 
stipulate explicit rules governing State conduct over fisheries. 
It should be re1nembered that at the Fish Stocks negotiations, it was not the preference of fishing 
states such as Japan and Korea to finalise a legally binding instrument (see de Fontaubert 1995). 
The Chair raised the FFA's involvement in his Closing Statement to the MHLC2, 
noting that the FF A will provide secretariat services for the negotiations and the inter-sessional 
1neetings (MHLC2 1997: 16). This decision gave the region some control over the negotiations. 
A crucial issue, however, was the need to ensure continued funding of the MHLC process. 
MHLC2 was funded by a variety of donors, including so1ne fishing states. Funding problen1s 
were a major irritant throughout the MHLC negotiations, not least because the FF A's resources 
were over-stretched. The FFA provided the staff and resources necessary to organise each 
MHLC and to help in the develop1nent ofMHLC policies (Tarte 2001a: 15). 
The MHLC3 was scheduled for June or July 1998. Technical inter-session consultations 
would be held before that. The first meeting, in Dece1nber 1997, would analyse the various 
options for the manage1nent of the region's highly migratory stocks. The second meeting, in 
April 1998, would "develop options for monitoring control and surveillance". Both inter-
sessional 1neetings would prepare reports for consideration by MHLC3 (Chair' s Repo1i, 
MHLC2 1997: 12-16). 
The n1ajor outcon1e of the MHLC2 was the Majuro Declaration. The Majuro 
Declaration con1mitted all states to co1nplete the negotiations within three years. This would be 
a challenge for all parties to the negotiations. The willingness of fishing states such as Korea 
and Japan to agree to the Majuro Declaration had i1nplications for their respective argu1nents at 
later stages of the negotiations. The unity displayed by the Oceanic states in highlighting the 
needs of small island states was an in1portant factor in regional unity; for example, Papua New 
Guinea' s specific mention of small island states and their needs and aspirations. This is not to 
discount the national interests of s01ne states, such as Kiribati , which is dependent on fisheries 
access fees. Nevertheless, eleven of the FFC delegations to the MHLC2 were led at ministerial 
level. This gave added weight to the co1mnit1nent of the regional leadership . It also presented a 
strong face to the fishing states. The third 1neeting scheduled for Tokyo in a year' s time would 
test that c01n1nit1nent. 
This Chapter exainined the outcomes of the Fish Stocks Agree1nent that include the 
regulation of high seas fishing, specifically adjacent to EEZs. This is an i1nportant issue, 
because while 1nost tuna is caught within 200-nautical 1nile EEZs, these stocks traverse high 
seas and EEZs. A second issue is the incorporation of the precautionary principle, which reflects 
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the pre-colonial conservation and management ethics of the region. A third issue is the 
require111ent that fishing states provide details of bycatch, discards, fishing effort and catch 
levels. This is where the region demonstrated the effectiveness of collective diplomacy at the 
Fish Stocks negotiations. 
These issues were important to the FFA me111bership, for example, the region ' s 
conservation and management ethic, dating back to pre-colonial times. A second positive factor 
was the strong indigenous leadership at the Fish Stocks Agreement by such individuals as Satya 
Nandan of Fiji, who chaired the negotiations. A third positive factor is the work undertaken by a 
s111all group which was led by Nandan (Fiji) and included Harwood (Australia), Murray (New 
Zealand) and Lodge (FF A), to draft the Fish Stocks Agreement. A fourth positive factor is the 
daily caucus of the FFC that strengthened the engagement of the Oceanic states of Fiji, Tonga, 
Kiribati, Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu and the Federated States of Micronesia. The region was 
united in its endeavours at the Fish Stocks negotiations and this unity helped the FFC 
n1e111bership to put in place those substantive provisions of a meaningful treaty. By doing so, the 
region would be better placed to achieve their objectives of regional fisheries co-operation. 
The MHLC2 negotiations concluded with the Majuro Declaration. The Declaration was 
adopted by acclamation. The Majuro Declaration incorporates the ideals of the Fish Stocks 
Agreement. The Declaration was used at later negotiating rounds when fishing states, ( which 
supported the Declaration) tried to dispute measures from the Fish Stocks Agreement being 
drafted into the negotiating text. By finalising the Majuro Declaration, the region committed 
itself to pursuing a co-operative arrangement with fishing states . The other side of the double-
edged sword again demonstrates the difficulties faced by the Oceanic states which, on the one 
hand, wanted prescriptive measures for high seas fishing, yet on the other hand, were committed 
to a co-operative arrangement with fishing states. 
An observer has said that one of the problems associated with the implementation of the 
Fish Stocks Agreement was an overemphasis on achieving a legal solution to what is essentially 
a technical fisheries management problem. What is needed for the region is to develop an 
effective fisheries management solution within the legal framework of that Agreement. This 
solution includes the management and allocation of the resource, jurisdictional arrangements for 
the high seas and the implementation of the Vessel Monitoring System (VMS), catch and 
capacity controls and other regulatory measures (Interview, Cartwright, May 2001 ).33 The 
drafting of the Fish Stocks Agreement by Nandan (and helped by Harwood, Talbot and Lodge), 
reflect the preference for a legal solution. With a legal solution being used to pursue a co-
operative arrangement, it was up to the region to harness its co-operative abilities to achieve the 
best outcome for the region. By the end of MHLC2, the region had laid the groundwork for such 
an outcome by finalising the Majuro Declaration. 
33 Cartwright, now a Consultant, was the Deputy Director of the FF A during the MHLC process. 
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Riding the high tide 
After the success of the Majuro 1neeting and the adoption by acclaim of the Majuro Declaration, 
the mood was positive in the region regarding the Multilateral High Level Conference on the 
Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central 
Pacific (the MHLC) negotiations. The next two negotiating rounds, MHLC3 at Tokyo and 
MHLC4 at Honolulu, represented the commencement of the serious side of the negotiating 
process. As was the case with the Fish Stocks negotiations, fro1n the MHLC3, the negotiations 
were divided generally between fishing and coastal states, with the United States changing 
sides, depending on the issues under debate. 1 
This Chapter comprises five sections. The first section examines the MHLC3 
negotiating round at Tokyo. The second section examines the MHLC4 negotiating round at 
Honolulu. At these two sessions, the distinct differences between the interests of fishing and 
coastal states over specific issues under negotiation became noticeable.2 The third section 
explores the 1nost important issues discussed at those two negotiating rounds. 
Section four pauses for reflection on the realities preoccupying the major fishing states 
operating in the region from the mid-l 990s to 2000. This section highlights the difficulties faced 
by fishing states whose operations were affected by changes in the global tuna economy, for 
example, fleet overcapacity, ageing fleets, continuing problems finding experienced crews, as 
well as the imposition of substantive treaty provisions aimed at regulating fleet activities. These 
difficulties created a context in which MHLC politics were conducted. The fifth section 
exan1ines the region's joint ventures and domestic tuna industry from the mid-l 990s to 2000. 
This section illustrates the difficulties faced by the region to achieve two specific objectives of 
regional fisheries co-operation; that of domestication of the tuna industry and indigenous control 
over the econon1ic and political process of develop1nent of the tuna resource . While it could be 
argued that the region did achieve indigenous control in relation to implementing substantive 
provisions in meaningful treaties, indigenous control over joint ventures, or increasing the level 
of the tuna industry' s domestication was not so certain. 
Before moving on to an examination of the MHLC3 and MHLC4, it is useful to 
exa1nine several of the more controversial issues which were debated at the negotiations and 
why they were iinportant to the Oceanic states. First, the precautionary approach was a concept 
which originated with the campaign against driftnet fishing, its purpose being to err on the side 
2 
For example, on issues relating to monitoring, control and surveillance, the United States was aligned with 
the FF A states. On issues such as decision-making or the Convention area however, the United States was 
aligned with other fishing states. 
The comparisons between the Opening Statements made by individual delegations at MHLC3 and MHLC4 
provide a useful source of differences. In addition, the reports of each of the negotiating rounds by an 
observer, Dr Sandra Tarte, of the University of the South Pacific (USP) provides supporting analysis. 
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of caution regarding fishing activity to li1nit any negative environ1nental i1npact (Doulman 
2000a). Moreover, the lack of full scientific evidence should not be used as a reason for not 
applying the precautionary principle. The precautionary approach was supported by the Oceanic 
states at the Fish Stocks negotiations and reflects their pre-colonial conservation ethic, which in 
conte1nporary ti1nes is linked to one objective of collective fisheries diplomacy, that of 
sustainability. Fro1n this, it is evident that the costs involved in not adhering to the precautionary 
principle may lead to unsustainability of the resource. The benefits are sustainability of the 
resource. 
Second, the issue of allocation illustrates a great divide between the fishing and Oceanic 
states. For the Oceanic states, allocation and the total allowable catch (TAC) are linked to their 
perceptions regarding sovereign rights.3 The allocation issue covers "process and criteria for 
allocation, new entrants and dispute settlement" (Tarte 1999a: 11 ). The Oceanic states believe 
that they should control the TAC within their EEZs, the future WCPF4 CoID1nission allocating 
high seas TAC. Furthe1more, in the Oceanic states' view, the fish caught in their EEZs re1nain 
their resource. The view of fishing states, such as Japan, is that they have ownership over the 
fish they catch and that allocation should be region-wide and not divided. Japan believes that 
allocation should be distributed on the basis of historical catch in the area, which benefits its 
fleet. This approach denies the Oceanic states the ability to increase domestication or encourage 
indigenous control (Tarte 1999a: 11). For the Oceanic states, the issue of allocation is tied to all 
four objectives of collective fisheries diplomacy - that of sustainability, a fair retun1, 
don1estication and indigenous control. Again, looking at the issue of costs, the fishing state 
approach to allocation denies the Oceanic states the right to develop do1nestication and 
indigenous control. Therefore, there are no benefits to the region. 
Third, the FF A had put in place 1niniinum tenns and conditions (MTCs) measures 
through various regional and sub-regional instru1nents and they were controversial at the MHLC 
negotiations, for exainple, the observer program, transshipn1ent and the VMS.5 MTC 1neasures 
reflect two objectives of collective fisheries diplomacy, those of sustainability and a fair retun1. 
It was through the implementation of MTCs under the Multilateral Fisheries Treaty, for 
exan1ple, the observer prograin, that the region was able to identify the illegal fishing practices 
of other fishing states in the region. 
3 
4 
5 
Just to review the meaning of sovereign rights; sovereignty means a state has exclusive rights, legal 
supremacy and powers over its lawful jurisdiction. Alternatively, sovereign rights prescribe control over a 
specific issue as a consequence of sovereignty. For example, Australia's sovereignty over its territorial sea 
means it has the sovereign right to exploit its resources as it see fit, or as may be allowed under 
international law. My thanks to Judith Swan and Mark Gray for their views on this distinction. See 
Akehurst (1991: 15-19) and Churchill and Lowe (1 983 : 130-132) for discussions on sovereignty and 
sovereign rights. 
Convention on the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and 
Central Pacific Ocean (WCPF) 
MTCs are also a part of monitoring, control and surveillance (MCS) measures that refl ect conservation and 
management goals. 
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The observer prograin has both a c01npliance and a scientific role. Asian fishing states 
argue against the compliance role, citing the cost, the restricted space aboard vessels and "the 
proble1ns of having "foreign' observers" (Tarte 1999a: 14). For the region, the benefits 
outweigh the costs. The prohibition on transshipment at sea is designed to "verify catch and 
effort reporting, as well as generate 1nore on-shore services and revenue for coastal states" 
(Tarte 1999a: 13). There are no costs for the region associated with this, but there are significant 
benefits. The VMS is supported by the 1najority of the FF A membership and provides a way of 
1nonitoring fishing fleet activities in the region. Japan has been a major opponent of the VMS, 
believing that confidential data from the fishing vessel should be first trans1nitted to the flag 
state and thereafter to the central monitoring hub. The FF A 1ne1nbership feels that this process 
allows for sanitisation of the data (Tarte 1999a: 14 ). In relation to costs and benefits to the 
region, the costs associated with imple1nenting the VMS and 1naintaining it are outweighed by 
the benefits associated with automatic location con1municators (ALCs ), auto1natically 
transmitting a signal to a satellite and thence to a monitoring centre, or central hub, such as the 
FF A. The signal contains information regarding the location of fishing vessels in the region 
(Molenaar and Tsamenyi 2000) .6 This discussion is not inclusive of all those issues debated at 
the negotiations, merely some of these more contentious issues. 
Section one: An appraisal of the MHLC3, Tokyo, June 1998 7 
By the MHLC3 negotiating round, new entrants to the region's tuna fishery had emerged with 
the European Union and France both expressing an interest in pursuing fishing access 
affange1nents. This prompted questions by the FFC regarding over-fishing by the European 
fleets elsewhere in the world and raised concen1s within the region regarding the European 
Union's c01runitinent to sustainable exploitation (FFC 34 1997). The push by the FFA to make 
the VMS a condition of fishing activity in the region caused problems with Japan and other 
fishing states (Tarte 1998c). Linked to these regional concerns regarding the tuna industry were 
the continued efforts of donors, such as Australia, to encourage economic refonn and private 
sector developn1ent (Firth 2000a, Sutherland 2000). 
Australia's Staten1ent to the FFC 34 meeting in Nove1nber 1997 notes the need to 
"identify and articulate our own national and collective interest". Further that 
6 
7 
See also Forum Fisheries Agency 1999b. 
Delegations at MHLC3 were Australia, Taiwan, Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, France, 
French Polynesia, Indonesia, Japan, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, New Caledonia, New Zealand, Niue, 
Palau, Papua New Guinea, China, Philippines, Korea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, United 
States and Vanuatu. Observers included Canada, the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation 
(FAO), Forum Secretariat, Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA), Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission 
(IA TTC), Secretariat of the Pacific Community (SPC), and the University of the South Pacific (USP). 
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Forum Leaders and Economic Ministers have committed themselves to an Action Plan for 
economic reform and development in the region. Sustainable management of resources -
and particularly our important fisheries resources - is an ilnportant part of that 
commitment. We must ensure that what happens in FFC is consistent with and contributes 
to broader regional work on sustainable economic development (FFC 34 1997: 
Attachment D).8 
Australia' s linking of economic refonn with the fisheries sector indicated that conditionality 
would be attached to the provision of fisheries aid, based on the in1plementation of good 
governance policies and econ01nic refonns, thus binding Australia's policies with the prevailing 
global neo-liberal agenda.9 Hence, Australia gave support to the ideals of "privatisation, 
'downsizing', liberalisation of trade, transparency, accountability and 1nanagement refonn" (Fry 
1999: 25-26). Overall, because of the land tenure issue and the li1nited capital investment in the 
region, there is a s1nall private sector and island communities are dependent upon the public 
sector for both investment and services. 10 
Aside from the neo-liberal demands of donors such as Australia at that ti1ne, the two 
inter-sessional 1neetings during the year before the MHLC3 helped to maintain the momentum 
of the MHLC negotiations. The fisheries management inter-sessional meeting recom1nended 
defining the geographical scope of the Convention for the Conservation and Management of 
Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific (WCPF Convention). Other 
reco1n1nendations included the specific stocks to be managed and the encouragement of 
participation by coastal states from the Wes tern Pacific region, for example, Indonesia. A 
workshop took place in Honolulu in May 1998 to study relevant issues surrounding the 
application of the precautionary approach. The n1eeting identified funding constraints for data 
collection and scientific evaluation (Taiie 1998b: 9, Tarte 2001a: 16). 
The n1onitoring, control and surveillance (MCS) inter-sessional 111eeting, held in Fiji in 
March 1998, supported the region's stand on the Regional Register, the Niue Treaty, the 
regional observer prograin and the VMS. 11 The 1neeting recommended to the forthcon1ing 
MHLC3 negotiating round that 
8 
9 
10 
11 
The overall objective ofMCS is to ensure compliance with conservation and management 
measures adopted through the Regional Arrangement. In carrying out this objective, the 
Regional Arrangement should adopt MCS measures which are compatible with existing 
MCS measures (MHLC 1998a: 5). 
The Forum Economic Ministers Meeting held at Cairns, Australia on 11 July 1997, agreed on an Action 
Plan. The Plan covered Economic Reform, Public Accountability, Investment Policies, Tariff Policies and 
Multilateral Trade Issues in the region ( online< http://w\vw.forumsec.org.fi date accessed 5 April 2002). 
Neo-liberalism and the belief in a globalised economic policy support an open global trading system that is 
free of government restrictions. For a discussion on globalisation and neo-liberalism, see Scholte 1997. 
This includes the often-disastrous attempts at investment in the tuna industry by the public sector (see 
Chapters Three and Four). 
The Intersessional was attended by Australia, Taiwan, Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, 
France, Japan, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, People ' s 
Republic of China, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, United States 
and Vanuatu (MHLC 1998a). 
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The existing MCS 1neasures in the region include those incorporated within the Multilateral 
Fisheries Treaty and those relating to the United States Lacey Act. 12 From the discussions, it 
was evident that fishing states 
were beginning to bridle at the way in which FF A Regional Terms and Conditions and the 
UNIA were being used by coastal States to support a push for high MCS standards for the 
regional arrangement. This was particularly noticeable in the case of VMS, transshipment 
and the compliance role of observers (Cartwright 1999: 21). 
This decision to use existing MCS 1neasures would lead to disagreement at later MHLC 
negotiating rounds. Fishing states believed that the new Com1nission should finalise MCS 
measures. It 1nust be remembered that MCS conditions helped to fonn the backbone of 
Oceania's achievement in regional fisheries co-operation. 
What the inter-sessional 1neetings illustrated was the sensitive issue of weighing up the 
rights and responsibilities of port state, flag state and coastal state. In the absence of a regional 
instrument, the Fish Stocks Agreement calls for flag state responsibility on the high seas and 
coastal state responsibility within an exclusive economic zone (EEZ). If a regional instru1nent 
had been put in place, then it sets out the requirements for high seas boarding and inspection. It 
was agreed that the Fish Stocks Agree1nent's prescriptions would prevail, pending the 
conclusion of a regional regiine. 13 The issue "1nasked deep reservations on the part of a nun1ber 
ofDWFNS, which became evident in subsequent negotiations" (Tarte 2001a: 17).14 
Five weeks before the Tokyo negotiating round the Chair circulated draft articles in the 
fonn of a discussion paper designed to 
Ensw·e, through proper management, the long-term conservation and sustainable use of 
highly migratory fish stocks in the western and central Pacific ocean in accordance with 
the 1982 Convention and the 1995 Agreement (MHLC3 1998b: 36). 
By doing so, Nandan hoped to generate discussion of those issues requiring negotiation. When 
these were discussed at the FFC 35 1neeting in May 1998, (one month before MHLC3), several 
states expressed anxiety that matters were moving too fast and that time would not allow a 
unified regional stand to be developed. States felt that due concern must be given to the loss of 
power over in-zone 1nanage1nent when the new regin1e was established, as it would cover stocks 
across their entire range (FFC 35 1998a). 
A divisive elen1ent, as well as a negative external factor, e1nerged when Japan 
announced it would only fund travel to Tokyo for those Oceanic states with which it had 
12 
13 
14 
Under the Lacey Act, FFA states, in conjunction with the United States, can seek the prosecution of foreign 
fishing vessels which infringe their fisheries laws and who subsequently attempt to discharge fish caught 
illegally at U.S. ports (Aqorau 1998: 232). The Lacey Act has provided a significant deterrent to illegal 
fishing activity or ' bad actors ' in fishing and has facilitated improved compliance rates in the WCPO 
(Aqorau 1998: 233). 
This decision is in accordance with Article 8.2 of the Fish Stocks Agreement which states, " [P]pending 
agreement on such arrangements, States shall observe the provisions of this Agreement and shall act in 
good faith and with due regard to the rights, interests and duties of other states". 
DWFNS are distant water fishing nations. 
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bilateral access arrangeinents. 15 In a letter to Mr Tatsuo Saito, Head of the Japanese delegation, 
the FFC 35 Chair notes the "united" stand taken by the 16 1nember countries at FFC 35 that the 
funding made available for the Tokyo MHLC "should be made available on a non 
discriminatory basis" (DFAT 12.6.1998). The letter went on to state that, given the high travel 
costs involved, FFC 1nembers had even gone so far as to look at alternative venues within the 
region for the next meeting. The FFC Chair's letter annoyed Saito. Saito's response to the FFC 
Chair states that 
the respective budget items were subject to various conditions and limitations, such as the 
restriction to use the appropriation only in Japan in case of some budget items or to be 
used only in connection with certain countries (DF AT 12.6.1998 italics added). 
Apart fr01n the perceived preference for PNA men1bers ( except for Fiji), the incident 
emphasises the lack of long term funding for the MHLC process. It draws attention to the fact 
that the FF A was powerless to control the financial aspects of running the process. The FFC 3 5 
meeting notes its concen1 regarding Japan's provision of funding. For example, the 1noney 
remained in Japan's hands and could not be used by the MHLC Secretariat. Further, the 1noney 
"was being used in a discriminatory manner" and that it was seen as "an attempt to fragment 
regional solidarity" (FFC 35 1998: 15). One observer notes that some people travelled to Tokyo 
business class, while other people travelled econo1ny class (Interview, Cartwright, May 2001 ). 16 
The region has dealt with Japan for a long time, however, and it was praginatic about Japan' s 
attempts to splinter solidarity over this issue. As an extra-regional power in the W estem and 
Central Pacific Ocean (WCPO), Japan 1nay have been attempting to liinit the abilities of the 
region to 1nanage the process. 
The MHLC3 negotiations in Tokyo attracted large delegations. For exainple, Japan ' s 
delegation comprised 55 officials. There were 25 delegates from the United States, 22 delegates 
fro1n the Philippines, 15 delegates fro1n Taiwan, 13 delegates fron1 the Republic of Korea 
(Korea), 10 delegates from Australia, and 7 delegates from both China and France. By attracting 
such large delegations, there was a clear perception by fishing and coastal states that the 
negotiations would change the way that tuna fishing is conducted in the WCPO. 17 
The Chair steered the conference through his circulated draft articles, one by one. Two 
1neeting styles were adopted which were used in subsequent negotiating rounds. Open plenary 
discussed the draft articles and delegations proposed alten1ative text. Where articles raised 
contentious issues, the n1eeting split into small working groups, which were convened to resolve 
differing perspectives (Tarte 2001a: 19). Nandan had used this operating style during the 
negotiations for the Fish Stocks Agree1nent and the sn1all working groups became an important 
focus for later MHLC negotiations. From the MHLC3 until the conclusion of the MHLC7, the 
15 
16 
17 
At that time, those states were Solomon Islands, Kiribati, Federated States of Micronesia, Marshall Islands, 
Tuvalu, Nauru and Fiji (Tarte 2001a). 
Ian Cartwright, now a consultant, was the Deputy Director of the FF A during the MHLC negotiations. 
By the MHLC7, for example, the United States delegation comprised 43 representatives. 
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PFC met in caucus regularly during the negotiations. N andan also gave the PFC a "special pre-
conference briefing" (Tarte 2001a: 19). 
According to one observer, the MHLC3 n1arked a turning point 1n the negotiating 
process. Japan, like all the other participants, received the Chair's draft articles in advance of the 
Tokyo meeting. Japan then put forward alternative text. Every ti1ne Japan tried to present 
alten1atives, it was 
shot down by New Zealand and Australia. Arguably, some of their suggestions improved 
the text, but we just said no, the only text we will accept is the Chairman's text. We 
embarrassed the Japanese in front of hundreds of their industry people (Interview, 
Cartwright May 2001). 
Having been overruled so comprehensively in front of its constituency, Japan emerged from the 
MHLC3 negotiations aggrieved, its position hardening at subsequent negotiating rounds. The 
PFC me1nbership had stood its ground, presenting a unified bloc at the Tokyo negotiations. The 
1ne1nbership realised that regional solidarity would be essential at future negotiations, however, 
they also realised that compron1ise n1ay be required in order to finalise the future agreement 
(Tarte 1998c: 10). 
At the end of the third round of negotiations, the draft text illustrated the Oceanic states' 
co1n1nitment to their inviolable rights over in-zone, MCS and TAC issues. The draft text 
reflected the rights of coastal states and highlighted the obligations of fishing states. 
Nonetheless, it was evident that Japan had tried to apply pressure under its bilateral 
an-ange1nents with certain of the Oceanic states, for example, Kiribati. 18 This was illustrated by 
the "virtual invisibility" of so1ne island delegations at PFC caucus 1neetings of the MHLC3 
negotiations ( anony1nous ). 19 
In Axline's (1994b: 29) exainination of this type of situation, he believes that a state 
(such as Japan), as an external factor in influencing the outcon1e of negotiations, would have 
"taken steps to influence the calculation of costs and benefits" in sidelining me1nbers of the 
regional coalition. On the other hand, Axline (1994b: 28) also argues that there are factors 
which can influence individual 1nembers of the coalition in relation to impmiant issues of 
national interest, for example, a state's domestic political and economic situation, as well as its 
reliance on aid. Put plainly, Kiribati's revenue fro1n fishing license revenue in 1998 totalled 
US$24.9 n1illion. Kiribati's aiu1ual budget in 1998 was $US$36.5 1nillion (Keith Reid, 2000d). 
Rumours abound within the region regarding pay1nents in brown paper bags to 
individuals fron1 the Oceanic states. Currying favours in this way has always been a less-than-
savoury aspect of the region's tuna industry. It has also been an external force used to try to 
18 
19 
The FFC had decided to move ahead with the VMS and increase its regional registration fee from US$200 
to US$500 per vessel. This led to pressure being applied by Japan and other fishing states regarding 
bilateral access arrangements (DFAT 3.7.1998). 
Another delegate remarked that "Kiribati is the worst, some senior people are in the pockets of the 
Japanese" (anonymous). 
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challenge those objectives of regional fisheries co-operation, for example, the sustainability of 
the tuna resource by undermining conservation and management ineasures.20 
There were clear dividing lines on the outcome of the MHLC3 negotiations. The FFC, 
other coastal states and the United States were firm on issues relating to the precautionary 
approach and other MCS 1natters. On questions of membership and TAC, the United States was 
aligned with the fishing states. The allocation issue was always going to be difficult. The 
Japanese approach, in particular, of promoting fishing effort levels, rather than fishing catch 
levels, would have the effect of 1ninimising the rights of Oceanic states over their tuna 
resource.
21 The FFA states needed to maintain their collective stance at the MHLC4 and 
beyond, to retain their control over the process. It was equally clear that the fishing states 
needed to work on the Chair, and to employ divisive tactics with individual FF A members, to 
tilt the process 1nore towards their favoured outcon1es. 
Section two: An appraisal of MHLC4, Honolulu, February 199922 
Australia and New Zealand believed it was necessary to encourage the Oceanic states to speak 
out publicly in defence of issues under debate at the MHLC4. Fishing states, such as Japan, 
would then realise that the FFC's more developed members were not 1nanipulating the Oceanic 
states.23 Furthennore, Japan would realise that the Oceanic states were serious about the issues 
at hand (DFAT 03.07.98, interviews with New Zealand's delegation). The FFC's daily caucus at 
the previous MHLC negotiations helped to formulate a regional position on specific issues. 
Nevertheless, Australia and New Zealand had always spoken individually. Now that the 
negotiations were about to get to the substance of issues, observers argued that the Oceanic 
states needed to speak individually. By allowing the FFC to speak for everyone, individual 
Oceanic states were vulnerable to suasion by others (DFAT 03.07.98, interviews with New 
Zealand's delegation). 
20 
2 1 
22 
23 
These views were told to the author by a variety of observers of the region ' s tuna fishery. One anonymous 
story concerned an Oceanic state delegation (state 'a'), which met a fishing state delegation (state 'b ') in 
Guam to discuss a bilateral fisheries access agreement. Upon reaching Guam, state ' a ' was told of a change 
of plans. The delegates were then flown to the capital of state 'b ' , in spite of their protests regarding 
inappropriate clothing. The delegates from state ' a' were provided with three new suits of clothing and 
'gifts ' and they were ' feted' for several days, in return for a favourable outcome to the negotiations. 
By setting effort levels, (which would be linked to historical catch records and the effort required to achieve 
that catch), the Japanese fleet could maintain, or increase its fleet numbers (if it needed to) , to ensure that 
its effort level corresponded with its historical catch figures. In this way, as catch levels can fluctuate 
seasonally, the Japanese fleet is assured of maintaining its catch level at whatever high harvests it has 
enjoyed historically. This scenario would exclude domestic catch significantly, as it does not have a 
bountiful historical catch history. 
Delegations at MHLC4 were Australia, China, Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, France, 
French Polynesia, Indonesia, Japan, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, New Caledonia, New Zealand, Niue, 
Palau, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Taiwan, Tonga, 
Tuvalu, United States of America, Vanuatu and Wallis and Futuna. Observers included Canada, Mexico, 
the European Commission (EC), FAO, Forum Secretariat, FFA, IATTC, SPC and USP. 
It was believed among the fishing states that Australia and New Zealand made the decisions for the FFC 
membership, particularly in the early stages of the negotiations (interviews with Australian and New 
Zealand delegation members, October-December 2000). 
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The Chair circulated an Inf onnation Note to all delegations in advance of the MHLC4 
negotiations. The Note emphasises the need for "consideration of a nu111ber of key substantive 
issues ... with a view to arriving at agreement on the111" (MHLC4 1999a: 32). These include 
"the convention area, issues relating to allocation ... 111ini111um terms and conditions of fishing, 
enf orce111ent, institutional arrangements, decision 111aking and dispute settle111ent" (MHLC4 
1999a: 32). Nandan clarified these issues at the FFC 37 111eeting at Honolulu i1n111ediately 
before the MHLC4 negotiations. 
At that FFC 37 111eeting, it was decided to deny the European Union's request to 
become a full participant at the negotiations. Instead, it would continue to attend as an observer. 
The demonstration of "real interest" by the European Union in the region ' s tuna fishery was 
considered tenuous (FFC 37 1999a: 1). The FFC ' s decision to deny the European Union full 
n1e111bership to the MHLC process was not taken lightly. FFC me111bers believed the European 
Union 111ight retaliate by denying the region access to the European tuna market (FFC 36: 
1998b, FFC 37: 1999a). This did not eventuate. 
The United States Govenunent' s hosting of the MHLC4 negotiating round at Honolulu, 
supported its con1111itinent to conclude a WCPF Convention. The FFC held caucus sessions 
regularly throughout the 111eeting over issues of concen1 to the region, for exainple, membership, 
allocation, TAC and Convention area. The Legal Working Group (L WG) within the FFC 
worked hard at the MHLC4, setting out co111prehensively such issues as the area of application, 
in-zone management functions, and enunciating the duties of coastal states for in-zone 
111anage111ent and the duties of the Commission in the Convention's zone (Tarte 1999a: 5). 
Japan maintained its prominent objection to the Chair's draft text at the comn1ence111ent 
of the MHLC4 by tabling a draft convention docu111ent 
wherein basic rights and obligations of the parties and skeleton of the framework of the 
Commission are clearly defined, with the details left for the connnission to decide, as is 
usual [sic] the case with other fisheries cmnmissions which have been working 
successfully (Japan's Statement, MHLC 1999b: 15). 
Japan was supported in its atte111pt to table an alternative draft text by other Asian fishing states, 
notably Korea and China (Taiie 1999a: 6). For example, China' s Statement notes that the 
current draft text "had a nu111ber of details, such as observer on board, 111inimun1 terms and 
conditions", adding that "there includes too many of these details to allow agree111ent to be 
reached in the sh01i term" (MHLC 1999b: 10.). 
There ai·e important issues to be reme111bered regarding Japan' s Statement and the support 
provided by Korea and China. The MHLC process represents the first time multilateral fisheries 
negotiations were unde1iaken in accordance with the prescriptions of the Fish Stocks 
Agreement. Japan' s rationale was that the Chair' s draft text contained too much detail, most of 
which should be left to the Co111mission to finalise. The Oceanic states were concerned about 
substantive issues being left to the Co1nmission to resolve. This could result in the fishing states 
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applying pressure to the Oceanic states by forcing their agree1nent to watered down provisions 
by withholding their funding to the Commission (Tarte 2001 a: 21 ). What concerned most other 
participants regarding the Japanese text was the 
danger of watering down provisions established by the UNIA; that the removal and 
deletion of key articles (for the sake of brevity) would undermine the objectives of 
conservation and management (Tarte 1999a: 6).24 
It was not a successful manoeuvre by the Asian fishing states, as the conference focused on the 
Chair's draft text. 
One Australian observer notes that what he really found encouraging at the MHLC4 
conference and gave him heart about the success of the negotiations, was the "warm and fuzzy" 
atmosphere (Interview, Jusseit, April 2001).25 He felt participants demonstrated a 
sense of moral responsibility to look after the resource and they were going to sit down 
and work together and forget about our personal political suasions (Interview, Jusseit, 
April 2001 ). 
The MHLC4 was considered a good outcon1e for the region by n1ost observers interviewed, 
including Jusseit. One delegate notes that the Conference Chair had remarked that following the 
MHLC4 "Japan was critical of his leadership and willingness to take up the views of the fishing 
states" (Interview, Hughes, November 2000).26 
One factor was singled out as making a difference at the MHLC4. These were the 
regular meetings convened by the FFC's Legal Working Group (LWG). This had resulted in the 
FFC bloc being involved at the meeting by regularly putting forward draft text for consideration 
(Tarte 2001: 24 ). This was strengthened by the refusal of the MHLC Chair to 
weaken compliance and enforcement measures, as well a water down decision making 
and references to the precautionary approach (Tarte 2001a: 24). 
The outco1nes of the MHLC4 negotiating round favoured the FFC membership. By working as 
a united bloc and participating actively in the meeting, the region ensured that the draft text was 
representative of their concen1s. These included the progress on issues such as the precautionary 
approach, the VMS and transship1nent. These outcomes occurred because of the L WG' s active 
participation, the FFC Chair at the time, Moses Amos, who helped to 1naintain a united regional 
bloc tlu·ough regular caucus sessions and the support of the MHLC Chair for the region' s 
objectives. On the other hand, the fishing states went away fro1n the MHLC4 unsettled about the 
li1nited power they had exercised over the process. The outcome of MHLC4 demonstrated the 
i1nportance that unity can play in negotiations. The fishing states did not comprise a united bloc 
in the same way that the FFC bloc did. 
24 
25 
26 
Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and 
Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (known as the Fish Stocks Agreement, or the UNIA). 
Hans Jusseit works for the East Coast Tuna Industry and was a member of Australia' s MHLC delegation. 
Neil Hughes works for Environment Australia and was a member of Australia' s MHLC delegation. 
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A major outco1ne of the MHLC4 meeting was the decision to establish a Commission, 
once the WCPF Convention was in place.27 Subsidiary c01nmittees would include a Scientific 
Com1nittee as well as a Compliance and Technical Co1n1nittee, both staffed by Commission 
members (Tarte 2001a: 22). In order to be cost-effective, it was considered that where possible, 
the Com1nission should draw on the services of existing scientific bodies, such as the Oceanic 
Fisheries Program of the Pacific Co1n1nunity (Tarte 2001a: 22). The Convention area, the 
observer program, transshipment, high seas boarding and inspection and the VMS are among 
those issues discussed at the MHLC3 and the MHLC4. They are exan1ined below. 
Section three: The major issues negotiated at the MHLC3 and the MHLC4 
At the MHLC3 Indonesia expressed strong views regarding the WCPF Convention Area by 
e1nphasising the sovereignty of coastal states over archipelagic waters and the difficulties 
involving se1ni-enclosed waters (FFA 1998F: 2). Japan stated its inability to sign an 
arrangen1ent without having the geographical boundary specified for stock :nianage1nent (FF A 
1998f: 2). The Chair's Su1nmary notes the open northern boundary and that the southern 
boundary needs to comply with the Co1nmission for the Convention of Atlantic Marine Living 
Resources (CCAMLR) (MHLC 1998b: 36).28 Furthermore, the eastern boundary needs to take 
account of French Polynesia, Pitcairn Island and the Inter-Arnerican Tropical Tuna Com1nission 
(IA TTC) boundaries, and the western boundary is difficult because of the South China Sea and 
the Celebus Sea. Nandan believed they needed to strike a balance "between two very irnportant 
ele1nents; political circumstances and scientific or biological considerations" (MHLC 1998b: 
36). 
Convention Area 
By MHLC4, Japan wanted the WCPF Convention's boundary defined as far north as 50°. This 
would result in Russia, Japan, Taiwan and Korea being included as coastal states. It would also 
incorporate other species, such as northern Pacific albacore and northern Pacific bluefin.29 
Neither of these two species is relevant to the region. There would be complexities with the 
northen1 boundary set at 50° .. These complexities include the status of Taiwan as a coastal state 
and the inclusion of Russia as a me1nber of the WCPF Co1n1nission. The extension northwards 
to include Korea, China and Japan as coastal states has the potential of making difficulties 
(Interview, Gray, March 1999).30 If the northen1 boundary went as high as 50°, there would be 
an erosion "of PFC dominance as small island States in the Convention area" (PFC 39 1999b: 
27 
28 
29 
30 
Commission for the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and 
Central Pacific. 
According to Lorraine Elliott, CCAMLR's boundary itself is "vague" on the Antarctic/Southern Ocean 
convergence (Personal communication, May 2001 ). 
That said, northern bluefin have been caught as far south as Fiji (FFC 39 1999b: 32). 
Mark Gray works for the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and was a member of Australia's 
MHLC delegation. 
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32). This could result in a 'siege 111entality' within the ranks of the FF A 111en1bership and n1ight 
undennine regional co-operation. 
The proposal was c01nplicated by Japan's den1and that the Co111111ission should have 
separate geographical co111mittees. This includes a separate northern con1n1ittee, where the 
"subregion' s unique geographic, fisheries patterns and the co111positions of 111e111bers involved as 
coastal states and fishing participant should be reflected" (Japan's Staten1ent MHLC 1999a: 16). 
In so doing, "different standards and regulations would apply" (Tarte 1999a: 8). The 111ajor 
fleets in the north Pacific are the Japanese and the United States, with Canada having a 111inor 
fleet. There is a difference between the northen1 and southen1 albacore stocks (Interview, 
Heikkila, April 2001).31 One delegate remarked that Japan could control the sub-regional 
c01111nittees ( anony111ous ). 
The FFC bloc was apprehensive in relation to the prospect of a northern sub-co111111ittee. 
Japan asserted that the co111111ittee would focus on the high seas fishing activity in the area by 
s111all trolling boats, "which did not have the 111eans of 111eeting the more stringent regulations 
elsewhere" (Taiie 1999a: 8). A concern of the FFC 111e111bers was the possibility that the 
con1111ittee could "divide and weaken the overall regi111e", as well as block others fron1 "any 
111anagen1ent role in that northen1 area" Tarte 1999a: 8). 
The western and eastern borders of the WCPF Convention area were also contentious. 
Apa1i fro111 disparate sovereignty claims in the South China Sea, the inclusion or exclusion of 
the archipelagic waters of Indonesia and the Philippines 111ade the westen1 boundary difficult to 
resolve (Tarte 1999a: 8). The Chair foreshadowed this in his Infonnation Note, which states that 
[B ]because of the conflicting claims to a number of islands in the South China Sea, it was 
suggested by some that the western boundary should be adjusted to avoid areas under 
controversy, but include, as far as possible, the important fishing and spawning grounds 
(MHLC 1999a: 32). 
The archipelagic waters of Indonesia and the Philippines are in1portant fishing grounds and 
excluding these waters fr0111 the WCPF Convention area could undennine the Co111111ission's 
work. 32 The Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea con1plicated this issue, both requesting 
that their archipelagic waters be excluded fro111 the Convention area, thus den1onstrating the 
pri111acy of national interests (1999a: 8).33 French Polynesia insisted that its EEZ be included, as 
its i1nportant southern albacore fleet is not covered under the conditions of the IA TTC,34 though 
"falling within their overall area of con1petence" (Tarte 1999a: 8). This issue 1nade the easten1 
boundary difficult. The representatives fro111 the United States tuna industry were unhappy, as it 
would require their fleet being "subject to dual (possibly conflicting) regulations" (Taiie 1999a: 
31 
32 
33 
34 
Wayne Heikkila works for the Western Fishboat Owners Association and was a member of the United 
States ' MHLC delegation. 
See the map of the Convention area at Figure 7.1 , Chapter 7, page 184a. 
This is in line with Papua New Guinea' s attempts to exclude the Multilateral Fisheries Treaty from its 
archipelagic waters. 
Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC) 
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8).35 These regulations include the WCPF Convention and the IATTC. French Polynesia argued, 
however, that it is not easy to accept "[B]being artificially separated fron1 other sectors of the 
maohi people" (French Polynesia Country Statement MHLC 1999a: 14). 
The Chair was lobbied intensively regarding the WCPF Convention's boundaries, the 
revised area incorporating the southern section of French Polynesia, exclusion of the 
archipelagic waters of the Philippines and Indonesia, and the inclusion of the EEZs of Korea 
and Japan, up to 42° north and 50° west (Tarte 1999a: 9). Provision was made for a 1101ihern 
management sub-committee, which is authorised to "make recommendations to the Commission 
on 111easures to be applied in that area" (Tarte 1999a: 9). The concept of an open-ended northen1 
boundary, managed by a northern sub-committee of the Co111mission was a serious issue for the 
FFC bloc. Not only did it mean that different conditions will apply in that northern area, but also 
that 111ajor fishing states might sit at the Co111111ission's negotiating table as coastal states, thus 
heightening the vulnerability of the Oceanic states. The fact that the 1101ihern sub-committee has 
to submit its recol11111endations to the Commission made this issue more reassuring for the 
Oceanic states (Taiie 1999a: 9). It means, however, that the region will have to maintain a 
united front at the Conunission's negotiating table over any 111easures the northern sub-
c0111mittee may want to instigate. 
Allocation 
Allocation was a difficult issue at the MHLC3 and subsequent negotiations. The Oceanic states, 
led by Nauru, believed that the new WCPF Commission should set a global Total Allowable 
Catch (TACs). Allocation would be then decided for either high seas or in-zone (EEZ). Flag 
states would control the high seas TAC, while the coastal states would decide the TAC split 
between EEZs (FF A l 998f: 19. This was not Japan's perspective. Rather, allocation should 
relate to past and present fishing effort (historical catch levels) and have no bearing on coastal 
state den1ands for in-zone TACs (FFA 1998f: 19, Taiie 1998c: 5). By tackling the allocation 
issue in this way, Japan would not only "secure its share of the fishery", but would "effectively 
re111ove ownership of the resource fro111 the Pacific island states" (Tarte 1998c: 9). This would 
result in the Oceanic states having mini111al advantage in access arrangement negotiations. The 
Chair dispelled any worries the Oceanic states might have in this regard, stating that 
35 
measures adopted by coastal states in-zone and those adopted on the high seas "should 
not undermine the other. The same standards must apply". Moreover, while "The 
Commission is entitled to adopt measures providing direction for the application of in-
zone measures ... It is the prerogative of the coastal state to manage EEZs and licensing 
arrangements". The key restraint was that once an overall TAC for a stock had been 
decided and allocation between high seas and EEZs made, "that TAC should not be 
breached" (Tarte 1998c: 8, quoting from the Chair ' s remarks made during the plenary 
sessions of the Conference). 
In my interview with Heikkila (U.S Western Fishboat Owners Association and member of the United 
States ' MHLC Delegation, April, 2001), he also expressed concern over this issue. 
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Allocation is the key to the management of the region's tuna fishery. That is why other 
interested fishing states, such as those under the umbrella of the European Union, are keen to be 
included in the negotiations. Without participation, they will not be eligible for allocation. It is 
also important to the Oceanic states. Their long-term goal is to increase do1nestication of the 
industry, which will require increased allocation. It is not in their regional, or national, interests 
to allow Japan to control the allocation issue. It has the capacity to undermine all of the 
objectives of collective fisheries diplomacy, that is; sustainability, a fair retun1, domestication 
and indigenous control. The allocation concept also drove that conservation ethic of the pre-
colonial island communities, when fan1ilies, villages or chiefly systems maintained, for the 1nost 
part, a judicious control over terrestrial and marine resources (Johannes 1976). 
This issue divided the parties to the MHLC4 negotiations. The FFC bloc maintained its 
right to set domestic TAC for EEZ fishing activity. The bloc conceded that the Commission 
could co-ordinate this, as well as setting a TAC for the high seas. The FFC 1nembership did not 
consider it appropriate that the Co1nn1ission "impose management and conservation measures 
on coastal states" (Tarte 1999a: 12). Rather, it was the responsibility of fishing states to accept 
EEZ regulations and "follow c01npatible standards on the high seas" (Tarte 1999a: 12). The 
FFC group was supported by Indonesia and the Philippines on this issue, as it is recognised that 
approxi1nately 60% of the catch is harvested within the EEZ of the FF A region (Tarte 1999a: 
12). According to Willock (Interview, January 2001),36 the issue did not receive the support of 
fishing states, including the United States, as they believed that when finalising allocation there 
should be no distinction drawn between the EEZ and high seas. The leader of the United States 
delegation, Mary Beth West, 1nade this issue more controversial during the MHLC4 
negotiations by stating "I can't believe we have been sitting at the same table, this is a non-
starter" (Interview, Willock, January 2001 ). 
Japan was forthright on this point, arguing that 
[I]if anyone is thinking of receiving national in-zone quota and by selling it a price with a 
expectation of higher economic return, I must say it is totally wrong. Allocation of highly 
migratory species by small areas is biologically and statistically nonsense, since the catch 
in a small area fluctuates year to year (Japan's Country Statement MHLC 1999b: 16). 
The allocation issue split fishing and coastal states. Japan has a tendency to perceive ownership 
or rights in tem1s of who catches the fish. Japan's concern is to hold market share and it is in 
Japan' s interests to have other countries wind back their fisheries effort. Hence, Japan has 
seized upon global n1oves to liinit fisheries effort. Through the auspices of the United Nations 
36 Anna Willock works for TRAFFIC Oceania, a non-governmental organisation, which is part of the 
Worldwide Fund for Nature (WWF). Previously Willock worked for the FFA. Willock attended the MHLC 
negotiations in both capacities. 
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Food and Agriculture Organisation (PAO), Japan has called for lowering of fishing capacity, to 
downsize fleet sizes.37 At MHLC4, Japan noted that 
[E]even in the area of the western and central Pacific some of the species, such as bigeye 
tuna, cause doubts for any further development .. [I]in other areas of the world ocean, 
most stocks of the tuna resources are already fully or overexploited and fishing capacity is 
becoming redundant. This is the reason why Japan decided to reduce 20 per cent of its 
distant water longline fleet following the advice of the FAO. We will take measures to 
totally scrap these vessels so that they should not increase fishing pressure in our region 
. . . [B ]but the same vessel reduction measures might not occur in other countries, or in 
" 8 other fleets ((Japan' s Statement, MHLC 1999a: 15) . .) 
For Oceania' s coastal states, however, tuna harvested within their EEZ "remains their resource 
(subject to both rights and obligations)" (Tarte 1999a: 12). The Chair tried to resolve the 
impasse by drafting a new article in line with the Fish Stocks Agreement ' s support of the rights 
of coastal states. The new draft article stipulates that 
T[t]he principles and measures for conservation and management enumerated in article 5 
shall be applied by coastal States within areas under national jurisdiction in the 
Convention Area in the exercise of their sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and 
exploiting, conserving and managing highly migratory fish stocks (MHLC 1999a: Annex 
5 Article 7 .1) 
Thus, thanks to the intervention by the Chair, the FFC's position was strengthened by this draft 
prov1s1on. 
Decision-making 
Another contentious issue at the MHLC3 and the MHLC4 related to methods of decision-
making. The PFC 1nembership was clear about its preference for decision-making by consensus, 
but agreed with the Chair' s fall back position of a voting process. This was not the preference of 
the fishing states. The United States supported a consensus voting procedure, or an objection 
procedure, arguing that the United States Senate 1night not support a process which bound an 
individual country to a 1najority view (FF A 1998f: 20-21 , Tarte 1998c: 6). Korea and Japan 
1naintained that they would not be bound by a three-quarters 1najority vote, as the l 6-me1nber 
FFA states could out-vote the fishing states. Japan stressed that this is unacceptable to the 5 
states that catch 1nost of the tuna. The retention of an objection clause was important because 
Japan needs to protect its national fishing industry. China also supported a consensus procedure 
(FFA 1998f: 20-21 , Tarte 1998c: 6). Fishing state anxieties focused on the number of coastal 
states who could out-vote then1 at the Commission' s negotiating table. The PFC membership, 
however, did not want one fishing state holding the balance of power over decisions. This is 
possible with the inclusion of an objection clause. 
37 
38 
See the FAO's Press Release 98/62, which called for fishing capacity to "be drastically reduced to rebuild 
stocks of ... temperate tunas on the high seas" (F AO l 998i). 
While Japan did scrap some of its longline fleet, the boats scrapped were older vessels. An observer argues 
that Japan will not be prepared to face the situation on adjustment of its fl eet (Interview, Lack, December, 
2000). Lack is a consultant, but worked formerly with the Australian Fisheries Management Authori ty 
(AFFA). In that fo rmer capacity, Lack was a member of Australia's MHLC delegation. 
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This issue re1nained intractable at the MHLC4. The Chair wanted to ensure that the 
WCPF Commission would require three-quarters majority and provide for a review tribunal. 
While this generally met with the support of the FFC members, the L WG group highlighted 
such problems as decision-1naking delays and endless review and procedures for reviews, 
disputes and appeals (Tarte 1999a: 18). Australia wants voting decisions, rather than consensus, 
because some fishing states could hold up the decision-making process by disagreeing with 
every decision (Interview, Gray, March 1999). Japan, Korea and Taiwan argued for binding 
decisions to have the support of those parties that harvested three-quarters of the region's catch. 
This argument was quashed by the FFC 111e1nbership. The Sainoan delegate noted "that such a 
system recalled the 'discriinination' of regional arrangements [specifically the SPC] during the 
colonial era" (Taiie 1999a: 19). No agree1nent was reached on this issue. 
Enforcement issues 
The debate over the establishment of a compliance and enforcement co1nmittee divided fishiI1g 
and coastal states at the MHLC3, although the United States agreed with the FFC's call for such 
a con1n1ittee. The Asian fishing states did not support an observer program which included 
compliance measures. They believed enforce1nent was a flag state responsibility. Japan argued 
that "too much emphasis is laid on compliance and enforcement aspect [sic]" (Country 
State1nent MHLC3 1998b: 18). Asian states instead promoted the idea of incorporating this 
con11nittee into a technical com1nittee which could look at these issues "as need arises" (Tarte 
1998c: 6). Japan argued that "flag state enforce1nent was paramount", but it was the Chafr's 
view that the role of observers is significant and that it will requfre additional deliberation (FF A 
1998f: 23-24). The FFC bloc and the United States are cmnmitted to the observer program as it 
is an integral aspect of the Multilateral Fisheries Treaty as well as forming paii of the region's 
111ini1nun1 tenns and conditions. 
The deliberations over the observer prograin continued at MHLC4, along with 
transshipment and the VMS. The region has consistently argued against transshipn1ent on the 
high seas. First, it makes 1nonitoring of catch and effort hard to facilitate, cmnpounds the issue 
of illegal fishing and therefore has an i1npact on the level of fishing access payments to the 
Oceanic states. Second, it denies the Oceanic states of the opportunity to provision fleets 
because of the 1notherships that restock and refuel fishing vessels on the high seas. Fishing 
states applied pressure to "water down provisions in the draft text that restricted and regulated 
tranship1nent" (Tarte 1999a: 14). This was not agreed to by the FFC states as they believe that 
the lack of clear guidelines on this issue could lead to "blanket authorisation" for transship1nent 
on the high seas (Tarte 1999a: 14 ). The draft text at the conclusion of MHLC4 prohibits 
transship1nent at sea "in the Convention Area beyond areas under national jurisdiction" (MHLC 
1999a: Annex 5 Article 30.3). 
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In relation to the observer program, it was argued by the Asian fishing states that 
observers were foreign, took up valuable space on board, created logistical difficulties and 
involved financial cost. Japan also argued that observers should not have a compliance or 
monitoring role, rather they were to carry out a specific scientific role (Tarte 1999a: 14). It was 
noted that observer costs would be covered under the WCPF Commission' s work prograin. The 
Asian fishing states, however, preferred to see this issue omitted from the WCPF Convention 
docu1nent. The issue was not resolved. The FFC group was of the opinion the wording of the 
draft article lacked strength, thereby creating opportunities for "delaying tactics or obstruction" 
of the program (Tarte 1999a: 14). 
Vessel Monitoring System (VMS) 
Along with transship1nent and the observer program, the VMS also forms part of the region ' s 
MTCs. Japan had already protested about the FFA' s imposition of a regional VMS. The 
argument that some of Japan's smaller vessels lacked the necessary space for the VMS 
equip1nent is unfounded. The transponder is the size of a s1nall box. Nevertheless, Japan 
1naintained that the VMS used by the FFA region is "not compatible with that used by Japanese 
vessels elsewhere" and expressed disquiet regarding data confidentiality and the cost of the 
VMS technology (Taiie 1999a: 14). In defiance of these arguments, the Solo1non Islands 
announced that it had imple1nented a new Fisheries Act, which requires fishing vessels to carry 
the VMS equip1nent. The Solo1non Islands Statement note that its own domestic tuna industry 
considers "the capital and operating costs of the VMS to be reasonable" (MHLC 1999a: 22). If 
vessel operators refuse to co1nply with the new arrange1nents, the Solomon Islands will seek 
alternative vessel operators. The Solomon Islands decision resulted in the Japanese fleet not 
renewing its fishing access arrange1nents. Kiribati, on the other hand, was seen to be lagging 
behind with the VMS i1nplementation. This would have been due, in no small part, to pressure 
being exerted on it by Japan (Interview, Gray, March 1999). The amended draft article, 
however, calls on all 1nembers to fit the VMS technology. 
In the discussion on the related issues of boarding and inspection, Japan argued that 
there was no need for this clause "if there existed a regional VMS and observer program" (Tarte 
1999a: 15). Japan also atte1npted to have removed n1ost of the draft text article relating to 
co1npliance and enforce1nent. While China and Korea supported Japan ' s attempt, the United 
States, however, sought additional text for "non-discriminatory trade measures" against any 
party that atten1pts to "undennine" the regi1ne, specifically those measures relating to 
1nonitoring, control and surveillance (MCS) (Taiie 1999a: 15). The Chair included this 
additional text, albeit with the reluctance of Korea, China and Japan. Through the United States' 
intervention, MCS n1easures, integral components of the region' s fisheries conservation and 
n1anage1nent measures, were protected in the draft text. 
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Precautionary Approach 
The precautionary approach is an important aspect of effectiveness and it is contained within 
one of the objectives of regional fisheries co-operation, that of sustainability. As discussed in 
Chapter Three, the precautionary approach was first applied in relation to the banning of driftnet 
fishing. At the MHLC3, Japan and Korea argued that the article should be deleted as it contains 
"too 1nuch detail and unnecessary at this stage [sic]" (FF A 1998f: 15). Korea maintains that it is 
i1nportant to guard against the indiscriminate use of the precautionary approach. Likewise, 
Taiwan notes that 
[F]for the fishing industries, an unpredictable precautionary principle inhibits efficiency 
and realistic fishing planning, and increases the costs and risks of doing fishery activities. 
For the larger international community, the uncertain precautionary principle impedes the 
development of rational, coordinated, and predictable fishery conservation and 
management policy (Country Statement MHLC 1998b: 29). 
The purpose of the precautionary principle is to err on the side of caution regarding fishing 
activity to li1nit any negative enviromnental impact, thus 
States shall apply the precautionary approach widely to conservation, management and 
exploitation of straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks in order to protect 
the living marine resources and preserve the marine enviromnent (Article 6(1), Fish 
Stocks Agreement) 
Fu1ihermore, the lack of full scientific evidence should not be used as a reason for not applying 
the precautionary principle. Taiwan's ratification of the Fish Stocks Agree1nent was facilitated 
by its inclusion as a fishing entity. Its criticisms of the precautionary approach, therefore (an 
essential component of that Agree1nent), is at odds with its stand at the MHLC negotiations. The 
Chair's revised text after the MHLC4 reflects the wording of the Fish Stocks Agreement by 
providing details of the precautionary approach.39 This was a definite win for the region because 
the precautionary approach represents a global shift in environ1nental norms and fonns the basis 
of conservation and 1nanagen1ent 1neasures as laid down in the Fish Stocks Agreen1ent. How do 
we understand this win against the fishing states? Did the MHLC Chair favour the region, given 
his background at the Fish Stocks negotiations? The lack of unity between the fishing states up 
to MHLC4 contrasted strongly with the unity of the FFC bloc, which benefited from good 
leadership, the hard work of the L WG and the evident regional co-operation between the FFC 
members. This led to collective dipl01nacy on issues such as the precautionary approach and the 
· support of the MHLC Chair, resulting in a draft negotiating text which favoured their outco1nes. 
High seas enclaves 
Another important issue for the Oceanic states at the MHLC3 were high seas enclaves, given 
that the unique characteristics of the region results in fishing being carried out in high seas 
enclaves or pockets, adjoining an EEZ. The geographical specificity of the region links states 
39 See Article 6 of the draft WCPF Convention at the conclusion of MHLC4. 
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via these high seas enclaves, or pockets.4° For this reason, the Oceanic states wish to see fishing 
effort controlled in these enclaves, or pockets. This results in those adjacent Oceanic states 
having special interests, and therefore rights, over those high seas enclaves, or pockets. Papua 
New Guinea's Statement notes the "special interests that the surrounding states have in their 
sound manage1nent" (Country Statement MHLC 1999a: 20). Fishing states, however, (in 
particular Japan and China), argued against any special consideration being attached to high 
seas enclaves, or pockets, on the grounds of 'creeping jurisdiction' (Tarte 1999a: 10). They felt 
that such consideration was not included in the Fish Stocks Agree1nent, which only specified 
special rights "where the high seas pocket is surrounded by just one EEZ" (Tarte 1999a: 10). 
The FFC bloc was successful on this issue, the draft text at the conclusion of MHLC4 notes the 
"special interest of the States surrounding such pockets of high seas" (MHLC 1999a: Annex 5 
Article 8.4). 
Membership 
This contentious issue co1npeted with disagreements over 1nembership and 'real interest' at the 
MHLC4. The extension of the northern boundary could bring in other states, for exainple, 
Russia. As noted above,41 the European Union was refused 1ne1nbership to the MHLC process 
because it could not de1nonstrate a 'real interest' in the region's tuna fishery. Canada, which 
attended the MHLC4 as an observer, had also been lobbying for me1nbership. This created 
discord between the fishing states. Japan disputed Canada's claim of having a "significant 
fishing presence in the area" as none of the Canadian fleet was registered to fish in the region 
(Tarte 1999a: 10). The Chair, however, considered that Canada should be granted admission for 
three reasons. First, it has a history of southen1 albacore fishing in the region. Second, it is a 
Pacific coastal state. Third, it has given staunch support for regional fisheries development and, 
through its con1mitinent to the Fish Stocks Agree1nent, it is a steadfast adherent of effective 
fisheries conservation and manage1nent (Tarte 1999a: 10). Canada was granted 1nembership to 
the negotiation process at the conclusion of the MHLC4. Because of the Chair's articulation of 
'real interests' , the European Union and Mexico were denied full membership. 
Scientific Conimittee 
Aside fron1 the en1otive issue of ' real interests', there were other divisive issues negotiated at 
the MHLC4. The discussions on scientific arrange1nents noted that there are two specific 
n1atters to be resolved. The first is the establishment of a Scientific Co1nn1ittee, to be located 
within the Co1nn1ission. The second is the provision of separate, autonomous scientific advice to 
40 These enclaves are located between the Federated States of Micronesia, Papua New Guinea, Marshall 
Islands, Nauru, Kiribati, Solomon Islands, Tuvalu, Fiji and Vanuatu. Enclaves located between Palau, 
Federated States of Micronesia, West Papua and Papua New Guinea. Between Australia (Norfolk Island), 
New Zealand, Vanuatu, Fiji and Tonga. Enclaves located between the Cook Islands, Kiribati and French 
Polynesia. Enclaves are also located between Kiribati, the United States (Palmyra Islands) and the Cook 
Islands. 
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the Commission. The United States recom1nended that the Oceanic Fisheries Program (OFP), 
which is housed within the Pacific Community (SPC), could provide this advice. Unless 
scientific advice is provided independently, the United States believed it could lead to 
disagreement within the WCPF Commission. Japan argued that it had no wish to see the 
Scientific Com1nittee "subordinated to, or weakened by, a scientific staff' (Tarte 1999a: 16). 
The FFC membership was amenable to the new draft text on this 1natter, which notes that 
scientific staff could make recommendations to the Commission directly and through the 
scientific co1nmittee (Article 13 draft WCPF Convention, Tarte 1999a: 16). 
Included species 
At the :tv1l--ILC4 there was also debate regarding the specific stocks to be included in the WCPF 
Convention ' s work. While the four main tuna species would be covered (skipjack, bigeye, 
albacore and yellowfin), the FFC was not happy about subsidising the WCPF Commission ' s 
work on those stocks not of direct relevance to the region. This includes those stocks to be 
covered by the northern management sub-committee.42 One scientific observer stated that the 
:tv1l--ILC process is concentrating on these four major stocks and that, compounding this, the 
process is run by diplomats and bureaucrats "who have no understanding of basic fisheries 
1nanagen1ent" (Interview, Ward, November 2000).43 Ward points out that scientists had tried to 
put their concen1s to the Australian delegation regarding other stocks, such as swordfish, 
i1npo1iant to Australia, New Zealand, Fiji and Hawaii.44 Because of the pace of the negotiations 
to get the WCPF Convention in line with the Fish Stocks Agreen1ent, however, these concerns 
were not allayed. 45 The draft negotiating text at the end of :tv1l--ILC4 does state, however, 
that the Commission may decide to add such other species of fish to the list of highly 
migratory species listed in Annex of the 1982 Convention as it considers necessary 
(MHLC 1999a: Annex 5 Part 1 Article 1 (f). 
The issues discussed above vvere the most contentious debates at the :tv1l--ILC3 and 
:tv1l--ILC4. They represent the ideological divide between fishing and coastal states. For the 1nost 
part, these issues also embody that pre-colonial conservation ethic which guided fi sheries 
resource 111anagen1ent. What is den1onstrated fro1n the above discussion was the determination 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
See p 155. 
For example, northern Pacific albacore and northern Pacific bluefin. 
Peter \Nord works for the Bureau of Resource Sciences (BRS) and was a member of Australia's MHLC 
delegation. 
In Part 1, Article 1 (f) of the draft negotiating text at the end of MHLC4, it was noted that the highly 
migratory fish stocks covered those stocks as outlined in Annex 1 of the UN CLOS, which were found in 
the Convention area. While that Annex includes Albacore, Bigeye, Skipjack and YellO\vfin tunas, it also 
includes Bluefin, Blackfin, Little and Southern Bluefin tunas, Frigate mackerel , Pomfrets, Marlins, Sail-
fishes, Swordfish, Sauries, Dolphin, Oceanic sharks and Cetaceans. 
One issue that has arisen regarding stocks is the preoccupation of the PNA group, the FF A and the SPC of 
the purse seine industry fo r harvesting skipjack. While skipjack is the single most valuable resource, it is 
largely confined to the P A countries (Interview, Talbot, October, 2000) . Talbot works for the ational 
Institute of Water and Atmospheric Research Limited (NIWA) and was a member of ew Zealand 's 
NIHLC delegation. 
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by the FFC bloc to participate in a significant way at the MHLC3 and the MHLC4 to ensure that 
the region's concen1s would be incorporated into the draft negotiating text. The FFC either 
succeeded in having its concen1s included in the draft negotiating text, for example, high seas 
pockets, the precautionary approach, transshipment and MCS n1easures, or the issues were not 
resolved and will be revisited at MHLC5, for exarnple, allocation and decision-1naking. As 
mentioned earlier, having good FFC leadership, the support of Australia and New Zealand, 
strong support through the L WG, the support of the United States for most issues and a 
Conference Chair who supported their outco1nes, all combined to help the FFC bloc' s 
effectiveness in collective diplo1nacy . The lack of unity within the fishing states resulted in 
their inability to influence the draft negotiating text, apart from the issue of the northen1 
1nanage1nent com1nittee. 
Section four: Foreign commercial tuna operations from the mid-1990s to 2000 
Section four examines the activities of the major fishing states in the region since the mid-
l 990s. The over-supply of tuna for the canning sector, the increase in flags of convenience-
registered (FOC) tuna vessels, ageing fleets , labour proble1ns and new entrants to the region, 
such as Spain, were 1naj or issues in this period. The MHLC negotiations did not occur in a 
vacuu1n, but were instead reflective of the co1npeting demands of national interests within the 
global tuna economy. To obtain some sense of this context we need to exan1ine the activities of 
the major fishing states in the region since the 1nid-1990s. The over-supply of tuna for the 
canning sector, the increase in flags of convenience-registered (FOC) tuna vessels, ageing fleets, 
labour problems and new entrants to the region, such as Spain, were major issues in this period. 
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China 
According to the SPC Yearbook (1998), China commenced its WCPO operations in 1988 with 7 
longliners. Its fleet peaked in 1994 with 456 longliners but fell to 116 longliners in 1997-1998. 
Recent FF A Director's Reports have noted the decline in i1nportance of the Chinese fleet during 
1997-199 8. The 199 8 Report notes that there are only 7 8 Chinese vessels on the Regional 
Register, down fr01n the 116 recorded by the SPC as fishing during the 1997-1998 registration 
year (Forum Fisheries Agency 1998). Nevertheless, some observers 111aintain that even though 
the Chinese effort to date has not been successful, the fact that 
even if only 10% of China's population reach income levels of Japan then there will be a 
huge domestic tuna market in China (Haward and Bergin 1996: 170). 
These observers note that looking ahead to fishing activity in the 21 st century, the large Chinese 
labour pool will be beneficial. They also suggest that Taiwanese capital could finance the 
expansion of China's tuna fleet with the ultra-low freezing technology (ULT) (Haward and 
Bergin 1996: 170).46 On the other hand, it is also argued that China, (as well as Japan), has no 
understanding of environmental protection. Furthermore, that the Chinese are n1ore difficult 
negotiators than the Japanese; that they are "thugs" (Interview, anonymous). 
46 Haward and Bergin (1996: 171 ) include the following footnote: " It should be noted that Japanese officials 
are particularly concerned about the growth and the sustainability of China's operations in the Western 
Pacific, many of them operating under Taiwan trading companies. Japan does not believe that China will 
continue to increase its effort in the Western Pacific as they have done in recent years. Japanese officials 
also note that China's catch is being landed at many ports and catches are not being reported accurately. 
Import data only does not report the port of shipment, not the actual catch, nor always who is actually 
catching. Some Japanese fishery scientists believe that China is 'secretly ' fishing for tuna" . 
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The support China provided Japan at the MHLC negotiations reflects an attitude that is 
more concerned with fleet freedom from regulatory requirements than fleet support for 
monitoring, control and surveillance. Linked to this is Haward and Bergin's (1996: 170) 
analysis that suggests that it is only a matter of time before Chinese fleet effort expands further 
into the WCPO and that domestic requirements will dictate this necessity. Clarke supports this 
analysis, believing that, with the wind-down in the Korean and Taiwanese fleets, there is a 
possibility that China will take over in the region (Interview, April 2001 ).47 
Japan 
Japan's increasing level of diplomatic activity in Oceania resulted in a Tokyo Sun11nit being 
convened in October 1997 with the Foru1n states. While the Summit focused publicly on the 
region's econo1nic development, including trade, investment and tourism, it also provided the 
opportunity to enhance Japan's role as the largest donor to the region (excluding Australia's 
comn1itinents to Papua New Guinea) (Finin and Wesley-Smith 1997). By 1997, Japan had 
e1nbassies in Papua New Guinea, Fiji, Solomon Islands, Federated States of Micronesia and the 
Marshall Islands (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 1997). Apart from Fiji, these states are 
Parties to the Nauru Agree1nent (PNA) 1ne1nbers, with rich tuna resources. 
Japan's purse seine fleet in the region went fro1n 4 vessels in 1969, peaked at 39 vessels 
in 1988 and declined to 35 vessels in 1998. Pole and line vessels in the region totalled 622 in 
1953, peaked at 715 in 1955 and declined to 162 in 1997 (SPC Yearbook 1998). As at 2000, 
Japan had 255 longline vessels listed on the Regional Register (McCoy, Rodwell and Ta1nate 
2000). At an Asian Pacific Economic Co1nmunity (APEC) meeting in July 1999, Japan called 
on other fishing states to reduce their vessel numbers as a means of preserving tuna resources, 
as laid down by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) (Kyodo News 
International 13.7.1999). While Japan used the FAO as a vehicle in calling for fleet size 
reductions, its reasons were 111otivated 1nore by the need to protect its own fleet harvests and 
safeguard its don1estic 1narket than FAO environmental concen1s. Japan had, by March 1999, 
retired 132 longline vessels, out of its global fleet of 650 (Kyodo News Inten1ational 13.7.1999). 
Japan then called on those states to which it had supplied fishing vessels in the past, for example 
Taiwan and Korea, to reduce their fleet capacity. 
Unfortunately, however, these calls have only encouraged fleets to reflag their vessels 
to Flags of Convenience (FOC) registries. In relation to the overall then1es of this thesis, the 
existence of FOC registries in the region can work against the achievement of the objectives of 
47 Les Clarke works at the FFA and was an FFA Secretariat observer to the Preparatory Conference for the 
WCPF Commission at Christchurch in April 2001. 
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Oceania's collective diplomacy. FOC registries in Oceania include the Marshall Islands and the 
Cook Islands.48 The expansion of FOC registries have signalled a growing attraction by some to 
regulatory freedom generally regarding issues such as "labour conditions, management powers, 
accounting standards, financial arrangements, exchange control and property rights (van Fossen 
1992: 3). Specifically, reflagging fishing vessels to open registries enables fleet owners to 
bypass national conservation and management requirements, as well as undennining such calls 
as those by Japan, to restrict fleet numbers. For example, when Japan and Korea agreed to limit 
Korea's tuna exports to Japan and to li1nit Korea's fleet size, Korean fleets simply reflagged to 
open registries to avoid the restrictions. 
It is estimated that as of 1996, approximately 20% of fishing fleets operating on the 
high seas globally are FOC-registered vessels (Bergin and Haward 1996: 77, see also Haward 
and Bergin 2001: 95-96). In October 1999, Mitsubishi Corporation, which controls 
approxiinately 30% of Japan's tuna market, issued a directive generally to all those in the tuna 
market to cease "buying, selling or dealing with FOC caught tuna" (Bergin and Haward 1996: 
77). The directive specifically called on members of its own organisation and all other Japanese 
trading companies to refrain from trading with FOC-caught tuna and "actively co-operate in the 
eli1nination of the FOC system" (International Transport Workers' Federation 22.10.1999).49 
The Mitsubishi Corporation said in a Press Release that the company 
and our affiliates voluntarily declare that we will not engage in any commercial 
transactions of fish caught by the fishing vessels on the list, and that our transportation 
vessels will not receive or transport fish caught by the fishing vessels on the list and that 
we will carry out all other acts in accordance with the purposes of the administrative 
guidance (17.12.99).50 
The increase in FOC-registered tuna vessels is a disturbing issue for the region's efforts to 
imple1nent conservation and manage1nent 1neasures and achieve the objective of sustainability. 
Japan has demonstrated a concern on this issue which is focused on maintaining the stability of 
its domestic tuna 1narket. Swainping its domestic market with FOC-caught tuna could be a 
disaster for its own tuna industry. The reflagging of fleets , from fishing states such as Taiwan 
and Korea reflect the increasingly regulated environment in which they are expected to operate. 
For example, the negotiations to conclude the Fish Stocks Agreement and the negotiations to 
conclude the WCPF were occurring alongside the decisions by these states to reflag to FOC 
registries. 
48 
49 
50 
A quick search of the Internet located a site specifically detailing flags of convenience registries and their 
services. Registries as at 16.05.2001 include Antigua & Barbuda, Belize, Cambodia, Cayman Islands, Costa 
Rica, Cyprus, Delaware (US), Gibraltar, Honduras, Liberia, Malta, etherlands Antilles, Republic of 
Georgia, Republic of the Marshall Islands, Panama, St Kitts & Nevis, St Vincent & the Grenadines 
(w,vw.flagsofconvenience.com). The Cook Islands was listed on another Internet site relating to flags of 
convenience registers (vvvvvv. fotw.ca/flags/flagconv.htrnl. as at 09.05.2002). 
See also letter from Greenpeace to Mitsubishi, http ://\,vwvv.greanpeace.on!/rnitletter.html on 17.12.1999. 
See http://wvv\v.rnitsubishi.co.jp/ . 
161 
Riding the high tide 
Republic of Korea (Korea) 
Korea' s longline operations in the WCPO started in 1958 with two vessels. It peaked in 1974 
with 220 vessels and at 1998 totalled 169 vessels. Figures for Korea' s WCPO purse seine 
industry show that activity commenced in 1980 with 2 vessels. The fleet expanded to 39 vessels 
in 1990 and then decreased to 26 vessels in 1998 (SPC Yearbook 1998). In relation to FOC 
vessels fishing in Oceania, it has been estimated by the SPC that during 1997 
there were at least 5 ex-Korean long-liners flagged in Panama, 2 ex-Korean long-liners 
flagged in Honduras .. [and] there were also 2 ex-Korean purse-seiners flagged in Panama 
(Bray 2000: 24). 
Fro1n the above figures , the Korean fleet appears to be in decline. Haward and Bergin 1996: 
170) have dis1nissed the Korean industry as a long-term competitor, given its insufficient funds 
and the fact that it relies heavily on large subsidies. Korea also has an ageing fleet and "even 
bigger labour proble1ns than Taiwan" (Haward and Bergin 1996: 170). As with Taiwan, the 
Korean govem1nent has had li1nited ability to control the activities of its tuna fleet, Oceanic 
observers noting the compliance record of Korea, in particular, has been weak (interviews with 
Oceanic delegates, April 2001 ). By reflagging to FOC registries, the Korean fleet hopes to avoid 
those 1nonitoring, control and surveillance measures, being negotiated for both the Fish Stocks 
Agree1nent and for the WCPF Convention. By supporting Japan at the MHLC negotiations, 
Korea hoped to lessen the regulatory measures under debate. 
Spain 
Spain' s sphere of influence in Oceania died with its defeat in the 1898 Spanish-An1erican War. 
It relinquished Guain to the United States and sold its Micronesian interests to Germany. 
Spain's visibility in the region did not reappear until 1998. By October 1998, the European 
Union had sought licenses for up to 20 large fishing vessels, the n1ajority being from Spain 
(Pacific Islands Rep01i 7.10.1998). What had created the sudden interest in Oceania' s tuna 
resource? Si1nply, that the tuna stocks in the Atlantic and Indian Ocean were under pressure. 
Add to that a European Union co1nn1ent that it wanted so1ne reciprocity fr01n the region for the 
aid which the states receive (Keith-Reid 3.3.2000). There have been other factors involved, for 
example, a condition of Spain ' s membership of the European Union was its agreement not to 
fish in the Union ' s waters, but rather distant waters (de Fontaubert 1995). Spain then proceeded 
to over-fish off the coasts of Namibia and Canada. After being pushed out of these waters, Spain 
needed new fishing grounds. 
Given Spain ' s "alleged poor compliance record", Kiribati has incorporated "rigorous 
conditions" on the Spanish fleet's licences, under a fisheries access agreement concluded in late 
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1999 (Keith-Reid 3 .3 .2000).51 Concen1s were raised about the agree1nent by the FF A and the 
Pacific Islands Forum, both of whom noted that the European fleets - among them Spain - were 
entering the region because "they had depleted their own fishing grounds in the Atlantic Ocean" 
(Pacific Islands Report 21.2.2000). The Spanish fleet had been tuna fishing for s01ne ti1ne in the 
Eastern Pacific fishing grounds of Panama, Ecuador and Guate1nala (Keith-Reid 3.3.2000). The 
fleet had moved towards the Kiribati ' s Line Islands and had requested the use of Kiritimati 
Island as a transshipment port. Keith-Reid notes that it was Kiribati's belief that unless it 
licensed the Spanish vessels, they would fish in these grounds illegally. The agreement provides 
payment of 1nore than 6% of the catch value. Asian fleets have refused to pay more than 4-5% 
of the catch value. 
Regional observers, while on the one hand deploring the actions of Kiribati in licensing 
the Spanish vessels in the wake of a regional decision not to do so, have nevertheless stressed 
the inability of a country, such as Kiribati, to forego such a revenue bonanza (Interview Oceanic 
delegates, April 2001 ). Kiribati has a land area of just 810 square kilometres, however its ocean 
area totals 3,550,000 square kilometres. This makes surveillance of its EEZ impossible. 
Observers are keen to emphasise, however, that while Kiribati had stretched the boundaries of 
regional co-operation, it had not broken those boundaries.52 
There is no doubt that Spain will become a more important player in the region. The 
European Union has been negotiating with the FF A over other access arrangements with, for 
example, France, which has sought licenses to fish in the EEZ of New Caledonia (Pacific 
Islands Report 7.10.1998, FFC 45 2000d).53 In mid-1998, the FFA held talks in Brussels 
regarding the European Union' s interest in purse seine operations in the WCPO. While at that 
ti1ne the European Union was talking about a multilateral treaty with the region, similar to that 
of the Multilateral Fisheries Treaty, this seems to have been dismissed in favour of bilateral 
access arrange1nents ( observer interviews, April 2001 ). 
Like Japan and the United States, the European Union believes that its aid contributions 
to the region give it the power to extract fishing access agreements from the FF A membership. 
At the time the Multilateral Fisheries Treaty was finalised, the American Tunaboat Association 
(AT A) "refused to pay more than a small proportion of the conunercial rate" for access to FF A 
waters, requiring the United States government to provide the re1nainder, "from its aid budget" 
(Nero 1997: 377). Industry pays approximately US$4 million, which is divided among the 
vessels. The United States government ' s aid budget pays the remaining US$14 million of the 
51 
52 
53 
Furthermore, Kiribati had signed an agreement with Spain in spite of the fact that, as a member of the 
WILC negotiations, it had agreed to an WILC5 Moratorium excluding new members from admission to 
the process. 
Observers wished to remain anonymous. 
New Caledonia, as a dependent territory of France, is not a member of the FFA, or any of the Forum's 
family of organisations, which are restricted to the region ' s independent states. To fish in the region, the 
French fleet needs to be licensed through the FF A' s Regional Register. 
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US$18 million Treaty per year (DFAT 12.2.98). At that 1998 meeting in Brussels, the FFA 
membership notes that it 
would not wish to see any confusion between grant aid, training and other forms of 
technical assistance and fisheries access. Whilst it is apparent that access arrangements 
have yielded other benefits, we are wary of arrangements that link aid funding with access 
and other arrangements. In this regard, we would also not wish to see linkages with access 
and Lome IV negotiations (Forum Fisheries Agency 30.6.1998). 
In the saine way, while Japan argues that its fisheries access agreements are separate to its 
Oceanic aid policies, it concedes that the priority of an aid project could be affected by Japan 's 
fishing access relationship with a particular coastal state (see Bergin and Haward 1996: 74). 
Taiwan 
Taiwan' s longline fleet activity in the region commenced in the WCPO in 1964 with 12 vessels 
peaked in 1976 with 194 vessels and declined to 52 vessels by 1998. Its WCPO purse seine 
activities, on the other hand, increased fro1n 3 vessels in 1983 to 42 vessels in 1998 (SPC 
Yearbook 1998). One advantage of Taiwan' s tuna industry, in comparison to that of either Japan 
or Korea, is its lower overheads, particularly for crew. Taiwan is also aware that reflagging 
vessels to FOC registries will work against its good standing in the inten1ational c01nmunity.54 
In Noven1ber 1999, in an effort to curtail over-fishing, Japan and Taiwan reached agreement on 
the level of con1pensation paid to Taiwan by Japan for the dec01nmissioning of fishing vessels 
which had been operating under FOC open registries (Bray 2000: 14, see also Haward and 
Bergin 2001: 95-96). In relation to the Taiwanese fleet's use of open registries, an industry 
official notes that so1ne me1nbers of the industry 
had not always been 'good students ' of Taiwan' s international relations and had caused 
'many headaches ' for government. These problems are associated with the recognition 
issue and Taiwan' s desire to be seen as a 'responsible fishing nation" (Haward and Bergin 
1996: 150) 
In addition, the SPC found an ex-Taiwanese longliner flagged in Belize that was operating in 
the region during 1997 (Bray 2000: 24). Unlike Japan, the Taiwanese and Korean governments 
have found it difficult to control their fishing fleets . So, while at the govenunent level, there 
111ay be agree1nent on inten1ational conservation and managen1ent measures, getting industry on 
side to i1nple1nent the measures has not been successful. This has been reflected in the defiance 
by the Korean and Taiwanese fleets of regulatory measures in Oceania and their history of 
illegal fishing activities. 
United States 
As was discussed in Chapter Three, the interests of the United States in the Oceanic region are 
based primarily on geostrategic considerations. United States concerns regarding China's 
54 It is believed that betv,reen 80-100 Taiwanese long-l ine vessels are reflagged (Haward and Bergin 1996: 
165). 
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strategic expansion into Asia are related to its continued traditional freedom of access in the 
Asia/Pacific region and explain the United States' continuing need for compliant Oceanic states 
(see Stratfor 2000). Some observers argue that the end of the Cold War and its policy of 
'strategic denial' to thwart the Soviet Union's expansion into the region 1nay have led to a 
decline in the strategic interests of the United States in Oceania (see Kiste 29.1.01).55 Rather, it 
seems that the United States remains strategically co1mnitted in the region. Admiral Blair notes 
that the Honolulu-based Pacific Con1mand is able to "successfully enhance security without 
conflict" (31.01.01). He goes on to say that 
We can, In Asia, successfully manage the development of countries which are developing 
their power - China, India, Russia, Indonesia (Blair 31.01.01 italics added). 
Thus, the United States needs access in Asia in order to "successfully 1nanage" developing 
countries, such as China. This access is predicated on access through Oceania. Hence, the 
United States will continue to regard its Micronesian defence strategies as crucial. 
The United States purse seine fleet rose fro1n 3 vessels in 1976, peaked at 62 vessels in 
1983 and declined to 39 vessels in 1998 (SPC Yearbook 1998). Its purse seine fleet was 
regulated following the October 1986 conclusion of the Multilateral Fisheries Treaty, which has 
allowed for up to 50 of its purse seiners to fish within agreed areas of the FF A region. The 1998 
figure of 39 purse seiners reflects the impact that excess global capacity has had on the industry. 
At the 1998 Multilateral Fisheries Treaty talks, United States and FF A officials noted that this 
problen1 had been exacerbated by the recent collapse in the price of tuna for the canning 
industry, which had followed a year of steady tuna 1narket prices. It had also not been helped by 
the continued landings of s1nall fish by fleets such as Taiwan and Korea. These landings 
contributed to an already oversupplied 1narket, resulted in decreased prices and affected 
negatively the tuna resource's value (FFA Director's Annual Report 1998). 
To date there have been two main fishing powers in the region, and both of them have 
applied leverage to gain access to the rich fishing grounds of Oceania. With Spain, and perhaps 
the rest of the European Union's fleet vying for access, you 1night expect to see 1nore 
con1petition and more gain to the FF A men1bers. This may not necessarily follow. While Spain 
is paying slightly n1ore in access fees, its reputation elsewhere precedes it regarding defiance 
over n1onitoring, control and surveillance initiatives. Kiribati's actions can be understood in 
tenns of its li1nited revenue sources, the impossibility of policing its vast EEZ, the realisation 
that the Spanish 1nay well have fished regardless and that Kiribati should take advantage of the 
offer and receive so1ne level of access fees. This reflects a costs and benefits approach to 
Spain's fishing access. As will be discussed in Chapter Seven, the European Union is anxious 
55 In this regard, Fry notes that the demise of the Cold War led to the "nuclear-armed B52s" being "withdrawn 
from Guam and the fall-back needs in Palau reassessed" (Fry 1999: 6). 
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to establish a presence in the region' s tuna fishery before the allocation issue is negotiated at the 
yet-to-be-established WCPF Commission. Equally anxious are the atte1npts by the region to 
limit the European Union ' s presence to observer status only during the MHLC negotiations, 
thus denying it the right to vote and have a say regarding the future of the region' s tuna fishery. 
This is an important issue because the European Union' s membership would 1nean another 
fishing state negotiating temn, with a Spanish presence, as well as providing Japan with another 
ally. The European Union has not been averse to strong-arm tactics over fisheries negotiations 
elsewhere in the world. 56 
Section five: Domestic commercial tuna operations and joint ventures since the 
mid-1990s 
Since the 1nid-1990s, the growth of joint ventures and the don1estic tuna industry has been 
li1nited. This is at odds with the i1nportance of the region' s tuna resource to the global tuna 
economy. As stated in the Introduction, Oceania provides 30% of Japan ' s sashimi market 
(Depart1nent of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2000). Moreover, between 70 and 75% of the 
774,000 tom1es of purse-seiner caught tuna in the WCPO is caught in the EEZs of Oceanic 
states. Therefore, both the fresh/frozen and cam1ed global tuna industry is reliant on the region 
(Depart1nent of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2000, Forum Fisheries Agency 1998: 89). Those 
Oceanic states with do1nestic tuna operations and joint ventures are examined below, including 
A1nerican Samoa, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Samoa Solomon 
Islands and Vanuatu. 
American Samoa 
There have been changes 111 ownership of the A1nerican Smnoan cannenes with the 1997 
bankruptcy of Van Cmnp Seafood. Van Can1p Seafood was the parent company for Samoa 
Packing cam1ery before its sale to Tri-Union. The three shareholders of Tri-Union include Thai 
Union, known as the "largest seafood cannery in Asia"; Tri Marine International, ("one of the 
largest tuna trading co1npanies in the world"); and Edward Gann, "an independent US flag tuna 
purse seiner boat owner and operator" (Smnoa News 11.7.1997). It is reported that during 1998, 
the Ainerican Sa1noa tuna canneries produced and consigned canned tuna wo1ih more than 
US$400 n1illion to the United States 1nainland (Samoa News 25.5.1999). 
Since then, however, there have been further developments, with both Tri Marine and 
Edward Gann selling their 50% share in the Van Camp Seafood Company to Thai Union in 
2000. Chicken of the Sea Inten1ational, one brand in the Van Cmnp Seafood stable, with a 
17 .6% share of the United States canned tuna market has recorded am1ual canned seafood sales 
56 See newspaper reports regarding Morocco ' s refusal to allow European Union an extension of their fisheries 
access (http ://fis.com/fis/worldnews) 
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in excess of US$400 million in 2000. The Thai Union c01npany "is now the largest canner of 
tuna in Asia and the second largest canner of tuna worldwide" (PR Newswire 26.12.2000). 
These develop1nents in the American Samoa canned tuna industry represent a 
consolidation by Thai tuna processing interests. The fact that American participation has 
declined is a reflection of the tight profit margin in this industry and the economies of scale in 
the global tuna economy. It also represents a growing monopoly of the cam1ed tuna industry by 
Thai operators. 
Federated States of Micronesia 
Along with Papua New Guinea, the Federated States of Micronesia has rich tuna fishing 
grounds. In 1998, with a reduction in operations, the domestic-based fleet provided US$25-30 
1nillion to the goven11nent (FAQ 1998f: 5). The reductions occurred because of the withdrawal 
of a large foreign operator in 1996, which in tun1 "reduced air lift capacity" and led to a "poorer 
scheduling for the remaining active vessels" as well as a weakening Yen against a stronger 
United States dollar (FAQ 1998f). In 1999, it was estimated that the Federated States of 
Micronesia govenunent had received US$15 .4 million in access fees (Micronesian Fisheries 
Authority 2000: 3). The outlook for the domestic industry is optimistic in relation to purse seine 
operations targetting skipjack and yellowfin, however, the "negative trends or poor performance 
by domestic co1nponents of the fishery are a cause for concen1" (FAQ 1998f: 3). That said, 
observers point out that the costs involved with purse seine operations make it difficult for local 
investors to participate in tuna fishing in the Federated States of Micronesia (e-mail 
correspondence, Thoulag, 4.6.2001). In spite of the attempts to develop a local tuna industry, the 
results are modest. In Chapter Four's discussion on these developments there were several 
reasons outlined which contributed to these modest gains. These include a lack of private 
investn1ent, land tenure issues, shipping difficulties, including the airport's short runway and 
limited wharf infrastructure. 
Fiji 
The P AFCQ cannery, located on the island of Qvalau is now 98% Fiji government-owned and 
in 1999 employed between 700-1000 (mainly women) asse1nbly-line workers. Qvaluan villages 
and private investors own the remaining 2% (Hunt 1999: 574). In 1997, the Fiji Auditor-General 
raised concerns regarding the US$2.52 million bail-out by the govenunent of P AFCQ, but Hunt 
points out that matters were not i1nproved when P AFCQ merged with the ailing goven11nent-
owned fishing company, Ika, back in 1994.57 PAFCQ was forced to import most of its canning 
require1nents and this was compounded by high transportation and transshipment costs in 
comparison to the Thai or Filipino cam1eries. This necessitated financial assistance by the Fiji 
govermnent (Hunt 1999: 574). 
57 See Pacific Islands Report of25 .6.1999 regarding the Auditor-General ' s report. 
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Financial security for PAFCO improved in mid-1999, when a 5-year joint venture 
agreement was finalised with Bumble Bee Seafood, Inc which is expanding its operations in the 
WCPO. This resulted in an expansion plan worth US$2.3 111illion to upgrade the processing 
facilities to meet European Union and United States Food and Drug Ad111inistration standards. 
P AFCO exports to markets in Europe, Canada, the United States, Australia, New Zealand and 
within the region. Like the Solomon Islands, as a former British colony, Fiji cam1ed tuna 
exports have been given preferential access to European markets under the Lome agreement 
(PACNEWS 22.7.1999, 4.2.2000, Food and Drink Weekly 16.5.2000, Hunt 1999: 574). 
Cornelius notes that the P AFCO management is optimistic that the Bumble Bee contract will 
free the company from dependence on Lome, or any other preferential trade agreement (2000: 
44). 
Operations like P AFCO 111ay not be competitive in the global tuna economy if the Lome 
Convention' s preferential access is withdrawn. Bumble Bee' s partnership with P AFCO gives 
the company access to the valuable United States canned tuna n1arket. It remains to be seen 
whether the company ' s opti111istic prediction that it will be independent of agreements such as 
Lome or Cotonou comes to fruition. 58 Other benefits include the restricted numbers of licensed 
vessels, "favourable air transport links . . . a low-tax policy . . . and the benefits of local 
entrepreneurial skills in what is a " largely domesticated catching, processing and fresh fish 
export industry" (Hunt 1999: 5 84). If these benefits are eroded or the abundance of tuna stocks 
in Fiji ' s EEZ diminish for reasons, such as El Nifio weather conditions, the Fijian tuna industry 
will suffer accordingly. 
Marshall Islands 
Since the mid-l 990s, the joint venture with China has declined because of "worsening economic 
conditions, resource considerations, and disputes between the Government and the base 
operators" (FAQ 1998h: 3). During 1996, there was a joint venture with a Hawaiian longline 
group. A US$5 million tuna loining facility was completed in 1999. Foreign interests include 
the San Francisco-based Pacific Micronesia and Orient Line, as well as Star Kist. The facility, 
which employs 3 00 local workers, cleans loined tuna targetted for American Samoan canneries 
(Radio Australia 25.8.1999). While it is considered too recent to analyse the opportunities for 
fmiher development of the facility, the Bank of Hawaii notes that 
58 
[G]given RMI's need to create jobs at practically any skill level, this type of activity is 
one of the most feasible (2001: 9). 
The Cotonou Agreement, which was signed in June 2000, replaces the Lome Convention. From 2008, 
World Trade Organisation rules will apply to trade agreements, with only those least developed countries 
being able to maintain non-reciprocal tariff preferences (ECDPM 200 1, online< http:i/v-,~vw.oneworld/orn:). 
At present neither Fiji nor Papua New Guinea is a designated Least Developed Country according to United 
Nations' criteria which is adhered to by the United ations Conference on Trade and Development (see 
http://\V\Vw.unctad.org). 
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While the Joining facility is a relative newcomer to the Marshall Islands, the other 
sector of the tuna industry, which earns the govermnent inco1ne is transship1nent. In 1998, the 
Marshall Islands became a transshipment centre for Asian, Pacific and United States fishing 
fleets. This was augmented by a "revamped, business-oriented fisheries department" that 
"slashed fees and removed bureaucratic red tape" (Johnson 16.4.1999). For exainple, the Korean 
fleet signed an access agreement with the Marshall Islands in 1998, which includes port calls 
and transshipment. While the license fees amount to US$840,000, spending by the Korean fleet 
in-country ainounts to US$500,000 (Johnson 16.4.1999). The economic injection fro1n port 
calls, apart from refuelling and resupplying the boats, co1nes from the money the crew spends in 
stores, bars and restaurants. On the other hand, the transshipment industry has resulted in 
environ1nental damage to Majuro's lagoon. For exainple, thousands of kilograms of discarded 
frozen tuna have been dumped into these waters which have also been polluted by oil and 
garbage after fishing vessels have cleaned their bilges or fish holds that are generally "full of 
salt" (Pacific Islands Report 17.08.2001). 
The uncertainty of the global tuna econo1ny was de1nonstrated in 2000, when global 
prices for an over-supplied tuna market plu1nmeted, with a flow-on effect for small econo1nies, 
such as the Marshall Islands. From 1998, the price of tuna was esti1nated to have dropped by 
almost 67% in 2 years (Johnson 11.9.2000). While in 1999, 27 Korean purse seiners 
transshipped in Majuro, generating revenue of approximately US$8 million, none visited in 
2000 (Johnson 11.9.2000). 
The above discussion of the Marshall Islands' domestic tuna industry demonstrates that 
factors as simple as the prevailing weather conditions can negatively affect the income 
generated through such sectors as transshipment. This 1nakes island economies vulnerable as 
tuna-related business generates a significant proportion of their income. Vulnerability 1nakes 
island states open to the suasion of fishing states, eager for cost reductions, and resulting in 
states like the Marshall Islands being prepared to ignore the environmental destruction caused 
by the transship1nent industry. 
Papua New Guinea 
The do1nestic longline fleet contracted to 8 vessels in 1998, however, the local purse seine 
industry rose fro1n 2 vessels in 1994 to 13 vessels in 1998 (SPC Yearbook 1998). Some of the 
tuna harvest went to Philippine canneries and some was unloaded in Micronesia (FAO 1998b: 
4). There are two canneries in operation in Papua New Guinea. One cannery in Lae processes 
i1nported frozen n1ackerel; the other cannery in Madang processes tuna. The Madang operation, 
RD Tuna Cam1ery, is a joint venture with Philippine interests. In August 1997, the cannery 
1nade its first export shipment of 4,000 cases of tuna to the United States. Other markets have 
been secured in Europe (Pacific Islands Report 26.8.1997). The above operations represent a 
very modest achievement given the fact that Papua New Guinea has one of the richest tuna 
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fishing grounds in the WCPO. During the period under review, the Japanese fleet was still being 
denied access, after refusing to countenance an increase in access fees in the late 1980s.59 The 
United States fleet concentrates on purse seine-caught tuna, which are processed at canneries in 
American Samoa. Develop1nent of a dmnestic longline industry could target the fresh/frozen 
sashimi 1narket. 
Samoa 
The development of the alia catamaran longline tuna fleet has grown since 1997. In 1999, the 
combined annual value of both locally-sold tuna and tuna exports amounted to approxiinately 
US$ l O 1nillion (2000: 44 ). Furthennore, tuna exports accounted for approximately 60% of total 
exports (Unpublished Treasury Department information in Gillette et.al. 2000: 44). Samoa's alia 
tuna fleet is growing and is an positive factor in the development of local tuna industries in 
Oceania. 
Solomon Islands 
In the years 1996-1998, the tuna harvest totalled 70,000 tonnes, "over 98% of which is taken by 
the domestic fleet" (FAO 1998d: 3). Tuna caught by the Solomon Taiyo venture was canned at 
Noro and then shipped to the British market. As pointed out in Chapter Four, this market does 
not accept purse seine-caught canned tuna, whereas both NFD and BC Packers supply the 
Japanese canned tuna 1narket, which accepts purse seine caught tuna (Campbell and Hand 
1998).60 
In August 2000 the cannery closed. The ongoing civil conflict between the two ethnic 
factions of the Guadalcanal Isatabu Freedom Fighters and the Malaita Eagle Force affected the 
physical safety and working environment of the cannery workers (Solomon Islands 
Broadcasting Corporation/PINA Nius Online 26.1.2001, Solomon Star/PINA Nius Online 
28.3.2001). The re-opening of the cannery depends on the global tuna economy and the easing 
of etlu1ic tensions. A lot also depends on the level of technological transfer that is supposed to 
have occurred between the Japanese and the local fishermen, ongoing access to European 
111arkets,61 the continued support of the Solomon Islands govenu11ent and other investment into 
the con1pany. The future re-opening of the cannery is bleak without these factors. An additional 
proble1n is the ageing of the pole and line fleet. This 1nay mean that supplies may be sourced 
fron1 purse seiners, which will cut off the niche United Kingdo1n market, given its strictures on 
quality. 
59 
60 
61 
See Tarte (1998a: 111-118). 
Barclay and Wakabayashi (2000: 5) point out that the European and North American markets are prepared 
to pay more for an environmentally friendly, or green, tuna product, harvested using the pole-and-line 
technique, rather than the indiscriminate technique of purse-seining which allows a significant bycatch. 
As the Solomon Islands is designated as a Least Developed Country (LDC), it may not be adversely 
affected by the World Trade Organisation 's rules regarding non-reciprocal tariff preferences (see ECDPM 
2001 , and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, http://\vww.unctad.org). 
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This Chapter examined the MHLC3-MHLC4 negotiating rounds and reflected on ,vhat 
was happening in the region after the mid- l 990s regarding the major fishing state operations, 
joint ventures and domestic tuna operations. The :M:HLC negotiations did not occur in a vacuum, 
but rather at the same time as day-to-day tuna operations in the region. The region demonstrated 
collective diplomacy that achieved outcomes and made a difference at the Fish Stocks 
negotiations and that momentum was maintained until the conclusion of the :M:HLC4 
negotiating round. This momentum was achieved for several reasons. The Fish Stocks 
negotiations v.1ere led by Satya Nandan, a Fiji national who, helped by several others, drafted an 
Agree1nent that met the region's concerns regarding conservation and management of highly 
migratory stocks on the high seas. N andan was then chosen to Chair the :M:HLC negotiations, a 
decision which reassured Oceanic delegations. The Majuro Declaration was seen as a sign of 
legitimacy of the region ' s goals for fisheries conservation and management. By the conclusion 
of the :M:HLC4 negotiations, a draft framework for the WCPF Convention was in place. The 
shape of the draft text reflected the region ' s concerns regarding conservation and management, 
in paiiicular the precautionary approach, transshipment, the VMS and high seas pockets. These 
outco1nes were a reflection of the effectiveness of collective diplomacy by the FFC bloc. For 
example, the work of the L WG, the strong leadership of the FFC, the united approach taken by 
the 1nembership on those areas of concen1, as v.1ell as the support of Australia and New Zealand. 
The United States also provided strong support to the region in relation to those monitoring, 
control and surveillance (MCS) issues under debate. As ,vell, the :M:HLC Chair provided support 
to the region ' s collective diplomacy efforts. 
The Asian fishing states were unhappy, particularly with the outcome of the MHLC4. It 
was not in their national interests that the FFC bloc exhibit a strong unified approach and they 
attempted to sideline individual Oceanic states in the hope that it would lessen the bloc ' s 
cohesion. To the conclusion of MHLC4, this had not occuITed. In spite of the invisibility of 
some Oceanic states, the FFC bloc maintained its commitment to securing favoured outcomes 
for the draft \1/CPF Con ention. 
The activities of fishing states in the region have undergone changes since the mid-
l 990s. The historical lineup of those more important fishing states in the region is altering to 
take account of nev.r interests, such as Spain and China and the gradual demise of operations by 
the Korean fleet. In the early days, Japan had financed both Korea' s and Tai,van ' s operations. 
Japan then mo ed the focus of its operations to retail and distribution, no longer being able to 
compete ,vith cheaper operators from Korea and Tai,van. Japan ,vill ,vant to maintain good 
relations ,vith China, gi en Korea' s decreasing level of activity if, for no other reason than to 
ensure a stable supply of tuna for Japan~s domestic market. For these reasons, the outcomes of 
the MHLC process are important to the future viability and operations of foreign fleets in the 
region. The reliance of the fishing states on the resources of the region mean that they need to 
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be engaged with the MHLC process and try to influence the outcome of the negotiations to suit 
the operations of their fleets. 
From the mid-1990s, the attempts by the Oceanic states to increase their level of 
exposure through joint ventures and domestic tuna industries did not meet with great success. 
The major joint venture success story in the region, Soltai, had closed down in 2000 due to 
inter-tribal conflict. Small gains were made in Papua New Guinea and Fiji, however, the long-
term gains from these projects are uncertain, given the changes projected under the Cotonou 
Agreement. Samoa represented a positive aspect of develop1nents in the local tuna industry and 
den1onstrates that longline ventures are more feasible than the capital-intensive purse seine 
industry. The Solomon Islands is designated as a Least Developed Country, unlike either Papua 
New Guinea or Fiji. This may 1nake them vulnerable to World Trade Organisation rules 
regarding non-reciprocal tariff preferences after 2008. Furthermore, issues such as allocation 
which were under negotiation at the MHLC process have major i1nplications for the future 
involvement of the Oceanic states in the region's tuna industry. Managing allocation is an 
integral component of managing the sustainability, a fair return, domestication and indigenous 
control over the tuna resource. 
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The tide turns 
Leading into the fifth Multilateral High Level Conference on Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in 
the Westen1 and Central Pacific (MHLC5) negotiating round, it was apparent to the MHLC 
Chair, Satya Nandan, that there was discontent within the ranks of the Asian fishing states. This 
discontent li1nited his ability to encourage the goals of the Foru1n Fisheries Com1nittee (FFC) 
states in these negotiations. The FFC states needed to offer alten1ative text and stand their 
ground against atte1npts to water down or sideline those issues that were i1nportant for the 
managen1ent and conservation of the region' s tuna fishery. While FFC co-operative action did 
occur at these last three negotiating rounds (MHLC5-MHLC7), it was not constant. Self-interest 
e1nerged on the part of individual states as well as on the part of the sub-regional group, the 
Parties to the Nauru Agreement (PNA) me1nbers. There were also concen1s about FFC 
leadership and 1natters were fuelled by antagonis1n between individuals from different 
delegations within the FFC caucus. 
This Chapter is split into six sections. Section one exainines the MHLC5 negotiations. 
Section two examines the MHLC6 negotiations. Section three examines the MHLC7 
negotiations. Section four examines the 1nain issues arising fron1 these last three rounds. 
Throughout the exainination of these negotiations, the thesis has focused on the Forum Fisheries 
Agency 1ne1nbership and that of its main protagonist, Japan. Section five explores the roles 
played by other states important to the negotiations, namely, the United States, Korea, Taiwan, 
China, Canada, France, Indonesia and the Philippines. Section six has a general discussion on 
the Preparatory Conference (Prepcon) n1eetings which have e1nanated fron1 the MHLC 
negotiations. Up to the ti1ne this thesis was submitted, there had been two Prepcon meetings. 
By the end of MHLC7, the Asian states were unhappy with the negotiated text for the 
Convention for the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the 
Western and Central Pacific (WCPF Convention). Furthem1ore, the FFC bloc achieved a less 
than opti1nu1n result and the United States would have difficulty getting Congress to ratify the 
regin1e. This Chapter concludes that the MHLC Chair, Australia, New Zealand and the United 
States persuaded the Oceanic states to accept a decision-making procedure that may 
disadvantage the1n. With controversial issues, such as allocation, being left to the WCPF 
Con1n1ission to finalise, the outlook was not necessarily optin1istic for the abilities of the 
Oceanic states to achieve the best outco1ne. Taiwan, which achieved exactly what it wanted - a 
degree of recognition in an inten1ational regi1ne, 1nay well be the only winner. The Chapter 
concludes that the MHLC process illustrates a decline in achieving the objectives of collective 
fisheries diplomacy - a reflection of the history of Oceania' s collective diplo1nacy generally. 
173 
The tide turns 
Section one: An appraisal of MHLCS, Honolulu, 6-15 September 1999 1 
Japan does not want you and our friends in this Conference room to underestimate the 
degree of its frustration with the process and intermediate outcome of the Conference up 
to the present. My delegation sincerely desires that I can make amicable statement at the 
conclusion of this round of the Conference (Japan's Country Statement, MHLC 1999b: 
15). 
The MHLC Chair circulated an Information Note to all parties in advance of the Septe1nber 
1999 negotiations. The Note outlines the substantive issues requiring attention at the MHLC5 
meeting. These include: 
decision-making and the formula for financing of the Commission ... the issue of a 
committee to advise the C01mnission on particular stocks in the northern region of the 
proposed Convention area, technical matters relating to the operational details of a 
regional vessel monitoring system, and ... the provisions of article 3 1 relating to the 
special requirements of developing States, territories and possessions (MHLC 1999b: 31 ). 
In addition to these issues, the Chair noted that other n1atters needed further negotiation. These 
included the total allowable catch (TAC) and allocation, transshipment, the precautionary 
approach, the Convention area, the species to be covered, membership, high seas pockets, the 
scientific co1n1nittee, the northen1 sub-con1mittee, archipelagic waters and the Taiwan question. 
It was re1narked above that at the end of the MHLC4, the draft WCPF Convention text on many 
of these issues was favourable to the goals of the FFC bloc. The bloc needed to maintain its 
unity at MHLC5 and beyond to ensure that the draft text on these issues remained strong and in 
its best interests. Unity within the group could be achieved through regional co-operation, a 
strong FFC Chair, and the continued activis1n of the Legal Working Group (L WG). The 
supportive role of Australia, New Zealand and the United States was also beneficial, as was the 
backing of the MHLC Chair. 
In the lead-up to the MHLC5 negotiations, the Chair received several high-level 
representations fron1 fishing states. Unhappiness was expressed with the lack of consideration 
accorded to their alternative text suggestions during previous negotiating rounds (Tarte 1999b: 
4 ). This included failure to take into account Asian fishing state: 
concerns and suggestions [including] removing from the text much of the details relating 
to the precautionary approach, MCS and enforcement ... [thus guaranteeing] ... that their 
freedom to fish on the high seas is not curtailed and that flag state responsibility is not 
subordinated to the Commission (or coastal states) (Tarte 1999b: 4). 
Representatives attended the MHLC5 negotiations from the following states: Australia, Canada, China, 
Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, France, French Polynesia, Indonesia, Japan, Kiribati, 
Marshall Islands, Nauru, New Caledonia, New Zealand, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, 
Republic of Korea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Chinese Taipei, Tonga, Tuvalu, United States of America, 
Vanuatu and Wallis and Futuna. Observers attended from Mexico, the European Commission (EC), the 
Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO), the Forum Secretariat, the South Pacific 
Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA), the Inter American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC), the Pacific 
Community (SPC) and the University of the South Pacific . 
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In his address to the FFC41 Honolulu meeting, held im1nediately before the MHLC5, the 
MHLC Chair advised the membership that after consideration of these views he "felt disposed 
to give more weight to the concen1s" of fishing states at the MHLC5 (Tarte 1999b: 4). 
Competing challenges faced the FFC bloc in its attempts to 1naintain unity and 
cohesion. The first challenge was a negative external factor: the fishing states which came to the 
MHLC5 round determined to break the FFC's control over the process. The second challenge 
was the self-interest which emerged with individual Oceanic states as well as with a sub-
regional group, the Parties to the Nauru Agreement (PNA) me111bers. The third challenge related 
to the FFC's leadership. 
The change in atmosphere was evident at the MHLC5 and was reinforced by the tone of 
the fishing states' Country Statements. For example, the United States was forthright in its 
refusal "to be legally bound to decisions on imp01iant issues made by the majority" (MHLC 
1999b: 27). The decision-making issue was a difficult one for the United States, as its Congress 
follows a consensus decision-making process. Japan "la1nented" its perceived "n1arginalisation 
fro1n the MHLC process" (Tarte 1999b: 4). Japan remarked that the: 
same Conference hall and the same familiar faces of delegations bring back to me the 
vivid memory of the last Conference. The most outstanding impression I could not escape 
from was a feeling that my delegation might not belong to the Conference. (Statement 
MHLC 1999b: 14) 
Japan went on to point out that it had not agreed to Canada' s inclusion as a full 1nember, and 
considered the "decision taken by a big caucusing group always to d01ninate the conference is 
far fro1n healthy [sic] picture" (Statement MHLC 1999b: 14). 
These ren1arks were pro1npted by Japan's alternative texts and suggestions having been 
ignored at previous MHLC negotiations. Japan was also not happy with a strong or united FFC 
as it limited the extent of the control Japan 1night otherwise have been able to exert over 
individual Oceanic states, or the process. Japan agreed with the United States ' refusal to be 
bound by a n1ajority vote decision-making process and refused to attend any future MHLC 
inter-sessionals that focused on monitoring, control and surveillance (MCS), the vessel 
monitoring system (VMS) and other issues which it believed should be left to the Com1nission 
to finalise (Tarte 1999b: 4 ). 
While the FFC' s Legal Working Group (LWG) had played an active role at the 
MHLC4, it lacked the scope to continue doing so at the MHLC5 because most of the sessions 
were conducted in plenary, rather than in small working groups. The L WG was hampered in 
any drafting it did try to initiate by a lack of cohesion within the FFC to "reach common 
positions on 1nany issues" (Tarte 1999b: 5). In addition, the LWG's drafting suggestions were 
rarely tabled in plenary discussions, or passed to the MHLC Chair for comment. These 
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problems were centred on the FFC Chair, Samoa's Vitolio Lui, who reportedly ignored advice 
fr01n the L WG, the FF A Secretariat or other FFC 1ne1nbers.2 
The previous Chair, Moses Amos from Vanuatu, had trusted the FF A Secretariat to 
make decisions and to provide technical advice to me1nbers regarding the intricacies of the 
MHLC negotiations. As one observer notes, Atnos had provided a very "coherent approach" by 
putting up group submissions at earlier MHLC negotiations (Interview, Geen, December 2000).3 
Lui, as FFC Chair, did not. He argued that as the Oceanic states were all equal, they could all 
make individual statements and "not rely on a unanimous approach" (Interview, Geen, 
Dece1nber 2000). Samoa does not have high seas areas outside its EEZ. Lui did not see the FF A 
as the appropriate vehicle for pro1noting the interests of the PNA group, one reason why the 
PNA group became more vocal at these later negotiating rounds.4 It was Lui's belief that a 
regional position is 1nore advantageous to the PNA group, than to other FF A n1embers 
(Interview, Willock, January 2001).5 
Thus, the more tuna-rich Oceanic states put up staten1ents, for example, Fiji, Papua 
New Guinea and the Federated States of Micronesia. There had been a will within the group at 
earlier MHLC negotiating rounds to have a more coherent approach. At MHLC5 it became 
passive and reactive (Interview, Geen, December 2000). AI1 Oceanic delegate noted that Japan 
was able to split the FFC through its interests with the PNA, reinforcing other criticisms made 
regarding Lui (Interview, Amos, April 2001).6 Japan's ability to split the FFC through its PNA 
interests also had the capacity to undermine effectiveness of collective diplomacy over the 
objectives of sustainability. 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
Vitolio Lui took over as FFC Chair at the FFC 39 meeting in May 1999. He replaced Moses Amos of 
Vanuatu. 
Geen, now a consultant, was part of the FFA Secretariat at the MHLC negotiations. 
The PNA group wanted to participate at the negotiations because purse seine skipjack operations, which are 
most prevalent in their sub-region, also take place on the high seas, adjacent to EEZs. 
Willock, who now works for TRAFFIC Oceania was, at the time, an FF A Secretariat staff member. 
Moses Amos led Vanuatu ' s MHLC delegation. 
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Section two: An Appraisal of MHLC6, Honolulu, April 20007 
Several controversial issues surfaced following the MHLC5 negotiations. In October 1999, after 
nearly two years of discussion, Kiribati finalised a fishing access agreement with Spain, a major 
European fishing state.8 At the thirtieth South Pacific Forun1, held in Palau in October 1999, 
leaders recognized: 
the importance of a strong agreement, including a decision-making process, which is 
respected by all, and a system of compliance that will ensure maximum effectiveness of 
management controls. The Forum noted the i1nportance of regional solidarity and the 
implementation of existing regional commitments on fisheries issues. (South Pacific 
Forum Communique 1999: 5) 
The Forum's comments, while alluding to regional disunity of the MHLC5, helped to focus the 
region on what was required of the MHLC6 negotiations. 
At the FFC42 meeting in March 2000, a 111011th before the MHLC6, the group discussed 
a range of strategies that would be utilised at the forthco1ning MHLC negotiations. These 
included the increased utilisation of the Legal Working Group (LWG) to provide advice to the 
FFC caucus. It was acknowledged that while the FFC had held regular caucus sessions during 
the MHLC5 round, there had been little common ground between its men1bers. This had 
resulted in a loss of impact on the negotiations by the FFC because of a lack of supporting 
statements (FFC42 2000a: 2-4). It was suggested that the LWG address the concen1s of 
individual 111en1bers, instead of 1ne1nbers airing their differences publicly in plenary or working 
groups, a course of action which had eroded unity. The n1eeting agreed that where co1nmon 
ground was lacking, individual men1bers should convey their concen1s to the MHLC Chair, 
Satya N andan. This had always been the Chair's prefeITed course of action. The Chair used it as 
a baro1neter of "how great a priority an issue was" (FFC42 2000a: 2-4 ). 
In the Chair's Infonnation Note, circulated to all 1nember states 111 advance of the 
MHLC6 session, Nandan observed that further consideration was needed on difficult issues 
such as decision-1naking, the financial a1Tange1nents, position of fishing entities, participation 
by teITitories and entry into force. To meet the ti1neframe for co1npletion of the negotiations, 
now set for the end of August 2000, the Chair believed it would be necessary to work long 
hours at the MHLC6 negotiations (MHLC 2000a: Am1ex 4 ). 
7 
8 
Delegations to the Conference included: Australia, Canada, China, Cook Islands, Federated States of 
Micronesia, Fiji, France, French Polynesia, Indonesia, Japan, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, New 
Caledonia, New Zealand, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Samoa, 
Solomon Islands, Taiwan, Tonga, Tuvalu, United States of America, Vanuatu, and Wallis and Futuna. 
Observer delegations included Mexico, the European Union (EU), the Food and Agriculture Organisation 
of the United Nations (FAO), the Forum Secretariat, the South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA), the 
Inter American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC), the Pacific Community (PC), and the University of 
the South Pacific (USP). 
It is noted "With pressure on Atlantic and Indian Ocean tuna stocks mounting, the European Union in 
recent years has mentioned access to the Pacific fishing grounds for its tuna fleets as a reciprocal benefit for 
the aid it gives to Pacific Island countries." (Keith-Reid, February 2000a: 18). In an Islands Business report 
it stated that although other members of the FFA had not spoken out publicly against Kiribati ' s decision, 
they felt that "Kiribati has broken ranks in letting the Spanish in before a deal has been done with the 
European Union." (April 2000: 9). 
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An observer (Tarte 2000a) has outlined the MHLC Chair's address to the FFC43 
i1nmediately before MHLC6. During that address, Nandan was ada1nant that neither opt-out 
provisions nor mandatory consensus was appropriate. This is to safeguard the interests of the 
Oceanic states, as well as "effective conservation and management" (in Tarte 2000a: 3). The 
Chair noted that: 
while distant water fishing nations can walk away and find somewhere else to fish once 
the resource was depleted, coastal states cannot. The people most threatened by over 
fishing are those in whose waters the stocks are found. (in Tarte 2000a: 3) 
Another issue discussed was the repeated request by the European Union for n1e1nbership of the 
process (rather than as an observer). The MHLC5 meeting had issued a Resolution which 
instituted a 1noratorimn disallowing new members joining the process.9 The Resolution 
reassured several of the Oceanic states which were opposed to any further fishing states entering 
the process. 10 
The Chair reminded the FFC bloc that he needed its active participation in the process, 
otherwise he would not be able to discount the "large quantity of input" that other states provide 
(in Tarte 2000a: 4). The Chair's re1narks motivated the FFC to 
table[ d] a position paper which suggested amend1nents to text dealing with definition of 
fishing, references to human food consumption in the allocation criteria, the northern sub-
committee, VMS, transship1nent, and requirements of small island developing states. An 
FFC statement was delivered in response to the EC's request for full participation in the 
preparatory commission. The FFC Chairman also delivered a closing statement that 
reiterated the FFC's 'bott01n line' on decision making, VMS, and entry into force, as well 
[as] its views on the convention area and compliance issues (Tarte 2000a: 4 ). 
The FFC's participation at the MHLC6 went some way to redressing its failures at the previous 
round. Neve1iheless, delegates had co1mnented that the FFC caucus sessions at the MHLC6 
were "ineffectual" and that Lui still found it difficult to differentiate between his position as 
FFC Chair and his country's position (Interview, Lack, Dece1nber 2000). 11 Because FFC 
positions were not adequately debated during caucus sessions, 1nany of the Oceanic delegations 
were not prepared to put their views strongly at the meeting. This led to the PNA states being 
prepared increasingly to aiiiculate their positions (Interview, Lack, Dece1nber 2000). 
Nevertheless, the FFC bloc was helped by the use of small working groups at MHLC6, 
rather than the open plenary fonnat adopted at the MHLC5. The FFC 1ne1nbership found it 
easier to debate issues in a less fonnal atmosphere. These groups considered such issues as 
observer status, financial arrangements, the regional observer prograin and the status of 
9 
JO 
11 
In spite of this, Kiribati went ahead and finalised a fishing access agreement with Spain, thereby defy ing 
the MHLC5 Resolution. 
At the MHLC6 session, a request was received from the United Kingdom requesting full participation on 
behalf of its territory, Pitcairn Island. The request was granted because the United Kingdom ' s territories of 
Pitcairn, Henderson, Ducie and Oeno Islands all lie within the WCPF Convention Area (Chair 's Closing 
Statement MHLC 2000a: Annex 7). 
Lack, now a consultant, as this time worked work at the Australian Fisheries Management Authority 
(AFI\1A) and was a member of Australia' s MHLC delegation. 
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Taiwan. 12 Larger working groups were also convened to deal with decision-1naking, VMS, 
transshipment, the WCPF convention area, boarding and inspection, the interim regime and 
European Union participation (Tarte 2000a: 4-5). 
Part way through the MHLC6 negotiations, when the Chair issued his revised text, 
Korea and Japan reiterated that neither of them was agreeable to the revisions. 13 Japan notes that 
its "past contribution might be looked at as 1narginal in tern1s of what has been reflected in the 
present text" (MHLC 2000a: Annex 3). This is surprising, as the draft text at the conclusion of 
the MHLC5 negotiating round had incorporated many of Japan's suggestions. For exainple, by 
the conclusion of the MHLC5, the draft articles which related to the precautionary approach, 
transship1nent and high seas boarding and inspection, had been watered down. Furthermore, the 
FFC's Opening State1nent at the MHLC6 notes that "in a number of recent instances, our 
concerns have been given little consideration" (FFC43 2000b: Attaclunent D). 
As they had done at previous negotiating rounds, Korea and Japan argued that because 
the Fish Stocks Agree1nent was not yet in force, it lacked formal status in international law and 
should not be used for the WCPF Convention. In response, the Chair noted the Majuro 
Declaration's reference to that Agreen1ent. He reminded Korea and Japan that they had both 
adopted the Declaration and that to delete reference to the Fish Stocks Agree1nent would 
"negate the whole objective of this meeting". He added that perhaps they were "attending the 
wrong 1neeting"? (Tarte 2001a: 3). A Tongan delegate, who re1narked "to reopen issues 
negotiated in the 1995 Agree1nent was "unacceptable", upheld the Chair's remarks (Tarte 
2000a: 5-6). 
While the MHLC6 negotiating round was a better outcome for the FFC bloc than the 
MHLC5, there were still difficulties within the FFC, for exainple, the FFC Chair's leadership, 
which undennined its unity. Some intractable issues remained, including decision-1naking 
1nethods, the participation of territories and possessions, and the status of Taiwan. Other 
controversial issues were considered by the Chair to have been satisfactorily resolved, for 
example, the Convention area, transship1nent and the observer progran1. With the United States 
finnly on the side of the regi_on in relation to MCS issues, Asian fishing states were not in a 
powerful-enough position to influence the negotiations as much as they would have liked. It was 
evident that if the MHLC7 negotiating round was to be concluded successfully, concessions 
would be required on both sides. The FFC bloc felt it had conceded too much at the MHLC5 
round, had regained some ground at the MHLC6 1neeting, and was therefore not prepared to 
12 
13 
While there was a moratorium in place on new members joining the process, new observers to the process 
were still allowed. The MHLC6 meeting discussed Ecuador's request for observership. The meeting passed 
a Resolution, agreeing that certain rules were to be imposed on observers. These include agreement that 
observer status was "not to be treated as an entitlement for accession to the convention, and membership of 
the future regime, or to any future allocation of fishing rights" (Tarte 2000a: 5). 
A delegate noted the Japanese would "try to undermine the Agreement, then not ratify it, conduct a 
scientific committee, anything to delay the procedure". That said, the Japanese "would never violate the 
letter of an agreement" (anonymous). 
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concede anything at the MHLC7 round. The fishing states, including the United States, were 
unhappy with several outstanding issues, including decision-making options. It was not clear 
that the MHLC7 would reach agreement. 
Section three: An a~praisal of MHLC7, Honolulu, 30 August - 5 September 
2000 4 
Finally, Mr. Chairman, the Sea is part and parcel of our being. While "fish" may only be 
a tradable commodity to our partners, to us, this is the lifeline for our future generations. 
It is part of our tradition, our history, heritage and culture. Indeed, it is part of our spirit 
and soul. In short, Mr Chairman, we are giving up a part of us in this Convention. We 
therefore call on our partners to recognize, value and respect this (Fiji's Opening 
Statement, MHLC 2000b: 15). 
The Conference Chair circulated an Infonnation Note to all delegations in advance of the 
MHLC7. Nandan believed that satisfactory progress had been made on a range of issues, 
however, he considered three areas required further negotiation. These were decision-1naking, 
the status of fishing entities and the participation of territories and possessions. The Chair then 
outlined the work program for the forthcoming MHLC7. It would con1mence with a three-day 
session to finalise the WCPF Convention, which would be then be opened for signature during a 
two-day n1inisterial level meeting (MHLC 2000b: 29-33). 
The decision-1naking issue highlighted fisheries management differences between the 
two groups. The status of Taiwan and the participation of territories ,and possessions were also 
linked to the geostrategic considerations of one delegation, the United States. At the MHLC 
negotiations, the United States had given Taiwan public support for its desire to have 
contracting party status, and had maintained military support for Taiwan in spite of protests by 
China. The refusal by the United States to give its Oceanic dependencies self-detennination 
centred on its geostrategic policies in the region. 
At the FFC 45 1neeting convened immediately before the MHLC7, the incoming Chair, 
Joe Thwaites of Australia, informed the group that Japan wished to raise several issues of 
concen1 during the final session (FFC 2000d: 4). Thwaites believed that the MHLC Chair ' s 
proposal for a chan1bered voting syste1n was worth consideration, particularly given its 
attractiveness to fishing states. The Oceanic delegates were not so sure. The meeting agreed that 
the FFC Chair would present an Opening State1nent, highlighting those issues of concern to the 
bloc. The Chair would also deliver a Closing State1nent. 
14 The following is a list of delegations attending the MHLC7 session. Australia, Canada, China Cook Islands, 
Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, France, French Polynesia, Indonesia, Japan, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, 
Nauru, New Caledonia, New Zealand, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Republic of Korea, 
Samoa, Solomon Islands, Taiwan, Tonga, Tuvalu, United States, Vanuatu, and Wallis and Futuna. 
Observers included Ecuador, the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), the Forum Secretariat, Forum 
Fisheries Agency (FF A), the South Pacific Regional Environment Programme (SPREP), the Inter American 
Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC), the Pacific Community and the University of the South Pacific 
(USP). 
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Most delegations went to MHLC7 believing that the three issues highlighted in the 
MHLC Chair's Note would fonn the basis of the negotiations. However, there was advance 
warning that Japan was having trouble domestically with the draft WCPF Convention, when its 
delegation leader resigned shortly before the MHLC7. As Talbot Murray15 put it, "once we saw 
who the new leader was, we realised we were in for trouble" (Interview, October 2000). The 
new Japanese delegation leader was Masayuki Komatsu, 16 Japan's leading negotiator to the 
Southern Bluefin Tuna Commission (CCSBT), the International Whaling Commission (IWC), 
and the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC). It transpired that Japan's don1estic fishing 
industry had not been kept abreast of the MHLC negotiations and there was unease that the new 
WCPF Convention would result in "international control" of its do1nestic fleets, particularly the 
skipjack industry (Tarte 2000b: 2). Leading up to MHLC7, Japan had requested a six-1nonth 
postpone1nent of the meeting, ostensibly to give it ti1ne to persuade its do1nestic fishing fleet of 
the benefits to be gained from the WCPF Convention round (Interviews, Ridings and Murray, 
October 2000).17 This request was denied. 
At the beginning of the MHLC7 negotiations, Japan advised that it had 22 separate 
proble1ns, and five 111ajor proble1ns, for example, it insisted on an opt-out provision on decision-
making (Sydnes 2001: 800). On the third day of the negotiations, Japan produced its own draft 
WCPF Convention text (Interview, Ridings, October 2000). The MHLC Chair commented that 
the only rese1nblance between Japan's draft Convention and his draft Convention were the page 
nu1nbers (Tarte 2000b: 2). Among the differences was a separate definition for the northern 
boundary of the 20° North parallel and the 20° South parallel. This includes a "separate regime 
for the area north of the 20 degrees North parallel" (Japan's Opening Statement MHLC 2000b: 
17).18 Japan argued that: 
15 
16 
17 
18 
Murray works for the National Institute of Water and Atmospheric Research (NIWA), and was a member 
of New Zealand ' s MHLC cielegation. 
One United States delegate referred to Komatsu as a "bulldog" (anonymous). 
Ridings works for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade and was a member of New Zealand ' s MHLC 
delegation. She led New Zealand 's delegation to the MHLC5, MHLC6 and MHLC7. 
Other major differences include the following. "In place of the existing provisions governing dispute 
settlement, Japan sought a formula that would require the consent of all parties to a dispute before seeking 
arbitration and it also favored a system ' unique ' to this arrangement". (Specifically Japan was opposed to 
the compulsory dispute settlement provision contained in the draft text. This drew on the Fish Stocks 
Agreement, where dispute settlement provisions contained in the United Nations Law of the Sea 
Convention (UN CLOS). This would apply to members of the Commission, whether or not they are also 
paiiies to the Fish Stocks Agreement.) On compliance and enforcement measures, Japan supported a 
' scheme . . . based on the flag state principle '. Japan believed that boarding and inspection, the regional 
observer programme and the VMS should ' avoid excessive and unnecessary operational and economic 
burdens ' . It reiterated its view that all references to the Fish Stocks Agreement should be removed, and that 
entry into force provisions changed. On decision-making, Japan favored an objection procedure that ' took 
into account the views of the minority-Asian fishing nations and entities ' . It argued that a majority would 
not necessarily be 'just or fair '. Moreover, Japan may not have the same notions of ' sustainable use ' as 
other countries" (Tarte 2000b: 2-3, see also Japan's Opening Statement MHLC 2000b: 17). 
181 
The tide turns 
fishing patterns and practices in the Pacific are quite different from that of the South 
Pacific, socio-economically, culturally, and traditionally and that there is strong scientific 
evidence that major tuna stocks are distributed mainly in the Northwestern Pacific. In this 
regard, we are inclined to start to create a regime for long-term conservation and 
sustainable use of highly migratory fish stocks in the North Pacific. Japan's Opening 
Statement MHLC 2000b: 17) 
There was suspicion among other delegations that Japan was attempting to have its EEZ 
excluded fr01n the WCPF Convention area (Tarte 2000b: 2). Ridings comments that the New 
Zealand delegation wished to avert a complete collapse of the work that had been achieved over 
the years of drafting the WCPF Convention (Interview, October 2000). 
Several PNA n1embers were vocal in their disappointment of Japan's actions. For 
example, Kiribati joined with other Oceanic states in their disapproval of Japan (Interviews: 
Heather Scott and Vaughan Wilkinson, October 2000). 19 The Marshall Islands openly voiced 
concen1 and noted that it could have an impact on their bilateral fishery access arrangements 
(Interview, Ridings, October 2000). An Oceanic delegate commented that the region had "bent 
over backwards to accoilllnodate them [Japan]", and having given up so much within the WCPF 
Convention text, "they [Japan] are still not in" (Bernard Thoulag, Interview, April 2001).20 Tarte 
noted that: 
[M]members of the FFC resolved not to entertain further demands from Japan or open up 
negotiation on all aspects of the text ... the FFC Chairman gave notice that if Japan was 
putting forward new proposals, then the FFC also had its own set of proposals. (Tarte 
2000b: 3) 
Tarte believes this was a "tactical move by the FFC", leaving Japan in no doubt that the 
FFC would simply "revert to its original position" should it go ahead with its new proposals 
(Tarte 2000b: 3). It was also a show of strength by the FFC, a positive demonstration of regional 
co-operation. Apart from Korea and to a lesser extent, China, there was no support for Japan's 
initiative.21 One delegate perceived that Australia neither seemed prepared for Japan's actions, 
nor able to handle the ensuing negotiations with calm. 
Wilkinson was critical of Australia's approach. In discussing his perceptions of 
Australia's negotiating style at the MHLC7 1neeting, he argues that when Australia was FFC 
Chair, it had a tendency to get excited. Wilkinson believed that Australia's head of delegation 
(which was Joe Thwaites), in particular, was endeavouring to incite Japan by being aggressive, 
basically "telling the1n to go to hell" and thus playing into Japan's hands (Interview October 
2000). Wilkinson adds that Nandan knew he had to draw Japan along in the negotiations, and 
19 
20 
21 
Scott works for Tuna New Zealand and was a member of New Zealand's :tvfHLC delegation. Wilkinson 
works for Simunovich Fisheries Ltd and was a member of ew Zealand ' s :tvfHLC delegation. He requested 
that it be noted that his comments are his personal views and do not reflect the views of New Zealand 's 
:tv!HLC delegation. 
Thoulag heads the Micronesian Maritime Authority and led the Federated States of Micronesia's :tvfHLC 
delegation. 
John Hampton, an observer commented that China had felt " insulted" by Japan ' s behaviour (Interview, 
Hampton, April 2001 ). Hampton works for the Oceanic Fisheries Programme at the Pacific Community and 
was its observer at the :tv!HLC negotiations. 
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Australia's aggressive baiting of Japan did not help. Because of the southern bluefin tuna (SBT) 
controversy, Wilkinson feels that Australia had "no credibility" at that time (Interview, October 
2000). He adds that Australia still appeared upset about the recent decisions made in the SBT 
case.
22 Wilkinson concludes that other members of the Australian delegation lacked 
international conference experience. As well, its two key delegates (Thwaites and Gray) were 
unable to stop several 1nembers making pointless and incomprehensible interjections (Interview, 
October 2000).23 On the other hand, an Australian delegate commented that New Zealand's 
delegation had changed, and that they were inexperienced (Interview, Ward,24 November 2000). 
In relation to the clai1n that Thwaites had incited Japan at small working groups within the 
MHLC7 negotiations, this could have been a strategy employed deliberately against Komatsu, 
famous for his own bullish tactics at international negotiations.25 
In his Closing Remarks, the MHLC Chair raised the issue of Japan's substantial 
changes to the draft text. He said it had been unfortunate that Japan's MHLC7 delegation was 
new to the negotiations and "not familiar" with the history of the process, resulting in 
difficulties "in the dialogue and communication" (MHLC 2000b: 63). While Japan had 
requested a postponement of the final session, consultation with other delegations had revealed 
a lack of desire to either agree to the postponement, or open up those issues which had already 
been agreed upon (MHLC 2000b: 63). 
Australian observers believe that the WCPF Convention was watered-down to 
accom1nodate Japan; one delegate saying that "we are not in the mood for compromise" and that 
"it would be detrimental to the process to reopen agreed text at subsequent negotiations" 
(Interview, Gray, November 2000). Another delegate argued that whilst Japan did not need to 
join the WCPF Convention, the United States did need Japan's membership (Interview, 
Heikkila,26 April 2001). While the United States won three campaigns at the MHLC7, (decision-
making, dependent territories and the Taiwan issue), it has not emerged a winner, yet. This is 
because the United States tuna industry needs Japan to sign on to the WCPF Convention, so that 
the United States Congress will ratify the Convention (Interview, Heikkila, April 2001 ). 
In its analysis of the MHLC7 round, the Western Fishboat Owners Association 
highlights two specific issues which damaged the United States' attempts to get Japan's 
22 
24 
25 
26 
Japan claimed victory in the dispute in August 2000, after an international tribunal, set up in Washington 
under the UNCLOS, ruled that it had no jurisdiction to authorise or ban research fishing (Radio Australia 
7.8.2000). 
Mark Gray, Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, was the other key delegate in Australia's 
MHLC delegation. 
Peter Ward is a scientist with the Bureau of Resource Science and a member of Australia' s MHLC 
delegation. 
These related particularly to his negotiating style for the SBT, as well as the International Whaling 
Commission. Komatsu said he felt there was nothing wrong "using the leverage of overseas development 
aid" to influence countries on the whaling issue (Pacific Islands Report 19.7.2001). Komatsu once 
"famously described minke whales" as "cockroaches of the sea"" (Pacific Islands Report, 27.7.2001 ). 
Heikkila works for the Western Fishboat Owners Association and was a member of the United States 
MHLC delegation. 
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agreement to the WCPF Convention. The first issue was the Clinton Administration decision, 
just as the MHLC7 negotiations commenced, to consider the imposition of trade sanctions on 
Japan over its whaling policies. As mentioned above, the leader of the Japanese delegation, 
K0111atsu, was also Japan's whaling negotiator. The second issue was the SBT controversy. 
Because of the perceived failure to co-operate with the other two 111embers of the SBT 
Convention, Komatsu would have been even more sceptical regarding the possibilities of co-
operating with in excess of 26 states and territories (Western Fishboat Owners Association 
MHLC7: 3). 
By the time the MHLC7 negotiations caine around, it was evident that the Oceanic 
delegations were tired and running out of steam. The process had been a drain on scarce 
Oceanic resources and any prolonged negotiating could have resulted in a 111ore fragmented FFC 
bloc. As will be discussed below, the MHLC Chair, Australia, New Zealand and the United 
States persuaded the Oceanic states to sign on at MHLC7 to a cha111bered voting system for 
decision-making which 111ay ultimately be to their detriment. Although it was done to attract the 
Asian fishing states to the WCPF Convention, this goal was not achieved. Some issues were not 
resolved and have been left to the Co111mission to negotiate, for exainple, allocation and new 
entrants. The region lost ground on several issues, for example, transship111ent, the precautionary 
approach, the observer pro grain, boarding and inspection and their 'special interest' over high 
seas enclaves. The FFC bloc's decline in effectiveness of collective diplomacy resulted in a 
weaker WCPF Convention. 
Section four: An appraisal of the issues at the MHLC5, MHLC6 and MHLC7 
The following discussion exa111ines those areas of the draft negotiating text that were unresolved 
and which required debate at the MHLC5-MHLC7 negotiating rounds. These included the 
WCPF Convention area; decision-making; allocation issues; the VMS; transshipment; preamble 
and final clauses; the observer program, compliance, and enforcement issues; small island 
developing states; financial arrange111ents; species list; high seas boarding and inspection; 
fishing entities (Taiwan); territories; participation by the European Union; the precautionary 
approach; scientific advice; and the interim regi111e. This list includes 111any of those substantive 
provisions of a n1eaningful 111ultilateral treaty, the WCPF draft Convention. 
WCP F Convention Area 
The westen1 and northen1 boundary to the WCPF Convention area remained controversial at the 
MHLC5. Indonesia objected to the United States' proposal at the MHLC5 that the westen1 
boundary should include its archipelagic waters.27 There was also objection from the 
27 This issue was also controversial at the UNCLOS III negotiations, when maritime powers, such as the 
United Kingdom and the United States, protested that the claims of archipelagic states "would result in 
areas which had previously been high seas or territorial seas becoming internal waters" (Teiwaki 1988: 81 ). 
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archipelagic Oceanic states of Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu, Fiji and the Solomon Islands 
regarding the "specific references" to Indonesia and the Philippines "on the grounds that all 
archipelagic states should be treated the same" (Tarte 1999b: 7).28 Related to the difficulties of 
resolving the western boundary was Indonesia's request that the Cele bes Sea should be 
excluded because it was an inland sea. The westen1 boundary was further complicated by 
territorial disputes involving coastal states within the South China Sea, and disputes around 
Japanese-claimed is lands. 29 
The issue of the northen1 boundary caused dissent within the FFC. Some members 
believed that it had the capacity to water-down the coastal states' level of influence within the 
Con1mission. By extending the northern boundary to 50°, it did include the full migratory range 
of the four 1nain stocks, but it also included other stocks of limited interest to the Western and 
Central Pacific Ocean (WCPO). Papua New Guinea argued that to extend the northern boundary 
as far north as 50° was not within the an1bit of the negotiations and that extending the northen1 
boundary 1nay result in dilution of their "interests as resource owners" (State1nent MHLC 
1999b: 21). Other FFC states agreed (Australia, Solomon Islands, Federated States of 
Micronesia, Fiji and Palau). Kiribati, however, favoured 1naintaining the extended northern 
boundary for species coverage (FFC 40 1999c: 1). Japan argued that the regime should: 
cover the entire 1nigratory range of the tuna and tuna like species, regardless of what legal 
or political status of particular areas ... if equity is not achieved ... as to the geographical 
boundary of the Convention area or Japan is forced to accept meaningless lines splitting 
its own 200 mile zones, then we have to insist that northern boundary should be brought 
down to 20°N parallel in order to avoid such shameful treatment. (MHLC 1999b: 15) 
This remark hides Japan's wish to control a northern sub-comn1ittee of the Commission. The 
argu1nent over splitting Japan's EEZ dis1nisses the fact that the WCPF Convention boundary 
cuts through Australia, fro1n South Australia to the Northern Territory. The MHLC Chair 
decided to leave the western and northen1 boundaries open, stating that the "stocks of interest 
(and their n1ove1nent) will help to define the convention area" (Tarte 1999b: 8). While this 
approach lacked the supp01i of the FFC, it was approved by the fishing states (Tarte 1999b: 8). 
Linked to the concerns regarding the northen1 boundary was the northen1 sub-
c01nn1ittee, pron1oted by Japan (and the United States) at the MHLC4 negotiations. The FFC 
requested advice regarding the i1nplications of such a committee and the participation by other 
Co1n1nission n1e1nbers to any of its discussions. The Chair's revised draft includes a northern 
sub-c01nn1ittee. In his Closing Statement, the Chair notes: 
28 
29 
This was relevant to those archipelagic areas around the Philippines and Indonesia that had been traditional 
shipping corridors (Teiwaki 1988: 81 ). See discussion on this issue in Chapter Three, p 55. 
Vanuatu's Statement noted, "approximately 21 % of skipjacks, 12% bigeye and 30% yellowfin tuna are 
harvested" in the archipelagic waters of Indonesia and the Philippines (MHLC 1999b: 29). 
For example, Japan has requested Russia to refuse access to Korean boats fishing around the disputed Kuril 
Islands. Towards the end of World War II, the Soviet Union seized these former Japanese-claimed islands. 
Japan claims sovereignty over these islands and their EEZ (FIS World News, 3.7.2001). 
185 
The tide turns 
[T]the membership of this sub-committee would be those situated in the northern part of 
the Convention Area, as well as those fishing in such area, with a right for all interested 
members of the Commission to attend meetings of the sub-committee as observers. 
(MHLC 1999b: Annex 6) 
The outcome of the debate on the WCPF Convention area represented a major setback for the 
FFC 111e111bership at MHLCS. Most of the 111e111bership had argued for a lowering of the 
northern boundary, to ensure that the regime would remain focused on the four main tuna 
species. There was also a very real fear that an open-ended northern boundary could bring in 
s0111e of the powerful fishing states as coastal states and weaken the island region's nun1erical 
influence in the Co111111ission. 30 Discussion on this issue at the MHLC6 concentrated on the 
westen1 and northern boundaries, both of which had been left open in the draft text. The 
Philippines and Indonesia wanted the westen1 boundary to follow their archipelagic baselines. 
This was added to the draft text. By the conclusion of MHLC6, the text had incorporated the 
open western and northern boundaries of the Convention area. 
The open westen1 and northen1 boundaries of the WCPF Convention concerned 111ost 
FFC 111en1bers because of the division caused by the northen1 sub-co111mittee, the fish stocks to 
be covered, and issues of enforce111ent. While their concen1s were 111et in the WCPF Convention 
in relation to FFC observer status for those northen1 sub-com111ittee meetings, the enforcement 
provisions for an open westen1 and northen1 boundary may prove 111ore difficult. Enf orce111ent 
con1es under 111onitoring, control and surveillance (MCS) 111easures and is an aspect of 
demonstrating the effectiveness or otherwise of collective diplo111acy in achieving objectives, 
for exa111ple, a substantive provision in a 111eaningful 111ultilateral treaty. It is not believed that 
this outco111e 111eets the objectives of collective fisheries diplo111acy, particularly in relation to 
sustainability. 31 
Decision-making 
While it see111ed that the Convention area debate had been resolved satisfactorily by MHLC6, a 
far 111ore contentious issue throughout the negotiations was decision-111aking. Decision-111aking 
has been called the "111ake or break of the MHLC process" (Sydnes 2000: 798). Both Japan and 
the United States tabled alten1ative text at MHLCS regarding decision-111aking. Japan' s 
proposition was co111plex, involving total fishing catch "in a weighted voting systen1" (Taiie 
1999b: 9). This would alleviate the concerns of both Korea and Japan of being a 111inority group. 
The United States' proposal had three separate decision-making processes.32 
30 
3 1 
32 
The United States and the Western Fishboat Owners Association "quickly latched onto [the] concept" of a 
northern sub-committee as "the best approach for preventing South Pacific nations from exerting undue 
influence over the region" (Western Fishboat Owners Association 2000a: 3). 
Those objectives are sustainability, a fair return, domestication and indigenous control. 
The first process is mandatory consensus. The second process is "where a super majority ( 4/5) voting 
procedure should operate along side an objection and opt out provision" Tarte 1999b: 9). The third process 
includes voting "without any objection clause" Tarte 1999b: 9). This relates to "decisions on MCS, 
enforcement, scientific research and data collection" (Tarte 1999b: 9). 
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The FFC members, together with Canada, Indonesia and the Philippines, agreed to 
amendments incorporating some of the suggestions raised by the United States and Japan. There 
were, however, two areas of disagreement. These related to Japan's co1nplicated weighted 
voting procedure (which nobody understood),33 and the United States proposal for mandatory 
consensus (Tarte 1999b: 9).34 The i1npasse was not resolved. After consultation, Japan 
abandoned its complex decision-making proposal and backed the United States' plan (Tarte 
1999b: 9). Australia argued that the mandatory consensus proposal could result in "a single 
contracting party [holding] the Cmnmission hostage in a 1nanner which would be very 
dainaging to our collective purpose" (Statement MHLC 1999b: 10). Furthermore, as the 
Federated States of Micronesia Government notes, it is necessary to have alternatives to 
consensus, to avoid "deadlock and paralysis" in facilitating the implementation of the WCPF 
Convention (State1nent MHLC 1999b: 13). Others observed that the United States "sto1nped its 
foot to ensure that fishing nations will have a voice in future Convention progra1ns" (Western 
Fishboat Owners Association MHLC5: 1). 
In the Chair's draft WCPF Convention text circulated at the close of MHLC5 there were 
provisions for mandatory consensus and "third party conciliation in the event of an objection, in 
order to facilitate consensus" (Section 6 Article 20). The United States representative was 
reportedly "disappointed" that his suggestions on decision-making had been rejected "out of 
hand" by the FFC membership (Western Fishboat Owners Association MHLC5: 5). The 
representative told the Conference that he: 
could not understand the belief that it would be fair for one group to make decisions for 
everybody. This is the only issue that will prompt the US to walk away from this process 
and the Convention. (Western Fishboat Owners Association MHLC5: 5). 
Apparently, the United States' remarks were "met with silence", followed by a senes of 
co1n1nents fro1n the Oceanic states regarding some ti1ne being needed to study the United States' 
proposal (Western Fishboat Owners Association MHLC5: 5). Japan too felt that its suggestions 
on decision-111aking belonged to a 1ninority group within the negotiations. Japan's Staten1ent 
notes that it was: 
seriously concerned about the effect of such tendency to disregard the minority view 
... [that] the present text will put the interest of the minority to be bound to be disregarded 
(MHLC 1999b: 14). 
The debate on this issue represented another setback for the FFC membership at MHLC5. FFC 
me1nbers were against mandatory consensus, particularly on crucial issues to the region such as 
33 
34 
Japan ' s proposal "was a somewhat convoluted approach, that included fishing catch totals in a weighted 
voting system" (Tarte 1999b: 9). The system ensures that neither Korea nor Japan is in a minority. 
As the United States Statement outlines, if the decision-making measures binds it as a minority to a 
majority decision, there is very little chance of it being ratified by the Congress. Further, the United States 
delegation would not "be prepared to present such a decision-making regime for Congressional approval" 
(Statement MHLC 1999b: 27). 
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allocation, and budgetary decisions. On the other hand, the fishing states, including the United 
States were emphatic in their refusal to be bound by majority decision-1naking. 
At FFC 43, held immediately before the MHLC6 session, the 1nembership agreed that it 
had "co1npr01nised enough . . . to accommodate the positions of DWFN35 and other coastal 
States" (FFC 43 2000b: 2). At the MHLC6, Japan reiterated its preference for mandatory 
consensus in all but a few cases. These exceptions would have a three-fourths 1najority vote, 
split between two groups. The first group included states and entities that harvested more than 
30,000 tonnes yearly. The second group comprised the remainder of the me1nbership. Japan also 
insisted on an opt-out clause (Tarte 2000a: 6-7).36 Japan and Korea emphasised that to join the 
WCPF Convention under the prevailing circumstances would be "suicidal" (Tarte 2000a: 6). 
Other fishing states, for exainple Taiwan, China and the United States, re1nained rigid on this 
issue. The stated preference of the United States was for its tabled position at the MHLC5 
negotiations. It was noted that the United States "has a problem with democracy - they do not 
like being outvoted" (Interview, anonymous). 
While fishing states protested, the MHLC Chair refused to consider "any further 
watering down" of the decision-1naking measures (MHLC 2000a: Annex 7). In his Closing 
State1nent at MHLC6, he noted that: 
the requirement for a four-fifths majority would have the effect in practice of promoting 
consensus on all matters. This should be more than sufficient assurance to all sides 
(MHLC 2000a: Annex 7). 
His refusal to allow any further amendment, while meeting with agreement from the FFC bloc 
rendered the participation of the fishing states uncertain. The United States remained 
detennined to resolve the impasse; however, Japan and Korea "rejected the text", Korea going 
so far as to request a further session of the MHLC to settle this and other contentious issues 
(Tarte 2000a: 8). 
At MHLC7, a new decision-making proposal was advanced by the United States at an 
infon11al 1neeting with the FFC 1ne1nbers for a chan1bered voting system; one chamber 
comprising FF A n1e1nbers, the other chamber con1prising non-FF A members (Sydnes 2001: 
800). Each chan1ber requires a 1najority vote for adoption of decisions not agreed to by 
consensus.
37 As Cordonnery (2002: 5) notes, the "voting system by chambers ... would be 
arithn1etically disadvantageous for the FFC me1nber states. The FFC membership was not in 
35 
36 
37 
Distant Water Fishing Nations, referred to in this thesis as 'fishing states'. 
An Australian delegate notes that Japan has problems with dispute resolution (as well as the precautionary 
approach), as neither of these is incorporated in the Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin 
Tuna (CCSBT) (Interview, Hughes, November 2000). Another delegate argues that it is important for the 
Commission to have independent scientific advice, to avoid the CCSBT situation (Interview, Lack, 
December 2000). 
Some issues, however, had mandatory consensus, for example, rules of procedure, allocation of TA Cs, 
financial regulations, new entrants and amendments to the convention (WCPF Convention 2000). 
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favour of this system, wanting to retain the text as at the end of the MHLC6. 
38 The Chair 
refused to contemplate opt-out provisions, "arguing that this would negate the right to a 
compulsory settle1nent of dispute procedure" (Tarte 2000b: 4).39 Lobbying on this issue 
continued until the closing stages of the MHLC7 negotiations. The Chair, Australia, New 
Zealand and the United States persuaded the FFC bloc to agree to the chambered voting 
system.40 They were persuaded to do so because acceptance of the chambered voting syste1n 
would bring the United States and other fishing states on board (Tarte 2000b: 4, Interviews with 
Australian, New Zealand and Oceanic delegates). The syste1n requires three-fourths majority in 
each chamber, "and provided further that in no circu1nstances shall a proposal be defeated by 
two or fewer votes in either chamber" (WCPF Convention, Section 6 Article 20.2). Ridings 
(Interview, October 2000) remarked that the chambered voting system came about as a way of 
getting the other fishing states on board. 41 
Lobbying on the decision-making issue also took place with the Korean delegation 
which agreed, the night before the MHLC7 negotiations concluded, to support the chambered 
voting system. However, it appears that following consultation with Japan, Korea decided not to 
support the chambered decision-making process (Sydnes 2001: 800). Korea's decision angered 
coastal states, (including New Zealand), which felt that Korea had stabbed them in the back. As 
Murray notes, however, there are sensitive bilateral issues between Japan and Korea, including 
critical bilateral fisheries agreements. (Interview, October 2000). Another observer, Peter 
Cozens42 (Interview, October 2000), e1nphasised the problematic nature of Northeast Asian 
security and noted that we hear little regarding the fights that occur between Japan and Korea 
over the Straits of Tsushiina.43 Cozens believes that other Asian states have always considered 
Korea as the "smallest boy on the block" and it was therefore not surprising that Korea aligned 
with Japan. 
The decision-1naking issue represents another aspect which demonstrates the 
effectiveness or otherwise of collective dipl01nacy in achieving objectives, such as substantive 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
At the conclusion ofMHLC6, the draft text incorporated a vote of four-fifths majority being required for 
decision-making, which Nandan considered almost consensus votirig. 
Tarte notes that the Chair had remarked that since the UNCLOS had entered irito force, "it was a 
requirement to have compulsory dispute settlement" . Any fisheries management regime that did allow an 
opt-out clause had been negotiated before the entry into force of the UN CLOS (Tarte 2000b: 4. ). 
It is not surprisirig that the MHLC Chair, Nandan, supports the chambered voting system. As well as 
leading the Fish Stocks negotiations, Nandan also steered the negotiating process for the Agreement 
relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 
December 1982 (sometimes referred to as the 'Boat Paper' , irI the same way as the Fish Stocks Agreement 
is referred to as the "Fish Paper") ( de Fontaubert 1995: 87). The 'Boat Paper' led to the establishment of 
the International Seabed Authority (ISA) and the division of the member states into chambers for decision-
making (Mann Borgese 1996: 7). 
A significant development resulting from the chambered voting system is that the FF A has been 
"institutionalised" irI the new Commission, as being part of the big chamber (Interview, Clarke, April 
2001). 
Peter Cozens, New Zealand Centre for Strategic Studies, Victoria University at Wellington. 
For example, see the ongoirig dispute regarding Korean fishirig activity around the disputed Kuril Islands. 
The Soviet Union seized control of these former Japanese-controlled islands towards the close of World 
War II. Japan has disputed Moscow' s sovereignty (FIS World News 3.7.2001). 
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provisions in a meaningful multilateral treaty like the WCPF Convention. In this case, the island 
region was persuaded to accept a substantive provision that may not be in its best interests. 
N andan had previously incorporated a chambered decision 1naking process into the International 
Seabed Authority (ISA). In discussing the cha1nbered decision-making of the ISA, Mann 
Borgese ( 1996: 7) argues that "as far as voting is concerned, . . . it is rigged in such a way that 
three industrialized states can block any decision of the Council". In relation to the WCPF 
Convention, a proposal cam1ot be defeated by two or fewer votes in either chamber" (WCPF 
Convention, Section 6 Article 20.2). This means that three votes in the chamber co1nprising the 
fishing states can defeat a specific decision, which may, for example, relate to conservation and 
1nanage1nent ineasures.44 Therefore, the chainbered voting system has the capacity to defeat the 
objectives of collective fisheries diplomacy as pursued by the island states. 
Allocation 
In spite of the differences of opinion regarding decision-making options, this issue was finalised 
at the conclusion of the MHLC7. The issue of allocation, however, was 1nore difficult to 
resolve. The Chair ' s inclusion at the MHLC5 of the difficult allocation issue indicated that he 
was considering inserting this 1neasure into the framework of the WCPF Convention text, rather 
than leaving it to the Commission. It was considered a "relatively controversial maneuver" 
(Western Fishboat Owners Association MHLC5: 6). The FFC 1ne1nbers' stand on allocation 
re1nained unchanged; that is, they had sovereign rights over their in-zone, including the 
detennination of allocation. They conceded that the Co1n1nission could co-ordinate a global 
Total Allowable Catch (TAC) and split EEZ allocation, in liaison with the FFC. Kiribati ' s 
State1nent notes that while the Co1n1nission 1nust be given powers in its management of the 
various functions , "it must not in any way compro1nise the rights and sovereignty of coastal 
States" (MHLC 1999b: 16). The other concern of the FFC was allocation of high seas pockets, 
or enclaves and the e1nphasis of special concerns/rights over these adjacent high seas areas. 
In this way, the Federated States of Micronesia' s State1nent notes the appropriateness of 
"special consideration" being afforded to those coastal states adjacent to high seas pockets 
regarding any high seas allocation (MHLC 1999b: 12). Japan and Korea rejected this 
suggestion. Japan argued that the variance in stock levels would lead to "under and over-
utilisation of fisheries" (Tarte 1999b: 11 ). They contended that recent catch levels should be 
utilised. As the capacity of the coastal states increased, so would their quotas. This was disputed 
by Indonesia the Philippines and the FFC members, who pointed out that such an approach 
hinders: 
44 
their aspirations to develop fishing capacity, and their desire to secure greater benefits 
from their tuna resources (Tarte 1999b: 11). 
See Cordonnery (2002: 5). 
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Furthermore, Kiribati's statement emphasises that the region needs a Convention to "conserve 
the resource sustainably but also to enable the resource-States to harvest their own resource" 
(MHLC 1999b: 16). This issue has relevance to the aspirations of the region in relation to 
domestication and indigenous control of the tuna fishery. 
Opposing this view, Korea states that it is "unreasonable" of coastal states to "claitn 
ownership of tuna within EEZs" and that they therefore "did not have the legal right to 
allocation within EEZs" (Tarte 1999b: 11 ). Despite the Chair correcting Korea on this issue, it 
e1nphasises the gulf in understanding between the fishing and coastal states. At the FFC40 
meeting in August 1999, it was noted that fishing states had made state1nents at other 
international fisheries manage1nent meetings, "asserting the rights of the fishing State to in-zone 
catch history" (FFC40 1999c: 4 ). The Sol01non Islands said that using catch history to resolve 
EEZ allocation 1neans that the historical catch is owned by the coastal states. It is then up to the 
coastal state to decide on the most advantageous access arrangement. Therefore, despite a 
fishing state's harvesting history in an EEZ, there is no "obligation on us as a coastal State to 
grant access" (Statement MHLC 1999b: 23). The Chair made s1nall adjust1nents to the draft text 
on this issue. For exainple, the level of catch destined for d01nestic consu1nption was included, 
as well as the "special circumstances" of those states with only limited EEZ (Tarte 1999b: 11).45 
The allocation issue was not resolved at the MHLC negotiations; rather the WCPF 
Con1111ission will have to negotiate an allocation system. This will not be an easy task, given the 
divergent opinions of the fishing and Oceanic states. Allocation is a substantive provision in a 
1neaningful 1nultilateral treaty like the WCPF Convention. It has particular reference to those 
objectives of collective fisheries diplo1nacy, for example, a fair retun1, domestication and 
indigenous control. As has been discussed elsewhere in this thesis, sovereign rights are an 
integral part of the region's stand on marine resources and are a reflection of their pre-colonial 
conservation ethic. This was reflected in the way fainilies, communities or chiefly systen1s 
allocated terrestrial and 1narine resources. Having regained that ethic through the various 
regional and sub-regional instru1nents which were put in place before the MHLC process, the 
region does not want to see its control over the allocation provision weakened because of 
fishing state tactics in the WCPF Co1n1nission. 
High seas enclaves 
Linked to the region's ethics over allocation are what the islanders believe are their special 
rights over high seas pockets or enclaves, which have been disputed by Japan and the United 
States. At the conclusion of the MHLC4 negotiations, the draft text had incorporated the special 
rights of coastal states over adjacent high seas pockets. In response to calls by the United States, 
Japan and Korea to re1nove these rights, the Chair amended the text at MHLC5. The new draft 
text merely notes the need for special attention to be paid to high seas pockets, or enclaves, by 
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the Com1nission (MHLC/WP.1/Rev. 4, Annex 5). This was not a good outcome for the FFC 
membership and reflected a reversal of the draft text at the MHLC4. This demonstrated the lack 
of unity and cohesion within the FFC bloc at MHLC5 in not putting forward supportive claims 
to retain the MHLC4 draft text on this issue. With strong FFC leadership, involve1nent of the 
LWG, regional co-operation a1nong the membership and the support of Australia, New Zealand 
and the United States, a different outco1ne on high seas pockets may have been achieved 
through collective diplomacy at the MHLC5. 
The issue of special rights over high seas pockets or enclaves relates to the highly 
1nigratory nature of tuna and the unique geographical realities of the Oc~anic region. EEZs and 
high seas pockets or enclaves link 1nany of the islands. This means that tuna swim through these 
areas and are vulnerable to concentrated fishing in those high seas areas. By clai1ning special 
rights, the Oceanic states hope to control tuna fishing in these areas. Again, like allocation, this 
issue relates to the pre-colonial conservation ethic of the island co1nmunities in relation to 
terrestrial and marine resources. Under the Palau Arrangen1ent, the region clai1ned 'special 
rights' over those high seas pockets or enclaves.46 Because the region had previously regained 
control over this issue, its status in the WCPF Convention has diminished this control. It was 
1neant to be a substantive provision in a meaningful 1nultilateral treaty - which it was under the 
Palau Arrange1nent. It has been weakened under the WCPF Convention in relation to those 
objectives of collective fisheries diplomacy concerning sustainability, a fair retun1 and 
indigenous control. 
Vessel Monitoring System (VMS) 
The VMS was another issue about which the FFC bloc felt strongly at the MHLC negotiations. 
The bloc wished to maintain control over VMS operations within EEZs, leaving the 
Con11nission responsible for high seas VMS operations. It was pointed out by the FF A Director, 
Victoria Uherbelau, in May 1999 that: 
the successful implementation of the FF A VMS would test the maturity of regional 
solidarity among the FFA membership, noting the divisive tactics being pursued by some 
distant water fishing nations ... that with unity and solidarity the FF A could prevail over 
external pressures mounted against it by the mightiest nations. (FFC 39 1999b: 4) 
It was envisaged by the FFC that the Cmnmission would contract the FF A to utilise its 
VMS facilities to co-ordinate high seas fishing activity. The United States supported this view, 
but it was rejected by Asian fishing states. The FFA Secretariat believed that Japan's opposition 
to the VMS was "based on political rather than economic grounds" (FFC39 1999b: 24). Japan, 
Korea and Taiwan argued that fishing data should be first transmitted to the flag state, which 
would then retransmit the data to the Com1nission. While the United States and FFC considered 
45 
46 
Japan had insisted on the inclusion of fish destined for domestic consumption. 
See Preamble to the Palau Arrangement. 
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that the data could be sin1ultaneously transmitted to the Commission and the flag state, they 
were wary about the data being sent to the flag state for it to retransmit to the Commission. This 
wariness related to concerns that the data could be sanitised by the flag state. New Zealand 
made this point in its Statement, believing that there needs to be: 
an effective and robust provision on the establishment of a vessel monitoring system, 
which New Zealand regards as a vital tool for monitoring and compliance in the region. 
(MHLC 1999b: 18) 
An aiu1ex proposed by the United States envisaged the Corrunission being responsible 
for high seas VMS, coastal states being responsible for EEZ VMS, and procedures being 
developed to co-ordinate different VMS and to ensure confidentiality of the data. The Chair 
included the annex in his draft text. By the end of the MHLC5, however, in response to the 
forceful arguments put forward by Japan and other fishing states, he removed the am1ex. The 
Chair also acknowledged the right of the flag state to receive the data and then to retransmit it to 
the Corrunission (Tarte 1999b: 13). The Chair' s acknowledgement represented a major 
concession to Japan ' s concerns over those of the United States, New Zealand and other coastal 
states. 
At MHLC6, the FFC bloc argued that given technological advances with the VMS, 
there should be no difficulty in simultaneous transmission (Tarte 2000a: 19). The FFC bloc' s 
concerns were answered in the Chair ' s draft text issued at the conclusion of the MHLC6. It 
called for VMS data to be simultaneously transmitted to the Commission ( or other designated 
central hub) and to the flag state "where the flag state so requires" (MHLC/Draft 
Convention/Rev.1 Paii V, Article 24.8). This outcome reflected objectives of collective fisheries 
diplomacy, specifically relating to sustainability, a fair retun1 and indigenous control. 
Transshipment 
Another MTC provision over which there was a clear divide between fishing and coastal states 
was in relation to transshipment. The PFC 1nembers argued for a complete ban on 
transshipment, believing that it undennines the Minimum Terms and Conditions (MTC) they 
had worked so hard to implement. The FFC 3 9 in May 1999 discussed the issue of 
transshipment at length. At that meeting, the FF A Secretariat noted that some of its members 
were experiencing difficulties in finalising bilateral access agreements because of the ban on 
transshipment at sea as set out in the MTCs (FFC 39 1999b: 21 ). While transshipment within an 
EEZ is subject to coastal state jurisdiction, most Oceanic states have banned the practice and it 
has become part of the region ' s MTCs. Transshipment on the high seas has not yet been 
circumscribed, with most fishing states arguing against its prohibition. The Philippines, for 
example, operates small purse seiners in Papua New Guinea' s EEZ and has called the moves to 
ban transship1nent as discriminatory. Papua ew Guinea supports this call. On the other hand, 
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the United States and New Zealand argue that the only effective way of fulfilling MCS 
requirements is to ban transshipment (see Tarte 2000a: 21 ). 
The Chair's draft text at the conclusion of the MHLC6 maintains a ban of purse seine 
transshipment at sea, although not within EEZs. Furthermore, "existing operations" on the high 
seas could be exempt (MHLC/Draft Convention/Rev .1 19 April 2000, Part IV, Article 29 1-5). 
It is argued that fishing states want to maintain transshipment for several reasons; it allows 
greater fishing time; it makes the operation more profitable; and it allows secrecy of catch and 
effort for those fishing fleets wishing to circumvent MCS measures. For conservation and 
manage1nent measures to be transparent there has to be control exerted over the catch. This 
control is maintained by shore-based transshipment. The ban on transshipment is a substantive 
1nultilateral treaty provision. While the WCPF Convention does ban high seas transshipment, it 
does not include existing operations, and there is no ban on EEZ purse seine transshipment. 
Most Oceanic states had banned EEZ transshipment as part of MTCs. It is believed there still 
could be problems with monitoring, control and surveillance and because of this, as an indicator 
of effectiveness, it may not meet the objectives of collective fisheries diplomacy, specifically 
sustainability, a fair return and indigenous control. 
Prea,nble 
Issues for inclusion in the Preamble were also controversial. For example, Japan requested the 
inclusion of fish for 'human food consumption' in the first paragraph of the Preainble.47 The 
Chair agreed to this request, despite opposition from the FFC states that felt that Japan could be 
advantaged when fishing opportunities are allocated (see Tarte 2000a: 18).48 Again, the 
allocation provision is likely to be a controversial aspect of negotiations at the WCPF 
negotiating table. Furthermore, the parties to the MHLC5 did not concur with Japan's request to 
re1nove the references to the Fish Stocks Agreement, as it "had not yet been ratified by the 
required number of states" (Tarte 1999b: 15-16). Oceanic states wanted the Preamble to note the 
precautionary approach and the special needs of small island states. The inclusion of the special 
needs and problems of the smaller island states, a sub-group of the Forum, was promoted by 
Kiribati, one of its members. These issues were included in the draft text at the conclusion of 
MHLC5. 
High seas boarding and inspection 
Also at MHLC5, the United States proposed a two-year moratorium on high seas boarding and 
inspection after the WCPF Convention's entry into force, during which time the Commission 
would "develop an enforcement regime that had the support of all members" (Tarte 1999b: 21). 
47 
48 
This is a reflection of Japan 's post Ward War II preoccupation with food security (see Bergin and Haward 
1996: 31). 
At :MHLC6, the FFC argued "consumption patterns do not necessarily reflect the measures of dependence 
of a population on the resource, such as availability of alternative good sources" (Tarte 2000a: 18). 
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Should agreement not be reached, the Fish Stocks Agree111ent ' s provision will apply. During 
that two-year period, unless there were reasonable grounds to suspect that a "serious violation" 
had occurred, boarding and inspection would not be sanctioned (Tarte 1999b: 21). Japan, China 
and Korea dismissed this proposal, arguing that it was best left to the Co111mission to resolve. 
The Chair, however, considered that there was 111erit in the U~ited States proposal and 
adopted it, with the addition of "alternative mechanisms" which will "ensure c0111pliance" 
(Chair ' s Closing State111ent MHLC 1999b: Am1ex 6). In so doing, the Chair believed he had 
dispelled the concerns of those states whose beliefs were at variance with the boarding and 
inspection articles of the Fish Stocks Agreement. The Chair agreed to a two-year grace period 
following the entry into force of the WCPF Convention. The FFC membership was concen1ed, 
however, that this grace period 111ay "unden11ine the compliance and enforcement role of the 
Com111ission" (Tarte 2001a: 28). This issue, in effect, watered down the Convention's text and 
distanced itself fro111 the Fish Stocks Agreement, not a result which favours conservation and 
111anage111ent 111easures. Boarding and inspection de111onstrates a substantive provision in a 
111eaningful 111ultilateral treaty like the WCPF Convention. This outcome therefore amounts to a 
reversal in tenns of the objectives of the island states in relation to sustainability and a fair 
retun1. 
Precautionary Approach 
Along with important MTCs like boarding and inspection, the precautionary approach is a 
central feature of conservation and 111anage111ent 111easures. At the MHLC5 negotiations, 
Canada, Australia and New Zealand highlighted the "co111pelling authority" of the precautionary 
approach, illustrated by its inclusion in the Fish Stocks Agree111ent (Tarte 1999b: 22). Japan, 
however, requested re111oval of any reference to that Agree111ent, as it was not yet in force, 
restating its "frustration that its interests were not being taken into account" (Tarte 1999b: 22). 
In response, the Chair "felt it was appropriate at this stage to delete the proposed annex" which 
set out the precautionary approach' s application (Chair' s Closing Statement, MHLC 1999b: 
Annex 6). This represented a fmiher reversal for the FFC bloc, which did not wish to see 
reference to the application of the precautionary approach ren1oved from the annex to the WCPF 
Convention, although its application was still contained within the Convention text. 
Scientific Advice 
The provision of scientific advice also divided the parties to the negotiations. Two sources were 
being considered for the provision of scientific advice. The first, a scientific committee, 111ade 
up of the Co111111ission ' s membership. The second, an autonomous scientific source, derived 
from the existing regional scientific establishments of the region, specifically, the Oceanic 
Fisheries Program (OFP) of the Pacific Community (SPC). While the FFC 111en1bership and 
111ost other parties agreed to this plan, Japan rejected it. Japan argued that it could not agree to 
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the scientific co1n1nittee being either "subordinated to, or sidelined by, the scientific staff ( over 
which Japan would have limited control)" (Tarte 1999b: 23). 
The United States disagreed with Japan's argument, asserting that the "whole point" of 
structuring the scientific advice in such a way was to ensure that the Commission received "the 
best advice (which is) free and unfiltered" (Tarte 1999b; 23). The Chair noted that he was 
"unable to depart from the basic scheme for the provision of scientific advice" which had been 
drafted at the MHLC4 (Chair's Closing Statement MHLC 1999b: Annex 6). This represented a 
win for the region and demonstrated an issue where unity and cohesion had resulted in a 
positive outcon1e. It also achieved an objective of collective fisheries diplomacy, in particular, 
sustainability. 
Funding 
Another controversial issue related to the financial arrangements for funding requiren1ents for 
the Co1n1nission's future activities. For exainple, activities relating to the observer program, 
VMS, vessel register and the provision of scientific advice. A proposed ainendment, tabled by 
Australia, suggested cost-recovery as a 1neans of financing those activities additional to the 
Co1n1nission's regular budget. The United States, Japan and Korea rejected this proposal (Tarte 
2000a).49 Japan argued that it would not support funding of those activities that it believed 
should not be included within the Co1n1nission's work prograin (for exainple, the observer 
progra1n). Fu1iher, if Japan was expected to contribute to such activities, it would have to reduce 
its level of budget funding (Tarte 2000a). The Chair agreed to ainend the text to note "any other 
funds which the Conunission may receive, including fees for specific services" (MHLC/Draft 
Convention/Rev. I Section 5 Article 17 ( d). This represents a further watering down of the text. 
The funding issue will be contentious, given the Com1nission ' s dependence on fishing state 
financial support. Their conditional support 1nay be 1nanif est tlu·ough inti1nidation and 
persuasive tactics by the fishing states in order to undennine, water down or limit MCS 
1neasures. 
Fishing entities 
In spite of continued lobbying throughout the MHLC6 negotiations, the status of fishing entities 
re1nained unresolved. On the one hand, Taiwan wants contracting party status, arguing that, 
along with China, it will shortly accede to the World Trade Organisation (Tarte 2000a: 11). 
Taiwan believes that if territories have Contracting Party status, then it should too, stating that it 
would be a "1najor defect" if Taiwan was not accorded Contracting Party status (Opening 
State1nent MHLC 2000a: Alu1ex 3). China, alternatively, noted that: 
49 Over 60 per cent of the catch in the WCPO Convention area is harvested in the EEZs of the Oceanic states 
by Japan, Korea, Taiwan and the United States (Western Fishboat Owners Association 2000a: 6). 
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the local election in Taiwan and the element of democracy and other irrelevant matters 
have nothing to do with fish stock conservation and management ... our colleague from 
Chinese Taipei has politicized the fishing issues in his opening statement on purpose . .. 
we hold that the status of fishing entities has no inevitable and direct link with the 
conservation and management measures. (Opening Statement MHLC 2000a: Annex 3) 
It was obvious that neither side would agree to the Chair's alternative draft that allowed 
Taiwan to accede to the WCPF Convention as a fishing entity, once that Convention has entered 
into force. Taiwan's inclusion as a contracting party was supported by the five Oceanic states 
with which it had diplomatic relations at the time; that is, Palau, Marshall Islands, Solomon 
Islands, Tuvalu and Nauru. Pro-Taiwanese Oceanic states were strongly supported by the 
United States (Tarte 2000a: 10-11). While Papua New Guinea did not side with Taiwan, it did 
ad1nit that the WCPF Convention's provisions should bind both China and Taiwan (Opening 
Statement MHLC 2000: Annex 3). The Chair requested China and Taiwan "reconsider their 
positions" to resolve this matter before the MHLC7 negotiations (Tarte 2000a: 10-11 ). 
This issue was not concluded until late in the MHLC7 process. In order to placate 
China, the issue "was resolved eventually through obfuscation and ambiguity" (Tarte 2000b: 5). 
This was achieved through removal of any direct reference to Taiwan' s membership of the 
Con11nission. Nevertheless, provisions re1nain which bind Taiwan to the WCPF Convention, on 
its entry into force. This includes voting rights, except on the issues relating to amend1nents and 
new members, where only contracting parties 1nay vote on these issues. Taiwan was included as 
a 1nember in the final text of the WCPF Convention, "without making it explicit" (Tarte 
2000b:5)5° While this satisfied Taiwan, China expressed its disapproval with the amendment by 
abstaining in the final vote on adoption of the WCPF Convention. China maintains that Taiwan 
should have li1nited participation. As one observer points out, however, if Taiwan is going to 
pay 20 per cent of the budget, "it is insulting of China to argue over its paiiicipation" 
(anonymous 2000). The result was one more step in Taiwan' s bid for international diplomatic 
recognition. The United States had won its second can1paign at the MHLC7 negotiations. As 
Taiwan operates one of the major fishing fleets in the region it must be bound by the WCPF 
Convention and it is in the best interests of the FF A membership that Taiwan signs on to that 
Convention in whatever way is appropriate. 
Participation of territories and dependencies 
The third cainpaign of the United States at the negotiations concerned the status of French 
teITitories such as New Caledonia and French Polynesia. The United States teITitories (Guam, 
Northern Marianas, American Samoa), the New Zealand teITitory (Tokelau) and France, (Wallis 
and Futuna) will not be given voting rights in the new Commission. France argues that, in view 
of the evolving nature of both New Caledonia and French Polynesia, each should have voting 
50 In Part III, Section 1, Article 9.2 of the MHLC Convention, it states: "A fishing entity referred to in the 
Agreement, which has agreed to be bound by the regime established by this Convention in accordance with 
the provisions of Annex I, may participate in the wor~ including decision-making, of the Commission". 
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competency for their in-zone management and conservation. France, however, has voting 
competency for their in-zone co1npliance and enforcement. Japan is nervous regarding the 
prospect of additional Oceanic states with voting rights and the United States is against 
territories having voting competency (Tarte 2000a: 12-13). 
As far as France was concerned, it did not matter what mechanisn1 was to be found, but 
French Polynesia and New Caledonia must be able to vote. Ridings remarks that when France's 
proposal was put on the table again at the MHLC7, New Zealand said that it wanted Tokelau to 
have a vote and that there be no discri1nination (Interview, October 2000).51 The United States 
on the other hand, insisted that inten1ational law should be used to decide the issue. France 
abstained fron1 the final vote on the adoption of the WCPF Convention. Ridings suggests, 
however, that by not 1naking a state1nent at the ti1ne of the adoption of the article, France 
appeared to indicate that this issue 1night not be such a sticking point in the future. Ridings 
concludes that separate rights and voting rights might be negotiable in the future (Interview 
October 2000). In this regard, Tarte notes that: 
the extent of that participation would depend on their respective competence under 
intematjonal law and would be spelt out in separate rules of procedure. (2000b: 5) 
The United States had won its third cainpaign at the MHLC7 negotiating round. The issue of the 
voting rights of territories and possessions is an i1nportant issue in the region, as F onnn 
1nen1bership is lin1ited to independent states. The decision would have pleased the Oceanic 
states - if France's de1nands had succeeded, it 1nay have led to France securing 111ore votes. 
Entry into force 
The differences of opinion over the participation of territories and possessions were also 
reflected in the issue of entry into force. Fishing states, including the United States, believed 
that there should be at least 13 ratifications, including three fro1n the north (fishing states) and 
seven fron1 the south ( coastal states), before entry into force. The United States also argued for 
the deletion of the text that allowed "entry into force after two years on the basis of twelve 
ratifications even without any northen1 (i.e. fishing) state ratifications" (Tarte 2000a: 13). This 
text was included to avoid delaying tactics, by even one fishing state, over entry into force. 
While Japan, Korea and China backed the United States proposal, they also argued that "at least 
two of the northern states be Asian states" (Tarte 2000a: 13). Australia questioned this latter 
proposal. Japan responded that the Asian states account for approxi1nately 60 per cent of the 
total catch. An added argu1nent of the Asian states was that the United States activities in the 
region are restricted to purse seine fishing (Tarte 2000a: 13). The Chair amended the MHLC6 
draft text to include ratification by at least three northern states and seven southern states, with 
51 At the MHLC6, New Zealand tabled a paper which argued that a mechanism should be put in place, 
whereby Tokelau could accede to the Convention. The United Kingdom, on behalf of Pitcairn Island, 
neither attended any of the MHLC negotiations, nor made any subrrussions regarding this issue. 
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13 states required for ratification, and entry into force increased to three years (Part XII, Article 
36). This result represents a compromise position for the FFC bloc, and also by the Asian 
fishing states. 
Participation of the European Union 
The Asian fishing states and the United States had dominated the region's tuna industry for 
many decades. New players were e1nerging, however, with the European Union requesting full 
participation in the Prepcon process that was to follow the signing of the WCPF Convention. 
The Prepcon is an interim regime until the entry into force of the WCPF Convention. The FFC 
is concerned about the increased level of fishing state participation in the process, specifically 
because the European Union might be difficult. In this regard, it was noted at the FFC 43 
n1eeting that the European Union had made "a fresh approach to certain FF A member countries" 
seeking endorsement for its full participation in the process. The meeting agreed not to support 
this request (FFC43 2000b: 5). The FFC bloc was also concerned that the European Union is not 
a flag state and that "competency would be divided between the EC and its individual member" 
(Tarte 2000a: 17). For exan1ple, The European Union's competence for fisheries only covers the 
European continent. If a European Union member has fisheries interests in the WCPO, that 
1nember has responsibility for those interests (Interview, Gray August 2000). Furthermore, the 
FFC was concerned that by allowing the European Union to participate it might lead to other 
fishing states seeking membership. This relates to Ecuador, Panama and Guatemala, all of 
whom fish in Kiribati's EEZ. Finally, it is known that members within the European Union 
opposed the Fish Stocks Agreement, for example, France and Spain (Interview, Doulman, April 
2001 ). 
The European Union believes there are several reasons why it is 'entitled ' to take part in 
the Prepcon. First, Spanish vessels fish in the region. Second, European Union nationals "were 
investing in the region to develop local fisheries" (Tarte 2000a: 18). Third, the European Union 
provides the region with funds for highly migratory fish stock research. As well, the European 
Union delegate notes that it might be awkward for the Union to ensure that 
vessels flying the flag of a member state .. . comply with regional terms and conditions of 
fishing if it were not a member of the interim regime. (Tarte 2000a: 18) 
The European Union tried to exert its power by threatening the Oceanic states with a reduction 
in its financial support to the region. It did not succeed. The European Union failed to achieve 
support for its full participation in the process. As Spain has not been allowed to fish within the 
in-zone jurisdiction of the European Union, and because it has overfished in other parts of the 
199 
The tide turns 
world, it needs new fishing grounds. The MHLC6 membership's decision to disallow the 
European Union ' s participation angered the European Union and Spain.52 
This is confinned by Cartwright, who believes it was the right 1nove to keep the 
European Union out until the MHLC process was complete, particularly to avoid a pre-e1nptive 
grab for an allocation of the tuna resource (Interview, May 2001). At the conclusion ofMHLC6, 
when the European Union was refused me1nbership, "they were furious" and "started cursing 
me and others, arguing that it was their right to full participation in the process" (Interview, 
Cartwright May 2001 ). Cartwright went on to concede that the European Union is more likely to 
con1ply with regulations than either Taiwan or Korea, and believes that it will be a "genuine 
partner in assisting the region to develop their tuna resource" (Interview, Cartwright May 2001 ). 
While a fisheries official, Les Clarke, 53 supports this view, he feels that the European 
Union has a lot of explaining to do, as "their compliance failures are in everyone's 1nind" 
(Interview April 2001 ). Furthermore, "an increasing number of people note the way they are 
treating other states, for example, the West African states" (Interview, May 2001 ). Clarke also 
believes that the European Union has no control over the Spanish or the French fishing fleets. 
Douhnan also discusses critically the issue of the European Union's participation in Oceania's 
tuna fishery, arguing that it had never previously displayed an interest in the region (Interview, 
April 2001).54 This was a good outco1ne for the region and demonstrated unity under pressure. 
In spite of Spain securing an access arrange1nent with Kiribati, it was not enough to secure 
1nembership of the MHLC process through the European Union. A fishing heavyweight, the 
European Union 1night have co1npounded the divisive tactics employed by the Asian fishing 
states over controversial issues at the MHLC negotiations. 
Observer program 
The Asian fishing states, such as Japan, were vocal in their opposition of another controversial 
issue, the observer pro grain, submitting alten1ative text that "curtailed and limited the role of the 
observers and strengthened protective 1neasures for the vessel's crew and fishing operations" 
52 
53 
54 
Another observer to the MHLC process noted that the European Union did not do itself any favours. It 
came late to the meetings and expected to be met with open arms. It was not. The conference had already 
decided who was going to be involved and who was not. There were cables back to Australia from the 
European Union, critical of Australia' s role in " locking them out" of the process (anonymous). 
Les Clarke, Fisheries official, FF A. 
Between 1987-1991 , Doulman made t\vo trips to Brussels to try to interest the European Union in fishing in 
the region, as a counter to the United States fleet. Other individuals also made trips for the same purpose. 
According to Doulman, the European Union was not interested, but has since decided to become involved. 
Further, the European Union 's stalling over ratification of the Fish Stocks Agreement infuriated the United 
Kingdom, which had deposited its instrument of acceptance, not just for itself, but also on behalf of its 
overseas territories, wh ich are not covered by the Treaty of Rome. The United Kingdom had asked France 
to do the same, but France had refused (interview, April 2001 ). Doulman specifically mentioned Michael 
Lodge, previously Legal Counsel at the FF A, (who now works with Satya Nandan at the International 
Seabed Authority) as being one of those individuals who also went, cap in hand, to Brussels to try to 
interest the European Union in the Pacific. 
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(Tarte 2000a: 23-24).55 While Japan's concerns were incorporated into the draft negotiating text 
at the conclusion of MHLC6, there remained two contentious issues. These were the 
acco1nmodation provided to observers on the vessels and the observer program's funding 
arrangements. In relation to observer accommodation, after further debate, a compro1nise in the 
wording was reached that accommodation would be at a level "normally available to an officer 
on board the vessel" (Annex 3, Article 3.3, MHLC/Draft Convention/Rev.I 19 April 2000). The 
funding issue remains controversial and has been left to the WCPF Com1nission to resolve. 
The observer progra1n's funding component will be proble1natic for the WCPF 
Commission. Asian fishing states are not in favour of the observer prograin. It is Japan's view 
that the MCS and observer program represent the "direct extension of in zone practice of certain 
group of countries over high seas" (Opening Statement MHLC 2000a: Annex 3). The FFC bloc 
prefers the funding to be based on cost recovery, making 1nembers liable for "the actual 
observer coverage of their vessels" (Tarte 2000a: 23). Fishing states, on the other hand, argue 
that the observer program should be based on the "assessed contributions of all members" (Tarte 
2000a: 23). The observer prograin is likely to be one of the most expensive components of the 
WCPF Com1nission's work progran1. The strength of the WCPF Convention will lie in its MCS 
provisions, including those back-up sanctions. The observer program is an essential component 
of MCS provisions. This outco1ne represents a watering-down of the WCPF Convention's text 
and of the MCS provisions that prevailed pre-MHLC and will have future conservation and 
1nanagement i1nplications. As a substantive provision of a meaningful multilateral treaty like the 
WCPF Convention, the observer prograin is linked to those objectives of collective fisheries 
diplomacy; specifically, sustainability, a fair return and indigenous control. Therefore, the 
dilution of this provision 1neans that these objectives have been undermined. 
Flag state jurisdiction 
Thus, the FFC bloc lost ground over compliance and enforcement issues. As well, the draft text 
was ainended to take account of fishing state concerns over erosion of flag state jurisdiction on 
the high seas. Japan argued successfully for the text to be further an1ended to give "greater 
protection for the flag state" (Tarte 2000a: 24 ). Japan also lobbied successfully for reassurance 
within the draft text that flag state responsibility will not be "overridden" by a coastal state 
,vhere a fishing vessel has fished illegally within its EEZ (Tarte 2000a: 24 ). The Canadian 
delegation 111ade boarding and inspection a focus of its MHLC6 Opening Statement, 
specifically, that the WCPF Convention should not "derogate from articles 21 and 22 of the 
Agreement in regard to boarding and inspection" (MHLC 2000a: Atu1ex 3). As Canada had had 
a very public fight with Spain in relation to its over-fishing of the Grand Banks ground-stock, it 
55 An observer to the MHLC process believed that the Japan was "50 years behind the rest of the world in 
understanding conservation " (anonymous). Hughes supports this belief, noting that in Japan's opinion, the 
environment "did not count" (Interview November 2000). Furthermore, Lack notes that "management and 
conservation are not on the agenda" for Japan (Interview, December 2000). 
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is committed to compliance and enforcement measures. Maximising flag state protection could 
easily lead to minimising compliance and enforcement 1neasures, resulting in a weakened 
regime. This represents a loss for the region again in relation to the objectives of collective 
fisheries diplomacy, as boarding and inspection relates specifically to sustainability, a fair retun1 
and indigenous control. 
While the Chair had been optimistic about the adoption of the WCPF Convention by 
consensus, by early into the MHLC7 n1eeting it was obvious this would not happen. When the 
draft text was put to the vote, it was adopted by 19 votes in favour, two against (Japan and 
Korea) and three abstentions (China, France and Tonga). Japan threatened the meeting by 
saying that the WCPF Convention would be "ineffective without the participation of the Asian 
fishing states" (Sydnes 2001: 801 ). Japan was also critical of the Chair's role, challenged the 
rules of procedure and "the credentials of Indonesia and Kiribati" (Sydnes 2001: 801 ). 
Furthen11ore, Japan told the meeting that it "would establish a competing Com1nission covering 
the northern part of the Convention area" (Sydnes 2001: 801). In spite of Japan's threats, all 
participating states, apart fron1 Japan, signed the Final Act and 11 states signed the WCPF 
Convention.56 Given Japan's actions at the MHLC7, it is clear it did not intend to sign the 
Convention. Taiwan signed a separate arrange1nent (Tarte 2000b: 5). The support of the 
Oceanic states for the Convention 1nay have reflected their belief that this was the best outcome 
that could be achieved. It was rumoured that the European Union had pressured Tonga not to 
sign at the MHLC7. Tonga has a rapidly expanding longline fleet that sells its fish directly to the 
European Union. Other rumours suggested that Tonga's delegation leader, Akau'ola,57 had 
arrived late at the negotiations and was unable to accept the changed decision-making 
provisions without advice fron1 his goven11nent. 58 Support was expressed for the European 
Union by a Tongan delegate, who re1narked to Scott (Interview, October 2000)59 that Spain 
should have been allowed 1ne1nbership of the MHLC process. 
The conclusion of the MHLC7 meeting marked the end of a lengthy negotiating process 
between fishing and Oceanic states which tested the resources of the regional bloc. As Sydnes 
(2001: 797) re1narks, "[T]the overwhehning number of issues negotiated during the MHLC 
were ... 1natters where there were important conflicts of interest". Fro1n the discussion of the 
56 
57 
58 
59 
States which signed included Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Marshall Islands, New 
Zealand (Depository), Palau, Philippines, Samoa, Tuvalu, United States and Vanuatu. 
As the leader of Tonga's delegation, Akau ' ola signed the WCPF Convention at the Prepcon meeting at 
Christchurch, New Zealand in April 2001. 
Thou lag mentioned that the Federated States of Micronesia had, at one time, tried to become a member 
under the Lome Convention. The response from the European Union was that "we were not wanted" . Then 
the European Union "developed an interest in fishing in our zone and suddenly the EU wants us to become 
a member" (Interview, April 2001). 
Delegates discussed with me the issue of Spanish fishing in the region. I was advised, for example, that the 
Director of Fisheries in Spain has just been appointed as Special Ambassador to Costa Rica, because that is 
where Spain is hoping to enter the Pacific fisheries (Interview, Doulman April 2001). In this regard, 
Heikkila noted that Spain is the most aggressive fishing nation he had ever seen, even more so than Japan. 
Spain is "totally arrogant" about its right to fish and wants a presence in the Pacific, perhaps through the 
IATTC (Interview, April 2001). It could achieve this through Costa Rica. 
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negotiations and the main provisions which were debated, the unity of the FFC bloc fraginented 
during the MHLC5 and the MHLC6 rounds because of poor FFC leadership, national interests 
and a decreased level of input from the L WG. There were inten1al and exten1al factors which 
sought to undermine regional co-operation at MHLC5 and MHLC6. These included the 
atte1npts by Asian fishing states to split the FFC by engaging with the PNA states, or individual 
PNA states. By doing so, they hoped to fracture the FFC and make gains in the negotiating text. 
Hence, fishing states were preoccupied with their own national interests, over the regional 
negotiating process or fisheries conservation and 1nanagement. These national interests reflect 
costs and benefits calculating those foreign and/or do1nestic policies of negotiating states. 
Internal negative factors included the self-interested actions of individual states, or 
individuals, such as the FFC Chair, antagonism between individuals within the FFC bloc and 
the self-interest of a regional sub-group. As regards the latter, fro1n the discussions above it is 
clear that the PNA group felt it had to take a stand independent of the FFC in order to express its 
concerns regarding specific issues of direct relevance to its skipjack purse seine industry. 
Divisions within the FFC, particularly over those with fish and those without fish, also occurred 
when the FFA was being established (see Chapter Three). The most impo1iant question is 
whether these divisions were enough to result in a decline in the effectiveness of collective 
diplo1nacy. In isolation, perhaps not. In combination, however, they were enough for the region 
to lose ground on several important negotiating issues, such as transship1nent, the precautionary 
approach, the observer progran1, boarding and inspection, 'special interest' over high seas 
pockets and enclaves, thus allowing the fishing states to gain so1ne control and influence over 
the process. 
It was not until MHLC7 that the region regained cohesion and unity. It is suggested that 
the bickering by Australia and New Zealand not only undennined their previous leadership roles 
in regional fisheries negotiations, but also demonstrated a weakness in Canberra's corporate 
knowledge on the co1nplex issues under negotiation. For exainple, Mark Gray co1nmenced work 
on the negotiations at MHLC3 and Joe Thwaites at MHLC7. Having regained a 1nore cohesive 
front, however, the Oceanic states were persuaded to accept a decision-making process that does 
not necessarily give the1n the confidence they need at the Com111ission's negotiating table. 
Several issues proved too difficult to resolve at the negotiations and have been left for the 
Co111n1ission to decide, for exan1ple, allocation and new entrants.60 If the chainbered voting 
syste1n is required to decide allocation issues at the Com111ission, there will be opportunity for 
suasion and other tactics to achieve outco1nes favoured by fishing states. This has implications 
for the Comn1ission's funding of such controversial issues as the observer program. 
60 A Resolution issued at MHLC5 which decided that "the number of participants in MHLC should not be 
increased", decided further "that requests for participation in MHLC will not be entertained until the draft 
Convention enters into force" and agrees "to consider applications for observer status as appropriate" 
(Annex 7 MHLC 1999b). 
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It is worth reflecting on whether, had the PFC bloc not lost its unifying role at 1YIHLC5, 
the WCPF Convention would be stronger than it is. As the Asian fishing states did not sign a 
weaker WCPF Convention, they certainly would not have signed a stronger one. Once that 
Convention enters into force, however, those fishing states who will want to retain their fishing 
access in the region, even if they are non-parties to the WCPF Convention, will have to abide by 
that Convention. The Fish Stocks Agreement requires that non-parties co-operate and co1nply 
with regional arrangeinents. 61 Loss of unity and cohesion within the PFC at 1YIHLC5 and 
1YIHLC6 led to a weaker regime and with it, less stringent conservation and management 
principles than those already in place through various regional and sub-regional instruinents.62 
Had the bloc been unified at the MHLC5 and the MHLC6, could they have fought these 
outc01nes and won? Does the outcome suggest that even though the PFC bloc de1nonstrated 
regional co-operation, it 111ay not have resulted in effectiveness in collective diplo1nacy? 
Perhaps the collective force of the Asian fishing states was enough to overco1ne whatever 
attempts at collective dipl01nacy the region attempted at those negotiating rounds. It 1nay not, 
therefore, have mattered at that stage whether they 1nounted an effective can1paign of collective 
dipl01nacy. 
What did matter, however, was the diplo1natic balancing act displayed throughout the 
process by the MHLC Chair, Amb_assador Satya Nandan and his colleague fr01n the 
Inten1ational Seabed Authority (ISA), Michael Lodge. Nandan, on behalf of Fiji, had presented 
a paper on the need for the conservation and 1nanage1nent of the region's fisheries at the 1976 
South Pacific Forun1 Meeting. As Fiji's representative, he had cainpaigned actively at the 
UNCLOS negotiations. He led the Fish Stocks negotiations during his tenure as the UN Under 
Secretary General for the Law of the Sea and subsequently was elected head of the ISA in 1996. 
Lodge was Legal Counsel at the FF A before taking up a position with Nandan at the ISA. It 
should be recalled that Lodge was part of an inner group of negotiators who assisted N andan 
draft the Fish Stocks Agreement. Lodge supported Nandan at the MHLC negotiations in his role 
as the Secretary of the Conference. The role played by Lodge took place 'behind the scenes', 
but was noted by the author at the first Prepcon negotiations and discussed generally by those 
interviewed during the course of the research. He acted as the eyes and ears of Nandan, as he 
worked his way around the conference participants, seeking to find and promote common 
ground and n1ove1nent forward on the issues being debated. For example, Hughes (interview 
Nove1nber 2000) noted that because Lodge took the time to listen and develop strong 
relationships with the delegations, Nandan relied on hiin to a great extent.63 
6 1 
62 
63 
See Part IV, Article 1 7 .1 of the Fish Stocks Agreement. 
Australia's Statement made upon the adoption of the Convention said that the "Convention should have 
been stronger and, with a longer term view by some participants, it could have been" (MHLC 2000b: 
Annex 9). 
Neil Hughes, an official with Environment Australia, was a member of Australia' s MHLC delegation. 
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It was N andan' s close association with the region which reassured the Oceanic 
participants that their interests were being protected. From the MHLC repo1is written by Tarte, 
the Opening and Closing State111ents presented by Nandan, and co111ments 111ade by observers 
such as Sydnes (2001), it is clear that Nandan's co111mitment to the Fish Stocks Convention and 
its application and benefit to the Oceanic region was foremost in his tireless chairing of the 
MHLC negotiation process. That the region achieved what it did in the WCPT Convention is in 
part due to his work on their behalf. Observers such as Syndes (2001: 807) co111111ents that 
because of the way the negotiations were structured, Nandan's leadership was pivotal through 
his agenda-setting· and his chairing of all substantive negotiations, and his proposing and 
drafting new provisions. Therefore, "he was a source of entrepreneurial and intellectual 
leadership throughout the MHLC process" (Syn des 2001: 807). 
The c0111111itn1ent shown by Nandan and Lodge to achieve a favourable outcome for the 
region is upheld by Tarte's (1999b: 3) comments that by MHLC4 the Asian fishing states had 
become dissatisfied with the way the negotiations were being steered by Nandan.64 Sydnes 
(2001: 802) argues that the Asian fishing states are the real "losers" in the process, because of 
the opposition they face "do111estically from politicians and the fishing industry". Therefore, the 
leadership and supp01i provided by N andan and Lodge at the MHLC negotiations did help to 
fashion a Convention that would provide a backbone for the conservation and 111anagement 
efforts of the Oceanic states. 
Section five: The roles of other key actors 
This Chapter has so far dealt with the MHLC5-MHLC7 negotiations, the contentious issues 
which were debated at those meetings, and the role of the Foru111 me111bership and that of the 
fore111ost of the Asian fishing states, Japan. It is important also to exainine the roles of other key 
actors in the MHLC process. These include the United States, France, Canada, China, Korea, 
Taiwan, Indonesia and the Philippines. 
United States 
The United States has been involved with tuna fisheries in the region since World War II and 
has, since signing the Multilateral Fisheries Treaty in 1987, been a strong supporter of the 
region's conservation and 111anagen1ent 111easures. This support n1anifested itself in a push for 
co-operation between fishing and Oceanic states to control unregulated high seas fishing in the 
early 1990s.65 The United States supported the Fish Stocks Agree111ent and saw the benefits of 
its application in establishing an organisation co111prising Oceanic and fishing states to conserve 
and manage fisheries resources across their migratory range in the western and central Pacific 
Ocean (WCPO). This attitude would cause friction during the MHLC negotiations, but 
64 
65 
This was also raised by a variety of delegates during interviews. 
In Chapter Five I discussed the United States ' promotion of fishing and Oceanic states ' co-operation at a 
Multilateral Fishing Treaty meeting in December 1991. 
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eventually the United States yielded to pressure by the Oceanic states to allow them to maintain 
sovereign rights over their in-zone fisheries. 66 From early on in the MHLC negotiations the 
United States adopted a supportive role towards the aspirations of the Oceanic states. However, 
on issues which were seen as opposing its fisheries foreign policy aims, the United States was 
more inclined to cross the floor to side with the views of other fishing states. As discussed in 
Chapter Five, the United States was, naturally, preoccupied with its national interests, both 
econo1nic and strategic. 
By MHLC3, there was a clear indication of the differences between the interests of 
fishing and coastal states. The United States, for example, was finnly allied with the FFC 
me1nbership and other coastal states on issues relating to monitoring, control and surveillance 
(MCS) and the precautionary approach. Alternatively, the United States was united with fishing 
states in relation to membership of the future Convention, total allowable catch (TAC) and an 
objection clause.67 The United States was diplo1natic in advancing its proposals and ideas and 
keen to be seen by other delegations as helping, not obstructing, the process. This was achieved 
not only by funding several of the MHLC negotiating rounds, but also by proposing and issuing 
draft articles throughout the negotiations, for example, on institutional structures, budget and 
finance, the observer program, transshipment, compliance, boarding and inspection and 
transparency. In addition, the United States chaired working groups on measures such as 
transshipment, observers and the VMS, prepared a paper on allocation, and suggested a list of 
Highly Migratory Species species to be covered.68 
Other initiatives raised by the United States included the support of independent 
scientific advice to the Commission; a proposal to allow flexibility in the Comn1ission's funding 
fonnula; and a draft article in relation to non government organisations (NGOs) as observers in 
the Co1n1nission. This initiative met with opposition from Japan, a strong opponent of NGO 
paiiicipation. Thus, as Tarte remarks, the "US has emerged as an increasingly pivotal actor in 
tenns of drafting and proposing text (1999b: 25). It is the most prodigious in its contributions." 
On issues where its strategic interests were parainount, the United States was also vocal, for 
exainple, its support of Taiwan's participation as a contracting party and its opposition to voting 
rights for territories. To achieve its strategic aims, the United States was not afraid to pressure 
the Oceanic states by reminding the1n of "its financial contributions and its fishing operations in 
order to reflect the possible consequences of it not being a party to the convention (which may 
follow if it did not get its way on certain issues)" (Tarte 1999b: 25). As Tarte (2000a: 8) 
remarks elsewhere, the 1nost important issue for the United States by the MHLC7, was decision 
66 
67 
68 
Article 7 (1) of the WCPT Convention notes that "Conservation and management measures established for 
the high seas and those adopted for areas under national jurisdiction shall be compatible in order to ensure 
conservation and management of highly migratory fish stocks in their entirety. To this end, the members of 
the Commission have a duty to cooperate for the purpose of achieving compatible measures in respect of 
such stocks" . 
See United States Country Statements to various MHI.,C meetings and Tarte 1998c. 
See Tarte ' s various MHl,C reports. 
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making. In discussions with delegates, they agreed that had its chambered voting system 
proposal not been accepted by the meeting, it would have been unlikely that the United States 
would have signed the Convention. Nevertheless, the WCPT Convention must have been seen 
by the United States ' delegation to be in its best interests, if participation of other powerful 
fishing states, such as Japan, could be assured. It was, after all, the United States that proposed a 
preparatory conference, to be convened by the depository government, \iVhich would meet on an 
ad hoc basis during the interim period before the WCPT Convention enters into force (Country 
Statement MHLC 2000a). The United States played a very careful role throughout these 
negotiations, ,;yary of upsetting its strategic and economic relations with either the Forum 
membership or its Asian interests. It succeeded, apart from the anxious comments made to me 
by Oceanic delegates in relation to the ramifications of the chambered voting system. It also 
achieved its other goals, for example, the non-voting rights of its territories and the participation 
by Taiwan. If Japan does sign on to the WCPT Convention, these negotiations \¥ill herald a 
major achievement in United States foreign policy. 
France 
As France has three territories in the region (Ne,;y Caledonia, Wallis and Futuna, and French 
Polynesia) it sat at the MHLC negotiating table as a full member. France ' s involvement in 
Oceania' s regional organisations originated with the establishment of the Pacific Community in 
194 7. One of its preoccupations during the MHLC negotiations was to ensure that the scientific 
work can-ied out by the Pacific Comn1unity was not undermined. It participated in the MHLC 
process by, for example, being part of a working group which met at the conclusion of MHLC3 
(along with Taiwan, Japan, Ne,;y Zealand and the United States) to review allocation methods 
used by other regional fisheries organisations (see Tarte 1999a: 8). France proposed 
membership for its three ten-itories, as each had participated in their o,;yn right at the 
negotiations, but France would remain responsible for their external affairs. France (Country 
Statement MHLC 20006) referred to "the diversity of evolving statutes existing in the Pacific 
area" ar1d noted that New Caledonia and French Polynesia would have, eventually, competence 
to become signatories and voting members. At MHLC7 there was support from New Zealand on 
France ' s position, but after intense negotiations with the United States, France yielded to United 
States persuasions not to allow membership for territories. Because of this , France abstained 
fr01n the final vote on the adoption of the convention. France ' s strategic considerations prevail 
through its maintenance of colonies in the Pacific region. While its nuclear testing program 
yielded to the demands of global forces , including the united forces of the Oceanic states, 
France realises the importance of the region to its fishing industry and its financial commitment 
to and involvement in the Pacific Community. For these reasons France will want to have a 
meaningful role in the future WCPT Commission and be seen as a fi shing state which is 
sympathetic to the Oceanic states. 
207 
The tide turns 
Canada 
At the MHLC4 negotiating round (where it was an observer), Canada pressed for membership 
of the MHLC process. It had to demonstrate 'real interest' in the region's fishery as either a 
fishing or coastal state. Nandan agreed to Canada's membership at the end of MHLC4, a 1nove 
not welcomed by Japan, who argued Canada did not have a "significant fishing presence in the 
area" (Tarte 1999a: 10). It was Nandan's view, however, that Canada should be granted 
membership because of its "history of southern albacore fishing in the region; geographic status 
as a Pacific nation; its strong support for fisheries development in the region; and for fisheries 
conservation and management (including the UNIA)" (Tarte 1999a: 11). Canada went on to 
play an active role in the negotiations by supporting the Chair's draft text on issues such as 
voting, along with FFC, Indonesia and Philippines. Canada, in line with the views expressed by 
the United States, Australia and New Zealand, believed in the separation of the scientific 
co1nmittee and the provision of scientific services, a belief not shared by the Asian fishing states 
(Tarte 1999b: 23). At MHLC6, Canada atten1pted to persuade the 111eeting to extend the eastern 
boundary of the Pacific to include its east coast to enable coverage of northern albacore. The 
FFC opposed this idea. The Chair noted Canada's proposal, but it was not taken on board. 
(Tarte 2000a: 22). Canada raised the issue again in its Staten1ent at MHLC7, but to no avail 
(MHLC 2000b ). One delegate noted that Canada "preached environmental concerns, but was 
selfish" (anonymous). It is hardly surprising. Prior to the-Fish Stocks Agreement, Canada 
fought a fierce battle to protect its Grand Banks ground-fish stocks, and lost. Its push for 
no1ihern albacore protection through the WCPT Convention highlighted the inadequacy of 
existing agreements, nainely the IATTC. Canada's long-term support for fisheries in the WCPO 
and its own struggle to protect diminishing stocks will ensure the region has an ally at the 
C01n1nission's negotiating table. 
China 
China's views were at sharp vanance with those of the FFC n1embership throughout the 
negotiations. For exainple, China strongly opposed participation by NGOs (Tarte1998c: 8). 
Along with Taiwan and Japan, it believed in minimizing enforce1nent and compliance 
mechanis1ns within the convention, and it strongly supported Japan's new draft text at MHLC4 
(Tarte 1999a: 8). Like other Asian fishing states, China was opposed to observers on vessels, 
citing their foreign culture, the cost involved and the logistics required for their presence. In 
addition, China opposed the draft convention's boarding and inspection provisions, arguing that 
it was not a me1nber of the Fish Stocks Agreen1ent and did not agree with these provisions 
(Country Statement MHLC 1999b ). China had opposed the Fish Stocks Agreement because it 
believed that the Agreement "eroded flag state freedon1 and jurisdiction on the high seas (Tarte 
2001c: 15) Throughout the negotiations, however, one issue re1nained constant. That was 
China' s refusal to accept Taiwan's participation in the negotiations as anything except an 
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observer (Country Statement MHLC 2000b). By MHLC7, China, like Japan and Korea, still 
pushed for an objection procedure, in the face of the chambered voting syste1n advanced by the 
United States (Tarte 2000b: 3). In the light of Japan's stand at MHLC7, China offered te1npered 
support, aware of its need not to get the United States and others offside. When the MHLC7 
negotiations agreed to make Taiwan a member, although not explicitly, and bound it to the 
convention on its entry into force, China showed its displeasure by abstaining in the final vote 
on adoption of the convention, but did, however, sign the Final Act. China could become a 
powerful fishing force in the region. Its involvement in this process is, therefore, critical. In 
spite of its displeasure at Taiwan's circuitous inclusion, China will participate in the Prepcon 
process and will want to sit at the Commission's negotiating table, with Taiwan. 
Korea 
Korea finnly believed that the Fish Stocks Agreement "eroded flag state freedom and 
jurisdiction on the high seas (Tarte 2001c: 15). These views on the Agreement shadowed 
Korea's support for the WCPT draft negotiating text throughout the MHLC process. At 
MHLC4, Korea offered public support for the alternative draft convention text sub1nitted by 
Japan (Korea's State1nent MHLC 1999a). Korea, like China, Taiwan and Japan, believed in 
minin1ising monitoring, control and surveillance measures (MCS) within the convention. For 
exan1ple, along with other Asian fishing states, Korea opposed the presence of observers on 
vessels, citing the costs involved, their foreign cultures and the logistics required for their 
presence (Tarte 1998c: 9, 1999a: 14). Furthermore, Korea agreed with Japan that any references 
to the precautionary approach should be removed from the text. At MHLC5, Korea argued that 
"coastal states did not have the legal right to allocation within EEZs and that to claim ownership 
of tuna within EEZs was 'unreasonable'. The MHLC Chair, Nandan, corrected Korea on this 
issue (Taiie 1999b: 11 ). Other opposing views included Korea's belief that coastal states should 
not have special rights to high seas pockets. Korea, like Taiwan and Japan, insisted that VMS 
data should go to a flag state first and then be retransmitted to the Conunission (Tarte 1999b; 
13). Korea supported Japan's idea of merging the scientific services with the scientific 
co1n1nittee and gave some support at MHLC7 for Japan's position. Korea, like Japan, voted 
against the Convention's final draft, but did sign the Final Act. Korea' s supporting role for 
Japan throughout the MHLC negotiations reflected the dynamics of their bilateral relationship. 
Historically, Japan funded Korea' s purse seine expansion into the region and, like Taiwan and 
China, is very conscious of their industry's reliance on Japan' s domestic tuna economy. 
Taiwan 
Taiwan, like China, Korea and Japan, believed in minimizing enforcement and compliance 
mechanisms within the convention (Tarte 1998c: 9). Taiwan' s overriding concen1 was to be 
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included as a contracting party, and it enjoyed full men1bership in the MHLC process.69 For 
example, Taiwan was part of a working group which met at the conclusion of MHLC3 (along 
with France, Japan, New Zealand and the United States) to review allocation 111ethods used by 
other regional fisheries organisations (Tarte 1999a: 8). Like other Asian states, Taiwan opposed 
the presence of observers on vessels, citing cost, their foreign cultures and the logistics required 
for their presence. Taiwan believed, as did Korea and Japan, that VMS data should go to a flag 
state first and then be retransmitted to the Commission (Tarte 1999b: 13). Taiwan agreed to be 
bound by the Convention once it enters into force, without its me111bership being explicitly 
stated, thus denying Taiwan contracting party status. Taiwan signed a separate arrangement 
providing for its participation in the Prepcon and its agree111ent to be bound by provisions of the 
Convention. Taiwan's eagen1ess to achieve some degree of legiti111acy within the global 
con1111unity of states may have resulted in less recognition, rather than more, within the WCPT 
Convention. There was a sense among those FFC delegates interviewed that Taiwan could have 
bargained 111ore for greater status, given its projected level of contributions to the WCPT 
Co111n1ission and its prograins.70 Nevertheless, the Taiwanese delegation appeared pleased with 
the result at the conclusion of the MHLC negotiations (interviews, various). 
Indonesia 
At MHLC4 Indonesia raised its opposition to the fish caught by its domestic fishing fleet within 
its EEZ being included when calculating funding contributions (Tarte 1999a: 17). Furthennore, 
Indonesia insisted its archipelagic waters were sovereign territory and therefore should not be 
included in the convention area (see Country Statement MHLC 1999b). This was behind 
Indonesia' s push for a defined western boundary. Indonesia supported the Chair' s draft text on 
issues such as voting, along with the FFC, Canada and Philippines, and also backed the FFC' s 
clain1s for special rights to high seas areas and high seas pockets (Tarte 1999b: 12). At the 
Chair' s request, Indonesia n1ediated with China and Taiwan to try and resolve their differences 
over 111e111bership in the lead-up to MHLC6 (Tarte 1999b: 5). Though this was not achieved, 
Indonesia was seen to play an active role in the MHLC negotiations and was perceived by the 
Oceanic delegates as providing solidarity on a range of issues. This will do Indonesia no harm 
in the future as its industry expands into the Oceanic region. 
Philippines 
The Philippines supported the Chair ' s draft text on issues such as voting, along with FFC, 
Indonesia and Canada. At MHLCS, however, there was "a strong push by the Philippines to 
further water down the restrictions on transship111ent, arguing that this provision was ' too 
69 
70 
Note the very pointed remarks made in Taiwan ' s Statement at MHLC6, " . .. it would be a major defect were 
Taiwan not to be rendered a Contracting Party status, should this Conference so agree". Taiwan stressed its 
views on this issue again in its Country Statement at MHLC7. 
Some pro-Taiwan FFC delegates noted that Taiwan could pay as much as 20 per cent towards the 
Commission 's budget. 
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negative' and should take into account the characteristics of the fishery ( and the economic need 
of small vessels to transship)" (Tarte 1999b: 14). These views were supported by Papua New 
Guinea, which allows Filipino purse seiners to transship at sea within its EEZ (Tarte 2000a: 21 ). 
For reasons different to those of the traditional fishing states, the Philippines expressed 
opposition to the VMS, mainly in relation to their traditional fishing boats, arguing that they 
would not be able to afford to operate the VMS, nor would the govenllllent support it. These 
arguments 1net with opposition from the United States and New Zealand, both of who1n argued 
that any exemptions could 'unravel' the VMS requiren1ents (Tarte 2000a: 20, see also Country 
Statements MHLC 1999b ). Thus the Philippines was prepared to argue against fisheries 
conservation and manage1nent measures when national interests prevailed. Papua New Guinea's 
support for the Philippines over transship1nent needs is interesting and must reflect their 
confidence in the accuracy of the Philippines' transshipn1ent records. It may also be a reflection 
of trust within their bilateral fisheries relationship. Nevertheless, these attitudes on the VMS and 
transshipment are not helpful in the pursuit of a united approach to fisheries conservation and 
1nanage1nent within the WCPT region. 
The participation by these states in the MHLC process de1nonstrated the importance of 
national interests and how these were reflected in their differing strategic aims within the 
negotiations. States like Canada and the United States were keen to see strong measures relating 
to monitoring control and surveillance issues. However, the United States was prepared to exert 
its power with the Oceanic states on those issues which reflected its concerns as a fishing state, 
for exainple, the Convention area, decision-making, participation of territories, and the issue of 
high seas pockets. In addition, the United States needed to ensure that its strategic goals, 
whether econo1nic or political, were met. In the saine way, France also played a cautious role; 
on the one hand wishing to influence any measures which would impact on its own fishing 
industry, while also protecting its own presence in the region, whether through the Pacific 
Co1nn1unity or through its territories. Indonesia and the Philippines, as more recent players in 
the region's tuna fishery, wanted to secure their own fishing industries. Indonesia, in particular, 
allied itself with the Oceanic states and their conservation and management goals. Taiwan, 
China and Korea were always going to ally the1nselves with Japan, given their reliance on 
Japan ' s don1estic tuna 111arket. This was both strategic and practical. The WCPT Commission' s 
negotiating table will comprise many differing views. The challenge will be to ensure that these 
views reflect the goals and aspirations of the WCPT Convention. 
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Section six: An overview of the WCPT Convention 
It is necessary to examine the WCPT Convention before drawing any final conclusions about 
the MHLC process. In the Introduction, I acknowledged the MHLC process as a remarkable feat 
of 1nultilateral diplomacy. There are differing perspectives on the length of the MHLC 
negotiating process. Some observers, such as Syndes (2001: 807) believe the "focused 
negotiations, MHLC3 to MHLC7, was little 1nore than two years". The longer perspective, 
recognising the resources required by the Oceanic states to maintain their involve1nent fro1n that 
first MHLC 1 meeting in December 1994 to the conclusion of MHLC7 in September 2000, is 
1nore accurate. This included the Intersessional meetings which interspersed the negotiating 
process. 
The road to the WCPT Convention 
Meeting When Reason 
MHLCl December 1994 Preliminary discussions on improving co-operation on 
issues such as compliance and data collection. 
Technical Septe1nber 1995 Discussions on i1nproved provision of catch and effort 
Intersessional data and establishing a frainework for data collection. 
Technical July 1996 and Discussions on the regional vessel monitoring system 
Intersessi onal November 1996 (VMS) 
MHLC2 June 1997 Aim for a Declaration to com1nit all parties to co-
operate in regional arrangements to achieve co1npatible 
management measures. 
Technical Dece1nber 1997 Fisheries management consultations. 
Intersessional 
Technical March 1998 Discussion of monitoring, control and surveillance 
Intersessional issues. 
Workshop May 1998 To discuss the application of the precautionary 
approach. 
MHLC3 June 1998 Discussion of the draft articles ( circulated by Satya 
N andan in advance of the meeting) for a Convention. 
MHLC4 February 1999 To negotiate key aspects of the draft convention. 
MHLC5 Septe1nber 1999 To continue the negotiations as well as to consider the 
develop1nent of an interim regin1e. 
MHLC6 April 2000 Final working session to resolve outstanding issues and 
to elaborate on the structure of the interim regime. 
MHLC7 August/Septen1ber Resolution of any outstanding issues, conclusion of the 
2000 WCPT Convention and its opening for signature. 
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The fact that the Oceanic states maintained their commitment of sparse resources is 
testainent to their willingness to negotiate a Convention that would help safeguard their tuna 
resource into the future. The WCPT Convention (which co1nprises twelve Parts and four 
Annexes71) gives practical meaning to the United Nations ' Fish Stocks Agreement, through its 
application to the conservation and n1anagement of a robust tuna fishery, such as that of the 
Westen1 and Central Pacific Ocean (WCPO). The WCPT Convention states that its primary 
objective is "to ensure, through effective manage1nent, the long-term conservation and 
sustainable use of highly 1nigratory fish stocks in the westen1 and central Pacific Ocean" (Part I, 
Article 2). As Aqorau (2002: 6) notes, this objective originates from the principle elucidated in 
the Fish Stocks Agree1nent that "highly migratory fish stocks must be managed throughout their 
n1igratory range both in areas under national jurisdiction and areas of high seas". 72 Furthennore, 
"the WCPT Convention reasserts the rights and duties of States under the LOSC and the United 
Nations Fish Stocks Agree1nent" (Aqorau 2002: 7). It is to enter into force upon ratification by 
three northen1 states ( fishing states) and seven southern states ( coastal states). "If, within three 
years of its adoption, this Convention has not been ratified" by three northen1 states, "this 
Convention shall enter into force six n1onths after the deposit of the thirteenth ratification" 
(Article 36, Part XII, WCPT Convention). This provision was included to avoid the delay of its 
entry into force by fishing states (see Tarte 2001a: 36). Nevertheless, as Tarte (2001a: 36) then 
mentions, the Convention will be difficult to enforce without fishing state participation. In 
addition, as fishing states will bear the 1najor financial burden of the Commission's activities, 
unless a wide range of fishing states ratify the Convention, the burden will fall on those fishing 
states who have done so (see also Jack 2001). 
71 
72 
Cordonnery (2001: 4) notes: 
[T]the primary mechanism for the implementation of the convention is a cormnission 
which is to be established with a secretariat and two committees dealing with compliance 
and scientific issues. The Commission will be the decision-making body and has the 
authority to: 
determine the total allowable catch and adopt such conservation and management 
1neasures that may be necessary to ensure the long-tenn sustainability of stocks; ensure 
that conservation and management measures on the high seas are compatible with areas 
under national jurisdiction; establish cooperative mechanisms for effective monitoring, 
control, surveillance, and enforcement, including a vessel monitoring system; promote 
peaceful settlement of disputes; and compile and disseminate statistical data while 
maintaining confidentiality (see also Part III, Articlel 0 (a), (b ); Article 10.1 (i); Article 
10.l(n) and Article 10.l(e), WCPT Convention). 
Part I (General Provisions) ; Part II (Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks); Part 
III (Commission for the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western 
and Central Pacific Ocean); Part IV (Obligations of Members of the Commission); Part V (Duties of the 
Flag State); Part VI (Compliance and Enforcement) ; Part VII (Regional Observer Programme and 
Regulation of Transhipment) ; Part VIII (Requirements of Developing States); Part IX (Peaceful Settlement 
of Disputes); Part X (Non-Parties to this Convention); Part XI (Good Faith and Abuse of Rights) ; and Part 
XII (Final Provisions). Annex 1 (Fishing Entities); Annex II (Review Panel) ; Annex III (Terms and 
Conditions for Fishing); and Annex IV (Information Requirements). 
See Article 7 (1 )(b ), Fish Stocks Agreement. 
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Precautionary approach 
An important aspect of the Commission's roles in conserving and managing the region's tuna 
resources concen1s that of the precautionary approach. In relation to the Con1mission' s 
responsibilities to apply "certain principles of conservation and management including the 
precautionary approach, Aqorau (2002: 7) notes that the Convention (Article 6. l(a), (b) and 
Article 6.3) "contains a weakened provision on the application of the precautionary approach 
largely in part through the insistence of Japan that such an approach was generally unknown in 
tuna fisheries 1nanagen1ent" (see also MHLC6 Rep01i). Aqorau (2002: 7) queries whether the 
Com1nission is "obliged to apply the precautionary approach?" From another perspective, the 
Con1mission is required to take into account any reports or recommendations by the Scientific 
Co1nn1ittee and that those would be based on "assess1nents and analyses prepared by scientific 
experts" (Cordonnery 2001: 7). Thus, it is not just a 1natter of whether the Co1nmission is 
obliged to apply the precautionary approach, but also whether the Co1n1nission is "capable of 
adopting conservation measures in the face of scientific uncertainty" (Cordonnery 2001 :7). As 
Cordonnery (2001: 7) goes on to suggest, gaps in scientific data, and therefore scientific 
"uncertainty", can result in "powerful arguments for reluctant states not to adopt proposed 
conservation measures". Thus, the dile1nmas surrounding such obligations and capabilities have 
the capacity to undermine the effectiveness of the Com1nission's work to ensure that 
conservation and 1nanage1nent measures are upheld. 
Total Allowable Catch 
Still within the ainbit of conserving and 1nanaging the region's highly migratory fish stocks are 
the Co1mnission's responsibilities in its detennination of Total Allowable Catch (TAC) and 
whether the subsequent allocation of quota should include tuna harvested within an EEZ. 
Cordonnery (2001: 8) notes that the Oceanic states are currently in the process of reviewing 
their fisheries legislation and putting into place national fisheries manage1nent plans to secure 
their right to set national EEZ quotas and rights of access.73 This was an issue about which the 
FF A n1embership was unequivocal during the MHLC negotiations. It raises the question of 
whether "the Commission has powers over areas under national jurisdiction" (Aqorau 2001: 
15). Aqorau (2001: 15) believes that because of this "it is necessary to distinguish between the 
application of the WCPT Convention and the jurisdictional co1npetence of the Co1nmission". 
The Convention n1akes it clear that it includes all highly 1nigratory stocks, except for sauries 74 
( see Article 1 ( f)). Nevertheless, as Aq orau notes (2001: 16), "the powers of the Commission are 
"without prejudice" to the sovereign rights of coastal States" ( see Article 10 .1 , W CPT 
Convention). Furthermore, because the Commission' s TAC and allocation responsibilities are 
73 For example, Papua New Guinea adopted a Plan in November 1998; the Republic of Vanuatu adopted a 
Plan in August 2000; and the Federated States of Micronesia adopted a Plan in January 2001 (see Jack 
2001 : 28). 
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confined to the Convention area, conservation measures may prove difficult, given the open 
western and northern boundaries (see Cordonnery 2001: 8). Some observers fear that the 
uncertainty over the weighting given to historical catch, for example, may lead to the Oceanic 
states being allocated a "much reduced share of the TAC" (Tarte 2001 c: 22). In addition, if 
issues such as the TAC become bogged down at the Co111n1ission's negotiating table, "conflicts 
over perceived economic interests could undennine the effective i111ple111entation of the 
convention" (Tarte 2001c: 23). 
Decision-making 
This leads into an examination. of the Convention's decision-making procedures which originate 
in Article 20 of the WCPT. Observers have called these provisions "innovative", "novel" and 
"controversial" (see Aqorau 2002: 12 and Jack 2001: 38). For example, Annex 1 of the WCPT 
requires that fishing entities "agree to be bound by the regi111e established by this Convention". 
Further, that they "shall participate in the work of the Commission, including decision-making". 
This goes beyond the duties of an entity laid down in the Fish Stocks Agreen1ent and reflects the 
desire of the Oceanic states to secure Taiwan's participation. In another innovative step, Article 
21 ( 6) of the WCPT Convention allows a review panel to evaluate specific decisions, as sought 
by an individual 111en1ber. This step marks a divergence from the 111ore traditional decision by an 
individual member to 'opt-out' (see Jack 2001: 39). As Aqorau (2002: 13) notes, the opt-out 
clause "i111peded inten1ational fisheries organisations". Until the review panel has brought down 
a decision, no individual 111ember "shall be required to give effect to the decision in question" 
(Article 20.7 WCPT). 
A further innovative, but controversial, decision-111aking provision relates to Articles 
20.2 and 20.3 of the WCPT Convention. For "decisions on questions of substance", consensus 
is 111andatory (Cordonnery 2002: 5). These include rules of procedure, budget and TAC 
allocation. Where consensus cannot be reached, a three-fourths majority of those present shall 
be sought in two chan1bers, one containing the members of the South Pacific Forum Fisheries 
Agency (FFA) and the other chainber comprising non-FFA members. In addition, " in no 
circumstances shall a proposal be defeated by two or fewer votes in either chamber (Article 
20.1). Cordonnery (2002: 5) believes that this provision has two rainifications for the decision-
n1aking process. First, "the adoption of conservation and n1anagement measures 111ay be 
prevented by the opposition of any three norunen1bers of the FF A" . Second, "despite the fact 
that the objection procedure was rejected, any n1e111ber which has voted against a decision 111ay 
seek a review of the decision by a review panel" (Cordonnery 2002: 5). As mentioned earlier, 
while the review panel is considering its decision, no member has to enforce that decision. Thus, 
74 Japan was successful in having sauries omitted from the WCPT Convention, as it is a fish stock that does 
not occur within the Convention area. 
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the delays caused by the review panel's deliberations 111ay have ramifications for any 
conservation and management measures which the FF A membership wishes to pr0111ote. 
Convention area 
This discussion has focused on the major aspects of the WCPT Convention, such as the budget, 
conservation and 111anagement issues (including the Convention area) and decision-making. 
There are also other issues on which countries failed to reach agreement during the MHLC 
negotiations, such as compliance and enforce111ent, VMS, observers and transshipment and 
which have been left to the WCPT Commission to resolve and imple111ent. Further, the lack of 
delimitation for the western and northern boundaries to the WCPT Convention area will create 
difficulties for the conservation and 111anagement of skipjack, yellowfin, bigeye and albacore 
tuna. Skipjack and yellowfin tuna are found outside the WCPT Convention area in the 
archipelagic waters of the Philippines and Indonesia. Thus, the stocks are not managed in their 
entirety under the WCPT Convei)tion. In addition, bigeye tuna's migratory pattern extends fro111 
the East coast of the Pacific to the West coast of the Pacific. For bigeye to be managed in its 
111igratory range, the WCPT Convention would need to be extended to the West coast of the 
A111ericas. Moreover, between 10 and 20 per cent of albacore tuna are located east of the WCPT 
Convention area, requiring co-ordination and management with the North Alnerican trawl 
fleet. 75 
Interim regime 
In his Closing Statement at MHLC4, Satya Nandan raised the suggestion of putting an interim 
regin1e in place pending the entry into force of the WCPT Convention (Annex 7 MHLC 1999a). 
The establishment of Prepcon was agreed to at MHLC7. The responsibility for convening its 
first session rested with New Zealand as the depositary of the WCPT Convention (see Annex, 
Resolution 1, WCPT Convention).76 The Prepcon would: 
prepare draft rules of procedure for the commission and the provisional agenda for the 
first meeting of the corrunission. The Preparatory Conference is to 1nake 
recommendations concerning the establishment of the headquarters of the commission 
and the budget for the first financial period, including a scheme for contributions to the 
budget. It will also formulate recorrunendatiohs on the collection of data and infonnation, 
the establishment of a record of fishing vessels, and the implementation of Articles 11, 
12,2 13 , 14, 24.8, 24.9, 24.10 and 30.3077 of the Convention (Cordonnery 2002: 12). 
Men1bership of the Prepcon is restricted to the MHLC parties, "including non-
signatories and territories" ( Syndes 2001: 803). Therefore, even though countries such as Japan 
have not signed the Convention, they are entitled to participate in the Prepcon process. Prepcon 
75 
76 
77 
See Jack 2001 for a detailed discussion on this issue. 
This thesis will only examine Prepcon 1 and Prepcon 2, both of which took place before submission of the 
thesis. 
These articles relate to subsidiary bodies of the Convention; functions of the Scientific Committee; 
scientific services; functions of the Technical and Compliance Committee; the Vessel Monitoring System 
(VMS); the participation by developing states. 
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membership by observers to the lvfHLC process, such as the European Union, Mexico and Peru, 
has been denied. They can, however, attend as observers. Prepcon 1 took place at Christchurch 
from 23-28 April 2001 78 and was chaired by the retired New Zealand diplomat, Mr Michael 
Powles. 
Prepcon 1 
In interviews with Prepcon 179 participants all stressed that the first 1neeting was right to 
proceed slowly and to lin1it itself to discussion on draft rules of procedure. This was done in 
large paii to quell the unease felt by Asian fishing states that the "wide scope" of the Prepcon ' s 
functions would lead to the establishn1ent of a "de facto regime" (Sydnes 2001: 803 ). States 
such as Korea, China and Tai,;vai1 believed the Prepcon process should be restricted to 
"preli1ninaiy ai1d basic tasks" and vlere opposed to the Prepon "considering or adopting 
reco1nmendations for interin1 conservation and 1nanagen1ent" (Tarte 2001 b: 3). Such beliefs 
\¥ere linked to their concen1s throughout the lvfHLC process of the ·wide-ranging pov,rers and 
functions of the future WCPT C01ru11ission ( see also Tarte 2001 b: 3 ). A dissenting attitude was 
struck by Japan when it failed to attend Prepcon 1, largely out of protest at the shape and 
content of the WCPT Convention and the refusal by other conference participai1ts to re-open 
aspects of the instruinent. 80 Japan ' s non-attendance ,;vas of real concern to the United States 
because of the increasingly li1nited support domestically for the Convention that ,;vould result 
fron1 the refusal of another n1ajor fishing state to becon1e a paiiy to it. Other issues of concern at 
Prepcon 1 focused on the insistence of French teITitories to be given voting rights and decision-
n1aking po,;vers in the C01nn1ission "co1nn1ensurate with their levels of political autono1ny" and 
the dete1n1ination by the Europeans for full paiiicipation (see Taiie 2001b: 4) . These issues had 
ren1ained contentious since the last lvfHLC negotiating round. 
The level of concen1 felt by the United States in relation to Japan ' s absence \¥as 
reflected in its proposal for an additional agenda ite1n. It proposed the possibility of a meeting 
vvith Japai1 to allay its concerns swTounding the V/ CPT Convention. The Philippines, China, 
Tai,;vai1, Korea and Cai1ada supported the ite111. As Taiie (2001 b: 4) notes, the proposal caused 
disquiet among the FFC 1nembership, fearing a reopening of the Convention text, the 
overshadowing ai1d undennining of Prepcon 2 by parallel discussions, and the financial 
in1plications of another 111eeting. In agreeing to the 1neeting, the FFC 111e1nbership stressed its 
78 
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0 
This \Vas in line with the requirements of Annex 1, Resolution 1 of the WCPT Convention, which states 
"the first session of the Conference shall take place no sooner than 180 days and no later than 240 days 
after the Convention is opened for signature". That is, between six. to nine months after the conclusion of 
MHLC7 (September 2000). 
All 16 FF A members attended, as \Vell as the United States, Canada, the Philippines, Indonesia, China, 
Korea, Taiv,;an, Ne\V Caledonia and the European Union. 
In a 'Circular at the Request of the Government of Japan' , distributed at Prepcon 1, it \Vas stated that the 
"·present Convention adopted at the t1i MHLC meeting last year does not constitute an appropriate basis to 
form the future relevant and workable regional fisheries organizations because the negotiations for the 
Convention did not follmv due process seeking good faith negotiations, as stipulated in the relevant 
pro isions of ICLOS and UN Fish Stock Agreement". 
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position that 'there would be no re-opening or weakening of the final text of the convention or 
resolutions"(Tarte 2001 b: 4 ). 
The issue of participation by territories received cautious support from the United 
States, which noted that they needed to meet 'a predetennined standard' in order to vote or 
participate in decision making (Tarte 2001 b: 4). This issue would be discussed again at Prepcon 
2. On the subject of European Union me1nbership, wide concern was voiced to 1ne during 
interviews with Oceanic delegates as to with who1n the region would deal, for exan1ple, Spain 
or France, or the European Union itself (see also Tarte 2001b: 4). The European Union was not 
invited to join the Prepcon as a men1ber. No decision was made at Prepcon 1 as to the location 
of the WCPT Commission, although several Oceanic states were interested in no1ninating for 
the headquarters. Two budgetary groups were fanned, one to focus on organisational and 
budget issues, the other to focus on the provision of scientific advice to the Com1nission. An 
organisation fund was set up to resource the establishment of an Interi1n Secretariat and to fund 
subsequent Prepcon meetings (see Tarte 2002a and \V\VW.ocean-affairs.com/PrepCon). 
Apart fro1n the consternation among participants at Japan's absence, the anger by the 
European Union at the meeting's refusal to grant it 1nen1bership, and the continued unease felt 
by Oceanic delegates about aspects of the WCPT Convention, Prepcon 1 was a sound beginning 
to a process which would end with the entry into force of the WCPT Convention. In the interests 
of budgetary constraint, no intersessionals were held, apart from the meeting with Japan, which 
was expected to take place before Prepcon 2.81 Given Japan's i1nportance to the region's tuna 
industry, its isolation from the process was not a desirable outco1ne for either fishing or coastal 
states. Therefore, persuading Japan to participate would be the 1najor preoccupation of the 
Prepcon 1nen1bership. 
Prepcon 2 
Prepcon 2 took place at Madang, Papua New Guinea, fro1n 25 February to 1 March 2002.82 
Imn1ediately prior to that 111eeting, an Infon11al Consultation was convened to discuss the 
reservations held by a nu1nber of states, including Japan and Korea, on aspects of the WCPT 
Convention. Japan refused to· attend the Consultation because "there was no provision in the 
agenda for amendn1ents of the convention text" (Tarte 2002a: 3).83 As mentioned above, at 
Prepcon 1, the FF A 1nembership had been united in its stand to not reopen the Convention text. 
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For a full outline of Prepcon 1 and 2 and their achievements, see http: //www.ocean-
affairs.com/PrepCon.html, the website of the Prepcon process. 
All 16 FF A members attended, as well as China, Korea, United States, Taiwan, France, Wallis and Futuna, 
New Caledonia, Canada, Philippines, Indonesia, and the European Union. Russia also made an appearance 
at Prepcon 2. The United Kingdom and French Polynesia did not attend. 
As will be recalled from discussions on the MHLC process, fishing states like Japan and Korea had been 
opposed to various aspects of the Convention, including decision making, dispute settlement, application of 
the precautionary approach or references to the Fish Stocks Agreement, boarding and inspection on the 
high seas, the role of observers on vessels, provision of data under the VMS and the convention area (see 
Tarte 2002a: 3). 
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Thus, it appeared the positions were polarised. In light of the entry into force of the Fish Stocks 
Agreement, the Prepcon Chair, Ambassador Powles informed the Consultation that it was now 
"quite appropriate to refer to it in the convention text, especially given that the WCPF 
convention built on the UN Fish Stocks Agreement" (Tarte 2002a: 3 ). Because of this, the 
Consultation concentrated on measures such as flag state rights and responsibilities (relating to 
monitoring, control and surveillance) and enforcement. A major outcmne of that Consultation 
was Korea's acknowledgtnent that it was not necessary to reopen the Convention text. 
Another concen1 at the Consultation was the issue of overlap with other fisheries bodies 
on the boundaries of the WCPT Convention. Specifically these were the CCSBT (Convention 
for the Conservation of Southen1 Bluefin Tuna); the IA TTC (Inter-American Tropical Tuna 
Com1nission; and the IOTC (Indian Ocean Tuna Coinmission).84 The Consultation developed a 
set of reco1nmendations to address future co-operation with these bodies. The second reason 
given by Japan for its refusal to attend the Consultation was the denial by other negotiating 
states to allow the European Union me1nbership to the Prepcon process. With reservations, the 
1neeting assigt1ed the European Union 'special' observer status, which allowed it to sit at the 
table and participate fully in discussions. It was, however, denied membership of the Prepcon 
and could only accede to the Convention once it entered into force. More in1portantly, the 
European Union agreed not to reopen the text, denying Japan a powerful ally (Tarte 2002a: 4). 
During the Prepon 2 1neeting, China's head of delegation, Liu Xiabing, was elected as 
vice-Chair of the Prepcon (Tarte 2002a: 6). This was a new position and arguably reflects the 
potential power of China as a fishing state in the region. The tenns of reference for a third 
working group which would deal with monitoring, control and surveillance issues were drafted 
during the 1neeting. Consensus was not reached within the FFC on what country should host the 
new WCPT Co1n1nission, instead a vote culminated in the Federated States of Micronesia being 
selected. In all, nine FFC members had nominated for this prestigious honour, including Papua 
New Guinea, the host of Prepcon 2, and Tonga.85 Because of the division with the FFC 
1nen1bership, unity once again was put aside in favour of self-interest by several of the Oceanic 
states. Following Prepcon 2, the FFC 1neeting held on Pohnpei in the Federated States of 
Micronesia in May 2002 focused on forging a united membership ahead of what was expected 
to be "a crucial preparatory conference in the Philippines in November (Pacific Island Repo1i 
8.5.2002). Both Tonga and Papua New Guinea opposed the Federated States of Micronesia's 
bid. 
Other issues discussed at Prepcon 2 included the FFC' s request that, because of 
financial concerns, not more than two Co1n1nission 1neetings be scheduled each year. This 
84 
85 
For details see ,vww.ocean-affairs.com/PrepCon. 
The Federated States of Micronesia beat Papua New Guinea by nine votes to seven in a secret ballot of the 
FFA membership. Nine other Oceanic states had applied to host the Commission. They were: Fiji, Papua 
New Guinea, the Federated States of Micronesia, Tonga, the Cook Islands, Kiribati, Vanuatu, Samoa and 
the Marshall Islands (Pacific Islands Report 28.2.2002). 
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request received general support among the participants. In addition, the participation in the 
process by non-government organisations was also raised, as well as the "participation of 
territories in the decision making process of the Com1nission (Tarte 2002a: 7). This issue was 
not resolved. However, France, the United States and New Zealand agreed to consult inter-
sessionally to reach consensus.86 With the European Union being granted special observer 
status, the meeting was optiinistic that Japan would attend future n1eetings. 
Tarte (2002a: 13) argues that li1nited progress was made at Prepcon 2 on issues of 
importance to the region, such as the special requirements fund, the budget formula, the 
continued use of existing regional ( co1npliance) programs and the uncertainty of whether the 
Prepcon process "will take steps to recommend provisional total allowable catches in the 
convention area". This reflects the continued approach taken by the Asian fishing states to 
pursue a "slow and incremental approach to the work of the PrepCon" (Tarte 2002a: 13). As 
concluded by Tarte (2002a: 13), the real risks caused by the delay in 1naking key decisions 
could jeopardize "the status of the fish stocks and the benefits" of this Convention. 
The two Prepcon sessions reviewed in this thesis made incremental advances on the 
work achieved by the conclusion of MHLC7. The refusal by Japan to participate in the process 
has, ii1 so1ne ways, allowed for good progress to be achieved on the draft rules of procedure, 
studies on scientific needs and information fron1 other organisations, participation by territories 
and observers, such as the European Union, the headquarters of the new Commission, and 
general issues surrounding budget requirements and funding for the participation of developing 
states. Nevertheless, for the Prepcon process to move forward and for the WCPT Convention to 
gain recognition among fishing states, Japan needs to participate. By doing so, the United States 
Congress 1nay look 1nore favourably at ratification, as well as other Asian fishing states, such as 
Korea and China. That said, the more substantive and outstanding issues which await 
deliberation and decision by the Prepcon process, and later by the Commission, will test the 
unity and strength of the Oceanic states. 
Intractable measures, such as determining allocation in relation to total allowable catch 
were not resolved at the MHLC negotiations and will be left for either the Prepcon process or 
the Co1n1nission to resolve. Negotiations between fishing states over the issue of allocation will 
be a battle between those who will strenuously defend their access rights and the Oceanic states 
who will see it as an opportunity to ensure sustainability, achieve a fair retun1, increase the 
domestication of the tuna industry and with it, iinprove indigenous control. This is compounded 
by the financial burden of running the C01n1nission and its programs that will be bon1e, in large 
part, by fishing states. This may lead to the fishing states exerting pressure on those individual 
island states that are atte1npting to achieve the objectives of collective fisheries diplomacy at the 
Commission' s negotiating table, to force them to instead support those objectives that are more 
86 See v.,rw,v.ocean-affairs.com/PrepCon 
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favourable to the fishing states. There are also funding issues for the Oceanic states. As Taiie 
(2001 c: 23) notes, the island states "will be dependent on the good will of the n1ore powerful 
and wealthy nations and on assistance from related regional and inten1ational organizations". 
Aqorau (2002), Cordonnery (2002) and Jack (2001) are observers who believe that the 
WCPF Convention is a positive step. Aqorau (2002: 24-245) co1n1nents that the Convention 
provides the means of economic opportunity for the Oceanic states by: 
strengthening the way in which the tuna resource is managed and empowering them to 
harness the resource in ways that could enhance development of the resource. 
These three observers reflect legal perspectives on the Convention. Their positive observations 
1nust be balanced by the need for Asian fishing states' participation and the continued co-
ordination by the Oceanic states of conservation and management measures within EEZs (Jack 
2001: 4 7). In addition, the decision-n1aking process reflected major concessions to fishing states 
(Cordom1ery (2002: 12), and fishing states may use the WCPF Convention to erode the control 
exercised by the Oceanic states over the tuna resource (Aqorau 2002: 25). 
Looking instead at the political economy of Oceania's tuna resource, it is argued that 
the outco1nes of the MHLC negotiations, as illustrated above, reveal a decline in effectiveness in 
achieving the objectives of collective fisheries diplo1nacy. This decline appears to be a 
reflection of the story of collective diplomacy generally in Oceania. 
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Working within the security-centric agenda of World War II, Australia's Foreign Minister H.V. 
Evatt and New Zealand's Pri1ne Minister Peter Fraser were preoccupied with ensuring that the 
Oceanic region would co1nprise stable, pro-west developing colonies in the post-War 
environ1nent. As part of this preoccupation, the concept of a South Seas Commission was 
devised in 1944. The colonial powers of the United States, France, the United Kingdo1n, and the 
Netherlands succumbed to their persuasive arguments and the South Pacific Con1mission (SPC) 
was established in 194 7. While at that tin1e the SPC was governed by 1netropolitan powers who 
believed they had initiated the concept of Oceanic regional co-operation, there had been 
infonnal inter-island communications in the region's pre-colonial era. This was reflected in 
inter-island trading for such prized possessions as stone and shell money, inter-island marriages 
and 1nilitary alliances. In its pre-colonial fonn, a co-operative conservation ethic governed, for 
the n1ost part, the judicious extraction of land and sea resources, overseen by families, villages, 
or chiefly syste1ns. That co-operative philosophy was overwhelmed by the island region's 
integration within the global econo1ny during the colonial era, but re-e111erged within the 
apparatus of 111ore fonnal structures of regional co-operation, exe111plified specifically by 
collective diplomacy initiatives. 
Fro111 the late 1960s, the Oceanic states witnessed a re111arkable growth in collective 
diplo111acy and from the 1980s, of its subset, collective fisheries diplomacy. The starting point 
for this thesis was that the effectiveness of this collective diplo111acy is puzzling, given the 
prevalent belief that s111all, seemingly powerless states/inicrostates are weak in their relations 
with big, powerful states (see Keohane 1986). Furthermore, there was a decline in the 
effectiveness of collective dipl0111acy generally from the mid-1990s and from the late- l 990s for 
collective fisheries diplomacy in particular. This outcome is also puzzling: having strengthened 
its control over regional co-operative endeavours it 111ight be expected that the region would 
retain its control. These puzzles led to the central question governing this thesis. That is, why 
has the effectiveness of collective diplomacy undergone a rise when we would expect failure, 
and a decline when we would expect success? 
The years of cumulative success in regional co-operation originated as part of a desire 
for indigenous control of regional organisations, such as the SPC. It led to the establishment of 
the South Pacific Forun1 where leaders could discuss and make their own decisions about issues 
affecting the region. The region benefited from strong indigenous leadership in that first wave 
of decolonisation and this helped to strengthen regional cooperation. The fact that Australia and 
New Zealand were prepared to support regional initiatives was indicative of the Cold War 
environment and the fact that the initiatives would not negatively affect their own foreign policy 
priorities. They were encouraged in this attitude by the United States which perceived Australia 
and New Zealand as the region's gatekeepers. The major issue to cause controversy with the 
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United States during those Cold War years was the decision by the region, including Australia 
and New Zealand, to in1plement the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone (SPNFZ). 
Together with a range of other collective diplo1nacy initiatives the region de1nonstrated 
to the world its support of e1nerging international environ1nental norms. Again, these nonns 
were not new to the region but were connected to that pre-colonial conservation ethic over land 
and n1arine resources. The region ' s support of these norms has to be considered in the 
international political enviro1unent. I argue that during the Cold War era the successes in 
fisheries diplomacy were n1ainly as a result of Oceania's diplomatic cohesion and effectiveness. 
Until 1987, rather than displaying paten1alistic attitudes towards the Oceanic states, the United 
States did nothing to curtail the non-compliant behaviour of its fishing fleet in the region. The 
fleet's activities defied those conservation and manage1nent nonns laid down by the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UN CLOS) and upheld by the region. The bargaining 
trade-offs by fishing states were bilateral in nature and did not extend to all Oceanic states. The 
trade-offs may have te1npted those affected Oceanic states but it did not deter them from united 
action at the Foru1n Fisheries Agency (FFA), including the i1nple1nentation of various sub-
regional arrangements, input into the UNCLOS negotiations, and a united front at the 
Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and 
Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (Fish Stocks Agree1nent) negotiations. 
In relation to the prominence of conservation nonns as championed by Australia and 
New Zealand and reinforced by UNCLOS, I argue that the region acted alongside their efforts. 
They de1nonstrated their support for these norms by finalising a range of regional and 
inten1ational regiines designed to protect the environment, such as the Climate Change 
Convention, the Convention for the Protection of the National Resources and Environment of 
the South Pacific Region (SPREP Convention), the Convention on Conservation of Nature in 
the South Pacific (Apia Convention), the Convention for the Prohibition of Fishing with Long 
Driftnets in the South Pacific (Driftnet Fishing Convention), the UNCLOS and the Fish Stocks 
Agree1nent negotiations. Inten1ational nonns were influenced by actions of the Oceanic States, 
for exan1ple, the UNCLOS and the Fish Stocks Agree1nent. It should not be seen as 
inten1ational versus local because these inten1ational norms were already influenced by local 
nonns. It should be recalled, for example, that Palau was the first country in the world to 
conclude a nuclear-free zone constitution ( 1979). 
The above discussion has de1nonstrated how 1 understand the nse of collective 
diplon1acy generally. How do I understand its decline? Again, there are internal and external 
factors that have brought about a decline in the effectiveness of collective diplomacy. The end 
of the Cold War was one factor, together with the global and regional instability that became 
visible after its demise. Once the Cold War had ended, the primacy of the neo-liberal agenda 
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could be championed globally. This began with the World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) lauding the benefits of good goven1ance and linking the provision of funding to 
those concepts. As a result, donor states began exhorting these principles to their 'clients' as a 
condition of the provision of aid. The donor states realised that in Oceania, for example, the best 
way of delivering this 1nessage was to channel their funding through multilateral agencies, such 
as the Forum. This was considered a 1nuch easier 1nethod than through bilateral aid pro grains as 
it was then up to the regional organisation to pressure its 1nembership to follow these principles. 
Fro1n the mid-1990s Australia and other donors were more inclined to want results for 
their aid. This placed increased pressure on the Oceanic states to conform to donor de1nands. 
The elite were co-opted and therefore less assertive in their collective diplo1nacy against the 
donor com1nunity. If the decisions taken by the region's leaders (the elite) have not been 
discussed or i1nplen1ented with the general population's involvement, then effective regional 
co-operation has been compromised. Furthermore, if the general population is excluded from 
the reforn1 process ( except as a casualty), then the legitimacy of such a process is questionable. 
As Sutherland (2000: 459), cited in Chapter One notes, this reform process has been "driven 
primarily by exten1al forces, particularly donors". Fron1 the 1nid-1990s, regional co-operation 
generally has been in decline, as it was not inclusive of the populace and also because it was 
i1nposed on the region by external forces. For this reason, the absence of strong leadership has 
been a factor contributing to the decline of collective diplo1nacy. 
Does this story of the rise and decline in collective diplomacy differ fro1n the story of 
the rise and decline of collective fisheries diplomacy? Answered simply, not to any great extent. 
In light of the historical exainination of collective fisheries diplo1nacy in this thesis, 
how do we understand its rise and subsequent decline? First, to understand what caused the rise 
of collective fisheries dipl01nacy, we need to go back to the UNCLOS 111 negotiations and the 
paiiicipation of the independent Oceanic states. The UNCLOS 111 negotiations came about 
because of changing global nonns in ocean goven1ance. The active participation by developing 
coastal states defied the pressure of the 1naritime powers. This defiance was to be repeated even 
1nore strongly at the Fish Stocks negotiations, where strengthening environmental norms 
successfully challenged those fishing states wishing to retain the status quo regarding freedo1n 
to exploit high seas fisheries. 
The Oceanic states were not alienated by the concepts associated with environ1nental 
norms. Rather, these norms reflected the pre-colonial custo1ns and culture of the island 
c01nn1unities. The UNCLOS did eventually result in grudging acceptance on this issue by 
fishing states, except for the United States. It took the defiance of small states/microstates such 
as Kiribati and Vanuatu to bring about the rehabilitation of the United States fleet and with it, 
the acceptance of the UNCLOS regin1e. The finalisation of the Multilateral Fisheries Treaty 
stands apart as an outstanding exainple of the effectiveness of collective diplomacy cooperation. 
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The significance of that Treaty lies in the way that it provides the region with a tool by which it 
could measure the activities of other fishing states. It has been an outstanding factor in 
measuring the rise in effectiveness of collective fisheries diplomacy. This has been 
de1nonstrated in the decline of under-reporting and non-reporting by fishing states fron1 the 
early to 1nid-1990s (FFA 1999b). 
By the 1nid-1990s, the region had i1nplemented wide-ranging controls designed to 
protect the sustainability of the tuna resource, to facilitate a fair retun1 and to encourage 
develop1nent of the region's domestic tuna industry. These de1nonstrate the effectiveness of 
collective diplo1nacy. These measures were enhanced by the region's involvement at the Fish 
Stocks negotiations and the important leadership of Satya Nandan at those negotiations. 
Nandan's leadership resulted in the text of the Fish Stocks Agree1nent reflecting the concerns of 
the Oceanic states in relation to high seas fishing. 
It was not until the second half of 1999 that collective fisheries diplo1nacy displayed 
so1ne disturbing cracks. That this tun1ing point was later than that of collective diplo1nacy 
generally may be because until then the region's fisheries goals and aspirations were in line with 
those of its exten1al supporters. How do we understand the decline in the effectiveness of 
collective fisheries diplomacy? There were several inten1al and exten1al forces. For example, by 
sidelining individual Oceanic states at the MHLC process, fishing states could encourage the 
divisions within the PFC down PNA lines. Fishing states could also obstruct the negotiations. 
These forces were assisted by disunity, a loss of cohesion and poor leadership within the PFC 
bloc at the MHLC5 and the MMC6. Poor leadership by the PFC Chair c01npounded this 
disintegration of unity and cohesion at the MI1LC5 and the MHLC6, resulting in the draft 
negotiating text being watered down although, it must be conceded, it was still too strong for the 
wishes of son1e fishing states. Nevertheless, in the exainination of how we understand the rise of 
collective fisheries diplo1nacy, it is clear that the latter negotiating rounds demonstrate a decline 
of collective fisheries diplo1nacy. 
The thesis set out to answer the central question concerning the rise and decline in the 
effectiveness of collective dipl01nacy ai1ned at asserting control of fisheries conservation and 
1nanage1nent. It is concluded that the reasons behind how and why collective dipl01nacy rose 
and declined apply also to the rise and decline of collective fisheries diplomacy. As a major 
natural resource for the Oceanic region, the conservation and management of the tuna fishery 
represents the past, the present and the future. The region's ability to exercise control over this 
natural resource is dependent on unity and cohesion. Without a unified stance, it is demonstrated 
that the region's ability to exercise that control is diminished. As a collective force, these island 
states are capable of great achieven1ents in collective diplomacy and defy those who may 
dis111iss the power of see1ningly disparate, isolated small states/micro states in a 'sea of islands'. 
225 
APPENDIX A 
Oceanic state/ Coloniser Date History of Independence 
territory colonised 
American Samoa (a) Germany 1884 1899 
United States 1899 (Remains an unincorporated 
United States territory) 
Cook Islands United Kingdom 1888 1901 
New Zealand 1901 1965 
Federated States of Spain 1886 1898 
Micronesia Germany 1898 1919 
Japan 1919 1945 
United States 1945 1986 
(Entered into Compact of Free 
Association with the United States) 
Fiji United Kingdom 1874 1970 
French Polynesia France 1887 (Remains a French territory) 
Guam Spain 1565 1898 
United States 1898 (Remains an organised territory 
of the United States) 
Hawai'i United States 1898 1959 
(Became a United States state) 
Kiribati (a) United Kingdom 1892 1979 
Marshall Islands Spain 1885 1898 
Germany 1898 1919 
Japan 1919 1945 
United States 1945 1986 
(Entered into Compact of Free 
Association with the United States) 
Nauru Gennany 1886 1918 
Australia 1918 1968 
New Caledonia France 1853 (Remains a French Territory) 
Niue Germany 1899 
United Kingdom 1900 1901 
New Zealand 1901 1974 
(Entered into Compact of Free 
Association with New Zealand) 
Northern Mariana Islands Spain 1668 1899 
Germany 1899 1919 
Japan 1919 1945 
United States 1945 1978 
(Entered into a Commonwealth 
Covenant with the United States) 
(a) Between 1884 and 1899, American Samoa and Western Samoa was one country (Samoa) and 
under German colonial control. 
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Oceanic state/ Coloniser Date History of Independence 
territory colonised 
Palau Spain 1886 1899 
Germany 1899 1919 
Japan 1919 1945 
United States 1945 1994 
(Entered into Compact of Free 
Association with the United States) 
Papua New Guinea Germany (north) 1884 1914 
United Kingdom (south) 1884 1906 
Australia 1906/1914 1975 
Pitcairn Island United Kingdom 1838 (Remains a dependent territory) 
Samoa Germany 1884 1899 
(Split into W estem and American 
Sainoa) 
W estem Sainoa ( c) Germany 1899 1920 
New Zealand 1920 1962 
Solomon Islands United Kingdom 1883/1899 1978 
Tokelau United Kingdom 1892 1948 
New Zealand 1948 (Remains a dependent territory) 
Tonga Germany (Surrendered any claim in 1899) 
United Kingdom 1899 (b) 
Tuvalu (d) United Kingdom 1892 1978 
Vanuatu (e) United Kingdom and 1906 1980 
France (Established a 
condominium) 
Wallis & Futuna France 1842 (Remains a French territory) 
West Papua (f) Holland 1898 1963 
(Remains an Indonesian territory) 
(a) Formerly known as the Gilbert Islands. 
(b) A treaty of friendship was signed between Tonga and the United Kingdom in 1900, which gave the United 
Kingdom control over foreign affairs. Tonga was never a colony, "but its affairs, both internal and external, 
were extensively guided and influenced by Great Britain" (Kiste 1994: 27). 
( c) Now known as Samoa. 
(d) Formerly known as the Ellice Islands. 
(e) Fonnerly known as the New Hebrides. 
(f) Also known as West New Guinea and Irian Jaya. 
(Sources: Bennett (1994), Denoon (1997), Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade Pacific Island Country 
Briefs (1999, 2001), Fieldhouse (1965), Firth (1997), Hanlon, (1994), Hempenstall (1994), Henningham (1994), 
Hezel (1984, 1995), Hoadley (1992), Kent (1980), Kiste (1994), Peattie (1988), Thompson (1994), Van Dyke (1992). 
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APPENDIXB 
THREE MAIN COMMERCIAL TUNA EXTRACTION METHODS AND 
RELEVANT OCEANIC TUNA SPECIES 
Longline Fishing 
States engaged in longline fishing in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean (WCPO) include 
A1nerican Samoa, Australia, China, Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, French 
Polynesia, Indonesia, Japan, Kiribati, Republic of Korea (Korea), Marshall Islands, New 
Caledonia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Sainoa, Solomon Islands, Taiwan, 
Tonga, United States and Vanuatu. Fujinami (1987: 58) notes that longlining vessels came 
about through "technological advances in the late 1800s". Albacore, bigeye and yellowfin are 
targetted by the longline 111ethod (SPC 1998). 
Albacore is not a surface-swimming species. A worldwide drop in albacore pnces 
resulted in a "significant decline" of longline catches, particularly during the 1980s. The species 
has seen an increase in landings in the 1990s (Kearney 1989: 38). Bigeye is not normally a 
surface-swimmer, but its harvesting as bycatch is increasing because of the prevalence of deeper 
purse seine sets. While bigeye is considered under-exploited, little is known about the species to 
n1ake this assertion confidently (Kearney 1989: 38). As the price for albacore is lower than for 
either yellowfin or bigeye, it is destined for tuna canning. For exainple, the two cam1eries 
operating at Pago Pago in American Samoa need more than 30,000 tonnes of albacore per 
am1um (FFA 1998: 17). Canned albacore is prized particularly in the United States as 'white 
1neat' tuna (FFA 1998: 17).1 Yellowfin is targetted by both longline and purse seine 111ethods, as 
the more juvenile of the species are surface swi1111ners ( caught by purse seiners), the 111ore 
111ature of the species swimming at deeper depths ( caught by longliners ).2 Observers are 
cautious about increasing fishing limits for this species because of their longer life span and 
greater maximum size achieved. This "longer life and associated lower natural mortality" makes 
the111 vulnerable to over-fishing (Kean1ey 1989: 38). 
The use of satellite navigation allows longline vessels to locate fishing grounds with 
accuracy.3 These vessels are an expensive acquisition, costing approxi111ately US$1.3 111illion, 
pursuing "mid and deep-layer" tunas which are older than surface swimming tunas (FFA 1998: 
9). Longline gear: 
2 
3 
Yellowfin tuna and skipjack, considered inferior to albacore, are marketed as " light meat" tuna. 
Campbell and Nicholl (1994: 123) point out that juvenile yellowfm targetted by purse seining are around 
one year old and weigh approximately five kilograms. In comparison, adult yellowfin targetted by 
longlining are around twp-and-a-half years old and weigh approximately twenty-seven kilograms. 
Vessels also use "echo sounders for detecting fish beneath the surface, radar for detecting sea bird activity, 
sea water temperature sensors and radio direction finders used to locate buoy-mounted transmitters which 
mark the location of the end of a line-set" (Campbell and Nicholl 1994: 90). 
228 
Oceania's four commercially-important Tuna species 
Albacore (Thunnus alal-unga) Bigeye Tuna (Thunnus obesus) 
Yellowfin Tuna (Thunnus albacores) . 
Skipjack (Katsuwonus pelamis) 
Source: Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations, 1996. 
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consists of a mainline (which can be up to 130 km in length) to which branchlines ( or 
snoods) with baited hooks are attached. By attaching buoys to the mainline (usually 300-
350 m spacing) a series of catenaries (also known as 'baskets') are formed (Campbell and 
Nicholl 1994: 89). 
For example, a Japanese longliner of 52 gross registered tonnes (GRT) could set its gear 
between 100 and 120 km long, with around 2,000 branch-lines, each with baited hooks set down 
as deep as 300 metres. To set the longline can take up from 4 to 6 hours and hauling up the 
longline can take from 7 to 15 hours (FF A 1998: 9). Veitayaki (1995: 40) notes that the process 
is now mechanised, using "automatic hauling, baiting and shooting machines". The harvested 
tuna are either frozen on board or chilled on board awaiting airfreight to the fresh tuna market. 
Those chilled tuna "must be at market within ten days of being caught if quality is to be 
maintained" (Hunt 1998: 64). With the development, by Japan, of ultra-low temperature (ULT) 
operations in the 1960s, tuna can be frozen on board at -55° Celsius.4 ULT means that fishing 
boats can operate at sea for longer periods, transshipping their frozen catch either in port or onto 
mother ships (FF A 1998: 8). Once the frozen tuna have been airfreighted to Japan, they are kept 
in ULT cold stores. 5 Frozen or fresh tuna can be eaten raw. Alternatively, it "is cooked, salted, 
dried, as fish cake, and as fish 'ham" (Owen and Troedson 1994: 235). It is estimated that raw 
tuna comprises more than 80% of the Japanese market (Owen and Troedson 1994: 235).6 
The FF A notes that several states in the region have become interested in longlining for 
tuna (FFA 1998: 8). For example, the Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Papua New Guinea, 
French Polynesia, New Caledonia, Palau and the Solomon Islands. These states are interested 
because this: 
technique is able to target large ( over 25 kg) high-value tunas, especially bigeye (the most 
tropical tuna species) and yellowfm (the second most valuable) which can be exported in 
fresh chilled form for sale as sashimi on, principally, Japanese markets ((FFA 1998: 8).7 
Airfreighting of chilled yellowfin and bigeye tuna comprises approximately 23 % of the 
Japanese market, with ULT frozen yellowfin and bigeye accounting for the balance (FF A 1998: 
16). Crews for longline vessels originate from China, Indonesia or the Philippines. On 
occasions, Fijian or ni-Vanuatu crew is employed (FFA 1998: 43). 
The longlining fishing industry is being monitored critically because it allows 
indiscriminate bycatch of, in particular, seabirds such as the albatross. While other fishing 
methods, such as trawling and recreational fishing can also attract the albatross, the albatross 
This ULT method ensures that the frozen tuna maintain both texture and colour, making it acceptable as a 
sashimi grade product in Japan (FFA 1998: 34 ). 
According to Cozens, there is a six-month shelflife for frozen tuna (Interview, 19.10.2000). Peter Cozens, 
Strategic Studies Centre, University of Victoria at Wellington. 
Raw tuna is eaten as sashimi or sushi. "Sashimi refers to slices ofraw tuna served with shredded Japanese 
radish (duikon) , a small amount of green paste (wasabi) made from horseradish, and soy sauce (shoy u) . 
Sushi is served in bit-sized snacks consisting of sliced tuna served on or in small rice-balls (sushi-meshi), 
seasoned with vinegar, salt and sugar" (Owen and Troedson 1994:235). 
While Japan is the principal buyer of sashimi-grade tuna, emerging markets are gaining an increasing share 
of the sashimi trade. These include Hawai ' i, the United States West Coast, Sydney (Australia) and Asian 
buyers, particularly Korea (FFA 1998: 8). 
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follow the longline vessels, ready to swoop down to the bait on the branch lines, as they are 
being set.8 Bergin (1997: 65) esti1nates that some albatross populations have dropped by as 
much as ninety percent. Gear 111odification is mandatory for longline vessels fishing in 
Australian waters.9 Japan and Taiwan have also introduced gear and operational modifications 
aimed at eliminating bird bycatch (Bergin 1997: 65). 
Purse seine fishing 
States engaged in this method of fishing in the WCPO include Australia, the FSM, Indonesia, 
Japan, Kiribati, Korea, Mexico, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, Russia, the 
Solomon Islands, Taiwan, the Unit~d States and Vanuatu (SPC 1998). According to FFA (1998: 
88) statistics, around 75% of the global purse seine fleet is either owned or controlled by 
corporations in eight countries: France, Spain, Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, Mexico, Venezuela 
and the United States. All but one of these purse seine fleets operates in the WCPO. Tuna purse 
seining, the invention of United States West Coast fishennen early last century, targets surface 
swi1n1ning tuna, such as skipjack and juvenile yellowfm (Douhnan 1987c: 134).10 
Skipjack are known to travel thousands of kilo1netres during their short life and are 
prolific reproducers. They start spawning after turning one, with a 1nature fe1nale capable of 
producing "between 1 and 3 million eggs in a year" (Kuk 1994:29). The skipjack are "indicative 
of a resource capable of sustaining tre1nendous catches" far more than their current levels of 
exploitation (Kean1ey 1989: 38). The breakdown, generally, of the purse seine catch is that 
skipjack co1nprises 70% of the haul and juvenile yellowfin the re1nainder. Cmnpbell and Nicholl 
note that there is also a s1nall bycatch of juvenile bigeye with the purse seine method (1994: 53 , 
see also Kean1ey 1989: 38). Purse seine tuna harvested in the WCPO account for approximately 
half of the global canned tuna industry, thus making the global canned tuna 1narket dependent 
upon the region's supply. The 1najor cmu1eries are located in American Samoa and Thailand 
(Hunt 1998). Other cmu1eries located in the Philippines, Indonesia, Puerto Rico and Fiji are 
alten1ative destinations_ I I 
Purse seiners can utilise helicopters, from which spotters determine the composition, or 
aggregation of the tuna school. The United States fleet, which is comprised of fmnily, or 
individual operations, uses helicopters, as does the Korean purse seine fleet. On the other hand, 
by using lookouts, Japanese vessels operate as a group and exchange information as to the 
8 
9 
IO 
11 
" ... bigger birds such as albatross, may take the whole bait into their beak and some swallow bait, get 
hooked in gullet and drown as the line sinks ... [SJ smaller birds, such as petrels and shearwaters, may take 
only part of the bait and fly away, but these birds also get hooked on longlines" (Bergin 1997: 65). 
Bergin (1997: 70) highlights Australia's active role in eliminating bird bycatch. Australia is also committed 
to measures to eliminate bird bycatch in the southern bluefin tuna industry (CCSBT: the Commission for 
the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna). 
Doulman (1987: 134) writes that the first United States tuna purse seiner "was commissioned by the Van 
Camp fishing and canning corporation in 1916" . 
There is also the cannery at Noro in the Solomon Islands, which until recently was a joint venture operation 
founded in 1973 between the Solomon Islands government and Taiyo Fishery Company (previously known 
as Solomon Taiyo, and now known as Soltai) (Hughes 1987). 
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location of fishing grounds (Doulman 1987d: 144). Because of the ti111e (and money) taken to 
search for fish aggregations, accurate infonnation is essential to establish whether the fish are 
large enough to warrant the cost of 111aking a set. This "involves placing a net around a school of 
fish and closing the net at the base" (Veitayaki 1995: 41 ). 12 As Veitayaki ( 1995: 41) notes, it is 
an effective 111ethod of catching tuna because: 
Once a school of fish is detected, one end of the seine is taken by a small boat which will 
move away from the vessel in such a direction that the school is encircles. The vessel, on 
receiving the end of the seine from the s1nall boat, winches in the wire cable, closing the 
bottom on the seine and forming a bag-like fence around the fish. The other lines are then 
winched in, reducing the area inside the net. The netted area is continually reduced to a 
minimum before the net is brought alongside the vessels and hauled aboard. 
There is also a need to consider the wear and tear on the gear and nets before 111aking a decision 
to make a set (Cainpbell and Nicholl 1994: 64, 65). 
The cost of the nets used in the purse seine industry can cost US$600,000, with the 
vessels the111selves costing as 111uch as US$18 111illion new and as much as US$9 111illion for a 
vessel which may be up to 15 years old (FFA 1998: 8). Crew costs are considered the 111ajor 
outlay for any of the purse seine fleets. It is difficult to find experienced crew. 13 Purse seine 
crews originate fro111 China, Indonesia, the Oceanic islands and the Philippines. These crews 
generally undertake the unskilled jobs on board such as deck work. The skilled officer positions 
are filled by increasingly hard-to-find experienced nationals. 14 Purse seiners operating in the 
WCPO average in size between 200-300 GRT. Most purse seiners operating globally today are 
classified as "super seiners" given their ability for in excess of 400 tom1es to be kept in the 
vessel's refrigerated hold (FFA 1998: 88). 15 
Given the deeper depths at which longliners operate, the tuna are of greater 111aturity 
than those caught by purse seiners. Hence, the econo111ic value of yellowfin caught by longliners 
is 2.6 ti111es greater than that caught by the purse seine 111ethod, with observers noting that 
harvesting of yellowfin in the WCPO is at sustainable levels (Cartwright 1999: 3). Skipjack 
stocks are considered abundant in the WCPO. 16 Fr0111 statistical analysis, it is clear that juvenile 
yellowfin can bring higher prices than skipjack. This 111akes an incentive for captains to search 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
Campbell and Nicholl (1994: 64) note two types of tuna schools. The first are the eastern Pacific tuna, 
which are found " in association with dolphins. This differs from tuna in the central and western Pacific, 
which are found around "floating objects such as logs" . No rationale yet exists as to why tuna from the two 
regions differ. 
Purse seine fishing is considered the four ' d' s: "dirty, dangerous, difficult, and distant (i.e. far from home) 
(FFA 1998: 115). 
Veitayaki (1995: 59) discusses a phantom purse seine crew: 'The crew is mixed with an Italian captain, a 
Korean engineer, Portuguese chief mate and cook and other deck hands from Micronesia and Philippines. 
The crew are paid between US$2-3 per tonne while the engineer and captain are paid US$35 and US$50 
per tonne respectively. If there is no catch for 45 days the crew are paid at the rate of US$14 a day. The 
captain, who flies home to San Diego once he brings the ship into port, often earns US$25,000 per trip". 
Most vessels can spend between 30 to 140 days at sea (Campbell and Nicholl 1994: 54). 
The Tuna & Billfish Assessment Programme at the Secretariat of the Pacific Community has had a tagging 
program for tuna in operation for many years (Herr 1990: 76). 
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for aggregations with greater levels of juvenile yellowfin, rather than skipjack (Campbell and 
Nicholl 1994: 65). 
Pole and line fishing 
States engaged in pole and line fishing in the WCPO include Australia, Fiji, French Polynesia, 
Indonesia, Japan, Kiribati, New Caledonia, New Zealand, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Solo1non 
Islands, Tuvalu and the United States. This method of fishing falls between artisanal operations 
and the co1nmercial purse seine industry, the 1nethod involving: 
the use of bamboo poles and unbaited barb less hooks and live baits. Tuna from a sighted 
school or a FAD are attracted by the release of live bait and the spraying of water on the 
surface and are caught by hooks suspended from the poles by the fishers when the fish are 
in a feeding frenzy. The method requires refined skills as it requires thrusting the fish on 
board (regardless of size), unhooking and returning the hook to the water in a single 
motion. In addition, the whole activity is done at great speed because the fish must be 
caught in the brief mmnents of their frenzy, before they swim away (Veitayaki 1995: 38). 
Pole and line fishing teclu1iques target the same surface swiinming fish as purse seiners, that is, 
juvenile yellowfin and skipjack. This fishing 1nethod is a more expensive and labour-intensive 
operation than purse seine fishing, although the fish caught are of superior quality and co1nmand 
a higher price than do fish caught in purse seine nets (Togolo 1987: 56). A pole and line vessel 
costs around US$2 1nillion and it seems there is no growth in this industry (AIDAB 1994). This 
concurs with Bergin' s (1993: 4) estimate that the pole and line harvest has declined "fro1n 18 
percent of the esti1nated catch in 1989 to around 9 per cent of the estimated catch in 1991 ". 
Taya (1995: 51) outlines the drop in Japanese distant water pole and line operations as having 
declined by 56% fro1n 1980 to 1993, "due to its failure to compete with the 1nore efficient tuna 
purse seine fishing". 
Japan is the only distant water fishing state engaged in pole and line activities in the 
WCPO, with 80 fishing vessels operating mainly in Micronesia and Kiribati. 17 Because pole and 
line and purse seine operation methods target surface swimming tuna, Japan has been careful to 
separate the fishing locations used by its pole and line and purse seine fleets , (Kuk 1994: 28). 
According . to Waugh (1985: 13 , 28), this 1nethod of fishing has always been contentious 
because it requires live baitfish, which is also used by the islanders for their subsistence 
fishing. 18 Not all Oceanic states have abundant stocks of baitfish in their waters (Waugh 1986: 
13 , 28). 
17 
18 
United States pole and line operators have a few vessels around Hawaii, wh ich falls within the WCPO 
region. Thus, these vessels are considered local (Hampton email communicati on 22.02.0 1). 
Baitfish is harvested in lagoon areas (Herr 1990: 127). Live baitfish is required fo r pole and line fishing. 
Oceanic states with "robust baitfish stocks" are "Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, and to a lesser 
extent Fij i and Hawaii" (Doulman and Kearney 1987: 13 ). 
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APPENDIXC 
LIST OF REGIONAL AND SUB-REGIONAL INSTRUMENTS 
South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency Convention (1979) 
The adoption by the South Pacific Foru1n of the Convention in 1979 formally established the 
South Pacific Foru1n Fisheries Agency (FF A). The Convention is the legal instrument which 
controls the activities of the FF A. Its membership co1nprises the 16 n1e1nbers of the Pacific 
Islands Foru1n. 
The Nauru Agreement Concerning Co-operation in the Management of Fisheries of Common 
Interest, 1982 ( otherwise known as the Parties to the Nauru Agree1nent, or the PNA Group) 
The PNA Group is co1nprised of those skipjack tuna-rich states of Micronesia and Melanesia. 
The tuna is harvested by purse-seiners and destined for the canned tuna 1narket. These states 
include the Federated States of Micronesia, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Papua New 
Guinea, Tuvalu and the Solomon Islands. 
An Arrangement Implementing the Nauru Agreement Setting Forth Minimum Terms and 
Conditions of Access to the Fisheries Zones of the Parties (1982) 
This First Imple1nenting Arrangen1ent established the Regional Register of foreign fishing 
vessels which is 1naintained by the FF A. The Register requires a recent photograph of the 
vessel, with its call sign and name clearly displayed. The database includes infonnation about 
vessel owners, operators and masters. Vessels can be struck off the register for violations, thus 
losing its 'good standing' in the region. The Register also de1nands Flag State co1npliance. 
Second Arrangement Implementing the Nauru Agreement Setting Forth Additional Terms and 
Conditions of Access to the Fisheries Zones of the Parties (1990) 
The Second Implen1enting Arrangement included additional harmonised 1nini1num terms and 
conditions of fishing vessel access. These included a prohibition of transshipment at sea; and an 
obligation by vessel operators to pay travel costs, provide accommodation and provide full 
insurance for observers. The Arrangement also foreshadowed the provision of the Vessel 
Monitoring Systen1 (VMS). The FF A has applied these two Implementing Arrangements as 
Mini1nu1n Tem1s and Conditions (MTC) for use in negotiations between its members and 
fishing states. 
Treaty on Fisheries Between the Governments of Certain Pacific Island States and the 
Government of the United States of America (198 7) (Multilateral Fisheries Treaty) 
Ten negotiating rounds to conclude the Multilateral Fisheries Treaty took place between 1984-
1987. Its conclusion heralded acceptance by the United States of the sovereign rights of the 
region ' s coastal states to manage highly migratory fish stocks such as tuna. The FF A 
membership de1nanded United States agree1nent on the Regional Register, closed and li1nited 
areas, catch repo1iing and licensing fees. 
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Convention for the Prohibition of Fishing with Long Driftnets zn the South Pacific Region 
(1991) (Driftnet Fishing Convention) 
Finalised after a concerted regional cainpaign to halt the use by Japan, Taiwan and the Republic 
of Korea of driftnets of up to fifty kilometres in length and ten metres deep, which were being 
used increasingly in the region since the late 1980s. The campaign was taken to the United 
Nations and supported by the United States. It resulted in a United Nations Resolution which 
called for a 1noratorium on high seas driftnet fishing. 
Palau Arrangement for the Management of the Western Pacific Purse Seine Fishery (1992) 
(Palau Arrangement) 
Because of over-fishing concerns regarding yellowfin and bigeye tuna harvesting, the PNA 
Group sought to cap the number of purse seine vessels ( currently 205) fishing these stocks in 
the EEZ of PNA 1nembers. A Review of the Palau Arrange1nent was undertaken in 2000. The 
Review stressed the need to decrease the levels of fishing activity to sustain the stocks and to 
revise the Arrange1nent' s manage1nent of the industry to effect an increase in inco1nes for the 
PNA Group (see Geen 2000). 
Niue Treaty on Co-operation in Fisheries Surveillance and Law Enforcement in the Pacific 
Region (1993) (The Niue Treaty) 
The Niue Treaty was finalised in an effort to enhance control over fishing fleets in the region. 
Bilateral or subsidiary agree1nents will contain specific clauses on how to facilitate cross-border 
surveillance and enforcement. 
Agreed Minute on Surveillance and Enforcement (1994) 
Signed between the FF A and the United States, the Minute outlines co-operation in fisheries 
monitoring, compliance and surveillance in the region. It is linked to the Lacey Act in the United 
States. The Lacey Act allows the United States to arrest and prosecute vessels entering one of its 
ports to discharge fish caught illegally in the region. The Regional Register is used as evidence. 
Federated States of Micronesia Arrangement for Regional Fisheries Access (1995) (FSM 
Arrange1nent) 
The FSM Arrangement encourages fishing state vessel owners to base their operations within 
the region by offering a discounted access fee. Access for these domestic-based operations are 
on terms no less favourable than those operating under either bilateral or multilateral 
arrangements. 
Convention for the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the 
Western and Central Pacific (finalised in September 2000, but has not yet entered into force) 
(WCPF Convention) 
In accordance with the UNCLOS and the Fish Stocks Agreement, the WCPF Convention 
co1nprises a co-operative arrangement between fishing and coastal states to conserve and 
manage tuna stocks in the W estem and Central Pacific Ocean. 
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